dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

(b)(6)
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF C-S-, INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JAN. 23, 2017 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a software development and information technology consulting company, seeks to 
temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a systems analyst under the H-1 B nonimmigrant classification 
for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to 
temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a 
bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for 
entry into the position. 
The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition. The Director concluded the Petitioner 
did not establish that it has an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary. Further, the 
Director found that the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the protiered position qualifies as a 
specialty occupation. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and 
asserts that the Director erred in denying the petition. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. PROFFERED POSITION 
On the Form 1-129, the Petitioner described itself as a 76-employee information technology services 
company located in Georgia. The Petitioner indicated on the labor condition application that the 
Beneficiary would work in California, and supporting evidence reflected that tbis work 
would be for through a mid-vendor In response to the 
Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary had been reassigned 
to a new end-client, located in California, and that he had been 
assigned to this location pursuant to a contract between the end-client and a mid-vendor, 
Matter ofC-S-, Inc. 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
We will first address whether the evidence of record establishes that the Petitioner will be a "United 
States employer" having "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this 
part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, tire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of 
any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1 B nonimn1igrant, in pertinent part, as an 
individual: 
[S]ubject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to 
perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(l) ... , who 
meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) ... , and with 
respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of 
Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of 
Labor] an application under section 212(n)(l) .... 
The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows: 
United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other 
association, or organization in the United States which: 
(1) Engages a person to work within the United States; 
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees 
under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire. pay, fire. 
supervise. or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and 
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number. 
(Emphasis added); see Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act 56 Fed. Reg. 61,111, 61,121 (Dec. 2, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(ii), it is noted 
that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-
1 B visa classification. Section 101 ( a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an individual coming to the 
United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will 
file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1 ). The intending employer is described as ofTering full-time or part-time 
"employment" to the H-IB "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1 )(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 
2 
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
U.S.C. § 1182(n)(l )(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" 
must file a Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, in order to classify individuals as H-lB 
temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States 
employer" indicates in its second prong that the Petitioner must have an "employer-employee 
relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H~1 B beneficiary, and that this relationship 
be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of 
any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer"). 
Neither the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for 
purposes of the H-18 visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-18 beneficiaries as 
being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States 
employer:'' !d. Therefore, for purposes of the H-lB visa classification, these terms are undefined. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term 
"employee," courts should conclude that the tenn was "intended to describe the conventional master­
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common 
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are 
0 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; 
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's 
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." 
!d.; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting 
Darden,. 503 U.S. at 323) . As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. 
of /Jm., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). 
In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(l)(A)(i) of the Act, or 
"employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See 
generally 136 Cong. Rec. Sl7106(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 
3 
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-18 visa classification, the regulations detine the term 
"United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. 
1 
Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1 B employers to have a 
tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the H-1 8 "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(ii). Accordingly, 
the term "United States employer" not only requires H-18 employers and employees to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes 
additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United 
States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or 
"employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition 
of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to 
extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that 
construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. Cf 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-19 _2 
Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the 
"conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the 
Darden construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used 
in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) ofthe Act, section 212(n) ofthe Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)? 
Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee 
1 While the Darden court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § I 002(6), and did Jnot address the definition of "employer," coutis have generally 
refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA 's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' 
in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the 
traditional common law definition." See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of ·'employer" in section 
I 0 I (a)(I5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)( I )(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 
212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1 B visa 
classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the 
common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted <to it is to 
be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natwal Res. Del Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844-45 (1984). 
2 To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee'' or "employer-employee relationship," 
the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless '"plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation."' Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 ( 1997) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332, 359 ( 1989)(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 ( 1945)). 
3 That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term 
"employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. See, e.g., section 214(c)(2)(F) of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184( c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1 B intracompany 
transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of 
unauthorized individuals). 
4 
Matter ofC-S-. Inc. 
relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-lB nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS 
must focus on the common-law touchstone of"control." Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450; see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee 
relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or othenvise control the work of any such employee .... "(emphasis added)). 
The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated 
in both the Darden and Clackamas decisions. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24; Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 
445; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, 
where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the 
employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work 
performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445; 
see also EEOC Compl. Man. at § 2-Ill(A)(l) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that 
said test was based on the Darden decision); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H -1 B 
nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 2 t'4.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the petitioner, 
because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the 
beneficiaries). 
It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in Darden and Clackamas are not exhaustive and 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties 
relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 
Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; hmvever, the fact finder must 
weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The 
determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, 
regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. 
See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-49; EEOC Compl. Man. at§ 2-JII(A)(l ). 
When examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual 
factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that 
factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24. For 
example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to assign them, 
it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not who has the 
right to provide the tools required to complete af?. assigned project. See id at 323. 
Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, ... the answer to 
whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no 
one factor being decisive."' ld. at 451 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 324). 
5 
(b)(6)
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
B. Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the Petitioner has not established the duration of the Beneficiary's 
employment for the entire requested period. On the Form I-129, the Petitioner requested that the 
Beneficiary be granted H-1B classification from October 12,2015 , to February 19,2018. However, 
the Petitioner has not submitted suppmting documentation to substantiate that the Beneficiary will 
be engaged at the end-client location during the entire period of the requested visa. For instance , a 
letter from the mid-vendor who has a direct contract \vith the end-client, 
states that the work order covering the Beneficiary began in February 2016, but did not indicate a 
specific duration of the project, stating only that the "project is expected to be extended again, based 
on the ongoing requirements of the project." Otherwise, the Petitioner submits no supporting 
documentation to support the duration of the Beneficiary's assignment. The Petitioner provides a 
contract between it and the mid-vendor, stating that the assignment of each Petitioner 
resource must be covered by a work order. However , the Petitioner does not provide the work order 
specific to the Beneficiary , or any other documentation reflecting the duration of the Beneficiary's 
assignment. In fact, a letter provided by the end-client on appeal sets forth no definitive duration for 
the project, stating only that the Beneficiary 's work ".will continue ... as long as the contract is 
renewed," thereby reflecting the very speculative nature of the Beneficiary's work. Indeed, the 
agreement between the Petitioner and states in paragraph 3 that the end-client may terminate 
any work order under the agreement with only 10 days' notice, further illustrating the tenuous nature 
of the proffered employment. A petitioner's unsuppmted statements are of very limited weight and 
normally will be insufficient to carry its burden of proof, particularly when supporting /documentary 
evidence would reasonably be available. See Maller of Sof{ici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm ' r 
1998) (citing Matter ofTreasure Craft ofCal. , 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg' ) Comm'r 1972)); see also 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner must support its assertions 
with relevant, probative , and credible evidence. See l'vfatter o(Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
We find that the Petitioner has not established non-speculative work for the Beneficiary at the time of 
the petition's filing for the entire period requested. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a 
petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the t~me the petition is tiled . See 
8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(l). A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility 
or after the Petitioner or Beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of 
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg ' ! Comm'r 1978). Thus, even if it were found that the 
Petitioner would be the Beneficiary's United States employer as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(4)(ii) , the Petitioner has not demonstrated that it would maintain such an employer-employee 
relationship for the duration of the period requested.4 
4 
The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-l B program. For example, a 
1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows: 
Historically, the Service has not granted H-1 B classification on the basis of speculative, or 
undetermined , prospective employment. The H-1 B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an 
alien to engage in a job search within the United States , or for employers to bring in temporary foreign 
workers to meet possible workforce need s arising from potential business expansions or the 
6 
(b)(6)
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
Furthermore, applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, we find that the evidence of 
record does not sufficiently establish that the Petitioner will be a "United States employer" having an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the Beneficiary as an H -1 B temporary "employee." 
Specifically, we find that the record of proceedings does not contain sufficient, consistent, and 
credible documentation confirming and describing who exercises control overthe Beneficiary. 
The Petitioner states that the Beneficiary will work for the end-client, at its work­
site in California. The Petitioner asserts that it has submitted sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it will control the Beneficiary while he is 
assigned to the end-client's location, including a letter from the end-client provided on appeal stating 
that it will "not provide any employment benefits" to the Beneficiary and that the Petitioner will 
have the right to pay, hire, fire, supervise, and otherwise control the Beneficiary's employment. The 
Petitioner emphasiz~s its agreement with which states that the Petitioner's .employees will 
remain that , including language specifying that in no event will Petitioner employees be considered 
employees of or its clients. The Petitioner also points to payroll and tax documentation 
reflecting that the Beneficiary is paid by the Petitioner and not or the end-client. 
However, the Petitioner has submitted little supporting documentation to corroborate that it does, 
and that it will continue to, exact daily control over the Beneficiary \vhile assigned to the end-client 
location. First, it is noteworthy that the Petitioner has provided no direct evidence to substantiate 
that the Beneficiary is, or will be, under the supervision and control of the Petitioner. For instance, 
the Petitioner, despite the direct request of the Director, provides no organizational chart reflecting to 
whon1 the Beneficiary will report on a daily basis. Support letters from the Petitioner, the mid­
vendor and the end-client do not specifically articulate the Beneficiary's 
supervisor or the nature of his day-to-day oversight. The Petitioner does not provide a work order 
applicable to the project, a document stated in its agreement with as required for every 
project. Again, a petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally will 
be insufficient to carry its burden of proof, particularly when supporting documentary evidence 
would reasonably be available. See ~Matter of Soffici, 22 l&N Dec . at 165; see also Matter of 
expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly 
classifiable as an H-1 B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the 
position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a 
specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the" Act"). The 
Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the 
case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis 
and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1 B classification . Moreover, there is no 
assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon aJTival in this country. 
Petitioning Requirements for the H Nonimmigrant Classification, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419 , 30,419-20 (proposed June 4, 
1998) (to be codifie-d at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to 
non-speculative employment , e.g., a change in duties or job location , it must nonetheless document such a material 
change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C. F. R. § 214.2(h){2)(i)(E). 
(b)(6)
.Matter of C-S- , Inc. 
Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, 
and credible evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 T&N Dec. at 376. 
/ 
The Petitioner also provides other conflicting evidence leaving question as tb whether it actually 
controls the Beneficiary's work on a daily basis. An end-client letter provided on appeal from an,IT 
BSA manager states that the project is under her supervision. The Petitioner's agreement with 
reflects that the Petitioner provides "staffing services" and the letter from references 
"staffing services, "human capital," and "staff augmentation" provided by the Petitioner. The 
Petitioner's ovm marketing materials also cite its "staff augmentation" services provided for clients. 
Similarly, the Petitioner submits evidence indicating that the .. Beneficiary is responsible for 
submitting his weekly timesheet in an end-client system, indicating that he is likely contracted labor 
under the direct supervision of the end-client. The Petitioner does not otherwise submit any 
evidence reflecting its oversight of the Beneficiary or the provision of materials and instrumentalities 
necessary for the completion of his work. Indeed, the record shows that the Beneficiary utilizes an 
end-client email and that his badge at the client location reflects that he is an ' contact. The 
Petitioner has not resolved these inconsistencies with independent, objective evidence pointing to 
where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The evidence strongly 
suggests that the Beneficiary acts largely autonomous trom the Petitioner, re~eting to client requests 
as they arise, and in essence, under the direction of the end-client. 
Although \Ve do not doubt that the Beneficiary is likely being paid and that his benefits are being 
administered by the Petitioner, the preponderance of the evidence appears to indicate that the 
Benefidary is primarily under the direction of the end-client and that he only occasionally checks in 
with the Petitioner as to his progress. While payroll , tax withholdings , and other employment 
benefits are relevant factors in determining who will control the Beneficiary, other aspects of the 
relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the Beneficiary , who will provide the 
instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and \vho has the right or ability to affect 
the projects to which the Beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to 
make a determination as to \Vho will be the Beneficiary's employer. Here, we find that the 
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the Beneficiary will be primarily under the control 
of the end-client and not the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner has not established that it qualifies as a "United States employer " as defined at 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). The Director's decision must be affirmed and the petition denied on this 
basis. 
III. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
The second issue before us is whether the evidence of record demonstrates by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Petitioner will employ the Beneficiary in a specialty occupation position. 
8 
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provid~ that the proffered position 
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
(I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that 
knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the 
attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). USCIS has consistently interpreted the term "degree" in the criteria 
at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a 
specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chefto.ff; 
484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one 
that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor, 201 F.3d at 
387. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we determine that the 
evidence is insufficient to establish that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a 
specialty occupation. 
9 
(b)(6)
Matter of C-S-, Inc. 
The record of proceeding is absent sufficient information from the end-client regarding the specific 
job duties to be performed by the Beneficiary for that company. The end-client letter makes no 
mention of the Beneficiary's job duties and does not convey the substantive nature of the proffered 
position and its duties. The Petitioner contends on appeal that the Director misinterpreted De.f(msor 
as applicable to the current matter, noting that it is not binding as a federal case from the Ilth 
Circuit. 
First, although we are not bound to the holding in Defensor, we have regularly accepted it as 
persuasive in interpreting matters involving a beneficiary primarily V.·orking at an end-client 
location. As recognized in Defensor, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient 
information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s), as well as any hiring 
requirements that it may have specified, in order to properly ascertain the minimum educational 
requirements necessary to perform those duties. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. In other words, 
as the nurses in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning 
staffing company , the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those 
duties were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. See id. Here, the record is 
insufficient to establish that, in fact, the Beneficiary would be performing services for the type of 
position for which the petition was filed, in this matter, a systems analyst position. Accordingly, \Ve 
concur with the Director's determination that the record is insufficient to establish that the duties of 
the proffered position comprise the duties of a specialty occupation. 
However, the Petitioner did submit a letter from the end-client explaining the Beneficiary's duties, 
but these duties are vague and convey only general tasks and not the specific work and assignments 
to be completed by the Beneficiary. For example, the largely identical letters from the end-client 
and list duties such as "understand[ing] the firm v ... ·ide initiative and technical requirements, " 
"using SQL, Excel, and Microsoft products extensively to understand an perform complex data 
analysis," "assist[ing) and support[ing] development and QA," "validat[ing) of user acceptance 
testing," "analyz[ing] and understand[ing] AF;S, INFOLEASE loan data," "perform[ing] Data 
analysis," and prepar[ing] data mapping documents." However, these letters, nor the other evidence , 
explain the nature of these applications or the specific work to be performed by the Beneficiary. The 
record of proceeding does not contain a more detailed description explaining what particular duties 
the Beneficiary will perform on a day-to-day basis, nor is there a detailed explanation regarding the 
demands, level of resl?onsibilities, compl~xity, or requirements necessary tor the performance of 
these duties (e.g., what "AFS" or "INFOLEASE loan data" are and what body of knowledge is 
required to perform the duties). In fact, the evidence of record does not specifically identify the 
particular project to which the Beneficiary will be assigned at the end-client's premises. Further, the 
end-client letter makes no reference to the specifics of the project. Once again, a petitioner's 
unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally will be insufficient to carry its 
burden of proof. See Matter of Soffici, 22 T&N Dec. at 165; see also Matter qf Chawalhe, 25 I&N 
Dec. at 376. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence. See ~Matter o.fChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. J 
10 
Matter ofC-S-. Inc. 
Overall, the evidence of record is insufficient to establish the substantive nature of the work to be 
performed by the Beneficiary. We are therefore precluded from finding that the protiered position 
satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that 
work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular 
position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered 
position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate 
prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the 
focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner 
normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the 
degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 
Furthermore, even if the Petitioner had established the substantive nature of the Beneficiary's 
position, it has not articulated what bachelor's degree in a specific specialty is required for the 
proffered position. For instance, in a petition support letter, the Petitioner states that the systems 
analyst position requires the minimum of a bachelor's degree in engineering, computer science, 
math, accounting, business administration or an information technology related field, while the letter 
from the end client provided on appeal indicates that a bachelor's degree in "a related technical 
field" would suffice. As such, the Petitioner's statements and the evidence submitted indicate that 
the position does not require a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty for minimum entry. A 
petitioner must demonstrate that the proffered position requires a precise and specific course of study 
that relates directly and closely to the position in question. Also, in general, provided the specialties 
are closely related, e.g., chemistry and biochemistry, a minimum of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
more than one specialty is recognized as satisfying the "degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent)" requirement of section 214(i)(l)(B) of the Act. In such a case, the required "body of 
highly specialized knowledge" would essentially be the same. Since there must be a close 
correlation between the required specialized studies and the position, the requirement of a degree 
with a generalized title, such as business administration, without further specification, does not 
establish the position as a specialty occupation. Cf 111atter qfA1ichael Hertz Assoc.~·., 19 J&N Dec. 
558, 560 (Comm'r 1988). 
In addition, a minimum entry requirement of a degree in two disparate fields, such as accounting and 
engineering, does not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be "in the specific specialty (or 
its equivalent)," unless it is established that each field is directly related to the duties and 
· responsibilities of the particular position such that the required "body of highly specialized 
knowledge" is essentially an amalgamation of these different specialties. Section 214(i)(l )(B) of the 
Act (emphasis added). In other words, while the statutory "the" and the regulatory "a" both denote a 
singular "specialty," we do not so narrowly interpret these provisions to exclude positions from 
qualif}ing as specialty occupations if they permit, as a minimum entry requirement, degrees in more 
than one closely related specialty. See section 214(i)(l )(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(ii). 
This also includes even seemingly disparate specialties providing, again, the evidence of record 
establishes how each acceptable, specific field of study is directly related to the duties and 
responsibilities of the particular position. 
II 
Matter ofC-S-, Inc. 
As the Petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a 
specialty occupation. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approvea. 
. ) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought. Section 291 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
c;ite as Matter ofC-S-. Inc., 10# 270950 (AAO Jan. 23, 2017) 
12