dismissed
EB-3
dismissed EB-3 Case: Information Technology
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the labor certification stated the petitioner would accept a 'combination of education and experience that is equivalent to completion of a U.S. Bachelor degree.' The AAO concluded this language indicated that a U.S. baccalaureate degree was not the true minimum requirement for the position, therefore failing to qualify it as a 'professional' role for the requested EB-3 classification.
Criteria Discussed
Labor Certification Requirements Baccalaureate Degree Requirement Professional Position Classification Combination Of Education And Experience Equivalency Kellogg Language
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services MATTER OF I- INC. Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office DATE: FEB. 8, 2017 APPEAL OF NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER DECISION PETITION: FORM I-140, IMMIGRANT PETITION FOR ALIEN WORKER The Petitioner, a company providing IT business solutions, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a software developer, applications. It requests classification of the Beneficiary as a professional under the third preference immigrant classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii). This employment-based immigrant classification allows a U.S. employer to sponsor a professional with a baccalaureate degree for lawful permanent resident status. The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition, finding that the record did not establish that the Beneficiary qualified for the requested classification or for the proffered position. He further determined that the labor certification, as it indicated the Petitioner would accept a combination of education and experience as equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate, did not support the requested visa classification. The matter is before us on appeal. The Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary qualifies for the offered position under the alternative requirements stated in the labor certification and that these requirements were not considered by the Director in reaching his decision. It further asserts that the labor certification's language indicating its willingness to accept a combination of education and experience as equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree is simply a restatement of the Kellogg language required by U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulation. Upon de novo review,, we will dismiss the appeal. I. LAW Employment-based immigration is generally a three-step process. First, a U.S. employer obtains an approved ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (labor certification) from DOL. See section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). Next, a U.S. employer may file an immigrant visa petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154. Finally, if the immigrant visa petition is approved, the foreign national may apply for an immigrant visa abroad or, if eligible, adjustment of status in the United States. See section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Matter of 1- Inc. By approving the labor certification, DOL certified that there are insufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available for the offered position. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(l) of the Act. The DOL also certified that the employment of a foreign national in the position will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of domestic workers similarly employed. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(II) ofthe Act. In visa petition proceedings, USCIS determines whether a foreign national meets the job requirements specified in the underlying labor certification and the requirements of the requested immigrant classification~ See section 204(b) of the Act (stating that USCIS must approve a petition if the facts stated in it are true and the foreign national is eligible for the requested preference classification); see also, e.g., Tongatapu Woodcrafi Haw., Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (both holding that USCIS has the authority to make preference classification decisions). In order to establish eligibility, a petitioner must also demonstrate the elements for the approval of the petition at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(g)(2), 1 03.2(b )(1), (12); see also Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm 'r 1977); Matter ol Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). The priority date of a petition is the date that DOL accepts the labor certification for processing. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). II. ANALYSIS The issues before us in this matter are whether the labor certification supports the requested visa classification, whether the record establishes that the Beneficiary is eligible for classilication as a professional under section 203(b )(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and whether the Beneficiary meets the requirements ofthe labor certification. A. Labor Certification Does Not Support the Requested Visa Classification The first issue is whether the proffered position, as it is described on the labor cetiification, supports classification as a professional. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), de(ines the term "profession" as including, but not limited to, "architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies or seminaries." If the offered position is not statutorily defined as a profession, "the petitioner must submit evidence showing that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required tor entry into the occupation." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(C). Here, the offered position of software developer, applications, is not statutorily defined as a profession. Therefore, to be classified as a professional position, the job offer portion of the labor certification "must demonstrate that the job requires the minimum of a baccalaureate degree." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(i). 2 Matter of 1- Inc. In this case, Part H of the labor certification submitted states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements: H.4. Education: Bachelor's degree in Computer Science. H.5. Training: None required. H.6. Experience in the job offered: Yes. 12 months. H. 7. Alternate field of study: Yes. Software developer, applications, physics, or IT related. H.8. Alternate combination of education and experience: None accepted. H.9. Foreign educational equivalent: Not Accepted. H.1 0. Experience in an alternate occupation: Yes. Software developer, programmer, or IT related. H.14. Specific skills or other requirements: "Working knowledge ofMS SQL Server, ASP.NET, NET, VB, C#, C/C++, Orbus Systems iServer, Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect using UML Standards; Cascading Style Sheets. Will accept a combination of education and experience that is equivalent to completion of a U.S. Bachelor degree plus 12 months IT experience. May be required to travel to unanticipated U.S. jobsites." In the present case, the Director found the Petitioner's language in Part H.14. of the labor certification, "[w]ill accept a combination of education and experience that is equivalent to completion of a U.S. Bachelor degree" to indicate that the minimum educational requirement for the offered position was less than a bachelor's degree, and, therefore, that the offered position did not qualify as a profession. Accordingly, he found that the labor certification did not support the requested visa classification, and denied the visa petition on this basis. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the above language is Kellogg language, placed in Part H.14. of the labor certification in compliance with DOL's Permanent Labor Certification Program (PERM) regulations, which "expressly require that the employer state on its application its willingness to accept applicants who possess any suitable combination of education, training or experience." The Petitioner contends that its language, while not identical to that routinely used by employers, meets the requirements at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)( 4 )(ii) and allows the Beneficiary to satisfy the labor certification's requirement for a baccalaureate degree with a degree equivalency based on education and experience. However, for the reasons that follow, the Petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. / The Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) ruled in Matter of Francis Kellogg, 1994-INA-465 and ?44, 1995-INA 68 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en bane), that "where the alien does not meet the primary job requirements, but only potentially qualifies for the job because the employer has chosen to list alternative requirements, the employer's alternative requirements are unlawfully tailored to the alien's qualifications ... unless the employer has indicated that applicants with any suitable combination of education, training or experience are acceptable." The statement that an employer will accept applicants with "any suitable combination of education, training or experience" is commonly referred to as Kellogg language. We must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the job requires. !d. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret 3 Matter of I- Inc. the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to examine the certified job offer exactly as it is completed by the prospective employer. See Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984). Our interpretation of the job's requirements must involve reading and applying the plain language of the alien employment certification application form. ld. at 834. Contrary to the assertions on appeal, the Petitioner's acceptance of "a combination of education and experience that is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree" to satisfy the labor certification's requirement for a U.S. baccalaureate degree is not a restatement of Kellogg language. Here, the phrase "[ w ]ill accept a combination of education and experience that is equivalent to completion of a U.S. Bachelor degree" goes beyond the standard Kellogg language and indicates the Petitioner's willingness to allow its requirement for a bachelor's degree in Part H.4. of the labor certification to be satisfied by a combination of education and experience, i.e., a degree equivalency. Moreover, on appeal, the Petitioner explicitly identifies the language in H.14 as creating an alternate requirement, which would allow the Beneficiary to qualify for the position with a combination of education and experience, rather than a bachelor's degree. Accordingly, as ,the labor certification in this matter does not, at a 1mmmum, require a U.S. bachelor's or foreign equivalent degree, it does not support the visa classification requested by the visa petition. Therefore, the petition cannot be approved and we will dismiss the appeal on this basis. B. Beneficiary Does Not Qualify as a Professional The second issue on appeal is whether the Beneficiary qualifies for professional classitl.cation. In order for the Beneficiary to be classified as a professional, the Petitioner must submit evidence that the Beneficiary has at least a U.S. baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(C) states: If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate 'degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicated that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative 4 (b)(6) Matter of I- Inc. history mak~ clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification ... an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree." 56 Fed. Reg. 60897,60900 (November 29, 1991). Furthermore, in Sriapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertof(, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006), the federal district court determined that the requirement of a bachelor's or foreign equivalent degree related solely to the beneficiary's educational background , precluding consideration of the alien's combined education and work experience. !d. at * 11-13. Additionally, the court found that in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where a foreign national is statutorily required to hold a bachelor's degree, a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. !d. at * 17, 19. In the present case, the record reflects that the Beneficiary holds a 3-year degree in physics from (India). To establish the Beneficiary's qualifications for the offered position, the Petitioner submitted two credentials evaluations. An evaluation prepared by , Ph.D., finds the Beneficiary's education to be equivalent to a 3-year program of post-secondary academic studies. The evaluation further states that when the Beneficiary ' s education is considered with more than 4 years of professional experience in the field of computer science, it is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree in science and computer science. An evaluation, from does not evaluate the Beneficiary's education alone, but instead relies on the education and 5 years of work experience and professional training in computer information systems to provide him with the equivalent of "at least a" U.S. bachelor of science in computer information systems. Neither evaluation asserts that the Beneficiary has a U.S. bachelor's degree or foreign equivalent degree. Rather, the evaluations both depend on a combination of education and experience to establish an equivalency to aU .S. bachelor's degree. However, a degree equivalency is not the single U.S. baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree required for classification as a professional under section 203(b )(3)(A)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the record does not establish that the Beneficiary has a U.S. bachelor's degree or foreign equivalent degree in computer science, software development, applications, physics, or an IT related field (Parts H.4, H.4-B., H.7-A. of the labor certification). Accordingly, the record does not establish that the Beneficiary is eligible for classification as a professional under section 203(b )(3)(A)(ii) of the Act and we will also dismiss the appeal on this basis. Additionally, we note, that even if the Beneficiary held a 4-year baccalaureate degree in computer science from an Indian university, it would not satisfy the requirements of the labor certification, which, at Part H.9., indicate that the Petitioner will not accept a foreign educational equivalent. 1 1 Although the Petitioner in response to the NOlO indicated that its response in Part H.9. was incorrect and submitted an amended page 3 of the labor certification, there is no mechanism under PERM for correcting or altering infonnation on an ETA Fonn 9089 after its submission to DOL. As stated by DOL in Permanent Labor Certification Program, Final Regulation, FAQs, August 8, 2005 (http ://www. foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov): Once an application has been electronically submitted or mailed , it is consider ed final and no changes to the application will be permitted. This applies to typographical errors as well. If the employer 5 Matter of 1- Inc. C. Beneficiary Does Not Meet Labor Certification Requirements The next issue is whether the Beneficiary has experience with the specific skills required by the terms of the labor certification. A petitioner must establish a beneficiary's possession of all the education, training, or experience stated on an accompanying labor certification by a petition's priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12); see also Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. at 159; Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. Part H.l4. of the labor certification requires the Beneficiary to have a working knowledge of the following: MS SQL Server, ASP.NET, NET, VB, C#, C/C++, Orbus Systems iServer, Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect using UML Standards; and Cascading Style Sheets. In his decision, the Director indicated that he found none of the experience letters, trammg certificates or transcripts submitted for the record to ret1ect that the Beneficiary had experience with Orbus Systems iServer or Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect using UML Standards. Accordingly, he concluded that the Beneficiary did not possess all of the technical skills required by the labor . certification and he denied the petition on this basis as well. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary's Microsoft Certified Solutions Expert (MCSE) training (October 4, 2005, to January 4, 2006) covered Orbus Systems iServer and Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect using UML Standards. The Petitioner provided the syllabus for the MCSE · training, but did not identify ~hat courses in the syllabus provided training in these specific skills and we find no syllabus listing that specifically identifies such training. While we note that in describing his employment with the Petitioner in Part K. of the labor certification, the Beneficiary indicates that he has worked with both Orbus Systems iServer and Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect using UML Standards, no experience letters in the record support the Beneficiary's claim. Therefore, like the Director, we do not find the record to demonstrate that the Beneficiary possesses all of the technical skills required by the labor certification. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal for this reason as well. D. Ability to Pay Although not a reason for our dismissal of the appeal, our review of the record in this matter has also found insufficient evidence of the Petitioner's ability to pay the Beneficiary the proffered wage. The Petitioner must resolve this issue in any future filings. believes changes and/or corrections are necessary for the accuracy or certifiability of the application, the employer should withdraw the application and file a new application with the changes and/or corrections .... 6 Matter of I- Inc. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part: Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petitiOn filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an otTer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. A petitioner must establish that its job offer to a beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the labor certification, a petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remains realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. A petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See j\1atter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'! Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USeiS requires a petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay a beneficiary's proffered wage, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See Afatter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg' 1 eomm'r 1967). In the present case, the priority date of the visa petition is March 9, 2015. Part G .1. of the labor certification reflects that the proffered wage in this matter is $42,890 per year. Therefore, the Petitioner must demonstrate its ability to pay the Beneficiary the annual wage of $42,890 from March 9, 2015, onward. To determine a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USeiS first examines whether a petitioner \Vas employing the beneficiary as of the date on which the labor certification was accepted for processing by DOL and whether it continues to do so. If a petitioner documents that it has employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, that evidence may be considered proof of its ability to pay. If a petitioner does not demonstrate that it employed and paid the beneficiary at an amount at least equal to the proffered \vage during the required period, users then examines the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax returns, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. River Street Donuts. LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); Taco Especial v. Napolitano, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. Filed Nov. 10, 2011). If a petitioner's net income during the required time period does not equal or exceed the proffered wage, or when added to any wages paid to the beneficiary does not equal or exceed the proffered wage, users reviews its net current assets. In cases where neither a petitioner's net income nor its net current assets establish its ability to pay the proffered wage during the required period, USeiS may also consider the overall magnitude of its business activities. Sonegawa, 12 l&N Dec. at 612. In assessing the totality of a petitioner's 7 (b)(6) Matter of I- Inc. circumstances, USCIS may look at such factors as the number of years it has been in business, its record of growth, the number of individuals it employs, abnormal business expenditures or losses, its reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence it deems relevant. Where a petitioner has filed Forms 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, for multiple beneficiaries, it must also demonstrate that its job offer to each beneficiary is realistic, and that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage to each . See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) ; see also Patel v. Johnson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 108, 124 (D. Mass. 2014) (upholding our denial of a petition where a petitioner did not demonstrate its ability to pay multiple beneficiaries). In determining whether a petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage to multiple beneficiaries, USCIS adds together the proffered wages for each beneficiary for each year starting from the priority date of the petition being adjudicated, and analyzes the petitioner's ability to pay the combined wages. However, the . wages offered to the other beneficiaries are not considered after the dates any beneficiary obtained lawful permanent residence, or after the date a Form I-140 petition was withdrawn, revoked, or denied without a pending appeal. In addition , USCIS will not require a petitioner to establish the ability to pay additional beneficiaries for any year that the beneficiary of the petition under consideration was paid the full proffered wage. The record in the present matter does not demonstrate that the Petitioner paid the Beneficiary the proffered wage of $42,890 in 2015, the time period considered by the Director. The Beneficiary's Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for 2015 reflects wages of $40,300, or $2590 less than the proffered wage. However, due to the timeframe in which the petition was filed, the record does not contain a regulatory prescribed document (tax return, annual report, or audited financial statement) for the year in question. Therefore, in any future filing the Petitioner must submit such evidence in order to establish its ability to pay the Beneficiary the proffered wage from the priority date onward. Moreover, relevant USCIS databases reflect that, as of the this petition's priority date, the Petitioner had previously filed for at least three beneficiaries whose Form I-140 petitions had been approved and ), and that in September and October 2015, it filed Forms 1-140 for two additional beneficiaries ( and == 1. None of these beneficiaries obtained lawful permanent resident status in 2015 and only one adjusted status in 2016. Therefore, to demonstrate its ability to pay during the relevant period, the Petitioner must establish its ability to cover the proffered wage of the instant Beneficiary, as well as the proffered wages of these five additional Form I-140 beneficiaries. However, no evidence relating to the proffered or actual wages of these additional beneficiaries is found in the record. In future filings, the Petitioner must provide information on the proffered wage of all its sponsored beneficiaries as well as information on their status, in order to demonstrate that it has the ability to pay the Beneficiary in this case. 8 Matter of I- Inc. III. CONCLUSION In the present case, the labor certification does not, at a minimum, require a U.S. baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree, and, therefore, does not support the visa petition, which requests classification of th~ Beneficiary as a professional under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act. Moreover, the Petitioner has also not established that the Beneficiary has the U.S. bachelor's or foreign equivalent degree required for classification as a professional. Nor has it demonstrated that the Beneficiary has all of the requisite technical skills listed in the job offer portion of the labor certification. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the Petitioner has not met that burden. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Cite as Matter of I- Inc., ID# 80873 (AAO Feb. 8, 2017) 9
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