dismissed EB-3 Case: Retail Business

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 10445121 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Skilled Worker 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: JAN. 20, 2023 
The Petitioner, which operates a convenience store and gas station, seeks to employ the Beneficiary 
as its account manager. The Petitioner seeks to classify the Beneficiary under the third-preference, 
immigrant visa category for "skilled workers." See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
203(b)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition for abandonment in 2010. The Petitioner 
filed a motion to reopen, establishing that this denial had been in error. The Director denied the 
petition for a second time in 2013, concluding that the Petitioner had not established its ability to pay 
the Beneficiary's proffered wage, and that discrepancies in the record cast doubt on the Petitioner's 
claims regarding the Beneficiary's work history . The Petitioner appealed that decision, and we 
remanded the matter for a new decision that more fully considered those issues, as well as any other 
issues that review of the record might reveal. The Director denied the petition for a third time in 
December 2019, finding willful misrepresentation of material facts and determining that the Petitioner 
had not established that: (1) the Beneficiary has the experience required for the proffered position; (2) 
the job offer is bona fide; and (3) the Petitioner has been able to pay the proffered wage since the 
petition's priority date. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will withdraw the finding of willful 
misrepresentation of material facts, as well as the Director's determination related to a bona fide job 
off er, but we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
Employment-based immigration generally follows a three-step process. First, an employer obtains an 
approved labor certification from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL ). See section 212( a)(5) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5). By approving the labor certification, the DOL certifies that there are 
insufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available for the offered position and 
that employing a foreign national in the position will not adversely affect the wages and working 
conditions of domestic workers similarly employed. See section 212(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II) of the 
Act. Second, the employer files an immigrant visa petition (Form I-140) with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). See section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154. Third, if USCIS 
approves the petition, the foreign national may apply for an immigrant visa abroad or, if eligible, 
adjustment of status in the United States. See section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
II. ABILITY TO PAY THE PROFFERED WAGE 
To be eligible for the classification it requests for the beneficiary, a petitioner must establish that it has 
the ability to pay the proffered wage stated on the labor certification. The Petitioner must establish this 
ability at the time the priority date is established I and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful 
permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies ofannualreports, federal 
tax returns, or audited financial statements. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). 
The priority date in this case is April 30, 2001, which is the date the Petitioner filed Form ETA 750, 
Application for Alien Employment Certification. 2 The proffered wage typed onto the labor 
certification reads "$30,000 per hr" (sic). This figure was changed, by hand, to $54,360 per year, in a 
DOL-acknowledged correction in February 2006, six months before DOL approved the labor 
certification in August 2006. 
In determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the 
beneficiary was employed and paid by the petitioner during the period following the priority date. A 
petitioner's submission of documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to 
or greater than the proffered wage for the time period in question, when accompanied by a form of 
evidence required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), may be considered proof of the 
petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. 
If the Petitioner does not show that it has paid the Beneficiary a salary equal to or above the proffered 
wage from the priority date onward, USCIS will generally examine the net income and net current 
assets figures recorded on the petitioner's federal income tax return(s), annual report(s), or audited 
financial statement(s ). If the net income or net current assets equals or exceeds the proffered wage, or 
the difference between the proffered wage and the amount paid to the beneficiary in a given year, then 
the petitioner would ordinarily be considered able to pay the proffered wage during that year. 
USCIS may also consider the totality of the Petitioner's circumstances, including the overall 
magnitude of its business activities, in determining the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. 
See Matter ofSonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). USCIS may consider such factors 
as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the 
petitioner's business, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, the overall number of employees, 
whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, the amount of 
compensation paid to officers, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, 
and any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. 
The Petitioner has submitted evidence including copies of some of its tax returns and IRS Forms W-2, 
Wage and Tax Statements, issued to the Beneficiary. The Petitioner has not paid the Beneficiary more 
1 The "priority date" of a petition is the date the underlying labor certification is filed with the DOL. See 8 C.F .R. 
§ 204.S(d). 
2 Form ETA 750 has since beenreplacedby ETAF01m 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification. 
2 
than $48,000 per year, but the Director determined that the Petitioner's net income was sufficient to 
cover the shortfallfrom2006 to 2009 and in 2011. Review of the Petitioner's 2010 tax return likewise 
shows sufficient net income. 
The record does not contain the Petitioner's post-2011 tax returns. This, by itself, is a serious 
deficiency, because 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires a petitioner to establish its ability to pay the 
proffered wage from the priority date until the beneficiary becomes a permanent resident, which has 
not yet happened. But the Petitioner has not established its ability to pay in earlier years, which the 
Director noted in the denial. 
The Petitioner's tax returns and the Beneficiary's IRS Fom1s W-2 for 2001-2005 show the following 
amounts: 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Beneficiary's wages paid 
Not applicable 
Notshown 4 
$18,000 
36,000 
36,000 
Shortfall 
$54,360 
54,360 
36,360 
18,360 
18,360 
Net Income 
$126 
19,108 
16,662 
10,268 
10,999 
Net Current Assets 
None claimed 3 
$12,445 
15,550 
15,570 
16,025 
Prior to the denial, the Petitioner submitted 
bank statements, and argued that the Director did not 
consider the Petitioner's cash on hand. But bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, 
listed in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. 
The same regulation indicates that bank records "may be submitted" as optional, supplemental 
evidence "in appropriate cases," but the Petitioner has not explained why the required primary 
documentation, such as tax returns, is not applicable or otherwise depicts an inaccurate financial 
picture of the petitioning employer. Also, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given 
date, and cannot show the sustained ability to pay a proffered wage. The Petitioner also has not 
established that the funds reported on its bank statements show additional available funds that were 
not reflected on its tax returns, such as the Petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or 
the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in detem1ining the Petitioner's net current 
assets. 5 We will not add the balances on the Petitioner's bank statements to its net income or net 
current assets. 
The Petitioner also stated that it "owns the real property that has net equity values of $461,491.00." 
Real estate and buildings are reportable assets, but not current assets that can be readily converted to 
cash in order to pay the proffered wage. Even then, the Petitioner did not claim "Land" or "Buildings" 
as positive assets on its tax returns until 2011. The Petitioner does not explain how its property 
holdings establish that it was able to pay the full proffered wage as of the priority date in 2001. 
3 The Petitioner's appellate brief includes a table showingnetcunent assets totaling$78,838 in 2001 and$78,763 in 2002, 
but the tax returns themselves do notshowthesefigures. 
4 The Petitioner reported paying $2,490 in wages and salaries in 2002, but the Beneficiary did not claim any wages or 
salaries on his 2002 individual tax return. 
5 Cash is reportable as a cunentasset, but most of the Petitioner's tax returns do not list cashamongthecompany's assets. 
On many of the returns, the only reported assets are in the formof inventmy. The 2011 return shows $766in cash. 
3 
After consideration of any wages paid, the Petitioner's tax returns do not show sufficient income or 
current assets to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date 
onward. 
Beyond a petitioner's net income and net current assets, we may consider the factors such factors as 
the size, longevity, reputation, and growth of the business, and any uncharacteristic expenditures or 
losses. See Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. at 615. Here, however, the Petitioner has not shown 
that any of these other factors apply. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the totality of its 
circumstances would overcome the deficiency in its ability to pay the proffered wage from 2001 to 
2005. Also, as noted above, the Petitioner has not submitted any tax returns to account for the time 
period after 2011. 
On appeal, the Petitioner's core argument is that, when the Form ETA 7 5 0 Part A was prepared in 
2001, the proffered wage was only $30,000, and the amount did not increase until the Petitioner 
amended the labor certification in 2006. But DOL considered this change to be a "correction" to the 
initial wage on a document that has at least three other acknowledged errors, such as indicating that 
the Petitioner was an auto parts trader located in the Beneficiary's house. As noted above, the 
proffered wage was originally stated as $30,000 per hour, not per year. 
The Petitioner cites no regulation, case law, or other authority that allows a petitioner to alter the 
proffered wage after filing an application for labor certification, such that the change is only effective 
from the time of the correction rather than the time of filing the application. The record shows that 
DOL did not approve the labor certification application when it showed the proffered wage as $30,000 
per hour. The Petitioner does not show that it originally obtained a prevailing wage determination that 
would have permitted the Petitioner to set the proffered wage at $30,000 per year. DOL approved 1he 
labor certification with the specific acknowledgment that the Petitioner had corrected the proffered 
wage to $54,360 per year. 
The Petitioner has not established that its wages paid, combined with net income or net current assets, 
were sufficientto pay the full, DOL-approved proffered wage before 2006. This, by itself, is sufficient 
grounds for denial of the petition and, therefore, dismissal of the appeal. 
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE JOB OFFERED 
To be eligible for classification as a skilled worker a beneficiary must have at least two years of 
training or experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(B). A beneficiary must also meet the specific 
educational, training, experience, and other requirements of the labor certification underlying the 
petition. Id. All requirements must be met by the petition's priority date, which in this case is April 
30, 2001. See Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm 'r 1977). 
A. Requirements of the Labor Certification and the Beneficiary's Qualifications 
The labor certification indicates that the proffered position requires two years of college education in 
business or a related subject, and two years of experience, either in the job offered, accounts manager, 
or in accounting. The Beneficiary holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of 
I I Pakistan, which equates to two years of college. Eligibility, therefore, revolves around the 
4 
Beneficiary's employment experience. The Beneficiary must have met the job requirements as of 
April 30,2001, when the Petitioner filed Form ETA 750. Any job experience after the priority date 
cannot serve to establish eligibility. See Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 
1971 ). 
The duties of the offered position are listed as follows: 
• Preparing all financial and management reports; 
• Keeping all accounting records both on a manual and computerized system; 
• Organizing staff within departments, cash and carry, housekeeping and maintenance; 
• Handling of all cash and banking transactions; 
• Account receivable and account payable; 
• Preparing payroll and tax reports; 
• Analyzing cash flow; and 
• Preparing budgets and balance sheet and financial statements; 
The original ETA Form 750 Part B, which the Beneficiary signed in April 2001, lists the following 
claimed employment experience: 
Branch Manager 
Account Manager I 
February 1980-December 1998 
February 2000-present 
Five years later, in July 2006, the Beneficiary crossed out the entry regarding and added 
a supplemental rider showing a different employment history: 
Branch Manager January 1980-December 1998 
Accountant January 1999-February 2000 
Owner/Accountant 6 February 2000-March 2002 
Account Manager [The petitioning entity] July 2002-present 
Further below, we will discuss the Director's conclusion that the conflicting employment histories 
amount to willful misrepresentation of a material fact. But first, we will address the question of how 
these claimed employment histories affect the Beneficiary's eligibility for the proffered position. 
The Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary's work for I I is qualifying 
experience as an account manager or accountant. 7 The Petitioner must therefore establish that the 
Beneficiary accrued at least two years of experience as an account manager or accountant by the Ap1il 
30,2001 priority date. The Beneficiary's employment with the petitioning entity occurred after the 
April 2001 priority date and therefore cannot count toward the required experience. 
6 The record contains variations of this name. For consistency, we use the business name as shown on licenses issued by 
authorities in !Georgia. 
7 A version of the Beneficiary's resume in the record indicates thatthe Beneficiary's duties at were essentially those 
ofan accountant, buttheemployer's own letterdoesnotconoboratethis claim. Evidencerelatingto qualifying experience 
shall be in the form ofletters from employers. 8 C.F.R. § 204.S(g)(l ). A resume does not meet this requirement. The 
Petitioner submitted the resume in question 2007, and subsequent submissions have not pursued the claim that the 
Beneficiaryworkedas an accountant oraccountmanagerat 
5 
An October 2002 letter froml lhuman resources manager states that the company employed the 
Beneficiary as an accountant "from O 1 /99 thru 02/00," and that the Beneficiary "compl[ied] with all 
accounting regulations. [The Beneficiary] computerized our accounting and human resource 
functions." The letter provides no further details about the Beneficiary's claimed work at and 
therefore it does not meet the requirement that an employment verification letter must include a 
specific description of the duties performed. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.S(g)(l ). In a notice of intent to deny 
(NOID), the Director notified the petitioner this letter was insufficient as it lacked a specific 
description of the job duties performed by the Beneficiary. 
Fmihermore, the letter from does not provide specific dates of employment, and therefore this 
period of employment could have ranged anywhere from just over 12 months (January 31, 1999 to 
February 1, 2000) to exactly 14 months (January 1, 1999to February 29, 2000). Given the narrow 28-
month window of time during which the Beneficiary had to accumulate 24 months of qualifying 
experience, this lack of detail is significant. A reference on appeal to the "Beneficiary's Self­
Employment (2/l/2000-3/1/2002)" appears to indicate that the Beneficiary lefie==]on February 1, 
2000. The initial Form ETA 750B from 2001 does not show employment with The Petitioner 
did not explain the omission. 
The Director also noted that this letter was not consistent with the Beneficiary's individual federal 
income tax returns, which did not show that the Beneficiary received any wages in 2000 even though 
I I employment letter claimed the Beneficiarywas employed in January and February ofthatyear. 
The Petitioner must resolve any inconsistency in the record with independent, objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). On appeal, the 
Petitioner did not address the Director's issues with this letter and the inconsistency with the 
Beneficiary's tax return. Instead, on appeal, the Petitioner resubmitted the same employment 
experience letter from Group. Therefore, because of these unresolved inconsistencies, the 
letter does not establish that the Beneficiary has two years of experience in the offered position or in 
the related occupation of accountant. 
As noted above, the initial Form ETA 750B named I las a former employer. The 
Beneficiary acknowledges that although I filed a petition to classify him as an H-IB 
nonimmigrant, he never actually worked there, and for that reason I ultimately withdrew 
its nonimmigrantvisa petition. Therefore, the Beneficiary accruedno qualifying experience there, and 
deleted the reference tol Ion the supplemental rider to Form ETA 750B. 
Citing several of the issues described above, the Director concluded that the Petitioner had not 
adequately established that the Beneficiary had the required experience as an account manager or 
accountant as of the priority date. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary "was 
responsible for all financial matters" when he operated! I 
In a separate sworn declaration, the Beneficiary states that he "worked as an accountant at the 
Group from January 1999 to February 2000," and "managed all the accounting matters while [he] was 
self-employed ... from February 2000 to March 2002." This statement repeats prior claims without 
adding corroborated details or addressing issues raised by the Director. 
6 
The Beneficiary acknowledges that he owned the business that operated as _____ which 
would entail numerous aspects of management beyond accounting, and the Petitioner has not 
established the extent, if any, to which the Beneficiary delegated other more minor roles to other 
employees, if any. The record does not contain adequate evidence to establish that the Beneficim.y 
worked there as an accountant or account manager, rather than in some other capacity with ancillary 
accounting responsibilities. 
In 2007, the Beneficiary wrote a letter to verify his own past employment at 
Among his claimed duties, the Beneficiary stated that he"[ o ]rganized staff within the department" 
The record does not establish the size of lstaff, or show that the staff was organized 
into departments. 
Since the letter was written by the Beneficiary and repeated the duties of the offered position from the 
labor certification, the Director's NOID requested that the Petitioner submit a new employment letter 
describing the Beneficiary's actual job duties and the time allotted to each duty as well as documentary 
evidence supporting the claims in the letter, including evidence that the Beneficiary's business 
employed sufficient staff to allow him to perform the duties of a full time accountant. The Petitioner's 
response did not address this request. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a 
material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103 .2(b )(14). 
Therefore, the Beneficiary's letter about his claimed employment at Food Mart does 
not establish that the Beneficiary has two years of experience in the offered position or in the related 
occupation of accountant. Also, less than two years elapsed from February 2000 to the priority date 
in April 2001. Therefore, the period of time claimed would amount to less than the required two years 
of full-time experience even if we were to accept the claim. 
The record shows that the Beneficiary did not report any salary income on his personal income tax 
returns for 2000, 2001, and 2002. Instead, he reported business income from an unnamed sole 
proprietorship engaged in "grocery sales," presumably ___ 8 On those tax returns, the 
Beneficiary did not report any wages among his business expenses. Thus, the tax returns argue against 
the existence of "staff' and "departments" at I and thus, by extension, they argue 
against the credibility of the Beneficiary's self-written description of his past employment there. A 
petitioner may submit a letter or affidavit that contains hearsay or biased infmmation, but such factors 
will affect the weight to be accorded the evidence in an administrative proceeding. See Matter of D­
R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445,461 (BIA 2011) (citations omitted). 
The Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary possessed the required experience as an account 
manager or accountant as of the April 30, 2001 priority date, and this deficiency is a basis for denying 
the petition and dismissing the appeal. 
B. Willful Misrepresentation of a Material Fact 
The Director found that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary willfully misrepresented the Beneficiary's 
past experience. Such misrepresentation would be material in this proceeding because employment 
8 We note that the store wa soperated by the Beneficiary's corporation, and a corporation is not a sole proprietorship, even 
if the corporation has only one shareholder. A sole proprietorship, by definition, is unincorporated. See 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/sole-proprietorships. 
7 
experience is a factor that determines eligibility for the benefit sought in this proceeding. As a result 
of the finding of willful misrepresentation, the Director invalidated the labor certification under the 
provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d). 
As outlined by the Board of Immigration Appeals, a material misrepresentation requires that one 
willfully make a material misstatement to a government official for the purpose of obtaining an 
immigration benefit to which one is not entitled. Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289-90 
(BIA 197 5). The term "willfully" means knowing and intentionally, as distinguished from 
accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts are otherwise. See Matter of Tijam, 22 
I&N Dec. 408,425 (BIA 1998); Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&NDec. 22, 28 (BIA 1979). To 
be considered material, the misrepresentation must be one which "tends to shut off a line of inquiry 
which is relevant to the alien's eligibility, and which might well have resulted in a proper 
determination that he be excluded." MatterofNg, 17 I&N Dec. 536,537 (BIA 1980). 
Accordingly, for an immigration officer to find a willful and material misrepresentation in visa petition 
proceedings, he or she must determine that: 1) the petitioner or beneficiarymade a false representation 
to an authorized official of the United States government; 2) the misrepresentation was willfully made; 
and 3) the fact misrepresented was material. See Matter ofM-, 6 I&N Dec. 149 (BIA 1954); Matter 
ofL-L-, 9 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 1961 ); Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. at 288. 
In the 2013 denial notice, the Director stated thatthe Beneficiary and the Petitioner had falsely claimed 
that the Beneficiary worked forl in 2000 and 2001. The Director also noted that the 
Beneficiary incorporated the entity that operated I in May 1999, several months 
before he purportedly began working for Group. 
In our December 2015 remand order, we noted that the Director had referred to willful 
misrepresentation, but had made no formal finding with regard to the issue. We instructed the Director 
to make "a finding as to whether the DOL received the changes to the Beneficiary's work experience 
... before it stamped the Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified on August 14, 
2006." 
In response to the Director's NOID, issued in August 2019, the Petitioner maintained that the prior 
attorney who prepared the labor certification had listed I I by mistake. The Petitioner 
asserted that the initialed dates on the ETA Form 750 show that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary 
made corrections to the form before its final submission to DOL for certification, and that this timely 
retraction demonstrates that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary did not act with fraudulent intent. 
In the latest decision, issued December 2019, the Director found that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary 
had willfully misrepresented material facts regarding the Beneficiary's employment experience. The 
Director stated that the Petitioner had not established "the actual date the error was discovered, the 
date any changes were made, the process employed to make the DOL aware of the error, or any 
correspondence between the petitioner and DOL discussing the changes." The Director also observed 
that, while the corrections to the Petitioner's address and the proffered wage were stamped 
"Corrections Approved by DOL Regional Office," there are no such stamps on the changes to the 
Beneficiary's employment history. In the 2019 decision, the Director did not allege misrepresentation 
regarding the Beneficiary's 1999 incorporation of the company that operated! I 
8 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that it the Beneficiary did not willfully misrepresentthe Beneficiaty's 
employment history on the labor certification, because the Beneficiary corrected the information "as 
soon as he found it" and "provided correct employment information [on Form] G-325A when he 
submitted the form." The Petitioner also maintains that the incorrect reference to I I is not 
material, because the Beneficiary's experience at ______ "from February 2000 to March 
2002" is sufficient to establish the required two years of experience. Regarding this last point, the 
priority date is April 30, 2001, and any experience after that date cannot establish eligibility. 
Upon careful consideration, we conclude that the record is simply too ambiguous to support a finding 
of willful misrepresentation of a material fact, with the serious immigration consequences that arise 
from such a finding. Nevertheless, our withdrawal of the Director's finding of fraud or willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact should not be construed as a finding that we find the evidence 
submitted with this petition to be credible. As discussed elsewhere in this decision, there are numerous 
discrepancies in the record, which the Petitioner has not adequately resolved or explained. 
There are serious questions, for example, regarding That employer filed a nonimmigrant 
petition on the Beneficiary's behalf, but the Beneficiary never worked for I after that 
petition was approved. The record shows that the attorney who handled that nonimmigrant petition 
was aware that the Beneficiary never worked for the company, but the attorney nevertheless listed 
I las the Beneficiary's current employer when he prepared ETA Form 750 Part B. Doubt 
cast on any aspect of a petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the 
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 
1988). 
As serious as these doubts are, we cannot conclude that they suffice to support a finding of willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact. We therefore withdraw the Director's finding to that effect, and 
we withdraw the invalidation of the labor certification that resulted from that finding. 9 
IV. BONA FIDE JOB OFFER 
The Director determined that the Petitioner did not make a bona fide job offer to the Beneficiary. The 
Director based this determination on evidence that the Beneficiary has closer ties to the petitioning 
entity than the Petitioner has disclosed, and on discrepancies in the record. 10 
The lack of evidence to establish the Petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage and the 
Beneficiary's required experience are sufficient to determine the outcome of the appeal. We withdraw 
the issue of the bona fide job offer. 
9 While the record does not rule outthepossibility ofwillfulmisrepresentation, it does not currently support such a finding 
with the degree of confidence that such a finding would require. 
10 We recognize that that the Director raised significant if somewhat speculative concerns. While the record is not 
sufficiently developed for purposes of this visa petition, the Director is not barred from further inquiry, investigation, or 
the development of questions for consular processing or adjustment of status proceedings. See Matter of 0, 8 I&N Dec. 
295 (BIA 1959) (stating that the immigrant visa petition is not the appropriate stage oftheprocess for questions regarding 
admissibility). 
9 
V. CONCLUSION 
The record does not adequately support a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact, and 
we withdraw the determination that a bona fide job offer does not exist. But the Petitioner has not 
established its ability to pay the proffered wage of $54,360 per year as of the priority date and that the 
Beneficiary had two years of experience as an accountant or account manager by the priority date of 
April 3 0, 2001. Therefore, the Petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.