dismissed
H-1B
dismissed H-1B Case: Finance
Decision Summary
The motion to reopen and reconsider was denied because the petitioner failed to meet the specific requirements for such a motion. The petitioner did not state new facts to support a motion to reopen, nor did they establish that the prior decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy to support a motion to reconsider.
Criteria Discussed
Specialty Occupation Motion To Reopen Motion To Reconsider
Sign up free to download the original PDF
Downloaded the case? Use it in your next draft →View Full Decision Text
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
MATTER OF M-E-, INC.
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office·
DATE: SEPT. 14, 2015
MOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE DECISION
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER
The Petitioner, a fast-food restaurant, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a financial manager and to
classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation. See section 101 ( a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
On May 12, 2011, the Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the nonimmigrant visa
petition. The Petitioner appealed this denial to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), and we
dismissed the appeal on November 7, 2012. On December 6, 2012, the Petitioner filed a motion to
reopen and reconsider, which we denied on July 14, 2014. On August 14, 2014, the Petitioner again
filed a motion to reopen and reconsider, which we denied on February 6, 2015. The matter is once
again before us on a motion to reopen and reconsider. The combined motion will be denied pursuant
to 8 C.P.R.§ 103.5(a)(2), (3), and (4).
The Director denied the petition, finding that the proffered position was not a specialty occupation,
and we dismissed the Petitioner's subsequent appeal. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed two motions
to reopen and reconsider, which were also denied. The decision that is the subject of the instant
motion is our most recent decision issued on February 6, 2015, which denied the Petitioner's
previous motion and affirmed our prior determinations that the Director's denial of the petition was
correct.
Although counsel indicated that he submitted the instant motion in response to our February 6, 2015,
decision, he did not assert any mistakes of law or fact in that decision. Rather, counsel referenced an
unspecified November 12, 2012 decision, and stated that we "failed to apply the tasks and
descriptions of 'Financial Managers' to the duties of the beneficiary's job offer." We did not issue a
decision to the Petitioner on November 12, 2012 and presume he is referring to our November 7,
2012 decision dismissing the appeal. Regardless, for the motion, we will focus on our decision to
deny the Petitioner's most recent motion because, in accordance with the regulations governing
motions, as the latest agency decision, that decision is the proper subject of this combined motion.
As indicated by the check mark at box F of Part 2 of the Form I-290B, counsel for the Petitioner
elected to file both a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider.
- --- ----~~~~------
Matter of M-E-, Inc.
I. EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
As a preliminary matter, and in light of counsel's references to the requirement that we apply the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard, we affirm that, in the exercise of our appellate review in
this matter, as in all matters that come within its purview, we follow the preponderance of the
evidence standard as specified in the controlling precedent decision, Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N
Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010). In pertinent part, that decision states the following:
!d.
Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in
administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence
that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.
* * *
The "preponderance of the evidence" of "truth" 1s made based on the factual
circumstances of each individual case.
* * *
Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative
value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the
evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.
Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant,
probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is
"more likely than not" or "probably" true, the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the
standard of proof. See INS v. Cardoza-Foncesca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)
(discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50% chance of an occurrence
taking place). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the
director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to
believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.
We conduct appellate review on a de novo basis. See Soltane v. DOJ, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir.
2004). In doing so, we apply the preponderance of the evidence standard as outlined in Matter of
Chawathe. Upon our review of the present matter pursuant to that standard, however, we find that
the evidence in the record of proceeding does not support counsel's contentions on motion that the
petition at issue should be reopened or reconsidered.
2
Matter of M-E-, Inc.
Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard as stated in Matter of Chawathe, we find that
the Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements for either a motion to reopen or a motion to
reconsider. Accordingly, the combined motion will be denied.
II. MOTION REQUIREMENTS
We will now discuss why the submission constituting the combined motion does not satisfy the
substantive requirements for either a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider. For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that tbe motion must be denied because the motion does not merit
either reopening or reconsideration.
A. Overarching Requirement for Motions by a Petitioner
The proviSIOn at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i) includes the following statement limiting a users
officer's authority to reopen the proceeding or reconsider the decision to instances where "proper
cause" has been shown for such action:
[T]he official having jurisdiction may, for proper cause shown, reopen the proceeding
or reconsider the prior decision.
Thus, to merit reopening or reconsideration, the submission must not only meet the formal
requirements for filing (such as, for instance, submission of a Form I-290B that is properly
completed and signed, and accompanied by the correct fee), but the petitioner must also show proper
cause for granting the motion. As stated in the provision at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4), "Processing
motions in proceedings before the Service," "[a] motion that does not meet applicable requirements
shall be dismissed."
B. Requirements for Motions to Reopen
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5(a)(2), "Requirementsfor motion to reopen," states:
A motion to reopen must [ (1)] state the new facts to be provided in the reopened
proceeding and [(2)] be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence ....
This provision is supplemented by the related instruction at Part 3 of the Form I-290B, which states:1
Motion to Reopen: The motion must state new facts and must be supported by
affidavits and/or documentary evidence.
1 The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(l) states in pertinent part:
Every benefit request or other document submitted to DHS must be executed and filed in accordance
with the form instructions, notwithstanding any provision of 8 CFR Chapter 1 to the contrary, such
instructions are incorporated into the regulations requiring its submission.
3
Matter of M-E-, Inc.
Further, the new facts must possess such significance that, "if proceedings ... were reopened, with
all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case." Matter
ofCoelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464,473 (BIA 1992); see also Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239-
40 (lOth Cir. 2013).
C. Requirements for Motions to Reconsider
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1 03.5(a)(3), "Requirements for motion to reconsider," states:
A motion to reconsider must [(1 )] state the reasons for reconsideration and [(2)] be
supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was
based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a
decision on an application or petition must [(3)], [(a)] when filed, also [(b)] establish
that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the
initial decision.
These provisions are augmented by the related instruction at Part 3 of the Form I-290B, which states:
Motion to Reconsider: The motion must be supported by citations to appropriate
statutes, regulations, or precedent decisions.
A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of the prior decision based on the previous factual
record, as opposed to a motion to reopen which seeks a new hearing based on new facts. Compare 8
C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2).
A motion to reconsider should not be used to raise a legal argument that could have been raised
earlier in the proceedings. See Matter of Medrano, 20 I&N Dec. 216, 219 (BIA 1990, 1991)
("Arguments for consideration on appeal should all be submitted at one time, rather than in
piecemeal fashion."). Rather, any "arguments" that are raised in a motion to reconsider should flow
from new law or a de novo legal determination that could not have been addressed by the affected
party. Matter ofO-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) (examining motions to reconsider under a
similar scheme provided at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)); see also Martinez-Lopez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 169,
171-72 (1st Cir. 2013 ). Further, the reiteration of previous arguments or general allegations of error
in the prior decision will not suffice. Instead, the affected party must state the specific factual and
legal issues raised on appeal that were decided in error or overlooked in the initial decision. See
Matter of 0-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 60.
4
(b)(6)
Matter of M-E-, Inc.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The submission constituting the motion consists of the following:
Petitioner's counsel; (2) the Form I-290B; (3) a six-page brief
( 4) documentary evidence , which consists of copies of the following:
( 1) a letter signed by the
submitted by counsel; and
1. Our decision dated February 6, 2015, denying the Petitioner 's previous combined
motion;
2. Former counsel's undated response letter to the Director's January 12, 2011,
request for evidence (RFE);
3. The Petitioner's support letter, dated August 1, 2010;
4. The Beneficiary's educational credentials and his resume;
5. Internet printouts of four job announcements;
6. Our decision dated November 7, 2012, dismissing the Petitioner's appeal;
7. Financial documents for
, and
A. Denial of the Motion to Reopen
Upon review of the evidence, we observe that most of the documents submitted on motion were
previously a part of the record of proceeding or previously available. The new submissions on
motion are four internet job announcements and financial documents from 2014.2
In any event, we find that neither the Form I-290B, nor the brief on motion, nor any document
submitted on motion "state[ s] new facts" or constitutes new facts to be provided if the proceeding
were to be reopened. It logically follows that, without showing such new facts to be provided if the
motion were to be reopened, the motion also does not establish new facts so significant as to likely
change the outcome of this case if the proceeding were reopened for their consideration. Even if
they constituted evidence of new facts to be provided in a reopened hearing - which is not the case -
the documents submitted on motion have little or no probative value towards establishing the
proffered position as satisfying the statutory and regulatory provisions for a specialty occupation. 3
2 Financial documents from 2012 and 2013 would have been available for submission for the previous motion filed on
August 14, 2014.
3 Even if these submissions did constitute the type of "new facts" supported by documentary evidence discussed in
8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2) , they still would not satisfy the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). For example, regarding
the job advertisements, the Petitioner did not supplement the record of proceeding to establish that the advertising
organizations both conduct business in its industry and also are similar to it. Nor did the Petitioner sufficiently establish
that the primary duties and responsibilities ofthe advertised positions parallel those of the proffered position. Therefore,
these submissions do not establish that organizations similar to the Petitioner in the Petitioner's industry routinely
require at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty , or its equivalent, for parallel positions. Similarly, the financial
documents submitted on motion do not demonstrate how the financial manager position as described requires the
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge such that a bachelor's or higher degree in
a specific specialty or its equivalent is required to perfonn them . Nor do they demonstrate a past hiring history by the
Petitioner of normally requiring a bachelor ' s degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position.
5
Matter ofM-E-, Inc.
Moreover, counsel provides no statements addressing the findings we articulated in our February 6,
2015, decision. Counsel outlines no new facts upon which the motion to reopen is based, and further
does not to support the motion with accompanying affidavits or documentary evidence in support of
new facts. In sum, counsel has not made any assertions regarding the manner in which the motion
meets the regulatory requirements.
"There is a strong public interest in bringing [a case] to a close as promptly as is consistent with the
interest in giving the [parties] a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases." INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988). Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are
disfavored for the same reasons as petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94 (1988)). A party seeking to reopen a proceeding bears a "heavy burden" of proof. INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. With the current motion, the petitioner and its counsel have not met that
burden.
B. Denial of the Motion to Reconsider
A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by citations to
pertinent statutes, regulations, and/or precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on
an incorrect application of law or USCIS policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an
application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the
evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) (detailing the
requirements for a motion to reconsider).
As stated earlier, although counsel indicated that he submitted the combined motion in response to
our February 6, 20 15, decision, counsel did not assert any mistakes in law and mistakes of fact in
that decision. Rather, counsel referenced a prior decision, and stated that we "failed to apply the
tasks and descriptions of 'Financial Managers' to the duties of the beneficiary's job offer." The
documents constituting this motion do not articulate how our February 6, 2015, decision denying the
previous motion misapplied any pertinent statutes, regulations, or precedent decisions to the evidence
of record when the decision to deny the motion was rendered. The petitioner has therefore not
submitted any document that would meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider. Accordingly, the
motion to reconsider must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be noted for the record that, unless USCIS directs otherwise, the filing of a motion to reopen
or reconsider does not stay the execution of any decision in a case or extend a previously set departure
date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(iv).
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration
benefit sought. Section 291 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter o.fOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128
Matter of M-E-, Inc.
(BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the motion will be denied, the
proceedings will not be reopened or reconsidered, and our previous decisions will not be disturbed.
ORDER: The motion is denied.
Cite as Matter of M-E-, Inc., ID# 13332 (AAO Sept. 14, 20 15) Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial
MeritDraft learns from dismissed cases so your petition avoids the same pitfalls. Get arguments built on winning precedents.
Avoid This in My Petition →No credit card required. Generate your first petition draft in minutes.