dismissed H-1B Case: Human Services

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: DEC. 13, 2024 In Re: 35360177 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant 
classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to 
file a petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to temporarily employ a 
qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor' s or higher degree in 
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The California Service Center Director denied the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker 
(petition), concluding that the record did not establish that the offered position qualified as a specialty 
occupation. The Director further determined the Beneficiary was not qualified to occupy a specialty 
occupation position. The matter is now before us on appeal. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof 
to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of 
Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. 
Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will 
dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 101 (a)( l 5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1 B nonimmigrant as a foreign national "who is 
coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in 
section 214(i)(l) .... " (emphasis added). Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines 
the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires "theoretical and practical application of 
a body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States." The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates section 214(i)(l) of the Act, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. 
In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A) provides that the offered position must meet one of four 
criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation position. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must be read with 
the statutory and regulatory definitions of a specialty occupation under section 214(i)(1) of the Act 
and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or 
higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a 
specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular 
position"). Lastly, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(l) states that an H-lB classification may be granted 
to a foreign national who "will pe1form services in a specialty occupation ... " ( emphasis added). 
Accordingly, to determine whether the Beneficiary will be employed in a specialty occupation, we 
look to the record to ascertain the services the Beneficiary will perform and whether such services 
require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained 
through at least a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty or its equivalent. 
By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(l) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director 
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C.F .R. § 103 .2(b )(8). 
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to 
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
II. ANALYSIS 
A Background 
The Petitioner filed the petition 
on the Beneficiary's behalf seeking a determination that its habilitation 
specialist position is a specialty occupation under section 214(i)(l) of the Act. If successful, the 
Beneficiary could be admitted to the United States and undertake the offered position in H-1 B 
classification at multiple locations within New York state. The Petitioner describes itself as a nonprofit 
entity related to or affiliated with an institution of higher education. Its operations include providing 
special education, residential and community services, as well as behavioral health services. The 
Petitioner described the habilitation specialist's job duties as a member of an interactive team that 
includes nursing, education professionals, therapists and psychology professionals providing input and 
influence on individual treatment plans and teaching individuals valuable life skills. 
The Director reviewed the initial filing and issued a request for evidence (RFE). The Director 
determined that the initial evidence reflected a disparate range of baccalaureate degree fields that were 
not related to one another, nor did the Petitioner explain a sufficient nexus between those fields and 
the offered position's duties. The Director surmised the record did not establish how each field was 
directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the position, and as a result it did not demonstrate 
that the position was a specialty occupation. The Director further noted that the Petitioner's acceptance 
of a degree in education without further specialization undermined their claims that the position 
qualified as a specialty occupation. 
Within the RFE, the Director informed the Petitioner that it had not shown its position was a specialty 
occupation as described in the statute and applicable regulations. In response, the Petitioner submitted 
expanded job duties, an opinion position analysis evaluation, a copy of Fed. R. Evid. 703, a copy of 
the "Rehabilitation Counselor" entry in the DO L's Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook), job 
postings advertising purportedly similar roles with other U.S. employers, a listing of fields of study 
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that can be categorized as human services, the Beneficiary's educational documentation and 
credentials, and a representative sample of educational documents from other habilitation specialists 
at the Petitioner's organization. 
As stated above, the Director denied the petitioner based on their determination that the record did not 
establish the Petitioner's offered job qualified as a specialty occupation under section 
lOl ( a)( 15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, and we agree with that assessment. 
B. Disparate Acceptable Degree Fields 
We conclude that the Petitioner's acceptance of a bachelor's degree from the wide variety of fields it 
specified precludes it from satisfying both the statutory and regulatory definition of a specialty 
occupation. The record of proceeding reflects that the Petitioner would accept a bachelor's degree in 
psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related human services field" for entry 
into the offered job. The Director correctly found this range of degrees too wide and denied the petition 
with the Petitioner's stated prerequisites as one dispositive basis. 
The Petitioner's grouping of psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related 
human services field" is not adequately supported in the record with evidence highlighting its 
composition as collectively forming a singular specialty from a body of highly specialized knowledge. 
The Petitioner provided a list of closely related human services fields populated with diverse fields 
like anthropology, criminal justice, nutrition, and divinity/religion/theology, all of which also broadly 
provide the skills required to perform the duties of the offered job. 
The Petitioner's vague and general duties in combination with its mass grouping of degree fields 
constitutes a range so broad that it cannot compose a "specialty" required to perform the duties of a 
"specialty occupation." When the desired skills could be gained from any number of seemingly 
unrelated degrees, spanning from sciences such as anthropology to humanities-adjacent fields such as 
divinity, religion, and theology, the only conclusion can be that these skills are basic or elementary, 
and not specialized. In fact, numerous unrelated specialties would fall within the Petitioner's 
minimum educational requirements with their desired range of skills. Such a position would not be 
considered specialized. See Caremax v. Holder, 40 F.Supp.3d 1182, 1187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ("A 
position that requires applicants to have any bachelor's degree, or a bachelor's degree in a large subset 
of fields, can hardly be considered specialized."). 
The record as it is presently composed does not establish how the Petitioner's range of skills sourced 
from the diverse grouping of psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related 
human services field" from the list it provided, form a body of highly specialized knowledge or a 
specific specialty. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that "degrees from multiple fields can qualify for H-lB status 
without undermining the 'specific' specialty component." The Petitioner cites to Raj & Co. vs. USCIS, 
85 F.Supp.3d 1241 (W.D. Wash 2015) and Residential Finance Corporation v. USCIS, 839 F.Supp.2d 
985 (S.D. Ohio 2012) to conclude that its wide range of degrees can constitute a specialty required to 
perform the duties of a specialty occupation. We agree insofar that we interpret the statutory term 
"the" and the regulatory term "a" to mean a singular specialty. But we do not so narrowly interpret 
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the statute and regulation such that multiple closely related fields of study would not constitute a 
specialty to perform the duties of a related specialty occupation. 
But, contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, the issue here is not that the Petitioner would accept degrees 
in various fields. The issue is that the Petitioner's stated spectrum of acceptable degrees is too broad 
to support a finding that the offered position requires a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or the 
equivalent. In general, a minimum of a bachelor's or higher degree in more than one specialty is 
recognized as satisfying the "degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent)" requirement of section 
214(i)(l)(B) of the Act provided the specialties are closely related such that they constitute a common 
specialty required to perform a position's duties. 
If they constitute a common specialty, then the required "body of highly specialized knowledge" 
would essentially be the same. If the required degree fields do not constitute a common specialty, a 
minimum entry requirement of a degree in disparate fields would not meet the statutory requirement 
that the degree be "in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent)." A minimum entry requirement that 
did include disparate fields of study, such as philosophy and engineering for example, would require 
a petitioner to establish how each field is directly related to all the duties and responsibilities of the 
particular position. Section 214(i)(l)(B) of the Act (emphasis added). 
The cases the Petitioner cites support the requirement of a singular specialty. The court in Residential 
Finance following this rationale found for the Plaintiff only after determining that the Plaintiff had 
established its minimum requirements capture the necessity of a baccalaureate degree in a specialized 
course of study in a field related to the offered job's duties as a minimum. Residential Finance 
C01poration, 839 F.Supp.2d at 996. In other words, the court in Residential Finance did not state that 
a petitioner can cobble together any mass grouping of degree fields and characterize them a specialty, 
as the Petitioner seems to imply. To the contrary, the plaintiff in Residential Finance prevailed 
because the court determined that the plaintiff's grouping of degree fields was a specialty. In other 
words, the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the "specific specialty" requirement. 
The foundational principle leading to the holding in Residential Finance is also present in Raj & Co. 
In Raj & Co., the court stated that a specialty occupation requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree 
or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. The court confirmed that this issue is well-settled 
in case law and with the agency's reasonable interpretation of the regulatory framework. In the 
decision, the court noted that "permitting an occupation to qualify simply by requiring a generalized 
bachelor degree would run contrary to congressional intent to provide a visa program for specialized, 
as opposed to merely educated, workers." And in Relx v. Baran, 397 F.Supp.3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019), 
the court determined that a specialty occupation existed only after determining that the occupation 
required a specialized course of study the plaintiff had earned. Relx, 397 F.Supp.3d at 55. 
The Petitioner also cites to Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, 382 F.Supp.3d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
201 7) as relevant here and relies on it to support a conclusion concerning the meaning of what is 
"normally" the minimum requirement for the position. We question the applicability of Next 
Generation Tech., Inc. in this case, as the court in Next Generation Tech., Inc. analyzed our reading 
of the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook) concerning 
the entry requirements for positions located within the different and separate occupational category of 
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"Computer Programmers," rather than the "Rehabilitation Counselors" category designated by the 
Petitioner in the LCA relating to this case. 
And the court in Next Generation Tech., Inc. relied in part on a USCIS policy memorandum specific 
to "Computer Programmers" indicating generally preferential treatment toward computer 
programmers, and "especially" toward companies in that particular petitioner's industry. Moreover, 
Next Generation Tech., Inc. is inapplicable because the Petitioner's mass grouping of psychology, 
sociology, social work, education, or any "closely related human services field" contained on its list 
ofrelated human services fields is not sufficiently narrow to conclude that the Petitioner's requirement 
comprises a "specialty" required to perform the duties of the specialty occupation. 
Or in other words, when a petitioner would accept a bachelor's degree from a wide variety of 
seemingly unconnected fields-like the range of fields the Petitioner presents here-it cannot establish 
that the fields constitute a "specialty" if it does not explain how each acceptable and specific field of 
study is directly related to the other specified fields, as well as to the duties and responsibilities of the 
particular position. 
C. The Petitioner's Assertions on Appeal 
The record contains the DOL's Occupational Information Network (O*NET) and Handbook entry for 
"Rehabilitation Counselors," an opinion position analysis 
with supporting evidence, the Beneficiary's 
educational documentation, job postings for purportedly parallel positions with reportedly similar 
employers, a copy of Fed. R. of Evid. 703, education documents for other habilitation specialists 
currently employed by the Petitioner, and a listing of fields of study that can be categorized as human 
services. 1 The Petitioner collectively relies on this material to support it assertion that its offered 
position requires a bachelor's degree in a specific field of study comprising a body of specialized 
knowledge or a specialty required to perform the duties of the position. But, as we discuss below, the 
supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(J)-(4) cannot be satisfied without 
the express requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree providing the theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge. 
The Handbook reports that "rehabilitation counselors typically need a master's degree in rehabilitation 
counseling or a related field" while "some employers hire workers with a bachelor's degree in 
rehabilitation and disability studies .... " See Bureau of Labor Statistics, DOL, Handbook, 
Rehabilitation Counselors, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-social-service/rehabilitation­
counselors.htm (Aug. 29, 2024). The Petitioner states that it requires a bachelor's degree, but in a 
diverse grouping of fields (psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related human 
services field" from a list ofrelated human services fields). 
The Petitioner does not adequately describe in the record how its grouping constitutes a specialty akin 
to the rehabilitation, rehabilitation counseling, or disability studies fields listed in the Handbook. 
Nevertheless, we understand that the Handbook is only one source that can be used to assist in 
demonstrating whether a particular occupation may be a specialty occupation. The Petitioner may 
present other sources to establish that a specific degree is normally the minimum requirement for entry 
1 While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
5 
into the position or may establish that its particular position requires a bachelor's level, or other, degree 
in a specific discipline or fields of disciplines constituting a specialty or theoretical or practical body 
of specialized knowledge required to perform the duties of the position. The Petitioner has not 
submitted sufficient evidence regarding its particular position to satisfy the requirements necessary to 
establish the position is a specialty occupation. 
Although we acknowledge the Petitioner's claims relating to recent developments pertaining to the 
concept of Chevron deference, the factors the organization discusses is more relevant to proceedings 
in federal courts than it is here. 
The Petitioner also submitted several job postings before the Director for purportedly parallel positions 
from reportedly similar employers. It further asserted that this evidence supports its contention that 
requirements like those it has established for its offered position are widely held across its industry. 
The Petitioner asserts on appeal that the fact the organizations posting the jobs "offer behavioral health 
services and/or long-term and short-term rehabilitative care" is sufficient to demonstrate the 
organizations' similarity to the Petitioner. 
But we do not agree. The job postings the Petitioner submitted do not adequately demonstrate that the 
employers who posted these positions are "similar" to the Petitioner. The advertisements the Petitioner 
submitted were posted by a wide range of employers. The record does not adequately describe how 
these diverse organizations, sharing only a service they offer, are similar to one another let alone to 
the Petitioner. 
For example, while the Petitioner and Rutgers University Behavioral Health Care may both seek the 
services of individuals performing similar duties, the Petitioner as a community services organization 
is dissimilar to a health care system affiliated with a large university managed health system, which is 
of different size, scope, mission, and may have different priorities. The evidence in the record does 
not provide any context that would permit a comparison of the Petitioner to the organizations whose 
job postings it submitted to evaluate their contended similarity. And, even if the organizations were 
similar, we would not conclude that the job postings demonstrate the offered job is a specialty 
occupation because the minimum educational requirements contained in the advertisements are varied 
and ranging such that they didn't constitute a specialty required to perform the duties of the job. 
While the other companies in the job postings might view a wide range of fields as a sufficient 
qualification for U.S. worker candidates to perform work for their organizations, such a qualification 
does not necessarily satisfy the statutory or regulatory requirements of the H-1 B program. Inherent 
with employing foreign nationals are additional burdens a U.S. employer must satisfy when compared 
to their self-imposed requirements of U.S. workers. Part of that burden in the H-lB context is to 
demonstrate the position meets the requirements of a specialty occupation as defined in the Act, and 
additional regulatory requirements described at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). Stated differently, simply 
because organizations seeking job applicants for a similar job might find a wide range of degrees as 
acceptable, those entities are not operating under the burden to demonstrate what the Petitioner in this 
petition is must show. 
Further, the education documentation for other habilitation specialists the Petitioner currently employs 
does not persuasively support the specialty occupation nature of the position in this petition. At most, 
6 
the documents indicate the Petitioner's preference for its employees to have a baccalaureate level of 
education in a disparate group of degree fields. It does not demonstrate the Petitioner's requirement 
of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, related to the performance of the 
position's job duties. Additionally, the Petitioner did not demonstrate the total number of people it 
has employed in the offered position. Consequently, we cannot determine how representative the 
Petitioner's claim is as represented in the list it provided before the Director of its normal recruiting 
and hiring practices when they indicated on the petition that the organization employs at least 500 
personnel. Without further information, the submission of the educational credentials of those on the 
provided list is not persuasive in establishing that the Petitioner normally requires at least a bachelor's 
degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position. 
The record must establish that a petitioner's stated degree requirement is not a matter of preference 
for high-caliber candidates but is necessitated instead by performance requirements of the position. 
See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2000). Were we limited solely to reviewing 
a petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, an organization could bring any individual with a 
bachelor's degree to the United States to perform any occupation so long as the petitioning entity 
created a token degree requirement. Id. Here, the evidence in the record simply supports the 
Petitioner's preference for its employees to have a baccalaureate level of education. 
The record contains an opinion letter to contend that the range of fields the Petitioner requires for the 
habilitation specialist position is not disparate, and that the fields constitute a specialty closely related 
together and with the duties of the position. As a matter of discretion, we may use opinion statements 
submitted by the Petitioner as advisory. Matter of Caron Int'l, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 
1988). But an opinion statement has less weight where there is cause to question or doubt the opinion, 
or if it is not in accord with other information in the record. The submission of opinion letters is not 
presumptive evidence in any event. Id.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, 502 n.2 (BIA, 
2008). 2 
The Petitioner's reliance on this opinion letter to support its argument that the range of fields of study 
it accepts is closely related appears to be misplaced. Dr.I I evaluation does not provide a strong 
enough basis for us to understand how the wide range of degrees the Petitioner would accept are related 
to one another to form a body of specialized knowledge. Nor does the evaluation explain how that 
body of specialized knowledge relates to the offered position's duties. Dr. I I formulated his 
2 We note that one element of the V-K- decision was overruled within Matter ofZ-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015); 
however, this does not affect the portion of V-K- we cite to here. The Z-Z-O- decision clearly limited its adverse treatment 
of the V-K- decision to the issue of "an Immigration Judge's predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the 
future ... " Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. at 590, which was related to the standard of review when evaluating an Immigration 
Judge's findings relating to an asylum applicant's reasonable fear claims. The Z-Z-O- decision made no mention of the 
evidentiary weight of expert testimony. The limit to the ovenuling nature of Z-Z-O- is illustrated within a footnote in 
which the BIA stated that other than the standard of review for predictive factual findings, it did not address and would 
not disturb other conclusions in the V-K- decision. Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. at 593 n.3. Consequently, the portion of the 
V-K- decision cited above remains effective. OR for shorter version See id. at 795; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 
500, n.2 (BIA 2008) (noting that expe11 opinion testimony does not purp011 to be evidence as to "fact"). We note that one 
element of the V-K- decision was overruled within Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015). The limit to the 
overruling nature of Z-Z-O- is illustrated within a footnote in which the BIA stated that other than the standard of review 
for predictive factual findings, it did not address and would not disturb other conclusions in the V-K- decision. Z-Z-O-, 26 
I&N Dec. at 593 n.3. Consequently. the portion of the V-K- decision cited above remains effective. 
7 
opinion based on his knowledge of the wider field of education gained as a professor in the department 
of educational technology at Idaho. He has taught courses in teacher 
education and professional development, educational philosophy and training, and instructional 
technology. He also noted other professional experience and certifications. Dr. Istates that he 
reviewed "the support letter and the detailed job description" provided by the Petitioner. He also lists 
the offered job's duties, the job's academic prerequisites, and attempts to establish the suitability of 
each required field of study to a selected portion of the offered job's overall duties, concluding that 
the offered position fits within the statute and regulations as a "specialty occupation." 
We have questions about the sufficiency of Dr. I !opinion because his conclusions do not 
adequately align with other information in the record. For example, Dr.I !references his research 
and published work as authority for his opinion. But he does not specifically identify what research 
in the record supports his opinion to bolster his conclusions. The evaluation is mainly based on 
unspecified research authority not present or described in the record of proceeding. 
Moreover, the evaluation makes numerous presuppositions and conclusory findings which are not 
tethered to any cognizable authority. For example, he "presupposes well-developed communication 
skills" as a requirement to perform the duties of the job and concludes baccalaureate level education 
in the grouping of degree fields identified by the Petitioner would confer the skill to successfully 
perform the duties. But "communication skills" could be attained, learned, or acquired through any 
number of vast and varied degree fields. 
And the Petitioner's own requirements, permitting baccalaureate level education in "a related human 
services field" demonstrate this because the list of "related human services fields" submitted by the 
Petitioner spans a significantly diverse spectrum as described above. It is apparent from the 
Petitioner's list that the "ability and knowledge" in human development and professional 
communication, individualized social, educational, and psychological knowledge, and participation as 
a part of a multi-disciplinary team is generally available among a wide swath of degree fields such 
that it is more basic knowledge than specialized knowledge required for the performance of the 
specific job duties. 
Even if we put aside any doubts about the basis for Dr. I I opinions, his conclusions of each 
degree field's applicability to the offered job duties are selectively applied to only a small portion of 
the overall job duties. The record does not support how each acceptable field of study is directly 
related to all the offered position's overall duties and responsibilities. Moreover, his expertise appears 
to be in the field of education. The record does not indicate how his specific expertise relates to the 
Petitioner's offered job of habilitation specialist or its operations as a community services 
organization. And the evidence in the record does not preponderantly corroborate Dr. I lclaims 
that education and education technology focused teaching and research activities renders them 
qualified to provide an opinion about the applicability of education and other seemingly unrelated 
degree fields such as psychology, sociology, social work and whether they qualify someone to perform 
the duties of the habilitation specialist or are related to one another such that they comprise a specialty 
required to perform those duties. 
And finally, we reiterate that the Petitioner provided vague and general job duties-especially the 
version it offered when it initially filed the petition-and the opinion letter author quotes from those 
8 
vague job functions to make their assessment. In the same manner that overly generalized duties for 
the offered position are insufficient to demonstrate eligibility, equally deficient are opinions based on 
these vague functions. See Parzenn Partners, LLC v. Baran, No. 19-CV-11515-ADB, 2020 WL 
5803143, at *9-10 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2020). 
Although we held in Chawathe that the standard of proof in immigration proceedings is the 
preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proof is always on the petitioner. A petitioner's burden 
of proof comprises both the initial burden of production, as well as the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. Matter ofY-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998); see also the definition of burden 
of proof from Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (reflecting the burden of proof includes both 
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). A petitioner must satisfy the burden of 
production. As the term suggests, this burden requires a filing party to produce evidence in the form 
of documents, testimony, etc. that adheres the governing statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions 
sufficient to have the issue decided on the merits. When, as here, a petitioner has not met the burden 
of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence because its evidence is not material, relevant, or 
probative, then it follows that the petitioning organization has not demonstrated eligibility for the 
benefit that it seeks. So, the evaluation is not probative and we will not ascribe it with any significant 
evidentiary weight. 
We therefore cannot conclude that the offered position's minimum requirement for entry into the job 
is anything more than a general bachelor's degree. The Petitioner has not satisfied the statutory 
definition of a "specialty occupation" at section 214(i)( 1 )(B) of the Act nor the regulatory definition 
of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
Without the express requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree providing the theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, or the equivalent, the supplemental 
regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4) cannot be satisfied. The supplemental 
regulatory criteria are read together within the related regulations and the statute as a whole. As such, 
where the regulations refer to the term "degree," we interpret that term to mean a baccalaureate or 
higher degree in a specific specialty related to the offered position. See Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147. 
The word "degree" is mentioned in each prong of the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4). 
And where, as here, a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty is not required as a 
minimum requirement of entry, it follows that each prong under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4) 
remains unsatisfied. So, we will not consider the Petitioner's arguments and the evidence it submits 
in support of its contention that it satisfies the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4). 
We conclude that the offered position here is not a specialty occupation because the Petitioner's stated 
range of acceptable degree fields is too broad to constitute a single specialty required to accomplish 
the duties of the offered position. The record of proceeding does not establish that the offered position 
requires both: (1) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; 
and (2) the attainment of a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty. 
9 
Because the identified basis for the petition's denial is dispositive of this appeal, we will not address 
and we reserve the Petitioner's remaining appellate arguments relating to the Beneficiary's 
qualifications. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 
25-26 (1976) (finding agencies are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are 
unnecessary to the ultimate decision)); see also Matter of M-R-M-S-, 28 I&N Dec. 757, 764 (BIA 
2023) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is a petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.