dismissed H-1B Case: Dentistry
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the AAO determined the petitioner and another company were "related entities" that improperly filed multiple H-1B petitions for the same beneficiary without a legitimate business need. The decision was further supported by significant discrepancies in the record regarding the terms of employment, including hours, pay rates, and pay statements, which undermined the credibility of the job offer.
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services MATTER OF S-P-D- CORP. Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office DATE: DEC. 26, 2017 APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION PETITION: FORM I-129. PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER A dental office seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a dentist under the H-1 B nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition. concluding that: ( 1) the Petitioner tiled a duplicate petition in prohibition of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(G): (2) the Petitioner did not make a credible offer of employment: and (3) the Petitioner did not pay the appropriate fee under the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). On appeal. counsel submits a brief and additional evidence, and asserts that the Director erred in her decision. Upon de novo review. we will dismiss the appeal. T. BACKGROUND The Form I-129. Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker. listed the name of the Petitioner asS Corp. 1 The Form I-129 requested new full-time employment for the Beneficiary. listed only one work address for her. and indicated that an itinerary would not be submitted with the petition. The Director issued a notice of intent to deny (NOID) questioning whether S Corp. and a related entity, D Corp .. filed duplicate petitions for the Beneficiary, and whether a credible offer of employment existed since both entities offered full-time employment. The Director further inquired 1 We will use abbreviated company names for simplicity and privacy purposes. . Matter ofS-P-D- Corp. about the appropriate ACWIA fee, noting that another company, petition. , appeared to have filed the responded to the NOID explaining that S Corp. is the Petitioner and did not intend to submit duplicate petitions for the Beneficiary. Citing to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(C) requiring separate petitions when a beneficiary will perform services for more than one employer, reasoned that two petitions were submitted for the Beneficiary because she will he concurrently working for S Corp. and D Corp. On appeal, counsel elaborates that, at the time of filing, both S Corp. and 0 Corp. intended to employ the Beneficiary on a full-time basis, defined as at least 30 hours per week. Counsel also requests U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to treat this as a ''concurrent" tiling explaining that, at the time of tiling, it could not have submitted this as a petition for concurrent employment since concurrent petitions require at least one approval. II. MULTIPLE PETITIONS A. Legal Framework The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(G) prohibits multiple H-1 B petitions from being tiled in the same fiscal year for the same bencticiary by an employer, or, under certain circumstances, by "related entities." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(G) states, in pertinent part: An employer may not tile, in the same fiscal year, more than one H-1 B petition on behalf of the same alien if the alien is subject to the numerical limitations of section 214(g)( 1 )(A) of the Act or is exempt from those limitations under section 214(g)( 5 )(C) of the Act. . . . Otherwise, filing more than one H-I B petition by an employer on behalf of the same alien in the same fiscal year will result in the denial or revocation of all such petitions. If USC IS believes that related entities (such as a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate) may not have a legitimate business need to file more than one H-1 B petition on behalf of the same alien subject to the numerical limitations of section 214(g)(J)(A) ofthe Act or otherwise eligible for an exemption under section 214(g)(5 )(C) of the Act USC IS may issue a request for additional evidence or notice of intent to deny. or notice of intent to revoke each petition. If any of the related entities fail to demonstrate a legitimate business need to file an H-1 B petition on behalf of the same alien, all petitions tiled on that alien's behalf by the related entities will be denied or revoked. 2 Documents in the record identify as a dental support organization which provides administrative and business support services (e.g., human resources, recruiting, payroll, and legal support services) to third party dental offices. including D Corp. and S Corp. 2 Matter o(S-P-D- ( 'orp. B. Analysis Upon review, we conclude that the Director properly denied the petition. In our view. S Corp. and D Corp. are ''related entities:· Their relationship is evident by such factors as their common ownership, utilization of the same management company's services, and history of concurrently employing the Beneficiary.' While counsel correctly points out that S Corp. and D Corp. are separate and independent employers with different federal tax identification numbers, their separate legal existence does not preclude a finding that they are ""related'' for these purposes. To say that an entity is "'related" to another, under the ordinary meaning of the word, is to say that a reasonable connection exists between the two. 4 The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(G) does not limit the meaning of '·related entities" to a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate; instead, by using "such as'' before those terms, it indicates that "'related entities" can include, but are not limited to, those enumerated relationships. We expansively interpret the types of •·related entities" encompassed by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(G) in order to effectuate this provision's remedial purposes. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(ii)(B) (addressing ''the fair and orderly allocation of numbers" under the H-lB visa lottery); Petitions Filed on Behalf of H-lB Temporary Workers Subject to or Exempt from the Annual Numerical Limitation, 73 Fed. Reg. 15389-95, 15391-93 (Mar. 24, 2008) (discussing the practice of petitioners who exploit the system by attempting to increase their chances of being selected for cap numbers). S'ee, e.g. Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S. 635. 639 (1980) (a remedial statute should be construed generously to further its primary purpose) (citing Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1980)). Counsel asserts that. to the extent S Corp. and D Corp. are related. they had a legitimate business need to file separate petitions for the Beneficiary based on their concurrent employment for her. However, the record does not sufticiently document the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's employment, which undermines any claim regarding either entity's legitimate need. Specifically, both petitions indicated that the Beneficiary will be employed on a full-time basis. but the record contains discrepancies regarding the Beneficiary's total number of hours per week per location. For example, on appeal counsel explains that S Corp's definition of ·'full-time" is at least 30 hours per week per ot1ice according to the Affordable Care Act. However. S Corp.'s original employment agreement with the Beneficiary, dated August 2015. is for pmi-time employment. defined as less than 32 hours per week. While counsel explains that this employment agreement was signed prior to S Corp.'s adoption ofthe Affordable Care Act definition in 2015. she does not clarify exactly when S Corp. adopted the new definition. Nor is counsel's explanation corroborated by the Corp.'s amended December 2015 employment agreement which. while changing the Beneficiary's 3 These are not exclusive factors. 4 For example, Merriam- Wehster Online Dictionmy defines the word ''related" as "connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation.'' Merriam-Wehster Online Dictionw)'. https://www.rnerriarn-webster.com/dictionary!related (last visited Dec. 22. 20 17). . Matter ofS-P-D- Corp. proposed employment from part-time to full-time , still defines part-time employment as less than 32 hours per week. Notably, the record contains a copy of the Beneficiary's employment agreement with D Corp. which is only for part-time , not full-time, employment. The employment agreements are silent as to the Beneficiary's specific pay rate. Further, the Form 1-129 listed the proffered wage as $2,000 per week , and the labor condition application (LCA) 5 indicated that the Beneficiary will be paid $50 per hour, which would suggest that based on the $2,000 weekly wage, she would work 40 hours per week. On the other hand, the Beneficiary's pay statements show an hourly pay rate of $56.25 per hour. The pay statements contain varying amounts of pay and unexplained pay categories, and we are unable to how many hours the Beneficiary worked during each pay period. For example, for the pay period from April 16, 2016, to April 30, 2016, the pay categories include "Salary" of $1,560 and ''Regular-Dr." category of $1,590 , which add up to $3,150. At $56.25 pay rate, this suggests that the Beneficiary worked 56 hours for the two week period or 28 hours per week. However , another pay statement from June 1, 2016, to June 15, 2016, reflect s that she received $1,560 , which would suggest she worked 28 hours for the two week period or 14 hours per week. Moreover, the employment agreement allows the Beneficiary to provid e dental services "at any and all other dental practices receiving business support services from or at1iliated companie s].'" By the very terms of her employment agreement, the Beneficiary may provide dental service s to other, unspecified dental offices under unspecified conditions. This contractual provision opens up additional questions about the Beneficiary' s proposed employment. As discussed above , the inconsi stencies and ambiguities surrounding the term s and conditions of Beneficiar y's employment preclude us from assessing the legitimac y of the claimed busines s need. Without more , we conclude that the Petition er has not demonstrated its legitimate business need and overcome the Director' s grounds for denying the petition. 6 III. CREDIBL E OFFER OF EMPLOYM ENT We also agree with the Director that the record was insufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the job offer to the Beneticiary. As discussed above. the record does not sufficiently demonstrate the terms and condition s of the proposed employment, including how many hours she will work per week per location and her pay rate . 5 The Petitioner is required to submit a certified LC A to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1 B worker the higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the "area of employment"" or the actual wage paid by the employer to other employees with similar experience and qualifications who are performing the same services. See Maller of"Simeio Solutions. LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542 . 545-546 (AAO 20 15). 6 We acknowledge counsel' s explanation for why she believed the filing of two petitions was necessary. If the record had credibly demonstrated the Beneficiary's definite, concurrent employment with both entities as claimed, then we likely would have agreed with counsel's position under those circumstances. However. we cannot reach that conclusion here. As discussed above, the inconsistencies and ambiguities surrounding the terms and conditions of Beneficiary's employment undermines the legitimacy of the claimed business need. 4 . Matter ofS-P-D- Corp. Ambiguities surrounding the actual employer, i.e., the Petitioner, further cloud our understanding of the job offer's credibility. While S Corp. is named as the employer and Petitioner, a representative of signed all attestations on the Form 1-129 and accompanying forms in the spaces reserved exclusively for the "Petitioner'' or an "Authorized Official of Employer." The support letter submitted with the petition is from and speaks of S Corp. as "part of' and the Beneficiary as becoming part of "our professional statr (emphasis added). submitted the NOlO response. The appeal was submitted by of whose Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative, was signed by a representative of See 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) (the Form G-28 must be properly completed and signed by the Petitioner). On appeal, counsel contends that properly signed all forms as D Corp.'s ·'agent for service." However, the record does not support the conclusion that qualified as D Corp.'s "agent" under California law, and more pertinently, for H-1B purposes under 8 C.F.R. § 2l4.2(h)(2)(i)(F). The record does not contain any agent authorization or similar contractual agreement between and D Corp. While the record confirms the existence of a relationship between and D Corp., it does not sufficiently detail the scope of that relationship, including authority, if any, to sign or file immigration paperwork on D Corp.'s behalf. The record as presently constituted does not sufficiently demonstrate who the actual employer and Petitioner is, and consequently. whether D Corp.'s offer of employment to the Beneficiary is credible. Even if S Corp. is the Petitioner of the Form I-129, we must question whether it maintained this standing at the time of appeal. On appeal, counsel submits new evidence establishing that S Corp. amended its corporate structure and changed its legal name to This corporate restructure appeared to have occurred on or before January 1, 2017. 7 The appeal was subsequently tiled on January 18, 2017, but continues to name the Petitioner as S Corp. rather than its legal name at that time, Moreover, counsel states that the restructure "does not grant any benefits or allowances for immigration purposes.'' This statement raises additional questions about the terms of agreement under which the corporate restructure took place. e.g., whether succeeded to the interests and obligations of S Corp. and whether the terms and conditions of employment remain the same but for the Petitioner's identity. See section 214(c)(l0) ofthe Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D), (E); 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(e)(2). Ultimately, the record does not sufficiently demonstrate the terms and conditions of employment, and hence, the credibility of the job otTer. The Petitioner has not overcome this additional ground of denial. IV. ACWIA FEE The same ambiguities regarding the actual employer and Petitioner also preclude us from determining whether the appropriate ACWlA fee was paid for this petition. Because the record does not sufficiently establish who the Petitioner is, i.e., or S. Corp., we cannot determine the 7 The most recent stock certificates were issued on January I, 2017. Matter ofS-P-D- Corp. Petitioner's size and whether the $1,500 fee or the $750 reduced fee (for petitioners who employ no more than 25 full-time equivalent employees) was appropriate. V. CONCLUSION The Petitioner has not overcome the Director's grounds for denying the petition. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Cite as Matter olS-P-D- Corp .. ID# 661479 (AAO Dec. 26, 2017)
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