dismissed EB-3 Case: Fashion Design

U.S. Citizenship 
. and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF N-M- CORP. 
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAR. 30,2018 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, a clothing manufacturer, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as an assistant designer. It 
requests classification of the Beneficiary as a skilled worker under the third preference immigrant 
classification. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(3)(A)(i). This employment-based immigrant classification allows a U.S. employer to 
sponsor a foreign national for lawful permanent resident status to work in a position that requires at 
least two years of training or experience. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center initially approved the petition. Subsequently, the Director 
revoked the approval of the petition, concluding that the record did not establish that the Beneficiary 
possessed the experience required by the labor certification as of the priority date. The Director 
noted unresolved inconsistencies regarding the Beneficiary's prior work experience in the record and 
on her prior nonimmigrant visa application. In addition, the Director invalidated the labor 
certification, concluding that the Beneficiary misrepresented her experience. The Director also 
determined that the Petitioner did not establish that it had the continuing ability to pay the wages of 
all of its Form I -140 beneficiaries. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary's representations on her nonimmigrant visa 
were not willfully falsely made because the application was prepared by someone on her behalf; and 
that it has established its ability to pay because it has been paying the protlered wage to the 
Beneficiary. Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
l. LAW 
A. The Employment-Based Immigration Process 
Employment-based immigration generally follows a three-step process. First, an employer obtains 
an approved labor certification from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). 1 See section 
1 The priority date of a petition is the date the DOL accepted the labor certification for processing, which in this case is 
February II, 2005. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The current DOL regulations concerning labor certifications went into 
effect on March 28, 2005. The new regulations are referred to by the DOL by the acronym PERM, for Program 
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lvfarter ofN-lvf- Corp. 
212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). By approving the labor certification, the DOL 
certifies that there are insufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available for the 
offered position and that employing a foreign national in the position will not adversely affect the wages 
and \Vorking conditions of domestic workers similarly employed. See section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II) of 
the Act. Second , the employer tiles an immigrant visa petition with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). See section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154. Third, if USCIS 
approves the petition , the foreign national applies for an immigrant visa abroad or, if eligible , 
adjustment of status in the United States. See section 245 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
B. Revocation of a Petition's Approval 
After granting a petition , USCIS may revoke the petition's approval "at any time" for '·good and 
sufficient cause." Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155. If supported by the record, a director's 
realization that a petition was erroneously approved may justify revocation. Maller qf Ho, 19 I&N 
Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988). 
Good and sufficient cause exists to issue a notice of intent to revoke (NOIR) where the record at the 
time of the notice's issuance, if unexplained or unrebutted, would have \Varranted the petition ' s 
denial. Jvfatter (?f Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450, 451 (BIA 1987). Similarly, revocation is proper if the 
record at the time of the decision, including any explanation or rebuttal evidence provided by a 
petitioner. \Varranted a petition's denial. /d. at 452. 
IT. THE BENEFICIARY'S EXPERIENCE 
The Director revoked the petition's approval, in part, because the Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary possessed the experience required by the labor certification as of the priority date . A 
beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set torth on the labor 
certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.2(b)(l), (12); Matter of Wing ·s Tea 
House, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'! Comm'r 1977). 
In this case, the labor cet1ification requires 24 months of experience as an assistant designer. 
Regarding the experience requirement, the labor certification states that the Beneficiary qualifies for 
the offered position based on experience as a full-time assistant designer with the 
collection in South Korea , from February 1992 to May 1994. Evidence relating to qualifying 
experience must be in the form of a letter from a current or former employer and must include the 
name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the 
beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3). 
Electronic Review Management. See 69 Fed. Reg. 77325, 77326 (Dec . 27, 2004). The PERM regulation was effective 
as of March 28, 2005. and applies to labor certification applications filed on or after that date . However , the labor 
certification application in this case was filed prior to March 28, 2005. and is governed by the prior regulations. 
2 
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Matter (~fN-A1- Corp. 
With the petition, the Petitioner submitted a certificate of career dated December 7, 2004, attesting to 
the Beneficiary's experience as an assistant designer with the Collection in South 
Korea, from February 1, 1992, to May 31, 1994. In his first NOIR in 2014, the Director noted that 
the certificate of career did not list the Beneficiary's job duties as required by regulation. The 
Director also noted that the job description provided on the labor certification tor the Beneficiary's 
job with the Collection was identical to the job duties listed for the offered position on 
the labor certification , which casts doubt on the veracity of the Beneficiary's claimed employment. 
The Director indicated that the Petitioner must resolve any inconsistencies with independent , 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. at 591-592. 
In response to the first NOTR, the Petitioner provided a letter dated April 22, 2014, from the fonner 
owner of the Collection attesting to the Beneficiary's experience as an assistant designer 
from February I, 1992, to May 31. 1994; and a tax certificate stating that the Collection 
closed on December 31, 1995. In his second NOIR in 2017, the Director noted that the job 
description provided on the 2014 letter from the former owner of the Collection was 
identical to the job duties listed for the offered position on the labor certification. See id. The 
Director also noted that although the Collection closed in 1995, the 2004 certificate of 
career submitted with the petition does not mention that the business had closed. See id. 
The Director also indicated that the information provided on the Beneficiary's J-2 nonimmigrant 
visa application submitted in 2006 cont1icts with the information provided on the labor certification 
in this case. The Beneficiary indicated on the nonimmigrant visa application that she was a 
housewife. She also indicated that she had no previous employers and had no specialized skills or 
training. She signed the application on June 21, 2006, thereby certifying that its contents were 
correct and that any false or misleading statement may result in the permanent refusal of a visa or 
denial of entry in the United States. In his second NOIR, the Director stated that the Petitioner must 
resolve these inconsistencies with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Jd. The second NOIR requested copies of paystubs, payroll records, personnel records, tax 
documents, and/or affidavits from non-parties to this case relating to the Beneficiary's prior work 
expenence. 
In response to the second NOIR , the Petitioner submitted an affidavit from the Beneficiary. In her 
affidavit, the Beneficiary asserted that her nonimmigrant visa form was prepared and submitted by a 
travel agency, and that she signed the fonn "without explanation or translation of the contents of the 
form." 
In his notice of revocation (NOR), the Director stated that the Beneficiary's affidavit was not 
properly translated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.2(b)(3). He further stated that the Beneficiary's 
nonimmigrant visa tonn indicates that it was prepared by the Beneficiary's spouse, and not a travel 
agency, as claimed in her affidavit. Even if a travel agency had prepared her tonns, she would be 
responsible for the content and accuracy of the information contained therein. He further noted that the 
nonimmigrant visa forms are dual language forms, in English and Korean, and that the Beneficiary 
signed the fom1s certifYing that she understood the information listed on the forms and that the 
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Matter ofN-Af- Corp. 
information was true and correct. He indicated that the Petitioner's response to the second NOIR 
contained none of the requested supplemental)' documentation of the Beneficiary's prior employment. 
Although the Petitioner's counsel asserted that such documents are not available, the assertions of 
counsel do not constitute evidence. .Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 (BIA 1988) 
(citing A1atter qf Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980)). 
Thus, the Director determined that the Petitioner had not established that the Beneficiary had the 
required two years of experience as an assistant designer. He further determined that the Beneficiary 
willfully misrepresented her employment with the Collection and, therefore, he entered 
a finding of misrepresentation against the Beneficiary and invalidated the labor certification. 
On appeal, the Petitioner provides no additional evidence of the Beneficiary's experience and asserts 
that the Beneficiary's representations on her nonimmigrant visa application were not willfully falsely 
made because the application was prepared by someone on her behalf. However, as discussed 
above, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the employment history claimed on the labor 
certification is correct. We agree with the Director's determination that the evidence submitted to 
the record regarding the Beneficiary's prior \Vork experience is not credible. 2 The Petitioner has not 
resolved the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the record with independent, objective evidence, 
such as the evidence requested by the Director in the second NOIR (i.e., paystubs, payroll records, 
personnel records, tax documents, and/or affidavits from non-parties to this case relating to the 
Beneficiary's prior work experience). Thus, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary 
possessed the experience required by the labor certification as of the priority date. We therefore 
affirm the Director's determination that the Beneficiary did not have the required two years of 
experience as an assistant designer. 
III. WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF A MATERIAL FACT 
AND INVALIDATION OF LABOR CERTIFICATION 
The Director also found that the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented her employment with the 
Collection on the labor certification, and as such invalidated the labor certification. 
users may invalidate a labor certification after its issuance upon a determination of "fraud or 
willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the labor certification application." 20 C.F.R. 
§ 656.30(d). 3 
1 The Petitioner must support assertions with relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 
I&N Dec. 369,376 (AAO 2010). 
3 The pre-PERM regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) provides, in part: 
(d) After issuance labor certifications are subject to invalidation by the INS or by a Consul of the 
Department of State upon a determination, made in accordance with those agencies, procedures or by a 
Court. of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the labor certification 
application. 
4 
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Matter ofN-Af- Corp. 
A material issue in this case is whether the Beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of the 
proffered position. A misrepresentation made in connection with an application for a visa or other 
document, or with entry into the United States, is material if either: (1) the beneficiary is excludable 
on the true facts, or (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to 
the beneficiary's eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be 
excluded. A1atter of S & B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 447 (A. G. 1961). Accordingly, the materiality test 
has three parts. First, if the record shows that the beneficiary is inadmissible on the true facts, then 
the misrepresentation is material. !d. at 448. If the beneficiary \Vould not be inadmissible on the 
true facts, then the second and third questions must be addressed. The second question is whether 
the misrepresentation shut off a line of inquiry relevant to the beneficiary's admissibility. !d. Third, 
if the relevant line of inquiry has been cut off: then it must be determined whether the inquiry might 
have resulted in a proper determination that the beneficiary should have been excluded. !d. at 449. 
As discussed above, in light of the contradictory information presented and lack of corroborating 
documentation, we agree that the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented her experience with the 
Collection on the labor certification. The listing of such experience misrepresented the 
Beneficiary's actual qualifications in a willful effort to procure a benefit ultimately leading to 
permanent residence under the Act. See Kun&'YS v. US, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). Here, the listing of 
false experience is a \Villful misrepresentation of the Beneficiary's qualifications that adversely 
impacted DOL's adjudication of the ETA 750 and USCIS's immigrant petition analysis. We 
therefore affirm the Director's finding that the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented a material fact 
on the labor certification. Due to the Beneficiary's 4 willful misrepresentation of a material fact 
involving the labor certification application, we also affirm the Director's invalidation of the labor 
certification. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.3l(d). 
IV. ABILITY TO PAY THE PROFFERED WAGE 
The Director revoked the petition's approval, in part, because the Petitioner did not establish that it 
had the continuing ability to pay the \Vages of all of its Form 1-140 beneficiaries. The proffered 
wage in this case is $9.09 per hour ($18,907.20 per year based on a 40-hour work week). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petitiOn filed by or for an 
employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be 
accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability 
to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the 
priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful 
4 
Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(6)(C)(i), states that "[a]ny alien, who by fraud or willfully 
misrepresenting a material fact. seeks (or has sought to procure, or who has procured) a visa, other documentation. or 
admission to the United States or other benefit provided under the Act is inadmissible." 
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Matter ofN-M- Corp. 
permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of 
annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
In determining a petitioner's ability to pay, we first examine whether it paid a beneficiary the full 
proffered \Vage each year from a petition's priority date. If a petitioner did not pay a beneficiary the 
full proffered wage, we next examine whether it had sufficient annual amounts of net income or net 
current assets to pay the difference between the proffered wage and the wages paid, if any. If a 
petitioner's net income or net current assets are insufficient, we may also consider other evidence of 
its ability to pay the proffered wage. 5 
In this case, the Petitioner did not establish that it paid the Beneficiary any \vages in 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2008. Therefore, it must demonstrate its ability to pay the full proffered wage in those 
years. 
The Petitioner submitted copies of IRS Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, and paychecks 
demonstrating that it employed the Beneficiary in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
and 2017. The Forms W-2 and paychecks reflect that the Petitioner paid the Beneficiary as fol!O\vs: 
• $14,960 in 2009; 
• $20,240 in 201 0; 
• $21,120in2011; 
• $21,120 in 2012; 
• $18,480 in 2013; 
• $18,492 in 2014; 
• $24,524 in 2015; 
• $25,344 in 2016: and 
• $8,448.00 in 2017. 6 
The Petitioner paid the Beneficiary more than the proffered wage in 2010, 201 I, 2012, 2015, and 
2016. However, the amounts on the Forms W-2 and paychecks do not equal or exceed the annual 
proffered wage of $18,907.20 in 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2017. The record therefore does not 
establish the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage based on the wages it paid to the 
Beneficiary. But we credit the Petitioner's payments to the Beneficiary. The Petitioner must 
demonstrate its ability to pay the difference between the annual proffered wage and the amounts it 
paid to the Beneficiary in 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2017, which is $3,947.20, $427.20. $415.20. and 
$10,459.20, respectively. 
5 Federal courts have upheld our method of determining a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. See. e.g.. River St. 
Donuts. LLC v. JVapolitano, 558 F.3d Ill, 118 (I st Cir. 2009); Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., Ltd. v. F efdman, 736 F.2d 
1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Estrada-Hernandez v. Holder,-- F. Supp. 3d--, 2015 WL 3634497, *5 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Ri::vi 
v. Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 37 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883-84 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd, --Fed. Appx. --, 2015 WL 57! 1445. * 1 
(5th Cir. Sept. 30, 20 15). 
6 The Petitioner provided paychecks through April 28, 2017. 
Afatter ofN-lvf- Corp. 
The Petitioner's federal tax returns state net income 7 amounts as follows: 
• $70,815 in 2005; 
• $88,573 in 2006; 
• $107,193 in 2007; 
• $109,486 in 2008; 
• $107,819 in 2009; and 
• $46,174 in 2013. 
The Petitioner did not provide regulatory-prescribed evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage 
in 2014,2015,2016, and 2017. See 8 C.F.R. §204.5(g)(2). Therefore, it has not established its 
ability to pay the proffered wage in those years. For the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, the 
Petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage; and for the years 2009 and 2013, the 
Petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the difference between the proffered w·age and the 
amounts it paid to the Beneficiary. 
However, where a petitioner has filed Form I-140 pet1t10ns for multiple beneficiaries, it must 
demonstrate that its job offer to each beneficiary is realistic, and that it has the ability to pay the 
protlered wage to each beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2); see also Patel v. Johnson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 
108, 124 (D. Mass. 2014) (upholding our denial of a petition where a petitioner did not demonstrate its 
ability to pay multiple beneficiaries). USCIS records shmv that the Petitioner has filed over 100 Form 
I -140 petitions for other beneficiaries since 2001. Thus, the Petitioner must establish its ability to pay 
this Beneficiary as well as the beneficiaries of the other Form I -140 petitions that were pending or filed 
after the priority date of the current petition. 8 We do not consider the other beneficiaries for any year 
that the Petitioner has paid the Beneficiary a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, 
which in this case is 2010,2011,2012,2015, and 2016. 
The Petitioner must document the receipt numbers, names of beneficiaries, pnonty dates, and 
proffered wages of these other petitions, and indicate the status of each petition and the date of any 
status change (i.e., pending, approved, withdrawn, revoked, denied, on appeal or motion, beneficiary 
obtained lawful permanent residence). To offset the total wage burden, the Petitioner may submit 
7 Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure 
for ordinary income. shown on line 21 of page I of a petitioner's IRS Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Retum for an S 
Corporation. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions, or other adjustments from sources other 
than a trade or business, net income is found on line 18 of Schedule K to Fonn 1120S. See Internal Revenue Serv .. 
Instructions to Form I 120S. 22. at https://www. irs.govipub/irs-pdf,ij 1120s.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 20 18). 
8 
The Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of one of the other I-140 beneficiaries is not considered: 
• After the other beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence; 
• If an 1-140 petition filed on behalf of the other beneficiary has been withdrawn, revoked, or denied without a 
pending appeal or motion; or 
• Before the priority· date of the 1-140 petition filed on behalf of the other beneficiary. 
Matter ojN-Af- Cmp. 
documentation showing that it paid wages to other beneficiaries. To demonstrate that it has the 
ability to pay the Beneficiary and the other beneficiaries, the Petitioner must, for each year at issue 
(a) calculate any shortfall between the proffered wages and any actual wages paid to the primary 
Beneficiary and its other beneficiaries, (b) add these amounts together to calculate the total wage 
deficiency, and (c) demonstrate that its net income or net current assets exceed the total wage 
deficiency. 9 Without this information, we cannot determine the Petitioner's ability to pay the combined 
proffered wages of all of its applicable beneficiaries. 
In response to the Director's request for evidence in 2008, the Petitioner submitted a chart identifying 
35 other Form I-140 petitions that it has filed between 2005 and 2008. The Petitioner also submitted 
evidence indicating its payments to the beneficiaries of the petitions. In response to the Director's first 
NOIR, the Petitioner provided additional evidence regarding Form I-140 petitions that it has filed 
betvv'een 2005 and 2014. The Director noted that the response did not include information regarding 
several additional beneficiaries. In response to the Director's second NOIR, the Petitioner did not 
provide complete information regarding several additional beneficiaries. 
The record does not document the priority dates or proffered wages of these other petitions, or whether 
the Petitioner paid wages to their beneficiaries. The record also does not indicate whether any of these 
other petitions were withdrawn, revoked, or denied, or whether any of the other beneficiaries obtained 
lawful permanent residence. Without this information, we cannot determine the Petitioner's ability to 
pay the combined proffered wages of all of its applicable beneficiaries. 
On appeal, the Petitioner states that it has been paying the proffered wage to the Beneficiary. 
Pursuant to a memorandum dated May 4, 2004, from William R. Yates, Associate Director of 
Operations, USCIS, regarding the determination of ability to pay, the Petitioner asserts it has 
established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. See 
Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, USCIS, HQOPRD 
90/16.45. Determination of Ability to Pay under 8 CFR 204.5 (g)(2) 2 (May 4, 2004 ), 
http://v..'\VV.'.uscis.gov/laws/policy-memoranda. 
The Yates Memorandum provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceedings and 
make a positive determination of a petitioner's ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary's 
employment, "[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner not only is 
employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage." !d. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires that a petitioner demonstrate its continuing ability to 
pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Thus, in this case, the Petitioner must shmv 
its ability to pay the proffered wage from 2005 onward. While the Petitioner established that it paid 
the Beneficiary more than the proffered wage in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2016, it did not 
establish that it paid the Beneficiary more than the proffered wage in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
9 It is the Petitioner·s burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1361; !if alter o{Skirball Cultural Crr., 25 l&N Dec. 799, 806 (AAO 20 12). 
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Matter of N-M- Corp. 
2013 , 2014 , and 2017. Further , the Petitioner did not provide regulatory-prescribed evidence of its 
ability to pay the proffered wage in 2014,2015, 2016, and 2017. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). 
We may consider evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay beyond its net income and net current 
assets, including such factors as: the number of years it has conducted business; the growth of its 
business; its number of employees; the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or 
losses; its reputation in its industry; whether a beneficiary will replace a current employee or 
outsourced service; or other evidence of its ability to pay a proffered wage. See Matter (~l 
Sonegawa , 12 I&N Dec. 612, 614-615 (Reg'! Comm'r 1967). 
In this case, the Petitioner indicated that it was established in 1991. Its tax returns indicate that it 
was established in 1993. However , online records show that the Petitioner was incorporated in 
Virginia on 2006 , after the labor certification was filed. Commonwealth of Virginia 
State Corp. Commission, https://cisiweb.scc.virginia.gov/z_container.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 
20 18). The Petitioner must resolve any inconsistencies with independent , objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter o{Ho , 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. Further , the Petitioner ' s tax 
returns indicate that its sales t1uctuated between 2005 and 2013, with sales declining steadily each 
year from 2009 to 2013 . Its payroll also declined each year from 2009 to 2013. The record does not 
contain regulatory-prescribed evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2014 , 2015, 2016, 
and 2017. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The record does not demonstrate the occurrence of any 
uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses or the Petitioner 's reputation in its industry. Also , 
unlike in Sonegawa, the Petitioner in this case must demonstrate its ability to pay multiple 
beneficiaries. Thus , assessing the totality of circumstances in this individual case, the record does 
not establish the Petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to Sonegawa. 
The Petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the petition's 
priority date onward. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated the Beneficiary's' possession of the required experience or its 
ability to pay the protTered wage. Furthermore, the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented her 
experience on the labor certification . Therefore, we affirm the Director 's finding of willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact against the Beneficiary, and we affirm his invalidation of the 
labor certification. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofN-M- Corp., ID# 1036693 (AAO Mar. 30, 20 18) 
9