dismissed H-1B

dismissed H-1B Case: Business Analysis

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Business Analysis

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the proffered 'junior business analyst' position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The AAO found that the accepted fields of study for the required bachelor's degree were too broad and disparate, and the petitioner did not demonstrate how each field was directly related to the specific duties of the position.

Criteria Discussed

Normal Degree Requirement For Position Degree Common To Industry Employer'S Normal Degree Requirement Specialized And Complex Duties

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U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF 1-V-P- CORP. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: SEPT. 26, 2019 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, which provides technology solutions to investing firms, seeks to employ the Beneficiary 
temporarily as a "junior business analyst" under the H-1B nonimmigrant classification for specialty 
occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified 
foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body 
of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty ( or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position . 
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant 
Worker, concluding that the record did not establish that the proffered position qualified as a specialty 
occupation. On appeal , the Petitioner asserts that the Director deviated from the statute and regulation 
within the decision. 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l) , defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires : 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge , 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition , but adds a 
non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition , the regulations provide that the offered position 
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
(]) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or 
higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. 1 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner provided the position's description, and added the percentage of time the Beneficiary 
would spend on each duty in response to the Director's requests for evidence (RFE). For the sake of 
brevity, we will not quote the most recent version; however, we note that we have closely reviewed 
and considered the duties. The Petitioner required "at least a Bachelor's degree, or the equivalent or 
at least a concentration, in Business Management, Business Administration, Finance, Accounting, 
Financial Engineering, Management Information Systems, Engineering Management, or a related 
field, for this position." 
For the reasons discussed below, we have determined that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the 
proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 2 Specifically, we conclude that the record does 
not establish that the job duties require an educational background, or its equivalent, commensurate 
with a specialty occupation. 3 
A. Broad Allegations and Standard of Proof 
The Petitioner claims within its appeal that because it signed the petition under the penalty of perjury, 
that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) "should act, with the presumption that 
whatever statements the petitioner makes are complete, true, and accurate." The Petitioner has not 
provided legal support that USCIS should accept eligibility claims as fact. We note that except where 
1 See Royal Siam COip. v. Chertof(, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific 
specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 
201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
2 Although some aspects of the regulatory criteria may overlap, we will address each of the criteria individually. 
3 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the petition, including evidence regarding the position and its business 
operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
2 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
a different standard is specified by law, a petlt10ner must prove eligibility for the requested 
immigration benefit by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 Under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, the evidence must demonstrate that the petitioner's claim is "probably true." 5 We will 
examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and 
within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably 
true. If a petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads us to believe that the 
claim is "more likely than not" or "probably" true, it has satisfied the standard of proof. Stated another 
way, a petitioner must establish that there is greater than a fifty percent chance that a claim is true. 
Additionally, the Petitioner asserts that USCIS erroneously followed Executive Order (E.O.) 13788, 
"Buy American and Hire American," while deviating from the law. 6 However, upon careful review 
of the record, the Director did not cite to E.O. 13788 as a basis for the decision. The Petitioner offers 
generalities and does not identify which statute, regulation, or policy it alleges the Director ignored to 
deny the petition. Although we decline to reach E.O. 13788 and its application to the matter at hand, 
we note that an Executive order has the same power as a regulation if it is issued under a power that 
belongs to the President under the Constitution or statute. 7 The Petitioner asserts that USCIS did not 
afford it the requisite fundamental principles of law in the form of "due process, justice, and fairness." 
To the extent that the Petitioner alleges a constitutional due process violation, we have no jurisdiction 
to reach that question. 8 Finally, inasmuch as the appellant contends that their rights to procedural due 
process were violated, the organization has not demonstrated any error by the Director in conducting 
her review of the petition, nor have they shown that any violation of the statute or the regulations 
resulted in "substantial prejudice" to them. 9 The respondents have fallen far short of meeting this 
standard. 
A review of the record and the adverse decision indicates that the Director properly applied the statute 
and regulations to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioner's primary complaint is that the Director denied 
the petition. As previously discussed, the Petitioner has not met its burden of proof and the denial was 
the proper result under the regulation. Accordingly, the Petitioner's claims surrounding these issues 
are without merit. 
B. Degree Requirements 
We note that the Petitioner's degree requirements are insufficient to qualify under the H-1B program. 
In general, provided the specialties are closely related, a minimum of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
more than one specialty is recognized as satisfying the "degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent)" 
4 Matter of Chawathe, 25 T&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). 
5 Id. at 376. 
6 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 21, 2017). 
7 See Farkas v. Texas Instrument. Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1967) (noting the "broad authority" granted to the 
President by the Procurement Act); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1981). 
8 See DHS Delegation No. 0150.1 para. (2)(U) (Mar. 1, 2003) (delegating appellate authority over those case types listed 
at 8 C.F.R. § 103.l(f)(3)(iii) (2003)). See. e.g.. Matter of Fuentes-Campos, 21 l&N Dec. 905, 912 (BIA 1997) (citing 
Matter of C-, 20 T&N Dec. 529 (BIA 1992); Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 T&N Dec. 335, 339 (BIA 1991 ). 
9 See De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an individual "must make an initial showing 
of substantial prejudice" to prevail on a due process challenge). 
3 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
requirement of section 2 l 4(i)(l )(B) of the Act. In such a case, the required "body of highly specialized 
knowledge" would essentially be the same. A minimum entry requirement of degrees in disparate fields, 
however, would not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be "in the specific specialty ( or its 
equivalent)," unless the Petitioner establishes how each field is directly related to the duties and 
responsibilities of the particular position. 10 In such a case, the organization must establish that the 
required "body of highly specialized knowledge" is essentially an amalgamation of these different 
specialties. 11 The Petitioner has not made this showing. The Petitioner stated that a degree in one of 
several disparate fields (i.e., any bachelor's degree as long as a candidate possesses "a concentration" in 
one of several fields) was sufficient for the position. 12 
We observe other issues within the Petitioner's degree requirements. The Petitioner required "at least 
a Bachelor's degree, or the equivalent or at least a concentration, in Business Management, Business 
Administration, Finance, Accounting, Financial Engineering, Management Information Systems, 
Engineering Management, or a related field, for this position." In addition to the problem created by 
the wide range of degrees that the Petitioner would accept, its claim that a bachelor's degree in business 
administration, with no further specialization, would adequately prepare a candidate to perform the duties 
of the proffered position is also problematic. Although a general-purpose bachelor's degree, such as a 
degree in business administration, may be a legitimate prerequisite for a particular position, requiring 
such a degree without more, will not justify a finding that a particular position qualifies for classification 
as a specialty occupation.13 
While the Petitioner indicates that this position's candidate "must apply an in-depth knowledge of 
business principles and their application," this explanation and this degree requirement do not amount to 
a precise and specific course of study that relates directly and closely to the position in question. These 
requirements do not satisfy the statutory and regulatory framework of the H-lB program. The 
requirement is not just a bachelor's or higher degree, but a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty 
that directly relates to the position duties. 14 A lack of a specific degree requirement-which we have 
in this case-precludes the Petitioner from demonstrating that the position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation. 
C. First Criterion 
Moving to the regulatory criteria, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(I) requires that a baccalaureate or 
higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is normally the minimum requirement for entry 
10 Section 214(i)(l)(B) of the Act (emphasis added). 
11 While the statutory "the" and the regulatory "a" both denote a singular "specialty," we do not so narrowly interpret these 
provisions to exclude positions from qualifying as specialty occupations if they permit, as a minimum entry requirement, 
degrees in more than one closely related specialty. See section 214(i)(l)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). This 
also includes even seemingly disparate specialties providing, again, the evidence ofrecord establishes how each acceptable. 
specific field of study is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position. 
12 The Petitioner did not indicate how it utilized the term "concentration." While the Petitioner could have intended this 
to mean that a candidate must have majored in one of the identified areas, it remains that it could have meant it would 
accept a minor in those areas, or even just a few courses. The Petitioner's lack of clarity further diminishes its ability to 
satisfy its burden of proof 
13 Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147. 
14 See section 214(i)(l)(b) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
4 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
into the particular position. To inform this inquiry, we recognize the U.S. Department of Labor's 
(DOL) Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook) as an authoritative source on the duties and 
educational requirements of the wide variety of occupations that it addresses. 15 The Petitioner 
submitted the required DOL ETA Form 9035 & 9035E, Labor Condition Application for 
Nonimmigrant Workers (LCA) with this petition, where it classified the proffered position under the 
occupational title "Management Analysts," corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification 
code 13-1111. 16 
Although the Handbook states that "[a] bachelor's degree is the typical entry-level requirement for 
management analysts," it also states that "common fields of study include business, management, 
economics, accounting, finance, marketing, psychology, and computer and information sciences." 17 
Based on the wide range of degrees the Handbook indicates is acceptable for entry into this occupation, 
the Handbook does not support the conclusion that a bachelor's or higher degree in a spec[fic specialty, 
or its equivalent, is normally the minimum requirement for entry into a management analyst position. 
In addition, the Handbook confirms that a general-purpose bachelor's degree ( e.g., a bachelor's degree 
in business, with no further specialization) would adequately prepare an individual to perform the 
duties of these positions. 
Furthermore, the Petitioner identifies the "Quick Facts" section within the Handbook stating this 
portion reflects that a bachelor's degree is the typical entry-level education for this occupation. This 
information does not satisfy the statutory and regulatory framework of the H-1B program. The 
requirement is not just a bachelor's degree, rather it is a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty that 
directly relates to the position's duties. 18 
Additionally, in support of the appeal the Petitioner references the DOL' s Occupational Information 
Network (O*NET) summary report for Management Analysts. The Summary Report provides general 
information regarding the Management Analysts occupation; however, it does not support the 
Petitioner's assertion regarding the educational requirements for Management Analysts positions. For 
example, the Management Analysts occupation is designated as Job Zone Five, a zone for which 
"most ... occupations require graduate school." However, the O*NET does not specify what field, if 
any, that the occupation requires the degree to be in. 19 
Finally, the Petitioner references the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 2 l 4.2(h)( 4)(ii) and its discussion of "business specialties." We reiterate our discussion in the 
previous section that a degree requirement of a bachelor's in business administration, with no further 
15 We do not, however, maintain that the Handbook is the exclusive source of relevant information. 
16 The Petitioner is required to submit a certified LCA to USCTS to demonstrate that it will pay the Beneficiary the higher 
of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the "area of employment" or the actual wage paid by 
the employer to other employees with similar experience and qualifications who are performing the same services. Section 
212(n)(l) ofthe Act; 20 C.F.R. § 655.73l(a). 
17 Bureau of Labor Statistics, DOL, Handbook, Management Analysts, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-and­
financial/management-analysts.htm (accessed on Sept. 18, 2019). 
18 See section 214(i)(l)(b) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
19 For additional information, see the O*NET Online Help webpage available at 
http: //v..v.w. onetonline. org/help/ online/ svp. 
5 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
specialization, is not considered to be one in a specific specialty that would satisfy the definition of a 
specialty occupation. 
The Petitioner has not provided documentation from a probative source to substantiate its assertion 
regarding the minimum requirement for entry into this particular position. Therefore, it has not 
satisfied the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l). 
D. Second Criterion 
The second criterion presents two, alternative prongs: 'The degree requirement is common to the 
industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show 
that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with 
a degree .... "20 The first prong concentrates on the common industry practice, while the alternative 
prong narrows its focus to the Petitioner's specific position. 
1. First Prong 
To satisfy this first prong of the second criterion, the Petitioner must establish that the "degree 
requirement" (i.e., a requirement of a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its 
equivalent) is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations. We generally 
consider the following sources of evidence to determine if there is such a common degree requirement: 
whether the Handbook reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional 
association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from 
firms or individuals in the industry establish that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed 
individuals." 21 
As previously discussed, the Petitioner has not established that an authoritative source reports at least 
a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent is required for the proffered position, and 
we incorporate our previous discussion on this matter. In addition, there are no submissions from the 
industry's professional association indicating that it has made a degree a minimum entry requirement. 
Furthermore, the Petitioner did not submit any letters or affidavits from similar firms or individuals in 
the Petitioner's industry attesting that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed 
individuals." 
A petitioner must satisfy the three main elements that the degree requirement is common: (1) to the 
industry, (2) among similar organizations, and (3) in parallel positions. When determining whether 
the Petitioner and other organizations share the same general characteristics, such factors may include 
information regarding the nature or type of organization, and, when pertinent, the size, scope, or scale 
of operations, expenditures, as well as the level ofrevenue and staffing (to list just a few elements that 
may be considered). It is not sufficient for the Petitioner to claim that an organization is similar and 
in the same industry without providing a legitimate basis for such an assertion. 
20 8 C.F.R. § 2 l 4.2(h)( 4 )(iii)(A)(2) ( emphasis added). 
21 See Shanti. Inc. v. Reno, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting Hird/Blaker Co1p. v. Sava, 712 F. Supp. 
1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
6 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
Although the Petitioner closes both its RFE response and the appeal brief identifying this as one of the 
criteria it has satisfied, it did not present arguments or explain how any of its evidence should apply 
to it. Under this requirement, the Director mentioned an opinion letter from~------- a 
retired professor froml I University and identified shortcomings associated with the letter. 
However, the Petitioner did not address or rebut the Director's findings. Instead, within the appeal it 
merely restates that it has satisfied this requirement. The reason for filing an appeal is to provide an 
affected party with the means to remedy what they perceive as an erroneous conclusion of law or 
statement of fact within a previous proceeding. 22 By presenting only a generalized statement without 
explaining the specific aspects they consider to be incorrect, the affected party has failed to identify 
the basis for contesting this requirement on appeal. 23 Consequently, the Petitioner has not 
demonstrated its eligibility under this criterion on appeal. 
We observe additional issues withl Is letter. First, he only tacitly discussed industry 
degree requirements for positions similar to the one proffered here, and he did not offer a detailed 
explanation of how he made this determination. How he came to this conclusion is not self-evident from 
his discussion on the matter, and we are not required to accept cursory or primarily conclusory statements 
as demonstrating eligibility. 24 Second, I I iudicard that he retired from I I 
UniversiQ. Yet, the Petitioner offered a letter froml dated in January 2014 ni which he 
discussed ~....,...........,...........,...--..,.....,.....ts performance for the university in the present tense. The Petitioner has 
not explained why it provided such dated material, or why we should consider the information within 
I b letter to still be accurate today. This deficient evidence is insufficient to satisfy the 
Petitioner's burden of proof. 
Without more, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that a bachelor's degree 
in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar 
organizations. Consequently, the Petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). 
2. Second Prong 
Throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner has not claimed to qualify under this criterion, and it has not 
offered evidence to apply to the second prong of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). 
E. Third Criterion 
The third criterion of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) entails an employer demonstrating that it normally 
requires a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position. The record must 
22 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(v). 
23 There is agreement among several circuit courts of appeals on this issue. See Minghai Tian v. Holder. 745 F.3d 822, 
827 (7th Cir. 2014); Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir. 2008); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen .. 401 F.3d 
1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005); Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988); Leer v. Mwphy, 844 F.2d 
628, 634 (9th Cir.1988); Tedder v. FM. C. Co1p .. 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1979). See also Matter of Valencia. 19 l&N 
Dec. 354, 354-55 (BIA 1986). 
24 Innova Solutions Inc., v. Baran. 2018 WL 4913632, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2018); 1756, Inc. v. At(v Gen, 745 F. 
Supp. 9, 17 (D.D.C. 1990). 
7 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
establish that a petitioner's stated degree requirement is not a matter of preference for high-caliber 
candidates but is necessitated instead by performance requirements of the position. 25 Were USCIS 
limited solely to reviewing the Petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, then any individual 
with a bachelor's degree could be brought to the United States to perform any occupation as long as 
the Petitioner created a token degree requirement. 26 Evidence provided in support of this criterion 
may include, but is not limited to, documentation regarding the Petitioner's past recruitment and hiring 
practices, as well as information regarding employees who previously held the position. 
The Petitioner's arguments under this criterion revolve around material relating to its current and 
previous hired personnel that it claims occupy a "position that is the same/similar to that of the 
proposed position .... " The evidence consists of two spreadsheets: one for current employees, and 
one for its previous personnel; a monthly pay statement for each employee; university-level diplomas 
and some related transcripts; resumes; and administrative employment documents and agreements. 
The Petitioner has not established eligibility under this criterion. Not only does its supporting 
documentation contain insufficient or inconsistent information, but also several shortcomings exist 
relating to the Petitioner's claims under this criterion. 
First, the job announcement only reflected that the Petitioner required a "Bachelor's degree with strong 
academic background." This representation of the Petitioner's claimed degree requirements for the 
offered position are not consistent with its own assertions in its correspondence. For instance, throughout 
these proceedings, the Petitioner has stated that the proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in 
business management, business administration, finance, accounting, financial engineering, 
management information systems, engineering management, or a related field. The Petitioner's own 
job announcement was in conflict with this claim, as its only requirement included a bachelor's degree 
without any concentration in a specific specialty. The Petitioner has not addressed this incongruity with 
independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, and as a result, its uncorroborated 
assertions are not sufficient to meet its burden of proof. 27 
Second, the Petitioner did not establish the number of personnel they have employed in the position, 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The only evidence directly relating to this aspect is what appears 
to be self-generated spreadsheets listing nine current and eight previous persons. We will not presume 
that the number of personnel the Petitioner has ever employed in the current position is demonstrated 
by what amounts to its assertion as represented by names on a spreadsheet. 28 
25 See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. A petitioner must demonstrate that its imposed requirements are genuine. Sagarwala 
v. Cissna, No. CV 18-2860 (RC), 2019 WL 3084309, at *9 (D.D.C. July 15, 2019). Cf Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 
19 T&N Dec. 558, 560 (BIA 1988) (finding: (1) the requirement of a degree for the sake of general education, or to obtain 
what an employer perceives to be a higher caliber employee, does not establish eligibility; and (2) an analysis of eligibility 
includes not only the actual requirements specified by the petitioner but also those required by the specific industry in 
question, to determine, in part, the validity of a petitioner's requirements). 
26 Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. 
27 Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
28 The Petitioner has not established the number of personnel it has hired-at least in recent history-in the junior business 
analyst position with unsupported testimonial evidence alone. Matter of Soffici, 22 T&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) 
(going on record without sufficient probative supporting documentary evidence falls short of satisfying the requisite burden 
ofproot). 
8 
Matter of 1-V-P- Corp. 
Third, even if we were to presume these spreadsheets folly represented the entirety of its junior 
business analyst hiring, the Petitioner has not demonstrated the duties the listed personnel perform for 
it are sufficiently similar to the position it offers in this petition. Lacking from the record is probative 
evidence establishing the duties of the personnel listed on the spreadsheets was sufficiently analogous 
to the offered position's responsibilities. While the spreadsheets indicate that all the positions shared 
the same job title as the one in the petition, a job title alone does not establish the corollary nature of 
a position's duties when comparing the jobs on the spreadsheets to the proffered one here. 29 
The only form of evidence that appears related to the duties the Petitioner's personnel perform, or 
previously performed, are the employees' resumes. We first note that these resumes are not 
corroborated with other material in the record that establishes the duties these individuals perform for 
the petitioning organization. In other words, these resumes essentially equate to assertions from these 
personnel, and are insufficient to satisfy the Petitioner's burden of proof in these proceedings. 30 
Beyond that shortcoming, only one resume out of seventeen-from I ~included work 
experience performed for the Petitioner. Consequently, only about six percent of this evidence 
appeared to relate to the Petitioner's claims under this criterion. 
Reviewing I Is resume, we observe that he claims to perform functions for the Petitioner as a 
junior business analyst that are atypical to the Management Analysts occupational classification. 
Specifically, he listed functions associated with the following occupational classifications: 
(1) Database Administrators, (2) Software Developers, Applications, and (3) Search Marketing 
Strategists as a subgroup under the Computer Occupations, All Other category. Were we to conclude 
that the Petitioner had overcome the bases in the Director's denial, this petition still does not appear 
to be approvable, as such functions make it appear that the petitioning organization may not be 
compensating the Beneficiary at a high enough prevailing wage rate. 
Other deficiencies forth er undermine the Petitioner's claims under this criterion. For their nine current 
employees, the Petitioner only offered one individual's university transcripts, which is photocopied in 
a manner that it is illegible. We observe that the Petitioner provided transcripts for half of its previous 
employees. The Petitioner did not explain why it was able to provide so many transcripts relating to 
former personnel, but was unable to produce even one legible sample for the individuals it currently 
employs. While this does not lead us to make any independent adverse determination regarding this 
issue, it does contribute to the overall inadequate nature of the Petitioner's claims under this criterion. 
Finally, of its current nine employees, only the Beneficiary's Covenant by Employee Regarding 
Competition and Trade Secrets contains an original signature, as the Covenants for the other personnel 
were either not provided, contain a signature generated by a word processor ( e.g., not an electronic 
signature), or are missing the candidate's signature entirely. This farther diminishes the evidentiary 
value of this evidence. 
29 Cf Feclin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990) (stating 
specifics are an important indication of the nature of a position's duties, otherwise meeting the requirements would simply 
be a matter of providing a job title.) "The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment." Id. 
30 Sofjici, 22 l&N Dec. at 165. 
9 
Matter of 1-V-P-Corp. 
Without more, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that it normally requires 
at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the proffered position. 
Therefore, it has not satisfied the third criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 
F. Fourth Criterion 
Throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner has not claimed to qualify under this criterion, and it has not 
explained how its evidence applies to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)( 4). 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is a petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner 
has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofl-V-P- Corp., ID# 4682795 (AAO Sept. 26, 2019) 
10 
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