dismissed H-1B Case: Computer Programming

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Room 3000
Washington, DC 20529
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
FILE: WAC 04 260 51185 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 2 4Z007
INRE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § llOl(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
SELF-REPRESENTED
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision ofthe Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office
WAC 04 260 51185
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
The petition will be denied.
The petitioner is a systems integration and software development company that seeks to employ the
beneficiary as a computer programmer. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a
nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(1S)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
The record of proceeding before the AAO contains (1) the Form 1-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the
director's request for additional evidence; (3) the petitioner's response to the director's request; (4) the
director's denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO reviewed the
record in its entirety before issuing its decision.
The director denied the petition on three grounds: (I) that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that it meets
the regulatory definition of an "employer" and that it will engage in an employer-employee relationship with
the beneficiary; (2) that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of a specialty occupation, as it
had not submitted an itinerary of services to be performed; and (3) that the petitioner had not established that
it would comply with the terms and conditions of the labor condition application (LCA) certified for the
location of intended employment.
On appeal, counsel contends that the director erred in denying the petition.
Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term
"specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge,
and
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.
The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:
[A]n occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly
specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to,
architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and
health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which
requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its
equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of
the following criteria:
WAC 04 260 51185
Page 3
(1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent IS normally the minimum
requirement for entry into the particular position;
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular
position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with
a degree;
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
(4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a
baccalaureate or higher degree.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific
specialty that is directly related to the proposed position.
The term "employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii):
United States employer means a person, finn, corporation, contractor, or other
association, or organization in the United States which:
(1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under
this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or
otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.
The AAO disagrees with the director's finding that the petitioner would not act as the beneficiary's
employer. The evidence of record establishes that the petitioner will act as the beneficiary's employer in
that it will hire, pay, fire, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary.' See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).
In view of this evidence, the AAO finds that the petitioner will be the employer of the beneficiary and
withdraws the director's decision to the contrary.
The petition may not be approved, however, as the petition does not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in a specialty occupation or that the employer has submitted an itinerary of employment.
1 See also Memorandum from
Interpretation of the Term "Itinerary" Found in 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) as it Relates to the H-IB
Nonimmigrant Classification,HQ 70/6.2.8 (December 29, 1995).
WAC 04 260 51185
Page 4
As the petitioner notes on appeal, the beneficiary would not perform his duties at the petitioner's place of
business. Rather, he would be "assigned to these client projects outside its placeof business," as "[t]he needs
of each project is dictated and prescribed by the client." Further,the AAO notes that, at page:2 of the Form 1­
129, in the field entitled "Address where the person(s) will work," the petitioner stated that subsequent work
locations for thebeneficiarywere unknown at the timeof the filing.
The etitioner submitted an "inde endent contractor agreement" between the petitioner and Inalytix, LLC
According to the contract, Inalytix is hiring the petitioner as
an in~actor and as a "consultant." The contract states that Inalytix desires to
retai~as an "independent contractor to assist [Inalytix] in performing its contract with
Ameriquest ('Client')." Under Paragraph 1, Retention, the contract states that "all work for Client
performed by shall be under the supervision of [Inalytix]." However, under the same
paragraph, the con rae goes on to state that "services will be performed at the times and at the location(s)
desi nated b Client." Therefore the petitioner's agreement with Inalytix calls for the petitioner to offer
which will in tum place t the end user client sites. The
pe I loner as no a resse ow a contract between the pet Iytix for the services of Pratap
Reddy establishes that thebeneficiarywill be employed in a specialty occupation.
The petitioner also submitted a "subcontract agreement for temporary consultant services" between the
petitioner and Kensington Resources Inc. ("Kensington"). The contract states that Kensington "provides
computer software professionals who are highly skilled in computer systems, analysis, programming or
related work in software functions" and Kensington desires to use the petitioner's services to "meet the
requirements of its customers." Under Paragraph 1, Subcontracted Services, the contract states that the
petitioner will provide services "at customer [sic] on behalf of Kensington" as specified in a professional
services work order." The petitioner submitted a professional services work order under the services
agreement between the petitioner and Kensington, dated June 7, 2004, indicating that ~iII
begin a four week assi nment for Kensin on as a data modeler from June 8, 2004 until July 6, 2004 at a
client's work site in The petitioner's agreement with Kensington calls for the
petitioner to offer Kensington, which will in tum place at the
end user client site. Again, ~as not addressed how a contract between the petitioner and
Kensington for the services of _ establishesthat the beneficiary will be employed in a specialty
occupation.
The AAO agrees with the director that the petition does not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in a specialty occupation. The evidence of record establishes that the petitioner is an
employment contractor in that the petitioner will place _and at work
locations to perform services established by contractual agreements for third-party compames.
The petitioner also submitted a "subcontract agreement" between the petitioner and Core Integration
Partners, Inc. ("Core Integration"). The contract submitted did not include a work order listing the
beneficiary or a job description for the duties that the beneficiary will perform for Core Integration. The
court in Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F. 3d 384 (5 th Cir. 2000) held that for the purpose of determining
whether a proposed position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor
is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more
WAC 04 260 51185
Page 5
relevant employer." The Defensor court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job
requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The court
held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and
regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proposed position qualifies as a specialty
occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services.
As the record does not contain documentation that establishes the specific duties the beneficiary would
perform under contract for Core Integration, the AAO cannot analyze whether these duties would require
at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a
specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies
for classification as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or
that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty
occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(1). Thus, the petition may not be approved.
Pursuant to the language at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B), employers must submit an itinerary with the
dates and locations of employment in such situations. While the Aytes memorandum cited at footnote 1
broadly interprets the term "itinerary," it provides CIS the discretion to require that the petitioner submit
the dates and locations of the proposed employment. As the evidence contained in the record at the time
the petition was filed did not establish that the petitioner had three years of work for the beneficiary to
perform, the director properly exercised his discretion to require an itinerary of employment.'
On appeal, the petitioner states, in response to this portion of the denial, that it is not an agent and is
therefore not required to submit an itinerary.' However, as noted previously, the regulation at
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) requires employers to submit an itinerary with the dates and locations of
employment in situations where the employment will occur in more than one location.
On appeal, counsel submits contracts from the following companies: (1) Wells Fargo; (2) Intuit;
(3) Oracle; and (4) MBN A. However, none of these documents specifically request the services of the
beneficiary, and do not indicate that the beneficiary was selected from the petitioner's qualified workers.
None of these contracts have any effect until work orders (referred to as "assignment memorandums," in
the case of the contract with Wells Fargo and "statements of work" in the case of the contracts with Intuit,
Oracle, and MBNA) are issued. The record contains no work orders with the beneficiary's itinerary.
Absent such information, the petitioner has not established that it has three years' worth of H-lB·level
work for the beneficiary to perform. Moreover, the contracts between the petitioner and Inalytix, Core
Integration, and Kensington, submitted with the petitioner's initial filing, failed to establish three years of
work in a specialty occupation with the proposed end user(s) of the beneficiary's services. The evidence
contained in the record does not satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) as it does not cover the entire period
of the beneficiary's employment by the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner has not complied with the
requirements at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) and the petition was properly denied.
2 As noted by I in the cited 1995 memorandum, "[t]he purpose of this
particular regulafioii IS to ensure t at a len eneficiaries accorded H status have an actual job offer and
are not coming to the United States for speculative employment."
3 On appeal, counsel submits a copy of regulations that were proposed in 1998. However, those
regulations were never published and have no legal effect here.
WAC 04 260 51185
Page 6
The director also found that the record does not establish that the LCA is valid for all work locations. As
the record does not contain an itinerary of employment, it cannot be determined that the LCA is valid for
the work locations. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
The petitioner's assertion that denial of the petition constituted a due process violation fails. The petitioner
has failed to overcome the director's denial, and it has demonstrated no prejudice on the part of the director
that would constitute a due process violation. See Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469-70
(9th Cir. 1986); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1979); Martin-Mendoza v. INS,
499 F.2d 918,922 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975). As discussed previously, the
petitioner has not met its burden of proof, and the denial was the proper result under the regulation.
The petitioner cites to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) on appeal, and states that the "hundreds of petitions" that the
petitioner has had approved in the past should serve as precedents. However, the petitioner has misread
8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c), which states the following:
Service precedent decisions. The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials of
the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with the concurrence
of the Attorney General, may file with the Attorney General decisions relating to the
administration of the immigration laws of the United States for publication as precedent
in future proceedings, and upon approval of the Attorney General as to the lawfulness of
such decision, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review shall cause
such decisions to be published in the same manner as decisions of the Board and the
Attorney General ... [D]esignated Service decisions are to serve as precedents in all
proceedings involving the same issue(s) ....
The petitioner's prior approval notices are not precedent decisions. The petitioner submits no evidence
that its previous approvals have been designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the
concurrence of the Attorney General, as precedent decisions, and published by the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent
decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not
similarly binding.
Regarding the petitioner's previous approvals, the AAO notes that each nonimmigrant petition is a
separate proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). If the petitioner's previous
petitions were approved based upon the same evidence contained in this record, their approval would
constitute error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions
where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been
erroneous. See, e.g. Matter ofChurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It
would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent.
Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1008 (1988).
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a
court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director did approve a nonimmigrant petition
WAC 0426051185
Page 7
similar to the one at issue here, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a
service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), aff'd,
248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).
Finally, the AAO notes that the petitioner has requested oral argument before the AAO, citing to "the
issues being decided herein and public policy at stake." The AAO disagrees. CIS has the sole authority
to grant or deny a request for oral argument and will grant argument only in cases involving unique
factors or issues of law that cannot be adequately addressed in writing. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(b). The
instant petition does not involve unique factors or issues of law, and the written record of proceedings
fully represents the facts and issues in this matter. Consequently, the request for oral argument is denied.
The petitioner has failed to establish that it has an itinerary of employment for the beneficiary, that it has
three years of work for the beneficiary, that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty
occupation, that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of
a specialty occupation, or that the LCA is valid for the work locations. Accordingly, the AAO will not
disturb the director's denial of the petition.
The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.