dismissed H-1B Case: Education

(b)(6)
DATE: JUL 2 7 2015 
IN RE: Pet itioner : 
Beneficiary: 
U.S. Depa1"tmcnt of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immi gration Services 
Administr ative A ppeals Off ice 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. , MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PETITION RECEIPT #: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act , 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
Enclosed is the non-prec edent deci sion of the Administr ative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case. 
If you believe we incorrectly decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to recon sider our 
decision and/o r reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are locat ed at 8 C.F .R. § 103.5. 
Motion s must be filed on 
a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this 
decision . Th e Form I-290B web page (www.uscis .gov/i-290b) contains the lates t information on fee, filing 
loca tion, and other requir ements. Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO. 
Th ank you, 
Ron Rose nberg 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
l\'VI'w.uscis.gov 
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t'age L 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative 
Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In the Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form 1-129), the petitioner describes itself as an 
education business , with 134 employees, established in In order to employ the beneficiary in 
what it designates as a teacher position, the petitioner seeks to classify her as a nonimmigrant worker 
in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). 
The Director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner did not establish that it meets the 
regulatory definition of a United States employer. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the 
Director's basis for denial was erroneous and contends that it satisfied all evidentiary requirements. 
The record of proceeding contains: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the 
Director's request for additional evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the 
Director's letter denying the petition; and (5) the Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form l-290B) and 
supporting documentation. We reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing our decision.' 
For reasons that will be discussed below, we agree with the Director that the petitioner has not 
established eligibility for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the Director's decision will not be 
disturbed. The appeal will be dismissed. 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Legal Framework 
For an H-1B petitiOn to be granted, the petitioner must establish that it meets the regulatory 
definition of a United States employer. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Specifically, the petitioner must 
establish that it will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this 
part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of 
any such employee." !d. 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-lB nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien: 
subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to 
perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) ... , 
who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) ... , 
and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the 
1 
We conduct appellate review on a de novo basis. See Soltane v. DOl, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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[Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the 
Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1) .... 
The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows: 
United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other 
association, or organization in the United States which: 
(1) Engages a person to work within the United States; 
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees 
under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and 
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number. 
(Emphasis added); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61121 (Dec. 2, 1991). 
AJthough "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted 
that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-
1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the 
United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will 
file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time 
"employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States 
employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as 
H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United 
States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee 
relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship 
be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any 
such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer"). 
Neither the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for 
purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as 
being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States 
employer." !d. Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term 
"employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master­
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mutual ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "Darden") (quoting Community for Creative Non-
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Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-
752); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) 
(hereinafter "Clackamas"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand 
formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quotingNLRB v. United Ins. Co. 
of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). 
In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or 
"employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See 
generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong~ Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 
1990). On the contrary, 
in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term 
"United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition? 
2 While the Darden court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of 
"employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common Jaw agency definition to ERJSA's use of 
employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates 
legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., Bowers v. 
Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 
513 u.s. 1000 (1994). 
However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in 
section 10l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(l)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in 
section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of 
the H-lB visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even 
more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose 
administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984). 
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Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a 
tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, 
the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes 
additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United 
States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or 
"employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of 
United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to 
extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that 
construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. Cf 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-319? 
Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the 
"conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the 
Darden construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used 
in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). 4 
Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee 
relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS 
must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450; see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee 
relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee .... " (emphasis added)). 
The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated 
in both the Darden and Clackamas decisions. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 
445; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, 
where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the 
employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work 
performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445; 
3 To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee 
relationship," the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "'plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing Robertson 
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) 
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 
(1945)). 
4 
That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term 
"employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. See, e.g., section 
214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and 
controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens). 
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see also N ew Compliance Manual, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) 
(adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the Darden decision); see 
also Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (detennining that hospitals , as the 
recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), 
even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately 
hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries) . 
It is important to note , however, that the factors listed in Darden and Clackamas are not exhaustive and 
must be evaluated on a case-by-c ase basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant 
to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 
Furthermore , not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must 
weigh and comp are a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individu al case. The 
determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, 
regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. 
See Clackamas , 538 U.S. at 448-449 ; New Compliance Manual at§ 2-III(A)(1). 
Furthermore , when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and 
weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence 
or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 
323-324 . For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to 
assign them, it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not 
who has the right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See id. at 323. 
Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement"' shall not lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, ... the answer to 
whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no 
one factor being decisive.'" !d. at 451 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 324). 
B. Analysis 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it will 
be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as 
an H-1B temporary "employee." We examined each piece of evidence for relevanc e, probati ve 
value, and credibility , both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, and 
find that the petition er did not establish the requisite employer-employee relationship with the 
beneficiary . Matt er ofChawath e, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). 
In the Form 1-129 and its supporting documents , the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will be 
working as a teacher at three locations during the requested H-1B validity nPrinrl nf nrtnhP .r 1 ?01 4 
to September 10, 2017: 
and ' ln the Form 1-
5 
We note that whil e not speci fied in the docum ents submitted, according to an intern et search, these locations 
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129 Addendum, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will be trained by the petitioner for the first 
three months and that the beneficiary would then be placed with County schools for the first 
academic year, and then in : County schools for the second academic year. However, in 
response to the RFE, the petitioner provided two additional contradictory statements about the 
intended employment. Specifically, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner intends to 
assign the beneficiary to County School District for the 2014-2016 school years, and to 
County School District for the 2016-2017 school year. On the other hand, the petitioner 
states that it intends to place the beneficiary with _ County schools for the 2014-2015 school 
year, and with the County School District for the remaining 2015-2017 school years. We 
note that the petitioner submitted an itinerary; however, it does not specify the dates and location of 
the services , other than stating that the teachers will be trained for the first 3 months at its location. 6 
We note that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unl ess the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Upon review, we find that the petitioner did 
not substantiate its claims regarding the location and length of the beneficiary's employment. 
For H-1B classification, the petitioner is required to submit written contracts between the petitioner 
and the beneficiary, or if there is no written agreement, a summary of the terms of the oral agreement 
under which the beneficiary will be employed. See 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iv)(A) and (B). The 
record contains an employment agreement signed by the petitioner and the beneficiary, effective 
February 20, 2014. The agreement states that the "[beneficiary] shall perform the assigned duties , or 
other specialized technical work as he/she is directed to perform by [the petitioner] for [its] Clients." 
However, the employment agreement does not provide any level of specificity as to the beneficiary's 
position , duties and requirements for the position or the duration of assignment at the client sites. 
While an employment agreement may provide some insights into the relationship of a petitioner and 
a beneficiary, it must be noted again that the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment 
agreement"' shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 
538 U.S. at 450. 
are the petitioner's office, the Administrative Offices of County Schools, and the Administrative 
Offices of l _ County Schools, respectively. It therefore appears that these locations are school district's 
administrative offices and are not locations of schools where the beneficiary would teach. 
6 The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) provides as follows: 
Service or training in more than one location. A petition that requires services to be 
performed or training to be received in more than one location must include an itinerary with 
the dates and locations of the services or training and must be filed with USCIS as provided 
in the form instructions. The address that the petitioner specifies as its location on the I-129 
shall be where the petitioner is located for purposes of this paragraph. 
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In response to the RFE, the petitioner asserts that, pursuant to the terms of the employment 
agreement: 
We further assert that [the beneficiary] though will be assigned to work at client locations, 
she is an employee of [the petitioner], as we will run her pay roll, responsible for her 
insurance, social security, medicare, etc. Only [the petitioner] has complete control of [the 
beneficiary's] employment in the U.S. [The petitioner] has the full rights over recruitment, 
transfer, promotion and termination of [the beneficiary]. (The petitioner] reviews the 
performance of our employees through periodical site visits, personal interaction and 
organizes orientations and workshop for their skill improvements. The Teachers during the 
entire period of employment report their duties to [the petitioner] and send their lesson plans 
and teaching modules for [the petitioner]'s review and [the petitioner] has complete control 
over work schedule outside the School hours. 
However, the assertions made by the petitioner are not supported by the documents in the record. 
Specifically, the record contains a Teaching Services Agreement with the County School 
System (HCSS). The agreement states that the initial term of the agreement would "commence at 
the beginning of August 2005, and shall terminate on the last teacher workday of the SCHOOL 
SYSTEM for the year 2005- 2006 school year." It also states that the agreement will automatically 
renew for one additional school year unless either party gives notice of its intent not to renew. In the 
RFE, the Director noted that it would appear that this agreement was no longer valid as the initial 
term and one year renewal term had lapsed. In response, the petitioner explains that "although the 
contract is dated[ ,] it is automatically renewed every year under Clause 1 of the agreement with the 
same terms; as such it is renewed every year." To support the assertion that the agreement is still in 
force at the time of filing, the petitioner submitted "Schedule A" work orders for the 2014 -2015 
school year showing placement of teachers in HCSS. However, the work orders do not reference an 
underlying agreement or contract between the petitioner and HCSS, and do not indicate that they are 
executed pursuant to the agreement in the record of proceeding. In other words, without further 
information, the work orders do not provide sufficient information regarding the position, duties and 
requirements for the position or the duration of assignment at the client sites. 
The agreement further details the relationship between the petitioner and HCSS, stating: 
During the initial and 
any renewal term of this Agreement, [the petitioner] shall 
supply the SCHOOL SYSTEM with teachers on an "as-needed" basis. [The 
petitioner] understands and agrees that this Agreement does not obligate the 
SCHOOL SYSTEM to accept any [of its] teachers and the SCHOOL SYSTEM 
shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to determine whether it needs any [of] 
[the petitioner's] teachers. 
The agreement further states that the petitioner must have a contract with each teacher and to include 
the following provisions for the teachers: 
1. Comply with the SCHOOL SYSTEM and the State's applicable curriculum 
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policies, rules and regulations, including but not limited to those relating to in­
field certification; 
11. Maintain adequate and current records in the manner required by the 
SCHOOL SYSTEM for all students served by the teacher; 
111. Follow the same work schedule as required by the School System's teachers; 
1v. Abide by all personnel policies of the SCHOOL SYSTEM [except] those 
relating to compensation, insurance, retirement, tenure and social security 
provisions. 
v. Provide notice of absences in the manner required of the SCHOOL 
SYSTEM'S teachers. 
Given that this agreement states that the teachers are placed and retained at the discretion of HCSS, 
that HCSS governs the terms of the contract between the teacher and the petitioner, and that the 
teachers must follow HCSS policies regarding curriculum, hours, training, record keeping, 
attendance etc., this document does not establish that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United 
States employer controlling the work of the beneficiary as expressed in the pertinent regulations. 
Based on a review of the foregoing, it is evident that the beneficiary, if actually placed with HCSS, 
would be subject to the policies and procedure of HCSS, and that HCSS, not the petitioner , would 
determine the type and length of assignment of teachers, day-to-day activities and supervision, and 
schedules of teachers assigned to its schools. It is also apparent that the agreement between HCSS 
and the petitioner would govern the terms of any contract or agreement made between the 
beneficiary and the petitioner regarding the beneficiary's employment. As such, these documents do 
not establish that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United States employer, as expressed in 
the pertinent regulations. 
Similarly, the petitioner submitted a Teaching Services Agreement with the County School 
System (NCSS). The agreement states that the initial term of the agreement would "commence at 
the beginning of the 2008-9 school year, and shall terminate on the last teacher workday of the 
SCHOOL SYSTEM for the year 2008 - 2009 school year. It also states that the agreement will 
automatically renew for one additional school year unless either party gives notice of its intent not to 
renew. In the RFE, the Director noted that it would appear that this agreement was also no longer 
valid as the initial term and one year renewal term had lapsed. In response, the petitioner explains 
that "although the contract is dated it is automatically renewed every year under Clause 1 of the 
agreement with the same terms as such it is renewed every year." To support the assertion that the 
agreement is still in force at the time of filing, the petitioner submitted "Schedule A" work orders for 
the 2014 -2015 school year showing placement of teachers in NCSS. However, the work orders do 
not reference an underlying agreement or contract between the petitioner and NCSS, and do not 
indicate that they are executed pursuant to the agreement in the record of proceeding. In other 
words, without further information, the work orders do not provide sufficient information regarding 
the position, duties and requirements for the position or the duration of assignment at the client sites. 
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The agreement further details the relationship between the petitioner and NCSS, stating: 
During the initial and any renewal term of this Agreement, [the petitioner J shall 
supply the SCHOOL SYSTEM with teachers on an "as-needed" basis. [The 
petitioner J understands and agrees that this Agreement does not obligate the 
SCHOOL SYSTEM to accept any [of its] teachers and the SCHOOL SYSTEM 
shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to determine whether it needs any [of] 
[the petitioner's] teachers. 
The agreement further states that the petitioner must have a contract with each teacher and to include 
the following provisions for the teachers: 
1. Comply with the SCHOOL SYSTEM and the State's applicable curriculum 
policies, rules and regulations, including but not limited to those relating to in­
field certification; 
n. Maintain adequate and current records in the manner required by the 
SCHOOL SYSTEM for all students served by the teacher; 
111. Follow the same work schedule as required by the School System's teachers; 
tv. Abide by all personnel policies of the SCHOOL SYSTEM except those 
relating to compensation, insurance, retirement, tenure and social security 
provisions. 
v. Provide notice of absences in the manner required of the SCHOOL 
SYSTEM'S teachers. 
Given that this agreement states that the teachers are placed and retained at the discretion of NCSS , 
that NCSS governs the terms of the contract between the teacher and the petitioner, and that the 
teachers must follow NCSS policies regarding curriculum, hours, training, record keeping, 
attendance etc., this document does not establish that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United 
States employer controlling the work of the beneficiary, as expressed in the pertinent regulations. 
In addition to the documents discussed above, the petitioner also submitted copies of performance 
reviews conducted for similarly placed teachers, a chart showing the beneficiary's supervisory chain 
with the petitioner, and its quarterly tax returns showing the tax treatment of similarly placed 
teachers. However, the performance reviews appear to be based on a single visit to the work 
location and the petitioner does not indicate how the teachers are evaluated on a regular basis or how 
often the evaluations take place . On appeal, the petitioner asserts 
that the teachers are required to 
send in their lesson plans for its review and approval; however, there is no documentary evidence to 
substantiate its claims. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the petitioner is overseeing or providing 
day-to-day supervision on a continuous and consistent basis. 
Furthermore, while the petitioner contends that it would pay the beneficiary's wages and would be 
responsible for the requisite taxes and insurance; this alone does not establish that the requisite 
employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary. We 
acknowledge that the method of payment of wages can be a pertinent factor to determining the 
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Page 11 
petitioner's relationship with the beneficiary. While social security contributions, worker's 
compensation contributions , unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax 
withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors in determining who will control an alien 
beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the 
beneficiary , who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and 
who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also 
be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's 
employer. 
Additionally, a review of the documents in the record reveals that the petitioner did not submit any 
document from the end client school districts, which outlines in detail the nature and scope of the 
beneficiary's employment. Specifically, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will be 
placed at the end client work sites pursuant to the service agreements discussed earlier, these service 
agreements do not contain information about the types of positions that will be filled (subject matter, 
grade level etc.), when the positions will be filled or where the positions will be located. 
Furthenhore, the petitioner did not submit any work orders or schedules to indicate that the end 
clients, HCSS and NCSS , intend to place the beneficiary in a position pursuant to the agreements 
submitted. 
On appeal, the petitiOner asserts that it cannot provide information specific to the beneficiary 
because the end clients in question require fingerprinting, background checks and licensing prior to 
confirming placement and that these processes can only take place once the beneficiary is in the 
United States. Despite the director's specific request for evidence such as a letter from the end 
clients , the petitioner did not submit such evidence. Failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 
103.2(b )(14 ). The petitioner has not provided evidence that either of the purported end-clients 
intends to place the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position for any period of time. Without 
full disclosure of all of the relevant factors, we are unable to find that the requisite employer­
employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary. 
The evidence in the record, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a 
United States employer, as defined by 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that 
the petitioner exercises complete control over the beneficiary, without evidence supporting the 
claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of 
Soff'ici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). The evidence of record did not establish that the petitioner 
would act as the beneficiary's employer in that it will hire, pay, fire, or otherwise control the work of 
the beneficiary. 
Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States 
employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary 
"employee." 8 C.P.R.§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
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Further, we find the record does not establish that the petitioner has available non-speculative work 
for the beneficiary in a specialty occupation. The Form I -129 states that the petitioner intends to 
employ the beneficiary as a teacher from October 1, 2014 to September 10, 2017. Assuming 
arguendo, that the agreement with HCSS and NCSS are valid through the end of the 2014-2015 
school year, the petitioner has only submitted evidence to establish that there may be work available 
with these end clients through August 2015. While the petitioner maintains that the submitted 
agreements can be renewed on a yearly basis, the petitioner did not submit evidence that any of the 
agreements had been renewed for the entire validity period, at the time of filing the instant petition. 7 
The petitioner has not submitted any other agreements, contracts or work orders that cover the 
remainder of the requested validity period. 
Therefore, we find that the petitioner has not established that the petition was filed for non-speculative 
work for the beneficiary, for the entire period requested, that existed at the time of filing this petition. 
USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is 
seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b )(1). A visa petition may not be 
approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes 
eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248. Thus, even 
if it were found that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United States employer as that term is 
defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), the petitioner has not demonstrated that it would maintain such 
an employer-employee relationship for the duration of the period requested .8 
7 Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 ((citing Matt er of Treasure Craft 
of California , 14 I&N Dec . 190)). 
8 The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. For 
example, a 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows: 
Historically , the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative , or 
undetermined, prospective employment. The H-lB classification is not intended as a vehicle 
for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in 
temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business 
expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether 
an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must 
first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the 
position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the 
alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, 
the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and , therefore, is 
unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no 
assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country. 
63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419- 30420 (June 4, 1998). 
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Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States 
employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary 
"employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
III. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
Additionally, we find that the record does not establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a 
specialty occupation, as defined by applicable statues and regulations. 
The Form I-129 describes the proffered position as a teacher and does not mention the subject matter 
or grade level of the position. To ascertain additional information on the proffered position, we look 
to the documents submitted with the Form I-129 including the LCA, petitioner's letter, itinerary of 
services, and the petitioner's response to the RFE. 
In the LCA, the petitioner states that the proffered position corresponds to the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) code and occupation title "25-2031 Secondary School Teachers, Except Special 
and Career/Technical Education" from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). In the 
petitioner's letter submitted in support of the initial petition and in the document called "Itinerary of 
services of [the petitioner's] Science Teacher," the petitioner describes the beneficiary's proffered 
position as a science teacher, but does not discuss the grade level of instruction. 
Moreover, throughout the record of proceeding, the petitioner describes the proposed duties as a 
teacher in overly broad and general terms. For example, in the itinerary , the petitioner indicates that 
the beneficiary is required to "maintain records for such things as student attendance, evaluations, 
and discipline" and "use computers to record grades and perform other administrative duties." The 
petitioner's description is generalized and generic in that the petitioner does not convey either the 
substantive nature of the work that the beneficiary would actually perform, any particular body of 
highly specialized knowledge that would have to be theoretically and practically applied to perform 
it, or the educational level of any such knowledge that may be necessary. The responsibilities for the 
proffered position contain generalized functions without providing sufficient information regarding 
the particular work, and associated educational requirements, into which the duties would manifest 
themselves in their day-to-day performance. The abstract, speculative level of information regarding 
the proffered position and the duties comprising it is exemplified by the phrases such as "use a 
variety of assignment strategies" and "promote interactive learning habits among student s." 
Based on a review of the submitted materials, it is evident that the documents in the record are 
incomplete in their description of the proffered position, such that we cannot determine whether or 
not the proffered position is in a specialty occupation, as defined by applicable statues and 
regulations. 
Furthermore, as recognized in Defensor v. Meissner, it is necessary for the end client to provide 
sufficient information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to 
properly ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. See 
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Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d at 387-388. In other words, as the nurses in that case would provide 
services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning staffing company, the petitioner­
provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were irrelevant to a specialty 
occupation determination. See id. 
In this matter, the petitioner did not submit documentation from the end clients, HCSS and NCSS 
that outline the nature and scope of the beneficiary's proposed employment. Specifically, the 
agreements with the end clients do not provide substantive information on the type, duties , or 
requirements for the proffered position. Therefore, the petitioner has not established the substantive 
nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary, which therefore precludes a finding that the 
proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the 
substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for 
the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to 
the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the 
first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered 
position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification 
for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; 
and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of 
criterion 4. Because the record does not contain information from the end client regarding the work 
to be performed , we cannot conclude that the beneficiary will be employed in a specialty occupation. 
Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
For this additional reason , the appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied. 
IV. BENEFICIARY QUALIFICATIONS 
We do not need to examine the issue of the beneficiary's qualifications, because the petitioner has 
not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the proffered position is a specialty 
occupation. In other words, the beneficiary's credentials to perform a particular job are relevant only 
when the job is found to be a specialty occupation. 
As discussed in this decision, the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence regarding the 
proffered position to determine whether it will require a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific 
specialty or its equivalent. Absent this determination that a baccalaureate or higher degree in a 
specific specialty or its equivalent is required to perform the duties of the proffered position , it also 
cannot be determined whether the beneficiary possesses that degree or its equivalent. 
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 
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2001), aff'd, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Soltane v. DOl, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(noting that we conduct appellate review on a de novo basis). 
Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a 
challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of our enumerated 
grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd. 345 F.3d 
683. 
We will dismiss the appeal for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the 
petitioner 's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, the petitioner has not 
met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.