dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 9097587 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : JUNE 8, 2020 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-IB nonimmigrant 
classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) . The H-lB program allows a U.S . employer to 
temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor ' s 
or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into 
the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not sufficiently establish that: (I) the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation; and, (2) it 
qualifies as a United States employer with an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary . 1 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec . 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the 
questions in this matter de nova. See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec . 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015) . 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SPECIAL TY OCCUPATION 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires : 
1 On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director only denied the petition on two grounds - determining that the Petitioner 
did not sufficiently establish: (1) "the actual work to be performed by the Beneficiary ", and (2) that it qualifies as a United 
States employer with an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary. The Petitioner stated "we are only 
addressing the issue[s] regarding the employer -employee relationship and availability of specialty occupation work." 
However , as the Director also concluded in her denial that the Petitioner did not establish that the proffered position 
qualifies as a specialty occupation , we will also address this H-lB eligibility issue. 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a 
non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered 
position must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
( I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or 
higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a 
specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular 
position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2000). 
B. Proffered Position 
The Petitioner indicated that the proffered pos1t10n is an "IT Application Analyst" [IAA] and 
submitted a certified labor condition application (LCA) 2 for the "Software Developers, Applications" 
occupational category corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code 15-
1132. The Petitioner has submitted job descriptions for the proffered position. 3 For instance, in 
2 A petitioner submits the LCA to U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1 B worker the 
higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid 
by the employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 20 
C.F.R. § 655.73l(a). 
3 We acknowledge that the Petitioner submitted additional information for the job duties, and have closely considered and 
reviewed this material, as with all evidence in the record. For example, the Petitioner discussed the Beneficiary's previous 
coursework for the purpose of correlating the need for the Beneficiary's education with the associated job duties of the 
position. However, we are required to follow long-standing legal standards and determine first, whether the proffered 
position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation, and second, whether the Beneficiary was qualified for the 
position at the time the nonimmigrant visa petition was filed. Cf Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 T&N Dec. 558, 560 
2 
response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE) the Petitioner provided a list of the Beneficiary's 
job functions, the relative time percentage that he will devote to each job function, along with 
underlying job duties for each function, which for the sake of brevity we will summarize, as follows: 
• Design and develop flows in Mulesoft ESB suing Anypoint Studio for enterprise 
level complex data integration across multiple, disparate systems; (50%) 
• Work on Relational Database Management Systems; (15%) 
• Use Bamboo for CI (Continuous Integration) and CD (Continuous Deployment); 
(5%) 
• Analyze business requirements and design documents by interacting with the Data 
Governance, Technical Architects, Business Analysts, and Leads; (10%) 
• Conduct Unit and Functional tests using MUnit; (15%) 
• Follow Agile Methodology with a 2-week Sprint process, which include iterative 
application development, Daily Stand-Ups, End of Sprint - Sprint Planning, Sprint 
Retrospective Meetings, and Three Amigos; (5%) 
C. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we conclude first that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
Specifically, the Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of the work that the Beneficiary 
will perform, which precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any of the criteria at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 4 
The Petitioner located in Florida, indicates in the petition and on the LCA that it will deploy the 
Beneficiary to an end-client's location in Iowa to work as an IAA pursuant to contractual agreements, as 
follows: 5 Petitioner ➔ G- (mid-vendor) ➔ P- (end-client). 
On a fundamental level, the record lacks a detailed explanation or documentation from the contractual 
parties, including the end-client, regarding the particular end-client project(s) to which the Beneficiary 
will be assigned. We must review the actual duties the Beneficiary will be expected to perform to 
ascertain whether those duties require at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its 
equivalent, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. To accomplish that task in this 
matter, we review the duties in conjunction with the specific project(s) to which the Beneficiary will 
be assigned. To allow otherwise, results in generic descriptions of duties that, while they may appear 
(in some instances) to comprise the duties of a specialty occupation, are not related to any actual 
services the Beneficiary is expected to provide. 
(Comm'r 1988) ('The facts of a beneficiary's background only come at issue after it is found that the position in which 
the petitioner intends to employ him falls within [a specialty occupation]."). 
4 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-1 B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. Although we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered 
each one. 
5 The Petitioner most recently employed the Beneficiary through STEM-related post-completion optional practical 
training. 8 C.F.R. § 274.a.12(c)(3)(i)(C); 8 C.F.R 214.2(t)(10)(ii)(C), and has provided copies of wage statements for his 
employment with the Petitioner. 
3 
The Petitioner initially states that the Beneficiary "will be temporarily employed as an [IAA] and will 
be based at the Petitioner's client's office." In response to the Director's RFE the Petitioner indicates 
that the end-client is a "global investment management firm," and describes the project to which the 
Beneficiary will be assigned as follows: 
The Marketing Collateral Automation Project [project] is about automating the 
factsheet production for [the end-client's asset management arm] to include 
stabilization, improved service level, consolidation, scalability, and oversight. 
For mutual fonds, a factsheet is a basic three-page document that gives an overview of 
a mutual fond. For potential investors, this is a necessary and easy report to read before 
delving more deeply. The fact sheet will give the following information: fees, risk 
assessment; and returns. 
There are many people and manual processes involved in generating fact sheets. The 
[project's] goal is to reduce and eventually eliminate manual business processes to 
increase speed to market for delivery of factsheets. This will, in tum, improve 
operational efficiency and risk mitigation and these three factors will ultimately 
improve customer/client experience. 
Importantly, the Petitioner did not present material that would delineate the Beneficiary's specific role 
and responsibilities as a member of the end-client's technology development team(s) for this project. 
To farther illustrate, the Petitioner emphasized throughout the proceedings that the Beneficiary will 
liaise or interact with various end-client personnel and stakeholder groups, including: 
• Analyze business requirements and design documents by interacting with the Data 
Governance, Technical Architects, Business Analysts, and Leads; 
• [Engage in] peer review of code; 
• Work in coordination with Quality Assurance personnel in testing the Mule 
application across Test, Pilot, and Production environments; 
• Provide status updates and reporting metrics to the program leadership; 
• Conduct and coordinate triage calls with users, and; 
• Participate in Agile Scrum meetings. 
Though the Petitioner described the job duties of the position, the evidence does not show the 
operational structure within this initiative in a manner that would establish the Beneficiary's role. The 
submitted material does not communicate the work that the Beneficiary will perform on a day-to-day 
basis within the context of the end-client's project, and the correlation between that work and a need 
for a particular education level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty. 
The Petitioner's position descriptions appear to have the Beneficiary performing software application 
development duties which may be consistent with the LCA for a position within the "Software 
Developers, Applications" occupational category. For example, the Petitioner states that the 
Beneficiary will be "[t]ranslat[ing] mapping documents and requirements specifications documents 
into technical design," "[b ]uilding code to design the integrations between the application and SFTP 
server," and "[a]nalysis of business requirements and design documents by interacting with the 
4 
Technical Lead, Architect, and Business Analysts." The Petitioner provides farther discussion about 
the job duties of the position in response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), indicating for 
instance, that the Beneficiary will "[c]onvert data formats such as XML, CSV, and JSON," 
"[i]mplement synchronous and asynchronous messaging scopes using Apache Active MQ in Mule," 
and "[ c ]reate stored procedures and SQL queries to get/update financial information and send it to 
Informatica." While these descriptions identify the use of software development languages, hardware, 
and data formats to perform information technology job functions, without a more complete position 
description and specific information detailing what role the end-client expects the Beneficiary to play 
within its development projects, we cannot conclude that the Beneficiary's actual position and overall 
level of responsibility require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the 
minimum for entry into the occupation. 
The Petitioner also provided third-party supplier agreements between the Petitioner and the mid­
vendor, and the mid-vendor and the end-client, which indicate that the nature of the contractual 
relationships between the parties is one in which the mid-vendor has agreed to provide the Petitioner's 
personnel to the end-client in order to augment the end-client's staff engaged in information 
technology-related development projects. The mid-vendor contracted with the Petitioner to provide 
personnel to work directly with the end-client at the end-client location. Toward that end, the January 
2000 end-client agreement with the mid-vendor specified, in pertinent part: 
2. Statement of Work. For each engagement under this Agreement, the services to be 
performed by the [the mid-vendor] at Client's request will be described in a 
statement of work [SOW]. Each [SOW] and amendment hereto must be signed by 
both parties and must state that it is made pursuant to this Agreement. ... 
4. Fees. Each [SOW] shall specify whether fees for the engagement will be on a time­
and-materials basis, a fixed price basis, or a combination of both. 
8. Change Orders. A [SOW] shall describe the work to be performed and may contain 
a list of assumptions on which delivery dates or prices are based. If the scope of 
the project or assumptions change during the course of the engagement, the changes 
shall be described in a change order to be signed by both parties. The change order 
shall set forth any changes to delivery dates and/or prices that the parties agree are 
fair in light of the changed scope or assumptions. 
12. Invoices. Client shall not be billed or be liable for any charges other than those 
described and authorized in the [SOW], in this Agreement or in a subsequent 
writing signed by Client. ... 
5 
14. Client's Responsibilities. In connection with each [SOW], Client shall (a) 
designate one employee of Client as a project manager who shall be [the mid­
vendor's] primary point of contact for all questions and issues relating to the 
engagement. ... 
The end-client's agreement with the mid-vendor reflects that the end-client will issue supplemental 
documentation such as SOWs to the mid-vendor detailing the services to be provided and the fees for 
such services. Further, the end-client's SOWs are to identify the work to be performed in accordance 
with the overarching end-client agreement. Though requested by the Director in her RFE, the record 
does not contain SOWs, work orders or other contractual documentation specific to the Beneficiary's 
assignment under the end-client agreement, between the mid-vendor and the end-client. 6 On appeal, 
the Petitioner submits an email from the mid-vendor, indicating "[the end-client] no longer sends us 
SOWs," noting "[t]hey are all electronic through their Vendor Management System." The Petitioner 
indicates on appeal that "[e]ven though the Petitioner requested the relevant document, [the mid­
vendor] was not able to provide it because, as a company policy, [the end-client] does not issue 
sows." 
Companies are generally permitted, of course, to keep sensitive information confidential. This does 
not, however, relieve the Petitioner of the need to demonstrate the existence of H-lB caliber work for 
the Beneficiary to perform during the period of requested employment. The claim a document is 
confidential does not provide a blanket excuse for a petitioner not providing such a document if that 
document is material to the requested benefit. Although a petitioner may always refuse to submit 
confidential commercial information if it is deemed too sensitive, the Petitioner must also satisfy the 
burden of proof and runs the risk of a denial. Cf Matter of Marques, 16 l&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977) 
(holding the "respondent had every right to assert his claim under the Fifth Amendment[; however], 
in so doing he runs the risk that he may fail to carry his burden of persuasion with respect to his 
application."). 
The Petitioner has also submitted a copy of the mid-vendor's agreement with the Petitioner, which 
provides among other things: 
Each consultant assigned to a particular work project by [the Petitioner] will maintain 
an individual purchase order [PO]. The [PO] will specify, among other things, the 
name(s) of the individuals provided by [the Petitioner], the types of services requested 
by [the mid-vendor's] Client ("Purchase Order Services"), the tasks or project to be 
performed by the assigned individual(s), the fee for the work, the acceptance criteria, 
the commencement and completion dates for the assignment. ... 
6 "Failure to submit requested evidence which precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
[petition]." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4). 
6 
The mid-vendor POs each identify the Beneficiary and the end-client, and indicate under "description 
of the services to be performed" that the Beneficiary will be employed at the end-client location as an 
"[IAA]; duties as directed by client." Contrary to the PO requirements specified in the mid-vendor's 
overarching agreement with the Petitioner, neither PO identifies the specific tasks or end-client 
project(s) to which he will be assigned, or the requirements of the position. 
Absent folly executed contracts and accompanying statements of work ( or similar documentation) 
between the Petitioner and the mid-vendor; and, the mid-vendor and the end-client, the record lacks 
evidence of any legal obligation on the part of the end-client to provide the position described by the 
Petitioner in this petition. 7 Therefore, we conclude that the mid-vendor and end-client contractual 
material is not probative towards establishing the specific terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's 
end-client work assignment. It is the Petitioner's burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that 
it is qualified for the benefit sought. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. In evaluating the 
evidence, eligibility is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Id. 
Moreover, the letters from the end-client and the mid-vendor do not identify or discuss the specific 
project(s) to which the Beneficiary will be assigned. The mid-vendor's letter indicates that the 
Beneficiary "is currently work[ ing] on a project for our client." The March 2019 end-client letter notes 
that the Beneficiary "is a contractor" obtained through the mid-vendor who is "performing the [IAA] 
role at our facility campus." The July 2019 end-client letter states that the Beneficiary "has been 
assigned to work as an [IAA] at [the end-client location]. We also observe that the Petitioner has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that the signatories of the end-client letters were authorized by the end-client 
to provide such letters. The March 2019 letter is classified by the end-client for "Internal Use," and 
is signed by M-T- who indicates that she is employed in "human resources." The July 2019 letter is 
classified by the end-client as "Personal," and is signed by J-B- who indicates that she is an "IT 
Leader." The signatories did not identify whether they are employees of the end-client, and if so, 
whether they were authorized to provide letters classified for "internal use" or as "personal" to external 
parties on behalf of the end-client. Nor did they explain how they came to have knowledge of the 
terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's employment at the end-client location. The Petitioner must 
resolve these inconsistencies and ambiguities in the record with independent, objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Therefore, we 
conclude that these letters hold little probative value. 8 
7 Cf Galaxy Sofiware Solutions, Inc. v. USC1S, No. 18-12617, 2019 WL 2296824, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2019) 
( describing the petitioner's "fail[ ure] to provide all of the contracts governing the relationships between the corporate 
entities in the chain" as a "material gap"). 
8 See Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. We also observe that the end-client letters inconsistently describe the 
requirements of the position. The March 2019 end-client letter identifies job tasks that do not appear to be job functions, 
but instead resemble general knowledge and skill requirements for an information technology position, such as "experience 
with mulesoft," "knowledge of business unit applications," and "maintain a high degree of accuracy and confidentiality." 
Notably, it did not specify any degree requirements for the position. In contrast, the July 2019 end-client reiterates the 
Petitioner's minimum position requirements of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in computer science or engineering 
(Electrical/Electronics) or IT or IS. The Petitioner must also resolve this inconsistency in the record with independent, 
objective evidence pointing to where the trnth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. 591-92. For this additional reason, the 
end-client letters are not probative towards establishing the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's assignment as 
imposed by the end-client. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. 
7 
On appeal, the Petitioner emphasizes "the end-client has engaged the services of the Petitioner through 
the vendor," noting "the end-client has some specific requirements, which under contractual 
obligations, by entering into the series of contracts, the Petitioner has undertaken to provide." 
However, the Petitioner has not submitted any end-client contractual documentation specific to the 
Beneficiary's assignment. It further states "USCIS is well aware of the difficulties companies like the 
Petitioner face in obtaining and providing letters and related documentation, which is practically 
impossible AND should not be insisted upon." Notably in this case the Petitioner describes an end­
client contingent worker hiring process whereby firms such as the Petitioner are provided with the 
end-client's "Purchase Order Services" describing the desired services to be performed for the end­
client. According to the mid-vendor agreement - prior to the issuance of the mid-vendor's PO, such 
firms present candidates for consideration who they believe will meet the end-client's requirements to 
perform the specific end-client assignments. If the candidate is accepted for the assignment, the mid­
vendor's PO is executed to facilitate the candidate's end-client consulting assignment. Therefore, the 
Petitioner's assertion that end-client documentation specifically relating to the Beneficiary's 
assignment is "practically impossible to obtain" seems incongruent with other evidence within this 
petition. 9 
The Petitioner also provided copies of the Beneficiary's work emails at the end-client location which 
reflect that the end-client's staff assign various tasks to the Beneficiary. While this material shows 
that the Beneficiary was involved in performing information technology-related tasks, such as 
determining whether certain source files can have null values for software testing purposes, 
performing software "bug-fixes," providing updates to staff regarding software pilot testing, and 
making requests of other staff to test various applications, the material in record does not sufficiently 
illustrate the scope and complexity of the Beneficiary's work assignments therein, or the nature of his 
position as a member of the end-client project development team. Further, the Beneficiary's status 
report tasks, such as "[ w ]orked on fixing a couple of production issues," "[h ]ad backlog grooming 
wherein we groomed the User Stories for coming sprints," and "[c]oded all Sourcerules user stories 
that needed refactor to match with the current architecture (60 user story points)," considered outside 
of the context of the end-client's project add little insight into the substantive nature of the position. 
As discussed, the general references in the petition regarding the Beneficiary's assignment to 
"projects" do not sufficiently establish that working on such projects require highly specialized 
knowledge and at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty. 
Considering the evidence in its entirety, we conclude that the record lacks sufficient documentation 
regarding the end-client project to which the Beneficiary will be assigned, and the specific work that 
the Beneficiary would perform during the intended period of employment. Nor does the Petitioner 
provide sufficient detail regarding the Petitioner's specific role with respect to the Beneficiary's 
day-to-day work while at the end-client site. We note again that the record lacks (1) SOWs, work orders 
or other contractual documentation specific to the Beneficiary's assignment under the end-client 
agreement, between the mid-vendor and the end-client; and, (2) the mid-vendor's purchase orders do 
not identify critical details, such as the end-client project to which the Beneficiary will be assigned, 
and his job tasks therein. 
9 Matter of Ho, Dec. at 591-92. 
8 
The Petitioner also submitted a letter from Professor W-, who determined that the nature of the duties 
of the position require "at least a bachelor's degree in computer science or engineering 
(electrical/electronics) or information technology or information systems." After careful 
consideration, we conclude that the opinion letter is not persuasive. The professor, indicates that his 
opinion is based upon a review of (1) the Petitioner's letters submitted in support of the petition, (2) 
the Petitioner's business, and (3) his "own independent research." However, he did not specifically 
discuss what his independent research activities entailed, nor were his research efforts documented in 
the record. 
For instance, while he opined that "[a]mong industry professionals, it is widely recognized that 
individuals [employed in the proffered position] must have [the professor's previously stated 
requirements]," his letter does not substantiate his conclusions, such that we can conclude that the 
Petitioner has met its burden of proof Here, the professor does not reference, cite, or discuss any 
studies, surveys, industry publications, authoritative publications, or other sources of empirical 
information which he may have consulted to complete his evaluation. 
Importantly, the professor indicates that the "[IAA] with [the Petitioner would be required to perform 
a range of duties to design, development, and implementation of integration services and applications 
based on clients' existing infrastructure and technical design documents," but does not reference the 
specifics of the particular projects upon which the Beneficiary would work for the instant end-client. 
He also quotes the job functions and job duties present in the record, which we previously stated are 
insufficient for determining what the Beneficiary would be doing in his IAA role at the end-client 
location. Therefore, his level of familiarity with the proposed job duties as they would be performed 
in the context of the end-client's business has also not been substantiated. 
Further, the professor provided narrative regarding academic degrees that would be acceptable for 
entry into the proffered position, and identified various coursework therein. However, he did not 
discuss any detailed course of study or the "educational foundation" provided by those degrees in 
relation to the specific duties of the position at the end-client location. We conclude that the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated through the professor's analysis how an established curriculum of courses 
leading to a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is required to 
successfully serve in the proffered position. 
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the opinion letter from the professor is insufficient to 
satisfy the first criterion. Matter of Caron Int'!, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 1988) (The service 
is not required to accept or may give less weight to an advisory opinion when it is "not in accord with 
other information or is in any way questionable."). For the sake of brevity, we will not address other 
deficiencies within the professor's analyses of the proffered position. 
Because the Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of definite, non-speculative work that 
the Beneficiary will perform for the stated end-client, we are unable to evaluate whether the proffered 
position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of 
that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular 
position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered 
position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong 
of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of 
9 
the second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a 
degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and 
complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. We therefore conclude that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 10 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
Since the identified basis for denial is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach 
and hereby reserve the Petitioner's appellate arguments regarding whether it will be a "United 
States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the Beneficiary as an H-lB 
temporary "employee." See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and agencies 
are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they 
reach"); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach 
alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
III. CONCLUSION 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden here, 
and the petition will remain denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
10 As the lack of probative and consistent evidence in the record precludes a conclusion that the proffered position is a 
specialty occupation and is dispositive of the appeal, we will not further discuss the Petitioner's assertions on appeal. 
10