dismissed H-1B Case: Computer Science

MATTER OF C-T-S-U.S. CORP. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: OCT. 30, 2015 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a computer and software consulting firm, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a 
manager and to classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation. See Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act) § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition. The 
matter is now before us on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Beneficiary was initially admitted into the United States on April 27, 2008, as an L-1 B 
specialized knowledge employee for the Petitioner. The Beneficiary was subsequently admitted into 
the United States on April 21, 2012, as an L-1 A managerial or executive employee for the 
Petitioner. 1 On February 10, 2011, the Petitioner filed a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien 
Worker, on behalf of the Beneficiary, which was approved on June 3, 2011, with an August 11, 
2010, priority date. On April 1, 2014, the Petitioner filed the instant petition requesting that the 
Beneficiary's status be changed on October 1, 2014, from L-1A nonimmigrant classification to H-1B 
nonimmigrant classification and that his stay in the United States be extended until June 15, 2017. 
In particular, the Petitioner is requesting that the Beneficiary's stay be extended beyond the six-year 
limitation contained in section 214(g)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4), pursuant to section 
104(c) of the "American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act" (AC21). See Pub. L. 
No. 106-313, §§ 104(c) and 106(a), (b), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253-54 (2000); Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
§ 11030A(a), 116 Stat. 1836 (2002). 
The Petitioner submitted evidence confirming that the Form I-140 filed by the Petitioner on the 
Beneficiary's behalf has been approved, and that there were no eligible visa numbers for the third 
preference immigrant visa category for individuals born in India when the instant petition was filed. 
Thus, the Beneficiary reached the maximum allowed time in "H or L" status pursuant to the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A) prior to the requested start date of October 1, 2014. The 
1 
The Beneficiary reached his seven-year maximum period of stay permitted in L-1 A classification, with recaptured time, 
on August 9, 2015. See section 214(c)(2)(D) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(1)(12). 
Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp. 
record does not show that, at the time the instant petition was filed, the Beneficiary had been present 
outside the United States for the immediate prior year. 
II. ISSUE 
The issue before us is whether the Petitioner has established that the Beneficiary is entitled to an 
exemption from the limitations imposed on extensions of stay for H-lB nonimmigrants. 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 214(g)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) provides: "In the case of a nonimmigrant 
described in section 101 ( a)(15)(H)(i)(b ), the period of authorized admission as such a nonimmigrant 
may not exceed 6 years." Section 106(a) and 104(c) of the AC21 as amended by the "Twenty-First 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act" (DOJ21) temporarily removes the 
six -year limitation on the authorized period of stay in H -1 B classification for foreign nationals under 
certain conditions. 
More specifically, an exemption is available under section 106(a) of AC21 for certain foreign 
nationals whose labor certifications or immigrant petitions remain undecided due to lengthy 
adjudication delays. See Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 106(a), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253-54 (2000); Pub. L. No. 
107-273, § 11030A(a), 116 Stat. 1836 (2002). According to the text of section 106(b) of AC21, 
foreign nationals may have their "stay" extended in the United States in one-year increments 
pursuant to an exemption under section 106(a) of AC21. 
As amended by section 11030A(a) ofDOJ21, section 106(a) of AC21 reads: 
(a) EXEMPTION FROM LIMITATION. -- The limitation contained in section 
214(g)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4)) with 
respect to the duration of authorized stay shall not apply to any nonimmigrant alien 
previously issued a visa or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status under section 
101 (a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(l S)(H)(i)(b )), if 365 days or more 
have elapsed since the filing of any of the following: 
(I) Any application for labor certification under section 212(a)(5)(A) of such Act 
(8 U.S. C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)), in a case in which certification is required or used by 
the alien to obtain status under section 203(b) of such Act (8 U.S. C.§ 1153(b)). 
(2) A petition described in section 204(b) of such Act (8 U.S. C. § 1154(b)) to 
accord the alien a status under section 203 (b) of such Act. 
Section 11030A(b) ofDOJ21 amended section 106(b) of AC21 to read: 
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Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp. 
(b) EXTENSION OF H-1B WORKER STATUS--The [Secretary of Homeland 
Security] shall extend the stay of an alien who qualifies for an exemption under 
subsection (a) in one-year increments until such time as a final decision is made-
(I) to deny the application described in subsection (a)(l), or, in a case in which 
such application is granted, to deny a petition described in subsection (a)(2) filed 
on behalf of the alien pursuant to such grant; 
(2) to deny the petition described in subsection (a)(2); or 
(3) to grant or deny the alien's application for an immigrant visa or for 
adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence. 
Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 106(a) and (b), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253-54 (2000); Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
§ 11030A, 116 Stat. 1836, 1836-37 (2002) (emphasis added to identify sections amended by 
DOJ21). A delay of 365 days or more in the final adjudication of a filed labor certification 
application or employment based immigrant petition under section 203(b) of the Act is considered "a 
lengthy adjudication delay" for purposes of this exemption. See Pub. Law No. 107-273, 116 Stat. at 
1836. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Upon review of the record of proceeding, we find that the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary is eligible for an extension of stay in the United States pursuant to section 1 04( c) of the 
AC21. That is because section 1 04( c) of AC21 applies only to an individual described in section 
214(g)(4) of the Act, i.e., an individual accorded H-1B status pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) 
of the Act. The Beneficiary is not an individual described in section 214(g)( 4) of the Act, as he does 
not have and has never been accorded H-1B status. 
The starting point for our analysis is the language of the statute. Section 1 04( c) of AC21 begins by 
specifically referring to section 214(g)( 4) of the Act, which in turn specifically refers to "a 
nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)." We interpret the specific reference to 
section 214(g)( 4) of the Act as framing and limiting the applicability of section 1 04( c) of AC21 to 
only to an individual described in section 214(g)( 4) of the Act. Moreover, we interpret the specific 
reference to "a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)" to determine that section 
214(g)(4) of the Act refers exclusively to an H-IB nonimmigrant. 
Here, the Petitioner asserts that section 1 04( c) of AC21 is not limited to H -1 B nonimmigrants. The 
Petitioner states that the term "any .alien" in section 1 04( c) should be broadly interpreted as 
including any individual in any nonimmigrant status. However, the Petitioner's proposition is not 
supported by the language of the statute. The term "any alien" in section 1 04( c) must be read 
together with, and qualified by, the immediate preceding phrase "[n]otwithstanding section 
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Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp. 
214(g)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." That is, the term "any alien" does not broadly 
refer to any individual in any nonimmigrant status, but rather, to any individual described in section 
214(g)(4) of the Act, i.e., an individual in H-lB status. In addition, the term "any alien" in section 
1 04( c) must be read together with the subsequent phrase "an extension of such nonimmigrant 
status." The word "such" would be rendered meaningless if we were too broadly interpret the term 
"any alien" to refer to any individual in any nonimmigrant status. The most reasonable reading of 
the word "such" is that it refers back to a nonimmigrant as described in section 214(g)( 4) of the Act, 
i.e., an individual in H-1B status. In other words, section 104(c) should be read as stating that any 
individual described in section 214(g)( 4) of the Act may apply for, and be granted, an extension of 
such H -1 B status. We also do not see how an individual who is not in H-1 B status could reasonably 
be granted an extension of H-IB status under the ordinary meaning of the word "extension" (as 
opposed to, for example, a change of status). 
Statutory language must be given conclusive weight unless the legislature expresses an intention to 
the contrary. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The plain meaning ofthe statutory language should control except in rare cases in 
which a literal application of the statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of 
its drafters, in which case it is the intention of the legislators, rather than the strict language, that 
controls. Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. CIR, 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.) We are expected to give the words 
used in their ordinary meaning. See Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc. 
The Petitioner's contention that the Beneficiary's time spent in L status should be treated as identical 
to time spent in H -1 B status for purposes of determining that the Beneficiary is an individual 
described in section 214(g)(4) of the Act is untenable. The Petitioner asserts that "L-1 status is 
treated essentially identical to H-lB status" by virtue of 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A), which 
states, in pertinent part, that an individual "who has spent six years in the United States under section 
101(a)(15)(H) and/or (L) of the Act may not seek extension, change status, or be readmitted to the 
United States under section I 0 I ( a)(lS)(H) or (L) of the Act." However, we cannot find that 8 C.F .R. 
§ 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A) effectively extends section 214(g)(4) of the Act to apply to L nonimmigrants. 
The Petitioner's position in this matter is not supported by statutory or regulatory authority. To the 
contrary, we find that the Act contains separate provisions regarding the maximum admission 
periods for H-lB and L nonimmigrants: section 214(g)(4) of the Act (for H-lB nonimmigrants), and 
section 214(c)(2)(D) of the Act (for L nonimmigrants). Likewise, the regulations separately address 
the maximum periods of admission for H-1B and L nonimmigrants. Compare 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.1(1)(12) (setting forth limitations on period of stay for L nonimmigrants) with 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A) (for H-1B nonimmigrants). That the statute and regulations separately address 
the maximum admission periods for H-1B and L nonimmigrants undermines the Petitioner's 
assertion that L and H -1 B status should be treated identically. 
Furthermore, the Petitioner has not presented persuasive arguments or supporting documentation 
demonstrating that Congress intended to extend the provisions of section 1 04( c) to any classification 
other than the H -1 B classification. The Petitioner claims that excluding L nonimmigrants from 
section 104(c) would be contrary to "the purpose of AC21." However, the legislative history 
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Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp. 
indicates that AC21 was specifically intended to provide relief to H-1B nonimmigrants. The 
legislative history discussing section 1 04( c) of AC21 does not reference the L or any classification 
other than the H-1B classification. Notably, the title ofPublic Law 106-313 begins as: "An Act: To 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to H-1B nonimmigrant aliens."2 We are to 
construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust of related provisions and with the 
statute as a whole. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that 
construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); 
see also COlT Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989); 
Matter ofW-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). 
As previously noted, Section 104(c) of AC21 begins by specifically referring to section 214(g)(4) of 
the Act; it does not reference section 214(c)(2)(D) of the Act. The title of the statute and its specific 
reference to section 214(g)(4) ofthe Act, to the exclusion of section 214(c)(2)(D) ofthe Act, further 
undermines the Petitioner's position that excluding L nonimmigrants from section 104(c) would be 
contrary to "the purpose of AC21." If Congress had specifically intended to include L or other 
nonimmigrants in section 104(c) of AC21, it could and would have done so.3 
The Petitioner states, "Had Congress intended that extensions under Section 1 04( c) of AC21 be 
limited to only individuals who had previously held H-1B status, it would have inserted the same 
restricting language in Section 1 04( c) that it included in Section 1 06( a)." The Petitioner 
acknowledges that section 1 06( a) of AC21 is "limited to only individuals who had previously held 
H-1B status." However, the Petitioner's reliance upon section 106(a) of AC21 is misplaced. As 
discussed above, the legislative history discussing section 1 04( c) of AC21, and AC21 more 
generally, exclusively references the H-1B classification. As such, it is more reasonable to construe 
section 1 04( c) consistently with section 1 06( a) and the rest of the statute as applying only to the 
H -1 B classification. 4 Again, we are to construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust 
2 The full version of the statute may be accessed online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLA W­
I 06publ313/pdf/PLA W-1 06publ313.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
3 For example, in drafting section 104(c) of AC21, Congress could have stated, "Notwithstanding section 214(g)(4) and 
section 214(c)(2)(D) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act .... " 
4 Finally, the Petitioner references the Interoffice Memorandum from Michael Yates, Associate Director, Domestic 
Operations, Guidance on Determining Periods of Admission for Aliens Previously in H-4 or L-2 Status; Aliens Applying 
for Additional Periods of Admission beyond the H-1 B Six Year Maximum; and Aliens Who Have Not Exhausted the Six-
Year Maximum But Who Have Been Absentfrom the United States for Over One Year (Dec. 5, 2006) and claims that it is 
relevant here. However, the sentence in the Yates Memorandum that "USCIS will focus on whether the alien is eligible 
for an additional period of admission in in H-1 B status, rather than whether the alien is currently in H-I B status that is 
about to expire and is seeking an extension of that status," does not support the conclusion that section 104(c) of AC21 
extends beyond H-1 B nonimmigrants. Notably, this sentence states that the individual must be "eligible for an additional 
period of admission in in H-1 B status." (Emphasis added). The use of the word "additional" implies that the individual 
must have had H-1 B status to begin with. Furthermore, we note that the above sentence is found in the paragraph 
beginning with the following sentence, "In sections I 06 and I 04( c) of AC21, Congress provided exemptions to the six­
year maximum period of stay rules for certain H-1 B aliens." We also observe the subsequent "note" which states that 
the Petitioner must establish the individual's eligibility for "any additional periods of stay in H-18 status ... including 
evidence of ... previous H-1 B status." Thus, contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, it is not clear how an individual who 
5 
Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp. 
of related provisions and with the statute as a whole. SeeK Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. at 
291. 
In short, the evidence of record is insufficient to establish that section 1 04( c) of AC21 extends to 
individual other than those described in section 214(g)(5) of the Act. Without statutory or regulatory 
authority, section 214(g)( 4) of the Act encompasses only individuals accorded H -1 B classification, 
and cannot be extended to other nonimmigrant classifications. Thus, an H -1 B nonimmigrant is the 
only nonimmigrant eligible for an extension of such pursuant to section 1 04( c) of AC21. 
Consequently, we cannot find that the Beneficiary, who is not and has never been in H -1 B status, is 
eligible for an extension of H -1 B nonimmigrant status pursuant to section I 04( c) of AC21. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The evidence of record does not establish that the Beneficiary is eligible for an extension of H -1 B 
nonimmigrant status pursuant to section 1 04( c) of AC21. For this reason, the petition must be 
denied. 
The Petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. 8 C.F .R. § 103 .2(b )( 1 ). In visa 
petition proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit 
sought. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that 
burden has not been met. 5 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofC-T-S-US. Corp., ID# 12514 (AAO Oct. 30, 2015) 
has never had H-1 8 status could be eligible for periods of "additional" H-1 8 status and could submit evidence of his or 
her "previous" H-18 status. 
5 As the identified ground of ineligibility is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we need not address any additional 
issues we observe in the record of proceeding.