dismissed H-1B

dismissed H-1B Case: Data Analytics

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Data Analytics

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the proffered position of senior consultant - data analytics qualifies as a specialty occupation. The AAO found that the petitioner's acceptance of a bachelor's degree from a wide and disparate range of fields (computer science, engineering, information technology, economics, and finance) was inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a position must require a degree in a specific specialty.

Criteria Discussed

Specialty Occupation Definition Bachelor'S Degree In A Specific Specialty Normal Degree Requirement For Position Industry Standard For Degree Employer'S Normal Degree Requirement Specialized And Complex Duties

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U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 20, 2023 In Re: 28650325 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification 
for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a 
qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that establish the Petitioner's proffered job's duties required the theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and that the attainment of a bachelor's or higher 
degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) providing that highly specialized knowledge was a 
minimum entry into the occupation in the United States. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter of Christa 's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
The Act at Section 214(i)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: (A) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) is a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) adds a non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor to the 
statutory definition. And the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii) requires that the proffered 
position must also meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
1. A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for 
entry into the particular position. 
2. The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar 
organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so 
complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree; 
3. The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
4. The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to 
perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher 
degree. 
The statute and the regulations must be read together to make sure that the proffered position meets 
the definition of a specialty occupation. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) 
(holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statue as a whole is 
preferred); see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. And Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 
(1989); Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). Considering the statute and the regulations 
separately leads to scenarios where a Petitioner satisfies a regulatory factor but not the definition of 
specialty occupation contained in the statute. See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 5th Cir. 
2000). The regulatory criteria read together with the statute gives effect to the statutory intent. See 
Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 61111, 61112 Dec. 2, 1991). 
So we construe the term "degree" in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate 
or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position 
supporting the statutory definition of specialty occupation. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 
F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that 
relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). USCIS' application of this 
standard has resulted in the orderly approval ofH-lB petitions for engineers, accountants, information 
technology professionals and other occupations, commensurate with what Congress intended when it 
created the H-1 B category. 
And job title or broad occupational category alone does not determine whether a particular job is a 
specialty occupation under the regulations and statute. The nature of the Petitioner's business 
operations along with the specific duties of the proffered job are also considered. We must evaluate 
the employment of the individual and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation. See Defensor, 201 F.3d 384. So a Petitioner's self-imposed requirements are not as 
critical as whether the position the Petitioner offers requires the application of a theoretical and 
practical body of knowledge gained after earning the required baccalaureate or higher degree in the 
specific specialty required to accomplish the duties of the job. 
By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(l) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director 
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8). 
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to 
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
2 
II. THE PETITIONER AND ITS PROFFERED JOB 
The Petitioner is offering the Beneficiary the position of senior consultant - data analytics. The 
petition included a labor condition application (LCA) certified for a position located within the 
"Computer Systems Analysts" occupation category corresponding to the Standard Occupational 
Classification code 15-1121.00. 1 The proffered job appears to align with the duties of the "Computer 
Systems Analysts" occupational category. In its response to the Director's request for additional 
evidence (RFE), the Petitioner submitted a brief in support to establish that the proffered position met 
all three of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) and referenced evidence submitted earlier in 
these proceedings. 2 
But the Petitioner's requirements are incompatible with the statutory and regulatory framework of the 
H-lB program. The Petitioner's acceptance of a bachelor's degree from a wide variety of fields 
precludes the Petitioner from satisfying both the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty 
occupation. And the evidence the Petitioner has submitted into the record does not demonstrate that 
performance of the proffered job's duties requires an individual with a bachelor's degree in a specific 
related specialty, or the equivalent under any of the criteria contained at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii). 
III. SPECIAL TY OCCUPATION 
A. Wide and Disparate Acceptable Degree Field Range 
The Petitioner inconsistently represented the minimum requirements for its senior consultant - data 
analytics position. The Petitioner asserts the minimum requirements for its senior consultant - data 
analytics position are a bachelor's degree in computer science or an engineering degree with no 
specialization. It farther contends that the stated "degree requirement ensure candidates have the 
knowledge, technical background and critical thinking skills to perform the job." But the Petitioner 
also introduced evidence in the record which reflected "the knowledge, technical background and 
critical thinking skills" for the proffered job were held by data analytics consultants and architects on 
the team the Beneficiary would be assigned to with bachelor's degrees in a vast range of fields such 
as computer science, information technology, finance, and economics. 3 
So the record of proceedings reflects the actual minimum requirements for the Petitioner's proffered 
position to be a bachelor's degree in computer science or engineering with no specialization, 
information technology, economics, and finance for entry into the proffered job. 4 The Petitioner's 
1 After the filing of the petition, the Department of Labor (DOL) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) advised that the 
Computer Systems Analyst entry contained at Standard Occupational Code (SOC) 15-1121 had been discontinued. BLS 
replaced the Computer Systems Analyst entry with the Computer Systems Analyst entry described at SOC 15-1211. 
2 While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
3 On appeal the Petitioner deemphasizes the Director's conclusion that the proffered positions' minimum requirements 
were wider than the range of fields the Petitioner presented, by noting the Director's conclusion in this regard is "not the 
focus [of its] appeal." Whilst the Petitioner has chosen to avert the focus of its appeal, we consider the Director's 
conclusions worthy of further examination because they go directly to the matter of the Petitioner's base eligibility under 
the statue and regulations. 
4 And we need not therefore consider whether a requirement of an engineering degree without specification composes a 
specialty providing the theoretical and practical body knowledge required to perform the duties of a specialty occupation 
3 
inapposite representations constitute an inconsistency relevant to the core statutory eligibility 
requirements for H-1 B classification. The Petitioner's grouping of computer science, engineering with 
no specialization, information technology, economics, and finance was not adequately supported in 
the record with evidence highlighting its composition as a singular specialty composing a body of 
highly specialized knowledge. So a position accommodating such a wide range of acceptable 
educational fields would not be considered specialized. See Caremax v. Holder, 40 F.Supp.3de 1182, 
1187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014)("A position that requires applicants to have any bachelor's degree, or a 
bachelor's degree in a large subset of field, can hardly be considered specialized."). The record as it 
is presently composed does not establish how the Petitioner's degree field grouping could form a body 
of highly specialized knowledge or a specific specialty. The Petitioner's demonstrated acceptance of 
a bachelor's degree from the wide variety of fields contained in the evidence of record precludes the 
Petitioner from satisfying both the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. 
The Petitioner's appeal includes an analysis of positional requirements ( evaluation) to argue that the 
range of fields it requires for the position is not disparate, and that the fields constitute a specialty 
closely related together and with the duties of the position. As a matter of discretion, we may use 
opinion statements submitted by the Petitioner as advisory. Matter of Caron Int'l, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 
791, 795 (Comm'r 1988). But an opinion statement has less weight where there is cause to question 
or doubt the opinion, or if it is not in accord with other information in the record. The submission of 
expert opinion letters is not presumptive evidence in any event. Id.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N 
Dec. 500, 502 n.2 (BIA, 2008). 
The evaluation's writer formulated their opinion based on their professional qualifications and 
experience as a =rofessor and director of computing and informatics at University I lat 
I ILouisiana. The writer states that they reviewed, amongst a list of materials, 
the support letter from the Petitioner submitted with the response documents to the Director's RFE. 
The writer lists the proffered job duties and attempts to establish the suitability of the Petitioner's 
required fields of computer science and any engineering degree without specialization to the proffered 
job's overall duties. In so doing, they focus on the "complexity and specialization of position and 
duties" and "degree requirement [commonality] for position and industry." 
The Petitioner's reliance on this evaluation to support its argument that the range of fields of study it 
accepts is closely related is misplaced. The evaluation does not provide a strong enough basis to 
understand how the wide range of degrees accepted by the Petitioner are related to one another to form 
a body of specialized knowledge. Nor does it show how that body of specialized knowledge relates 
to the duties of the proffered job. So we have questions about the sufficiency of the writer's opinion 
because their conclusions are not in accord with information in the record. Specifically, the writer 
focuses their analysis on the suitability of degrees in computer science and degrees in engineering 
without specialization. But the writer's review of the Petitioner's support letter submitted in response 
to the Director's RFE would have advised them that the Petitioner's need for its "degree requirement 
[to] ensure candidates have the knowledge, technical background and critical thinking skills to perform 
the job" is satisfied by individuals with degrees in finance and economics. The writer makes no 
as it is simply one field listed amongst a diverse range of degree fields the Petitioner apparently accepted for entry into 
their proffered position. The position's minimum education for entry amounts to nothing more than a token requirement 
when "[ a ]11 of Centric Consulting' s Data Analytics consultants and architects possess bachelor's or higher degrees" in the 
variety of different fields listed earlier. 
4 
mention of, nor do they address, the Petitioner's acceptance of these additional degree fields. Nor 
does the writer sufficiently describe how the Petitioner's accepted degree fields mentioned in the 
record relate to one another such that they compose the base commonality of a specialty to perform 
the duties of the proffered occupation. 
And the documentation supporting the writer's opinion presents inconsistent facts. The letter ofD 
~-------,,===-d_e_a_n_o_f_t_h_e__,g"'-,raduate school, University ofj Iattests that the 
University of~------~has "divisions that evaluate professional work experience for 
admission to graduate study." The materials present in the record and accompanying the writer's 
evaluation in support of this proposition consist only of web pages dated October 25, 2022. These 
web pages make no mention or allowance for the evaluation of work experience for appropriate credit 
for admission to graduate study. The copies of web pages in the record state the University of
I I graduate school only "recognizes the appropriateness of accepting credits 
completed at another regionally accredited institution for coursework" equivalent to coursework at 
University of1 IWhilst we held in Chawathe that the standard of proof in 
immigration proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proof is always on the 
petitioner. A petitioner's burden of proof comprises both the initial burden of production, as well as 
the ultimate burden of persuasion. Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998); see also 
the definition of burden of proof from Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (reflecting the burden 
of proof includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). A petitioner must 
satisfy the burden of production. As the term suggests, this burden requires a filing party to produce 
evidence in the form of documents, testimony, etc. that adheres the governing statutory, regulatory, 
and policy provisions sufficient to have the issue decided on the merits. When, as here, a petitioner 
has not met the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence because its evidence is not 
material, relevant, or probative it follows that it has not demonstrated eligibility for the benefit that it 
seeks. And the materiality, relevance, and probity of the writer's opinion is meaningfully undercut 
upon identification of the inconsistency inl Iletter and the supporting web page 
documentation present in the record. So the evaluation is not probative, and we decline to assign it 
any significant evidentiary weight. 
Whilst there is no requirement in the statute for the required education to consist of one specific degree 
or major there must be a close relation between the required specialized studies to constitute a common 
"specialty" and that "specialty" must be related to the duties of the position as supported by the case 
law cited by the Petitioner in its appeal. When a petitioner would accept a bachelor's degree from a 
wide variety of seemingly unconnected fields, like the range of fields the Petitioner presents here, it 
cannot establish that the fields constitute a "specialty" if it does not establish how each accepted and 
specific field of study is directly related to each another and to the duties and responsibilities of the 
particular position. The record as it is currently constituted does not support a conclusion that the 
Petitioner's mass grouping of degree-fields is sufficiently narrow to conclude that it comprises a 
"specialty" requires to perform the duties of the "specialty occupation." 
B. The Petitioner's Additional Assertions on Appeal Regarding Eligibility Under the Four Criteria 
Contained at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 
The Petitioner asserts on appeal that the Director erred in concluding the Petitioner did not establish 
its proffered position is a specialty occupation pursuant to the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
5 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We disagree. We cannot conclude that the proffered position's minimum 
requirement for entry into the job is anything more than a general bachelor's degree for the above 
stated reasons and the Petitioner has not satisfied the statutory definition of a "specialty occupation" 
at section 214(i)(l )(B) of the Act nor the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Without the express requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree providing the 
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, the supplemental 
regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4) cannot be satisfied. The supplemental 
regulatory criteria are read together within the related regulations and the statute as a whole. So, where 
the regulations refer to the term "degree," we interpret that term to mean a baccalaureate or higher 
degree in a specific specialty related to the proffered position. See Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147. The 
word "degree" is mentioned in each prong of the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4). And where, as here, a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific 
specialty is not required as a minimum requirement of entry, it follows that each prong under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4) remains unsatisfied. So we are not required to consider the Petitioner's 
arguments and the evidence it submits in support of its contention that it satisfies the supplemental 
regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4). 
But, even if we set aside the base statutory ineligibility we have already discussed, we would still 
conclude upon examination of the Petitioner's assertions and evidence in the record before us that its 
proffered position is not a specialty occupation under the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4). 5 
1. A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is not the normal minimum requirement for 
entry into the Petitioner's proffered position. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l). 
The Petitioner's proffered job does not qualify as a specialty occupation under the first criterion of the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l). The regulations require a bachelor's or higher degree 
in a specific specialty as a threshold for entry into the proffered position. The Petitioner selected the 
computer systems analyst position contained at Standard Occupational Code (SOC) 15-1121 ofDOL 
BLS' Occupational Information Network (O*NET). 6 The corresponding entry in DOL's 
Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook) related to the computer systems analyst job 
classification reports "[ c ]omputer systems analysts typically need a bachelor's degree in computer and 
information technology or a related field, such as mathematics." 
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Computer 
Systems Analysts (Sept. 6, 2023), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information­
technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm. We folly acknowledge the data contained in the 
Handbook. But the Petitioner's requirements are diverse compared to those included in the Handbook. 
The Petitioner's actual minimum requirements of a bachelor's degree in computer science, any 
engineering field without specialization, economics, and finance are broader than those contained in 
the Handbook. The Petitioner's broader degree field requirements do not identify a specific discipline 
5 The Petitioner did not rebut the Director's conclusions with respect to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (first prong -
common industry practice) or 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(J). 
6 After the filing of the petition, the DOL BLS advised that the Computer Systems Analyst entty contained at Standard 
Occupational Code (SOC) 15-1121 had been discontinued. BLS replaced the Computer Systems Analyst entty with the 
Computer Systems Analyst entry described at SOC 15-1211. 
6 
or specialty cognizable from the degree grouping required to perform the duties of the occupation. 
The Petitioner's reliance on the Handbook is therefore misplaced. The computer systems analyst 
entry in the Handbook does not support a conclusion that the Petitioner's proffered job normally 
requires at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent as a minimum requirement 
for entry. 
2. The Petitioner's proffered job does not qualify as a specialty occupation under the second 
alternate prong of the second criterion or the fourth criterion of the regulations. 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2) and (A)(4). 
The Petitioner's proffered job does not qualify as a specialty occupation under the second alternate 
prong of the second criterion or the fourth criterion of the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2) and (A)(4). The second criterion presents two, alternative prongs: (A) the 
degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations; or 
(B) the employer's particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree. The first prong, concerned with common industry practice is satisfied when 
the Petitioner establishes that its degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions 
among similar organizations. The Petitioner here states that its appeal does not focus on the first prong 
of the second criterion and we will not address it farther. 
The Petitioner does claim that its proffered job is a specialty occupation under the second alternate 
prong of the second criterion. That alternative prong of the second criterion is satisfied if the Petitioner 
shows that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual 
with a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty related to the duties of the proffered position or its 
equivalent. The fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4) requires a petitioner to establish 
that the nature of the specific job duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to 
perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific 
specialty, or its equivalent. 
The Petitioner contends its particular position is more complex or unique than a "prototypical" 
computer systems analyst on three bases. First, it asserts the role has a data analytics focus requiring 
the use of "sophisticated processes and cutting-edge technologies." It specifically identifies 
"SQL/TSQL/PL/SQL," "Agile," and "Mainframe" as the technologies its incumbent will utilize. 
Second, it purports the "consulting nature" of its proffered position "sets a higher bar than most" for 
computer system analysts. Finally, it advances the proposition that the "cross-over" between the 
industry team (insurance) and its service offering (data analytics) elevates the position's complexity 
or umqueness. 
The Petitioner, by Counsel and through its support letter submitted with the response documents to 
the Director's RFE, grounds its assertions in its original and expanded job duties. But the sole function 
served by the Petitioner and its Counsel's assertions in the support letter and brief is a recitation of its 
proffered position's duties. The record does not contain any additional supporting documentation or 
evidence that would highlight or substantiate its claims of complexity or uniqueness. For example, 
the record does not contain evidence supporting the complexity or uniqueness in the use of 
"SQL/TSQL/PL/SQL," "Agile," or "Mainframe" in the performance of computer system analyst 
duties. Similarly, the record does not support the assertion that a consulting component elevates the 
7 
complexity or uniqueness of a position. When viewed in the context of the ubiquity of consulting 
professionals in the corporate, academic, and public sector the Petitioner's assertion elevating the 
function of consulting without specific or contextual evidence in the record is viewed weakly. And 
the record does not sufficiently explain how the performance of computer system analyst duties 
involving data analytics for insurance clients is complex or unique to performing those duties for any 
of the Petitioner's other clients. 
Unlike the second prong of the second criterion contained at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2) where 
complexity or uniqueness is considered disjunctively, the fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4) requires a petitioner to demonstrate its proffered job duties are both complex 
and specialized. Again the Petitioner submits no more than a recitation of the job duties and their 
expansion submitted in response to the Director's RFE to substantiate its claim that the job duties in 
its proffered position are specialized and complex in combination with reference to O*NET and 
Handbook entry for computer systems analysts. 7 The Petitioner emphasizes the use of the word 
"complex" in the O*NET and Handbook entries, but does not mention its placement. For example, in 
the Handbook, DOL BLS utilizes the word "complex" to describe the important qualities of an 
incumbent individual in the computer systems analyst category. But the requirements of the regulation 
refer to job duties which are "complex" not the capabilities of individuals to "interpret complex 
information" or "explain complex issues." The record does not sufficiently describe how the 
Petitioner's proffered senior consultant - data analytics job presents complex information to interpret 
or complex issues to explain. And, even if the record did reflect complex duties, we would still 
conclude that the Petitioner did not meet this criterion because the record does not demonstrate how 
those complex duties are also conjunctively specialized as required by the regulation. For example, 
the record does not sufficiently describe how the duties performed in consulting on data analytics in 
the insurance industry requires any or more specialization than consulting in any other industry. 
And whilst the Petitioner asserts that the "specialized and complex nature of the Sr. Consultant - Data 
Analytics' duties" require a bachelor's degree or higher in computer science, any engineering degree 
without specialization, or a related field for the role, the Petitioner states in its support letter submitted 
in response to the Director's RFE that it has employed individuals with degrees in finance and 
economics to fill the role it is offering to the Beneficiary. The Petitioner does not sufficiently 
acknowledge or explain in the record how the individuals it identifies with finance and economics 
degrees functioning in the role it proffered to the Beneficiary attained the "knowledge, technical 
background, and critical thinking skills to perform the job" that it asserts requires a bachelor's degree 
in computer science, engineering without specialization, or a related field to perform duties of a 
specialized and complex nature. 
So the record lacks sufficient unambiguous information to set the Petitioner's senior consultant - data 
analytics position as more "complex or unique" or its duties "specialized and complex" from positions 
that do not require at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent to perform the 
duties of the Petitioner's officer job. Thus the Petitioner has not satisfied the second alternative prong 
7 In their Decision. the Director concluded the Petitioner did not meet this criterion. We disagree with the Director's 
rationale for concluding the Petitioner did not meet the criterion. Neveitheless we agree with the Director's ultimate 
decision that the Petitioner did not demonstrate eligibility under the criterion. Upon exercise of our authority pursuant to 
our de novo review of this matter, we considered the assertions and evidence the Petitioner introduced previously and on 
appeal and do not find them persuasive for the reasons set forth herein. 
8 
of the second criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2) or the fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)( 4). 
III. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the proffered position here is not a specialty occupation because the Petitioner's 
stated range of acceptable degree fields is too broad to constitute a single specialty required to 
accomplish the duties of proffered job. The record of proceedings does not establish that the proffered 
position requires both: (1) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge; and (2) the attainment of a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty. The Petitioner has 
satisfied neither the statutory definition of a "specialty occupation" at section 214(i)(l )(B) of the Act 
nor the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). As the Petitioner 
had not satisfied that threshold requirement, it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty­
occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(])-(4). The Petitioner has not 
established that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the 
Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
9 
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