dismissed H-1B Case: Business Administration

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 21179781 
Appeal of Vermont Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: MAY 10, 2022 
The Petitioner seeks to employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for specialty 
occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(HXi)(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15XH)(iXb). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified 
foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body 
of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The Vermont 
Service Center Director denied the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker. The matter is 
now before us on appeal. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369,375 
(AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 
537,537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. ANALYSIS 
After reviewing the entire record, for the reasons set out below, we have determined that the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. Upon 
consideration of the record-including the arguments made on appeal-we adopt and affirm the 
Director's ultimate determination as it relates to the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214 .2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-{4). See Matter of P. Singh , Attorney , 26 I&N Dec. 623, 624 (BIA 2015) 
(citing Matter of Burbano , 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)); see also Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7-8 
(1st Cir. 1996) ("[I]f a reviewing tribunal decides that the facts and evaluative judgments prescinding 
from them have been adequately confronted and correctly resolved by a trial judge or hearing officer, 
then the tribunal is free simply to adopt those findings" provided the tribunal's order reflects 
individualized attention to the case) . 
Further, we note that the Director denied the petition based on two independent grounds : 
1. The Director thoroughly discussed the Petitioner's failure to meet any of the four regulatory 
criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l) - ( 4); and 
2. They decided that the Petitioner's minimum entry requirements for the offered position were 
in a wide variety of disparate fields of study. In particular , the Director indicated that the 
Petitioner did not explain how the field of business administration-without any further 
specialization-was sufficiently related to the offered position's duties. 
Each of these individual issues standing alone would serve as an independent basis for a denial. 
Therefore, the appellant here, must sufficiently demonstrate that every stated ground for the denial 
was inconect. However, within the appeal the Petitioner only adequately addresses item 2. 
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that: 
• The Director generally failed to consider its evidence and arguments relating to its minimum 
education requirements for the offered position; 
• The Director mischaracterized the content of an opinion letter speaking to those position 
requirements; and 
• They applied an increased burden of proof beyond the preponderance standard to this case. 
We note that the Petitioner included short statements of error relating to item 1 listed above (i.e., 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l), (3)) on the Form I-290B under Part 7. Additional Information. 
However, it does not explain the manner in which the Director committed an error in their denial 
analysis and the Petitioner simply claims that the Director erred in their ultimate detennination relating 
to those two regulatory criteria. 
First relating to 8 C.F.R. § 2 l 4.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l), the Petitioner simply stated that the Director 
"improperly disregarded the complexity and uniqueness of the job responsibilities which also marks 
the position as a specialty occupation." This general statement of disagreement fails to inform us of 
what specific error the Director may have made or what elements they disregarded from the position 
that were so complex or unique. Second, under the requirement that the Petitioner demonstrate that it 
normally requires a specialized degree or an equivalent under 8 C.F.R. § 2 l 4.2(h)( 4 )(iii)(A)(J), the 
Director noted that all of the Petitioner's evidence post-dated the petition filing date-which does not 
demonstrate eligibility at the of filing in line with 8 C.F.R. § 103 .2(b )(1 )-and the organization's 
statements were not sufficient to carry its burden under this criterion. On appeal, the Petitioner does 
not explain or even address how the Director erred in making that determination. These two claims 
of error are not adequately detailed and they do not inform us of what specific error the Director may 
have committed when analyzing the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)--{4). 
The reason for filing an appeal is to provide an affected party with the means to remedy what it 
perceives to be an erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact within a decision in a previous 
proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(v). As it relates to the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)--{4), by presenting only a generalized statement without explaining the 
specific aspects of the denial they consider to be incorrect, the affected party fails to identify a 
sufficient basis for the appeal. Matter of Valencia, 19 I&N Dec. 354, 354-55 (BIA 1986). In order 
to review this appeal, it would therefore be necessary to search through the record and speculate on 
what possible errors the Petitioner claims. Further, the burden to present and develop the arguments 
lie with the Petitioner. Section 291 of the Act; Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 3 7 5. It is insufficient for a 
petitioner's appeal to mention a possible argument in a skeletal way, leaving it up to us to put flesh on 
its bones. See Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Singh v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 
1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing to Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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Consequently, the Petitioner has not satisfied its burden to demonstrate eligibility as it relates to the 
criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 2 l 4.2(h)( 4 )(iii)(A)(l)---{ 4). As a result, even if the Petitioner overcame the issues 
it addresses within the appeal brief (broadly its minimum education requirements for the offered 
position), it still would not demonstrate that the petition should be approved. Because the Petitioner 
has not offered sufficient information specifically relating to and contesting one of the independent 
bases of the Director's decision (i.e., the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)---{4)), and because 
we see no obvious error in that analysis, it is unnecessary for us to reach a decision on the Petitioner's 
minimum education requirements for the offered position. When the Director includes multiple 
dis positive bases in their denial, an appealing party must sufficiently contest all of those reasons. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The Petitioner has not met that burden here, and the 
petition will remain denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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