dismissed EB-3 Case: Hospitality Management

------------------~---------------------, 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF K-I- CO. 
APPEAL OF TEXAS SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JAN. 5, 2017 
PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER 
The Petitioner, a motel operator, seeks to permanently employ the Beneficiary as a manager. It 
requests classification of the Beneficiary as a skilled worker under the third preference immigrant 
category. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1153(b)(3)(A)(i). This category allows a U.S. employer to sponsor a foreign national with at least 2 
years of training or experience for lawful permanent .resident status. 
The California Service Center initially approved the petition on April 28, 2003, but revoked its 
approval on November 4, 2004. After the California Service Center denied the Beneficiary's motion 
to reopen, the Director, Texas Service Center, reopened the petition on his own motion and revoked 
the petition's approval pursuant to a notice of revocation dated April29, 2016 (NOR). 1 
The Director concluded that the record at the time of the petition's approval did not establish the 
Beneficiary's possession of the experience required for the offered position or the Petitioner's ability 
to pay the proffered wage. The Director also invalidated the accompanying Form ETA 750, 
Application for Alien Labor Certification (labor certification), finding that the Beneficiary willfully 
misrepresented his qualifying experience on the document. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. The record at the time of the revocation did not establish the 
Beneficiary's qualifying experience for the offered position or the Petitioner's ability to pay the 
proffered wage, and the record contained evidence that the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented a 
material fact on the accompanying labor Gertification. On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief and 
no new evidence. Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
1 The California Service Center found that the Beneficiary's motion was not signed by an "affected party." See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(l)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B) (defining the term "affected party" to exclude a beneficiary of a 
visa petition). The California Service Center no longer adjudicates employment-based immigrant visa petitions. See 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (USCIS), "News Release: USCIS Notifies Employers of Filing Changes" (Mar. 
24, 2006) at https://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-news/USCIS-notifies-employers-filing-changes (last visited Oct. II, 
20 16). Therefore, the Director, Texas Service Center - rather than the California Service Center - properly considered 
revocation of the petition's approval. 
Matter of K-1- Co. 
I. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. USCIS' Role in the Employment-Based Immigration Process 
Employment-based immigration is generally a three-step process. First, an employer must obtain an 
approved labor certification from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). See section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) 
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). Next, USC IS must approve an immigrant visa petition. See 
section 204 of the Act.. Finally, a foreign national must apply for an immigrant visa abroad or, if 
eligible, adjustment of status in the United States. See section 245 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
By approving a labor certification application, the DOL certifies that there are insufficient U.S. workers 
who are able, willing, qualified, and available for an offered position. See section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(I) of 
the Act. The DOL also certifies that the employment of a foreign national in the position will not 
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of domestic workers similarly employed. See 
section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(II). 
In these visa petition proceedings, USCIS determines whether a foreign national meets the job 
requirements specified on a labor certification and the requirements of the requested immigrant 
classification. See section 204(b) of the Act (stating that USCIS must approve a petition if the facts 
stated in it are true and the foreign national is eligible for the requested preference classification); see 
also, e.g., Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (both holding that USCIS has authority to 
make preference classification decisions). 
After granting a petition, USCIS may revoke the petition's approval "at any time" for "good and 
sufficient cause." Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155. If supported by the record, a director's 
realization that a petition was erroneously approved may justify revocation. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N 
Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988). 
In these proceedings, we must decide whether the Director properly revoked the petition's approval. 
B. The Notice of Intent to Revoke 
Good and sufficient cause exists to issue a notice of intent to revoke where the record at the time of 
the notice's issuance, if unexplained or unrebutted, would have warranted the petition's denial. 
Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450, 451 (BIA 1987). Similarly, revocation is proper if the record at 
the time of the decision, including any explanation or rebuttal evidence provided by a petitioner, 
warranted a petition's denial. ld. at 452. 
In the instant case, good and sufficient cause supported the Director's issuance ofthe March 3, 2016, 
notice of intent to revoke (NOIR). As the NOIR indicated, the record at the time of the notice's 
issuance did not establish the Beneficiary's possession of the experience required for the offered 
position. The purported former employer of the Beneficiary told a Department of Homeland 
2 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
Security (DHS) officer that the Beneficiary did not gain his claimed qualifying experience with the 
employer. 
Also, the record at the time of the NOIR's issuance lacked required evidence of the Petitioner's 
ability to pay the proffered wage during a relevant year. The record therefore did not establish the 
Petitioner's continuing ability to pay from the petition's priority date onward. 
If unexplained or unrebutted, the record at the time of the NOIR ' s issuance would have warranted 
the petition's denial. The Director therefore properly issued the NOIR. 
C. The Beneficiary's Possession ofthe Required Experience 
A petitioner must establish a beneficiary's possession of all the education, training, and experience 
specified on an accompanying labor ce1iification by a petition 's priority date. 8 C .P.R. §§ 
103.2(b)(l), (12); see also Matter of Wing 's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l 
Comm 'r 1977); Matter ofKatigbak , 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Reg ' l Comrn 'r 1971). 
In evaluating a beneficiary's qualifications, we must examine the job offer portion of an 
accompanying labor certification to determine the minimum requirements of an offered position. 
We may neither ignore a term of a labor certification, nor impose additional requirements. See 
K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 P.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983); Madany v. Smith. 696 F.2d at 
1012-13; Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Mass., Inc. v. Coomey, 661 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981). 
In the instant case, the petition's priority date is April 27, 2001. This is the date an office in the 
DOL ' s employment service system accepted the accompanying labor certification application for 
processing. See 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(d) (explaining how to determine a petition ' s priority date). 
The accompanying labor certification states the minimum requirements of the offered position of 
manager as 2 years of experience in the job offered. The labor certification states that the position 
does not require any education or training. 
The Beneficiary attested on the labor certification to his possession of 2 years of full-time, qualifying 
experience. The Beneficiary stated his employment by the m India as a manager 
from March 1997 to March 1999. 
A petitioner must support a beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience with a letter from an employer. 
8 C.P.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(A). A letter must provide the name, address, and title of an employer, and 
describe a beneficiary's experience. !d. 
The Petitioner submitted three letters from an owner on the stationery of the Consistent 
with the . information on the labor certification, the letters state the hotel's employment of the 
Beneficiary as a manager from March 1, 1997, to March 1, 1999. The initially submitted letter does not 
identify the name of its signatory and is dated March 1, 1997, before the Beneficiary completed his 
3 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
purported tenure at the hotel. As noted by the Director in the NOR, the second and third letters 
identified the signatory but did not address the discrepancy in the initial letter or contain any 
independent, objective evidence of the Beneficiary's experience. Therefore, the Director determined 
that the letters were not credible. 
The record contains evidence casting doubt on the Beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience. See 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591 (stating that doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may 
lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support 
of the visa petition). On April 21, 2004, a DHS officer in India spoke to the owner who signed the 
letters. The owner signed a written statement on the top of one of the letters indicating that the 
Beneficiary "was not the employee of and this letter was issued in good faith since he is 
my son-in-law." 
The officer concluded that the Beneficiary was the owner's son-in-law, was never a hotel employee, 
and never worked at the hotel in any capacity. The officer found the experience letters to be 
fraudulently obtained and reported that the proprietor of the hotel issued the letter to the Beneficiary 
solely because the Beneficiary was his son-in-law. 
In a later affidavit, the hotel owner "strongly object[ ed] to the totally false Statement of the 
Investigating officer that I told him that the experience letter was given to the beneficiary simply 
because he is my son-in-law." The owner admitted that he told the officer that the Beneficiary was not 
a hotel employee. But the owner stated that the Beneficiary managed the hotel from March 1997, 
shortly after his engagement to the owner's daughter, to March 1999, shortly after his maniage to her. 
The owner explained that the Beneficiary was part of the hotel's management, rather than an 
"employee," and was paid in cash. The owner stated that he wanted the Beneficiary, as a member of the 
owner's family, to inherit the business. 
Further, as noted by the Director in the NOR, the record contains three Form G-325A, Biographic 
Information forms, signed by the Beneficiary. Form G-325A instructs individuals to list their 
employment for the previous 5 years, and their last occupation abroad if not listed elsewhere on the 
form. The Beneficiary failed to list his purported employment with on all three of the 
forms submitted.2 The Beneficiary claims to have trusted his former attorneys to complete the 
forms.3 However, on the first G-325A, the Beneficiary completed rimch of the form by hand before 
signing it. The Petitioner has not resolved the discrepancies with independent, objective evidence 
2 We note that the record contains an employee identification card issued to the Beneficiary indicating that he was 
employed by a firm in India that was authorized to transact business in 
The Beneficiary failed to list this employment on the Forms G-325A. 
3 The Beneficiary's purported failure to apprise himself of the contents of the paperwork or the information being 
submitted constitutes deliberate avoidance and does not absolve him of responsibility for the content of the materials 
submitted in support of a petition or application. See Hanna v. Gonzales, 128 Fed. Appx. 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(unpublished) (an applicant who signed his application for adjustment of status but who disavowed knowledge of the 
actual contents of the application because a friend filled out the application on his behalf was still charged with 
knowledge ofthe application's contents). 
4 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
pointing to where the truth lies. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. 
We also note that the record contains the Beneficiary's marks sheet dated April 15, 1997, from the 
in India. It indicates that the 
Beneficiary passed his examinations in March 1997 for seven courses he took that semester in college 
in It is not clear how the Beneficiary attended school full-time in while working 40-
hours per week in during the period starting March 1, 1997. The Beneficiary did not list any 
yducation on the labor certification, and the record is not clear if he continued his college education 
beyond March 1997. 
The record lacks sufficient evidence to corroborate the Beneficiary's claimed 2 years of qualifying 
experience. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. Because ofthe owner's family relationship to the Beneficiary, 
the owner's letters and affidavits do not constitute independent, objective evidence of the Beneficiary's 
claimed qualifying experience. 
A petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility for a requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner must establish that it meets each eligibility requirement of the 
benefit sought by a preponderance of the evidence. See Matter o.fChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-
3 76 (AAO 201 0). The instant Petitioner must support its assertions with independent, objective 
documentary evidence. See Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm 'r 1998) (citation omitted) 
(holding that assertions unsupported by documentary evidence are insufficient to meet the burden of 
proof in visa petition proceedings). 
The instant record contains 47 original, daily hotel "logbooks" that appear to contain the Beneficiary's 
signature.4 But the logbooks document hotel activities during only 2 months: August 1998; and 
January 1999. Further, it is not clear when the signatures were placed on the logbooks.5 The owner of 
the hotel asserted in a March 30, 2016, affidavit that the Beneficiary "travelled back and forth [sic] 
to - Monday through Friday ... " But the logbooks document several weekend days in 
August 1998 (four weekends) and January 1999 (four weekends) when the Beneficiary was purportedly 
working._ Additionally, the name of the hotel listed on the logbooks is '' while the 
name listed on the experience letters and labor certification is ' The Petitioner has not 
resolved the discrepancies with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. See 
4 The logbooks accompanied the Beneficiary's motion to reopen . As our prior footnote indicates, the regulations barred 
the Beneficiary's filing of that motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5(a)( I )(i). But they do not preclude, nor does the Petitioner 
object to, our consideration of the evidence accompanying the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l) (stating that " [a]ny 
evidence submitted in connection with a benefit request is incorporated into and considered part of the request") . 
5 Evidence that a petitioner creates after USCIS points out the deficiencies and inconsistencies in the petition will not 
generally be considered independent and objective evidence . 
5 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. The documentation does not establish the Beneficiary's 
qualifying experience during the claimed 2-year period of March 1997 to March 1999. 
The record also contains copies of the Beneficiary's Indian income tax returns for 1997-98, 1998-99, 
and 1999-2000. But these documents do not indicate the source of the Beneficiary's reported income 
during those fiscal years, nor do they appear to document the full-time salary of a hotel manager based 
on the limited income amounts listed (52380 rupees, 70600 rupees, and 79580 rupees, respectively). 
These documents therefore also do not establish the Beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience. 
The Petitioner asserts that the closed in 2008 and that government and business records of 
the Beneficiary's work there are unavailable because he was paid in cash. The unavailability of any 
government or business records supporting the Beneficiary's employment at or his 
purported ownership in the business, however , has not been demonstrated_. 6 
The Beneficiary's motion also included an affidavit from the manage~ of a hotel where 
the Beneficiary purportedly stayed while managing the But this atlidavit also does not 
establish the entire 2-year period of the Beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience. The affidavit 
equivocally states that the Beneficiary managed the "for nearly 2 years." Also, the 
affidavi~ is not supported by documentary evidence of his purported 2 years of weekly stays at 
For the foregoing reasons, the record at the time of the revocation of the petition's approval did not 
establish the Beneficiary's possession of the experience required for the offered position as specified on 
the accompanying labor certification. We will therefore affirm the revocation and dismiss the appeal. 
D. The Invalidation of the Labor Certification 
A petition for a skilled worker must be accompanied by a valid individual labor certification, an 
application for Schedule A designation, or documentation of a beneficiary ' s qualifications for a 
shortage occupation. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(1)(3)(i). We may invalidate a·labor certification after its 
issuance upon a finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the labor 
certification. · 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d). 
6 The Director cited 8 C. F. R. § I 03 .2(b )(2)(i) in the NOR, which states that if a required document does not exist or cannot 
be obtained, an appellant must generally demonstrate its nonexistence or unavailability , and submit relevant secondary 
evidence. If relevant secondary evidence also does not exist or cannot be obtained, the appellant must generally 
demonstrate the unavailability of both the required document and relevant secondary evidence; and submit two or more 
affidavits, sworn to or affirmed by persons who are not parties to the petition and who have direct personal knowledge of 
the event and circumstances . 
7 
The Director noted in his NOR that the Beneficiary lived in 
at m India . is four hours away from 
and forth from to ·Monday through Friday-each week. 
8 was purportedly owned by the owner of the 
6 
India, during the time he claimed to have worked 
The Beneficiary claims to have travelled back 
(e.g., the Beneficiary 's tather-in-law). 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
A willful misrepresentation of a material fact must be voluntary and deliberate, made with 
knowledge of its falsity. Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995). A misrepresentation is 
material if has "a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the [government]." !d. at 442-43 
(citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988)). 
A material issue in this case is whether the Beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of the 
proffered position through meeting the experience requirements of the position offered. The 
Beneficiary, in listing on Form ETA 750B that he gained this experience with and 
signing that form under penalty of perjury, constitutes an act of willful misrepresentation if the 
Beneficiary was not employed in that position. The listing of such experience misrepresented the 
Beneficiary's actual qualifications in a willful effort to procure a benefit ultimately leading to 
permanent residence under the Act. Here, the listing of false experience is a willful 
misrepresentation of the Beneficiary's qualifications that adversely impacted DOL's adjudication of 
the Form ETA750 and USCIS's immigrant petition analysis. 
As previously indicated, the Director in this case invalidated the accompanying labor certification. 
Relying on the DHS officer's report, the Director concluded that the Beneficiary willfully 
misrepresented his qualifying experience at the on the labor certification. The 
Petitioner has submitted no new evidence on appeal to overcome the Director's determination of 
willful misrepresentation. Assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of C)baigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 (BIA 1988). 
The record establishes that the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented a material fact on the 
accompanying labor certification. We will therefore affirm that portion of the Director's decision. 
E. The Petitioner's Ability to Pay ,the Proffered Wage 
A petitioner must establish its continuing ability to pay a proffered wage from a petition's priority 
date until a beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Evidence of 
ability to pay must include copies of annual reports, federal income tax returns, or audited financial 
statements. !d. 
In determining ability to pay, we examine whether a petitioner paid a beneficiary the full proffered 
wage each year from a petition's priority date. If a petitioner did not pay a beneficiary the full 
proffered wage each year, we examine whether it generated sufficient annual amounts of net income 
or net current assets to pay any difference between the annual proffered wage and the wages paid. If 
a petitioner's net income or net current assets are insufficient, we may also consider the overall 
magnitude of its business activities. See Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 
1967).9 
9 Federal courts have upheld our method of determining a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. See, e.g.. River St. 
Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano , 558 F.3d Ill, I 18 (I st Cir. 2009) ; Estrada-Hernandez v. Holder, I 08 F. Supp. 3d 936, 942-43 
7 
Matter ~f K-1- Co. 
In the instant case, the accompanying labor certification states the proffered wage of the offered 
position of manager as $30 per hour, or $62,400 per year for a 40-hour work week. As previously 
indicated, the petition's priority date is April 27, 2001. 
The record does not contain evidence of any payments by the Petitioner to the Beneficiary in 2001 or 
2002. At the time of the petition's approval on April 28, 2003, the record contained a copy of the 
Petitioner's federal income tax return for 2001. The tax return reflected annual net income of 
$72,308, indicating the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage that year. 
At the time of the petition's approval, required evidence of the Petitioner's ability to pay the 
proffered wage in 2003 was not yet available. But the record lacked required evidence of the 
Petitioner's ability to pay in 2002. 
In response to the Director's NOIR, the Petitioner submitted a copy of its federal income tax return 
for 2002. The tax return reflects negative amounts of net income and net current assets for 2002. 
Thus, based on examinations of wages paid to the Beneficiary by the Petitioner, its net income, and 
its net current assets, the record at the time of the revocation of the petition's approval did not 
establish the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. 
As previously indicated, we may consider a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage beyond its 
net income and net current assets. Pursuant to Sonegawa, we may consider such factors as: the 
number of years a petitioner has conducted business; the growth of its business; its number of 
employees; the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses; its reputation in 
its industry; whether a beneficiary would replace a current employee or outsourced service; or other 
evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. 
The instant record at the time of the revocation indicates the Petitioner's continuous business 
operations since 1987. On the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, the Petitioner 
claimed its employment of eight people. But a copy of a payroll record from February 2003 reflects 
the Petitioner's employment of four people. Copies of the Petitioner's federal tax returns indicate 
that its annual amounts of gross revenues and wages paid dropped from 2001 to 2005. 
Unlike the petitioner in Sonegawa, the record does not establish the instant Petitioner's possession of 
an outstanding reputation in its field or the occurrence of unchaL"acteristic expenses or losses. The 
record also does not establish the Beneficiary's replacement of a current employee or outsourced 
service. Thus, pursuant to Sonegawa, the record does not establish the Petitioner's ability to pay the 
proffered wage. 
(S.D. Cal. 20 15); Rivzi v. Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 37 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883-84 (S.D. Tex. 20 14), aff'd, 627 Fed. App'x. 
292 (5th Cir. 20 15). 
8 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
The record at the time of the revocation of the petition's approval did not establish the Petitioner's 
continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the petition's priority date onward. For this 
additional reason, we will affirm the revocation and dismiss the appeal. 
F. The Area of Intended Employment 
The record at the time of the revocation also did not establish the validity of the accompanying labor 
certification for the geographic area of intended employment stated on it. 
A labor certification remains valid only for the particular job opportunity, the foreign national, and 
the geographical area of intended employment stated on it. 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2) (2004). 10 The 
term "area of intended employment" means "the area within normal commuting distance of the place 
(address) of intended employment." 20 C.F.R. § 656.3. The area of intended employment includes 
any site within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA). !d. 
We may deny a petition accompanied by a labor certification that is invalid for the geographic area 
of intended employment. See Matter of Sunoco Energy Dev. Co., 17 I&N Dec. 283, 284 (Reg'} 
Comm'r 1979) (affirming a petition's denial where the petitioner intended to employ a beneficiary in 
a different state than listed in the area of intended employment on an accompanying labor 
certification). 
In the instant case, the Form I -140 and the accompanying labor certification state the area of 
intended employment for the offered position of manager as an address in California. 
The record at the time of the petition's approval , however, indicated that the Beneficiary would work 
at a different location. 
The record contains copies of a business license, valid until March 30, 2003, and photographs of the 
purported motel where the Beneficiary would work. The license authorizes the Petitioner to operate 
a motel in California. The name of the motel in the photos matches the motel name on 
the business license, indicating the business's location in 
Online public records indicate the Petitioner's possession of a business license to operate a motel at 
the address since 1992. See City of (Cal.), Bus. License Unit, at 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016). Public records 
indicate that a different company has a license to operate a motel at the location stated on 
the Form 1-140 and accompanying labor certification. See City of (Cal.), Bus. License 
Search, at (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
10 
Because the labor certification accompanying the instant petition was filed before March 28, 2005, we cite prior DOL 
regulations. See Final Labor Certification Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 77325 , 77325 (Dec. 27, 2004) (stating that the DOL 's 
current regulations apply to all labor certification applications filed on or after March 28, 2005) . 
9 
(b)(6)
Matter of K-1- Co. 
In addition, in connection with an application for adjustment of status, the Beneficiary submitted a 
November 17, 2009, Form G-325A, Biographic Information, to USCIS. The Form G-325A states 
his employment 
by the Petitioner from June 2003 to September 2004 in 
Thus, the record indicates that the geographic area of intended employment for the offered position 
Is m not as stated on the petition and accompanying labor certification . 
Online DOL information indicates that located in and 
located in are not in the same MSA. See Foreign Labor Cettification Data Ctr., at 
http:/ /www.flcdatacenter.com/Oes WizardStep2.aspx?stateName=California (last visited Oct. 13, 
20 16). The record lacks evidence that is within normal commuting distance of 
The record therefore does not establish the validity of the accompanying labor 
certification for the geographic area of intended employment. 
In any future filings in this matter, the Petitioner must establish the validity of the labor certification 
for the stated area of intended employment. See Betancur v. Roark, No. 10-11131-RWZ, 2012 WL 
4862774, *9 (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 2012) (holding that we may "cure " a deficient notice of intent to 
revoke by notifying a petitioner on appeal of additional or amended revocation grounds). 
II. CONCLUSION 
The record at the time of the revocation of the petition's approval established that the Beneficiary 
willfully misrepresented his qualifying experience on the accompanying labor certification. Further, 
the record did not establish the Beneficiary's possession of the experience required for the offered 
position or the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. We will therefore affirm the revocation 
and dismiss the appeal. 
The petition's approval will remain revoked for the reasons stated above, with each considered an 
independent and alternate ground of revocation. As in visa petition proceedings, a petitioner in 
revocation proceedings bears the burden of establishing eligibility for a requested benefit. Section 
291 of the Act; Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 590. Here, the instant Petitioner did not entirely meet that 
burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of K-1- Co. , ID# 73773 (AAO Jan. 5, 2017) 
10