dismissed H-1B Case: Fraud Control Software

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 17573072 
Appeal of Vermont Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-1B) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG. 30, 2021 
The Petitioner, a fraud control software company, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a 
"fraud data analyst" under the H-1B nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified 
foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body 
of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief 
and asserts that the Director erred by denying the petition. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375 
(AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de nova. See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 l&N 
Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition but adds a 
non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered 
position must also meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
(1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
(4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
We note as a threshold issue that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with 
section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language 
must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a 
whole. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of 
language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); see also COIT 
Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989); Matter of W-F-, 
21 l&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should 
logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory 
definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular 
positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory 
definition. See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in 
accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty 
occupation. 
As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii), we construe the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to 
mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related 
to the proffered position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) 
( describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and 
responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B 
petitions for qualified individuals who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified 
public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which 
petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of 
a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, directly related to the duties 
and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that 
Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category. 
To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, we do not rely simply upon 
a position's title or the broader occupational category within which a petitioner claims the position is 
2 
located. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning 
entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. We must examine the ultimate employment 
of the individual, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally 
Defensor, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position or an employer's self­
imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in 
the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act. 
Without sufficient evidence regarding the duties the Beneficiary will perform, we are unable to determine 
whether the Beneficiary will be employed in an occupation that meets the statutory and regulatory 
definitions of a specialty occupation and a position that also satisfies at least one of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). The services the Beneficiary will perform in the position determine: (1) the normal 
minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 
1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review 
for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of 
complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong 
of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, 
when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the 
specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 
By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(1) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director 
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8). 
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to 
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). 
11. PROFFERED POSITION 
The Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary will work as a "fraud data analyst" and submitted a labor 
condition application (LCA) certified for a position located within the "Information Security Analysts" 
occupational category, corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification code 15-1122. The 
Petitioner stated in its support letter that the proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in 
management, business, or a related field. 1 The Petitioner initially provided a I ist of duties and provided 
more details to the duties in their response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE). While we 
will not list each duty here, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we conclude that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. In 
particular, we find that two separate factors independently bar approval of this petition: (1) the 
Petitioner's lack of a requirement for a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent; and 
1 The Petitioner submitted documentation in support of the H-1B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered 
position and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and 
considered each one. 
3 
(2) the lack of a sufficiently-detailed description of the duties of the proffered position, which makes 
it impossible for us to discern the actual, substantive nature of the position. 
A. Lack of a Requirement for a Bachelor's Degree in a Specific Specialty, or the Equivalent 
As a result of the Petitioner's own stated requirements, the proffered position does not meet the 
statutory or regulatory definition of the term "specialty occupation." As noted, both definitions require 
the Petitioner to demonstrate that the proffered position requires: (1) the theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (2) the attainment of a bachelor's degree 
in the specific specialty. The record of proceedings satisfies neither. 
That the Petitioner would find acceptable a bachelor's degree in business, with no further 
specialization, alone precludes a determination that the position involves a "body of highly specialized 
knowledge" or that it requires the attainment of a bachelor 's degree in a "specific specialty." The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147, that: 
The courts and the agency consistently have stated that, although a general-purpose 
bachelor's degree, such as a business administration degree, may be a legitimate 
prerequisite for a particular position, requiring such a degree, without more, will not 
justify the granting of a petition for an H-1B specialty occupation visa. See, e.g., Tapis 
Int'lv. INS, 94 F.Supp.2d 172, 175-76 (D. Mass. 2000); Shanti, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-
66; cf. Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 I & &N Dec. 558, 560 ([Comm 'r] 1988) 
(providing frequently cited analysis in connection with a conceptually similar 
provision). This is as it should be: elsewise, an employer could ensure the granting of 
a specialty occupation visa petition by the simple expedient of creating a generic (and 
essentially artificial) degree requirement. 2 
2 Id. But see India House, Inc. v. McAleenan, 449 F. Supp. 3d 4, 2020 WL 1479519 (D.R.I. 2020). In India House the 
court distinguished Royal Siam on factual grounds but did not dispute its central reasoning: that a position whose duties 
can be fulfilled by an individual with a general-purpose bachelor's degree in business is not a specialty occupation. Instead, 
it distinguished Royal Siam on factual grounds. Here, the Petitioner specifically recognizes an unspecialized bachelor's 
degree in business as being one of the many degrees it considers as providing an adequate preparation to perform the duties 
of the proffered position. 
The agency has longstanding concerns regarding general-purpose bachelor's degrees in business with no additional 
specialization. For example, in Matter of Ling, 13 I. & N. Dec. 35 (Reg'! Comm'r 1968), the agency stated that attainment 
of a bachelor's degree in business administration alone was insufficient to qualify a foreign national as a member of the 
professions pursuant to section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32). Twenty years later, the agency looked to 
the nature of the position itself and clarified that a requirement for a degree with a generalized title, such as business, 
without further specification, was insufficient to qualify the position as one that is professional pursuant to section 
101(a)(32) of the Act. Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 l&N Dec. at 560. See also Matter of'Caron Int 'l, Inc., 19 l&N Dec. 791 
(Comm'r 1988) (vice president for manufacturing in a textile company was not a professional position because individual 
holding general degree in business, engineering or science could perform its duties). 
4 
The record therefore satisfies neither the statutory nor the regulatory definition of the term "specialty 
occupation." 
As the Petitioner has not met the threshold requirement of satisfying the statutory and regulatory 
definitions of the term "specialty occupation," it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty­
occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4) because, again, we must 
consider those criteria in harmony with the thrust of the related regulatory provisions and with the 
statute as a whole. In other words, we must construe those criteria's references to the tenn "degree" 
as meaning not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly 
related to the proffered position. 3 For example, the Petitioner cannot satisfy the supplemental 
specialty-occupation criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l) because even if it establishes, in the 
words of this criterion, that "a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the 
minimum requirement for entry into the particular position," we would still construe the term "degree" 
to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly 
related to the proffered position. And as discussed above, the Petitioner would not be able to make 
that demonstration. 
The same would be true of the remaining three criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2)-(4): because 
the Petitioner does not require a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent, it would 
not be able to satisfy any of those criteria because we would interpret each reference to a "degree" to 
mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related 
to the proffered position . We therefore will not consider the Petitioner's arguments, and the evidence 
it submits, in support of its contention that it satisfies at least one of the supplemental specialty­
occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4). 
The record of proceedings does not establish that the proffered position requires both: (1) the 
Congress created the modern H-lB program as part of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 . 
In doing so, it pivoted away from the prior H-1 standard of whether a position was "professional. " Instead , petitioners 
were now required to demonstrate that a proffered position qualified as a "specialty occupation." Section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act. In the final rule setting forth the requirements for the revamped H-1B program, the agency , 
responding to comrnenters suggesting that the proposed regulatory "specific specialty" requirement "was too severe and 
would exclude certain occupations from classifications as specialty occupations ," stated that "[t]he definition of specialty 
occupation contained in the statute contains this requirement." Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61112 (Dec. 2, 1991) . 
The agency's concerns regarding a general-purpose, non-specific degree in business, or business administration, continued 
under the revamped H-1B program. See, e.g., Shanti, Inc. v. Reno, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. 1999); Royal Siam, 484 
F.3d at 147; 2233 Paradise Road, LLC v. Cissna, No. 17-cv - 01018- APG- VCF, 2018 WL 3312967 (D. Nev., July 3, 
2018); XiaoTong Liu v. Baran, No. 18-00376-JVS, 2018 WL 7348851 (C.D. Cal. , Dec. 21, 2018); Parzenn Partners v. 
Baran, No. 19-cv-11515-ADB, 2019 WL 6130678 (D. Mass., Nov. 19, 2019). 
To the extent the Petitioner is arguing that a bachelor 's degree in business , with no further specialization (or the equivalent), 
is a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, then consistent with agency history and federal case law, we must disagree. 
3 Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147; Caremax, 40 F.Supp.3d at 1187-88; lnnova Sols., Inc. v. Baran, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 
1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (USCIS did not abuse its discretion in reading the degree requirement together with the "specific 
specialty" language) ; Payjoy v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-cv-03977-HSG, 2019 WL 3207839 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2019) 
(statutory and regulatory text appear to support USCIS 's interpretation that the degree requirement must be read in 
conjunction with the "specific specialty" requirement). 
5 
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (2) the attainment 
of a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty. The Petitioner, therefore, has satisfied neither the 
statutory definition of a "specialty occupation" at section 214(i)(l )(B) of the Act nor the regulatory 
definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). As the Petitioner has not satisfied 
that threshold requirement, it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty-occupation criteria 
enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4). The Petitioner, therefore, has not established that 
the proffered position is a specialty occupation, and the appeal must be dismissed and the petition 
denied for this reason alone. 
Even if we were to set this foundational deficiency aside and overlook the acceptability of a non­
specific degree for the position, we would still be unable to analyze the position under the 
supplemental specialty-occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4), 
because the Petitioner has not demonstrated the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the 
Beneficiary. 
B. Substantive Nature of the Proffered Position 
As indicated, a crucial aspect of this matter is whether the Petitioner has sufficiently described the 
duties of the proffered position such that we may discern the nature of the position and whether the 
position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge attained through at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific discipline. When determining 
whether a position is a specialty occupation, we look at the nature of the business offering the 
employment and the description of the specific duties of the position as it relates to the performance 
of those duties within the context of that particular employer's business operations. 
As mentioned, the Petitioner designated the proffered position on the LCA4 under the occupational 
category "Information Security Analysts" conesponding to the SOC 15-1122 from the Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET), at a Level I wage rate. According to O*NET's description, 
individuals holding positions located within the "Information Security Analysts" occupation "[p]lan, 
implement, upgrade, or monitor security measures for the protection of computer networks and 
information."5 A review of the O*NET tasks indicate the occupation may safeguard data but has 
limited data analysis duties.6 
The Petitioner's description of the proffered position creates ambiguity in the record regarding the 
nature of the position and raises questions as to whether the position actually falls within the 
occupational category designated on the LCA. The Petitioner's data analysis duties appear to be 
atypical of the duties generally performed by individuals working in positions located within the 
4 A petitioner submits the LCA to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1B worker the 
higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid 
by the employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 
20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a). 
5 We reviewed the O*NET Summary Report for ·'Information Security Analysts" at the time of filing. O*NET Online 
Archives, "Summary Rep01i for: 15-1122.00 Information Security Analysts," 
https://www.onetonline.org/Archive_ONET-SOC_2010_ Taxonomy_09_2020/link/summary/15-1122.00 (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2021). 
6 Id. 
6 
"Information Security Analysts" occupation. For example, the Petitioner's job description would 
require the Beneficiary to "[b ]uild PostgreSQL queries to analyze billions of data points being shared 
by over 6000 organizations ... and stored in Apache Impala DB to identify global fraud patterns"; 
"[analyze] customer data to tune rules, exposes patterns, research anomalies, reduce false positives, 
and build executive and project-level reports"; "[i]dentify meaningful insights from chargeback data 
using statistical methodologies and machine learning techniques"; "[c]reate statistical models (using 
Python and/ or PostgreSQL) to look for fraud patterns within chargeback data provided by ... 
customers from the e-commerce industry"; "[g]enerate customer reports by pulling data through 
PostgreSQL scripting on an Apache Impala DB"; and "[c]reate statistical models using PostgreSQL 
queries and Python/ R scripts to proactively analyze transaction data." The Petitioner's duties suggest 
the Beneficiary wi 11 query data to look for patterns and trends. These data analysis duties are not 
found within the O*NET tasks for positions located within the '"Information Security Analysts" 
occupation, but they do appear among the tasks listed for SOC code 15-1199.08, "Business 
Intelligence Analysts," who are required to "[p]roduce financial and market intelligence by querying 
data repositories and generating periodic reports"; "[d]evise methods for identifying data patterns and 
trends in available information sources"; "[g]enerate standard or custom reports summarizing 
business, financial, or economic data for review by executives, managers, clients, and other 
stakeholders"; "[s]ynthesize current business intelligence or trend data to support recommendations 
for action"; and "[ c ]ollect business intelligence data from available industry reports, public 
information, field reports, or purchased sources." 7 In other words, many of the position's duties are 
beyond the description of the "Information Security Analysts" SOC code and appear more closely 
aligned to the duties of the "Business Intelligence Analysts" SOC code. With these ambiguities in the 
record regarding the duties of the position, we cannot ascertain the substantive nature of the position. 
In addition, the letter authored b~ I Professor and Associate Dean in the College of Business 
and Economics atl I university, does not account for the proffered position's data duties. 
Professor Scott restates the extended duties provided by the Petitioner and describes the proffered 
position will "create and generate reports that aggregate data from across may [sic] software products, 
and track data across time to provide actionable data-centered information to decision-makers." 
Again, these data-gathering and analysis duties appear to be outside the scope of the positions within 
the "Information Security Analysts" and appear to be more closely aligned to the duties of the 
"Business Intelligence Analysts" occupation.~----~does not address or explain the apparent 
conflict between the Petitioner's designation of the occupation on the certified LCA and the data 
analysis duties that fall outside the parameters of that occupation. As suchJ I's opinion 
does not support the selected designation on the Petitioner's LCA. 
If the duties of a proffered position involve aspects of more than one occupational category (e.g., 
"Information Security Analysts" and "Business Intelligence Analysts"), U.S. Department of Labor's 
(DOL) "Prevailing Wage Detennination Policy Guidance" states that the employer "should default 
7 Likewise, we reviewed the O*NET Summary Report for ··Business Intelligence Analysts" at the time of filing. The 
occupation of "Business Intelligence Analysts" was previously designated SOC code 15-1199.08. O*NET Online 
Archives, "15-1199.08 Business Intelligence Analysts," https://www.onetonline.org/Archive_ONET­
SOC_2010_ Taxonomy_09_2020/link/summary/15-1199.08 (last visited Aug. 30, 2021). 
7 
directly to the relevant O*NET-SOC occupational code for the highest paying occupation." 8 The 
Petitioner did not do so. A Level I position located within the "Business Intelligence Analysts" (SOC 
code 15-1199.08) occupational category would necessitate a higher wage of $82,255 rather than the 
offered wage of $69,971 per year. 9 This wage disparity highlights the difference between the 
"Information Security Analysts" and the "Business Intelligence Analysts" occupational categories 
generally, and more specific to this case, the significance of the Petitioner's choice of the lower-paying 
occupational category. In sum, since the position's broad description lacks specificity because it 
includes duties that more likely pertain to other occupations, we cannot determine the substantive 
nature of this particular position. Therefore, we could not conclude that the actual duties of the 
proffered position require a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, nor determine 
that the duties actually correspond to the certified LCA.10 
Absent more specific and persuasive evidence regarding the nature of the proffered position's duties, 
the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the 
Beneficiary. This would preclude further analysis of whether the proffered position satisfies any 
criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Moreover, the record does not establish that the Petitioner 
satisfied the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, we conclude that the evidence of record does not establish, more likely than not, 
that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's 
burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
8 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't & Training Admin., Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagric. 
Immigration Programs (rev. Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf . .--------, 9 The Petitioner provided an LCA certified on April 30, 2020 for a position located in~----- California. The 
wages for SOC 15-1199.08, at the time of the LCA's certification can be found on the Foreign Labor Ce1iification Data 
Center Online Wage Library: https://flcdatacenter.com/OesQuickResults.aspx?code=15-
1199&area~&year=20&source=l 
10 The LCA serves as the critical mechanism for enforcing section 212(n)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(l). See Labor 
Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants on H-lB Visas in Specialty Occupations 
and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 80,110, 80,110-11 (proposed Dec. 20, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 655-56) (indicating that the wage 
protections in the Act seek "to protect U.S. workers' wages and eliminate any economic incentive or advantage in hiring 
temporary foreign workers" and that this "process of protecting U.S. workers begins with [the filing of an LCA] with 
[DOL]."). While DOL is the agency that certifies LCA applications before they are submitted to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), DOL regulations note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (i.e., its 
immigration benefits branch, USCIS) is the department responsible for determining whether the content of an LCA filed 
for a particular Form 1-129 actually supports that petition. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b). The regulation at 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.705(b) requires that USCIS ensure that "the petition is supported by an LCA which conesponds with the 
petition .... " 
8