dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 8998360 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-18) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG. 26, 2020 
The Petitioner, an information technology consulting services firm, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary under the H-18 nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-18 
program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that 
requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; 
and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a 
minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The California Service Center Director denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner had not 
established that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the 
Director erred and that the proffered position is a specialty occupation.1 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate el igibi I ity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the 
questions in this matter de nova. See Matter of Christa's Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-18 nonimmigrant as a foreign national "who is 
coming temporarily to the United States to perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in 
section 214(i)(l) ... "(emphasis added). Section 214(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(I), defines the 
term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires "theoretical and practical application of a 
body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States." The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates section 214(i)(I) of the Act, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) provides that the 
proffered position must meet one of four criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation position. 2 Lastly, 
1 We decline the Petitioner's request for oral argument. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(b). 
2 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must be read with the statutory and regulatory definitions of a specialty occupation under 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(1) states that an H-1B classification may be granted to a foreign national 
who "will perform services in a specialty occupation ... "(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, to determine whether the Beneficiary will be employed in a specialty occupation, we 
look to the record to ascertain the services the Beneficiary will perform and whether such services 
require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained 
through at least a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty or its equivalent. Without 
sufficient evidence regarding the duties the Beneficiary will perform, we are unable to determine whether 
the Beneficiary will be employed in an occupation that meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of 
a specialty occupation and a position that also satisfies at least one of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). The services the Beneficiary will perform in the position determine: (1) the normal 
minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 
1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review 
for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of 
complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong 
of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, 
when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the 
specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 
By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(1) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director 
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8). 
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to 
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). 
II. ANALYSIS 
For the reasons set out below, we determine that the proffered position does not qualify as a specialty 
occupation. Specifically, the record provides inconsistent and insufficient information regarding the 
proffered position, which in turn precludes us from understanding the position's substantive nature 
and determining whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation.3 
The Petitioner, located in Georgia, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a ".Net CRM Developer" [NCO] 
offsite for an end-client located in Illinois. It designated the proffered position under the occupational 
category "Software Developers, Applications" corresponding to the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) code 15-1132 on the labor condition application (LCA) submitted in support of the 
H-1B petition. 4 
section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any 
baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as 
"one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). 
3 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-lB petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each 
one. 
4 A petitioner submits the LCA to the U.S. Department of Labor to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1B worker the higher 
2 
The contractual agreements and other supporting evidence presented to the Director and on appeal do not 
substantiate the Petitioner's assertions regarding the substantive nature of the work the Beneficiary would 
perform at the end-client worksite.5 There are several entities involved with the Beneficiary's 
placement at the ultimate end-client.6 The contractual chain the Petitioner and other relevant parties 
represented in the petition are: 
Petitioner ::t: A-T- (mid-vendor) ::t: A-C-S- (prime-vendor) ::t: T- (end-client). 
The Petitioner maintains that the Beneficiary will be solely employed at the end-client location. The 
Petitioner describes the end-client as "a leading global distributor of [metal] stocks and processes Tube, 
Pipe, Bar, Extrusions, Sheet and Plate in stainless, aluminum, nickel, titanium, and carbon alloy." 
However, it did not initially identify or discuss the end-client projects to which the Beneficiary would be 
assigned, other than to note that he would be assigned to the "Sales and Customer Relationship 
Management System." The Petitioner also provided material from the mid-vendor. The mid-vendor's 
master service agreement with the Petitioner details their contractual arrangement, in pertinent part: 
1. Benefits/Administration: 
[The mid-vendor] agrees to compensate [the Petitioner] according to appendix A 
(hereinafter alternatively referred to as the "Work Order") as per CLIENT approved 
billable hour .... 
2. SCOPE/DIRECTION: 
[The Petitioner] shall provide its consultants to the business location required in the Work 
Order annexed to or annexed hereto. Further, [the Petitioner] and/or its consultants shall 
perform service for [the mid-vendor] as described in this agreement and the Work Order. 
CLIENT, not [the mid-vendor], shall make the entire direction, scope, control, and 
interpretation of any systems work to be performed by [the Petitioner's] consultants. 
CLIENT alone shall provide the facilities and services necessary to the completion of this 
effort. 
of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid by the 
employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(1) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.731(a). 
5 Although a petitioner is not required by existing regulation to submit contracts or legal agreements between the petitioner 
and third parties to establish an employer-employee relationship, "the petitioner must demonstrate eligibility for the benefit 
sought" and "if a petitioner provides contracts or legal agreements, [an] officer is not precluded from evaluating that 
evidence in the adjudication of other eligibility criteria." USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0114, Rescission of Policy 
Memoranda at 3 (June 17, 2020), http://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/policy-memoranda. 
6 The Petitioner employed the Beneficiary through post-completion optional practical training, and has provided copies of 
wage statements for his employment with the Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(3)(i)(B), 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(A)(3). 
3 
4. TIMESHEETS: 
[The Petitioner] shall complete [mid-vendor]/Client project time sheets at the conclusion 
of each week and fax his/her hours to [the mid-vendor's] corporate headquarters on a 
timely basis .... 
The terms of this mid-vendor agreement reflect that the Beneficiary will work for the end-client under a 
staff augmentation arrangement. The Petitioner has also provided mid-vendor work orders and letters to 
establish the nature of the Beneficiary's contractual assignment. However, the Petitioner's reliance on 
this material is misplaced. The mid-vendor's March 11, 2018 work order provided with the petition 
indicates that the Beneficiary will be employed as an NCD with the end-client to commence in March 
2019 for "12+ Months with possibilities of extension," but does not describe the project(s) to which he 
will be assigned. Later, the Petitioner submitted another mid-vendor work order, also executed on March 
11, 2018, which is identical to the initially submitted work order, except the duration of the work 
assignment is stated to be "36+ Months with possibilities of extension." It seems incongruous that the 
mid-vendor issued work orders on the same day in March 2018 for an assignment to commence a year 
later, for two different periods of employment. The Petitioner must resolve this inconsistency and 
ambiguity in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter 
of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
The mid-vendor's letters also provide insufficient and ambiguous information about the Beneficiary's 
end-client work assignment.7 For instance, the signatory of the mid-vendor's letters states therein: 
I have been informed that this letter was prepared by counsel engaged to process the 
H-1 related petition in this matter. I have reviewed it carefully and believe all 
information in this letter to be accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and 
belief. 
Notably, the mid-vendor's April 2019 letter indicates that the Beneficiary "is being supervised by 
***name***," and lists this person's email address as "email:******." The letter also quotes verbatim 
the Petitioner's job description and position requirements, and states the Beneficiary will be "assigned to 
the **** Project." The mid-vendor's September 2019 letter is identical to the April letter, except it 
provides information about the Beneficiary's supervisor that was previously omitted from the letter, and 
the end-client project is identified as the 'I I Project." We conclude that the mid­
vendor's letters are of little probative value as the mid-vendor was supplied with a "template" letter from 
Petitioner's counsel, which casts doubt about whether the signatory of the mid-vendor's letters possessed 
a degree of familiarity with the Beneficiary's proposed employment sufficient to verify the nature of 
his employment with the end-client.8 
7 Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. at 591-92. 
8 In evaluating the evidence, the truth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Matter of 
Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
4 
Additionally, the limited end-client and prime-vendor material in the record does not sufficiently 
describe the specific services to be provided through the contractual relationships between and 
amongst the Petitioner, the intermediary vendors, and ultimately the end-client. The prime vendor's 
March 2019 letter to the end-client indicates that the Beneficiary commenced employment with the 
end-client that month "at the rate of $00.00 per hour." The record does not contain any clarification 
about the actual rate of pay that the prime-vendor will be paid for the Beneficiary's services. 9 The 
prime-vendor's letter also does not identify the proffered position's title, the services to be rendered, 
or the project(s) to which the Beneficiary will be assigned. The Director denied the petition, in part, 
concluding that the evidence did not sufficiently establish whether the job to be performed by the 
Beneficiary qualifies as a specialty occupation. We agree. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits a statement of work [SOW] between the prime-vendor and the end­
client. The date of the SOW is November 25, 2019, but the start date of the employment covered 
under the SOW is March 19, 2019 - a date eight months prior to the date the SOW was executed by 
the prime-vendor.10 The SOW also states on the first page "you can hide this," followed by the heading 
- "Looking for candidates with the following skills and experience:," but the SOW does not list any 
position requirements within this section of the document. Oddly, the prime-vendor's SOW also lists 
the rate that the end-client will pay for the Beneficiary's services as "$00.00/hr" in the same fashion 
as the prime-vendor's letter to the end-client.11 The SOW lists the end-client's address as the 
Beneficiary's work location, but does not identify the projects to which he will be assigned. Rather, 
a section of the SOW entitled "Project Details," reiterates verbatim excerpts from the Petitioner's job 
description, such as "Support, troubleshoot and fix Production Outages and assist in CRM upgrades," 
and "Test and implement the system to provide analytical support to monitor operation of assigned 
application system." Though the SOW details a need for the performance of generic information 
technology job functions, it does not, for instance, describe the "application system" actually under 
development at the end-client location. 
We further note identical language and typographical errors in the aforementioned documentation 
from the Petitioner, the mid-vendor, and the prime-vendor. For example, the material states that the 
position involves tasks, such as: 
I Develop console applications to import data from Legacy applications. 
I Develop custom Dashboards and security-based Views based on customer 
requirements. 
I As part of Release Management, create and maintain multiple branches. 
This verbiage appears in letters from the Petitioner and the mid-vendor submitted prior to the 
Director's denial of the petition, and in the prime-vendor's SOW submitted on appeal, to include the 
peculiar capitalizations within the quote. Further similarities in documentation from all three entities 
include similar capitalization and grammatical errors, such as in the following sentence regarding 
position requirements: "The minimum education requirements to perform these job duties are a 
Bachelors or Higher degree in Computer Science or equivalent," which raises additional questions 
about the actual source of the information provided for the proffered position. Id. 
9 Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. at 591-92. 
10 The SOW also bears no indication that it was executed by the end-client, which raises questions as to what the end­
client actually agreed to. Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
11 Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. at 591-92. 
5 
When we consider the unique similarities in the letters from all three entities, we conclude that the 
Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the duties originated from the 
end-client.12 The Petitioner must also resolve this ambiguity in the record with independent, objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth I ies.13 As a general concept, when a petitioner has provided material 
from different entities, but the language and structure contained within is notably similar, the trier of fact 
may treat those similarities as a basis for questioning a petitioner's claims.14 When affidavits contain 
such similarities, it is reasonable to infer that the petitioner who submitted the strikingly similar 
documents is the actual source from where the similarities derive.15 We are unable to determine the 
original source of the proposed duties, but it remains the Petitioner's burden to demonstrate the duties 
relate to the actual work the Beneficiary will perform at the end-client worksite. The Petitioner must 
also establish the duties are the requirements actually imposed by the entity using the Beneficiary's 
services. Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2000). 
Turning to the end-client letter submitted on appeal, we also conclude this evidence is insufficient to 
satisfy the Petitioner's burden of proof. The Petitioner did not offer material from the end-client until 
the appeal - more than six months after it filed the petition. A petitioner must establish eligibility at 
the time it files the nonimmigrant visa petition.16 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
may not approve a visa petition at a future date after a petitioner or a beneficiary becomes eligible 
under a new set of facts.17 The Petitioner offers no explanation of why it did not submit the end-client 
letter in April 2019 when it filed the petition or within its response RFE, other than noting "despite 
the [P]etitioner's best efforts, letters from [the end-client] are unavailable." The signatory of the end­
client letter states the purpose of the letter is to "verify" that the "Beneficiary is working at our 
premises located at D through the [prime-vendor] via contract in the P,0sition of ~NCD]. ... on an 
ongoing project to Integrate Microsoft dynamics CRM System with ourl--_~ERP System."18 
Notably absent from the end-client letter are any prerequisites it requires to perform the duties we discuss 
below even though the Director's RFE notified the Petitioner that this information should be included in 
any end-client letter.19 The material within the record does not reflect what the end-client requires as a 
prerequisite for the position, and thus is not probative towards establishing the terms and conditions of 
the Beneficiary's assignment as imposed by the end-client. 20 This lack of information alone is sufficient 
to preclude the petition's approval, as the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the offered position satisfies 
the definition of a specialty occupation found at section 214(i)(l) of the Act. 
12 Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
13 Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. at 591-92. 
14 See Matter of R-K-K-, 26 l&N Dec. 658, 665 (BIA 2015); Surinder Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 438 F.3d 
145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006); Wang v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2016); Dehonzai v. Holder , 650 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
15 See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 519 (2d Cir. 2007). 
16 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l) , (12). 
17 Matter of Michelin Tire Corp. , 17 l&N Dec. 248,249 (Reg'I Comm'r 1978). 
18 The end-client letter does not discuss the nature of the project(s) to which the Beneficiary will be assigned, his position 
title, or the specific duties that he will perform . 
19 "Failure to submit requested evidence which precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
[petition]." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
20 See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88 (where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of 
the client companies' job requirements is critical). 
6 
Moreover, when determining whether a position is a specialty occupation, we look at the nature of the 
business offering the employment and the description of the specific duties of the position as it relates 
to the performance of those duties within the context of that particular employer's business operations. 
In this case, the record describes the proffered position with the end-client as that of a contract worker 
hired to augment the end-client's existing information technology staff, but does not sufficiently 
describe the work that the Beneficiary will perform as part of the end-client information technology 
development efforts. As a result, the record does not include probative evidence that any work that may 
be available will be H-lB caliber work.21 On a fundamental level we conclude that the Petitioner has 
not provided consistent and sufficient material about the end-client's projects that the Beneficiary wi II 
be engaged in. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts: 
The substantive nature of Beneficiary's work on.__ ________ ____. and 
I I project was sufficiently identified as requiring professional level 
complexity and specialized knowledge from specific degrees. 
As discussed, the submitted contractual documentation and letters variously identify the end-client 
project(s) that the Beneficiary for which will be provide services as the "Sales and Customer 
Relationship Management System," i !Project," and the.___ _____ _. 
project." The Petitioner has submitted computer screen shots entitled "IT Project Task Lists," pages 
of computer code as exemplars of the "Beneficiary['s] Project Programming skill," and a copy of a 
screen shot entitled "database SQL Server" as evidence of the Beneficiary's work product. However, 
the Petitioner has not adequately substantiated that this material comprises the Beneficiary's end-client 
work assignments, or documented what the end-client's projects entail, and how the Beneficiary will 
perform the duties described in the petition as part of the end-client's software development team. 22 
The Petitioner also submitted an opinion letter from Professor G-D-. In his letter, the professor 
describes the credentials that he asserts qualify him to opine upon the nature of the proffered position, 
discusses the general characteristics of NCO positions, analyzes the job functions and the Petitioner­
proposed duties of the proffered position, and reiterates the Petitioner's degree requirements for the 
position (a bachelor's or higher degree in computer science or equivalent). We carefully evaluated 
the professor's assertions in support of the petition but, for the following reasons, determine his letter 
is not persuasive. The professor indicates, among other things: 
I have been asked to render an expert opinion on this matter. For that purpose, I have 
been provided a description of an offered job and other pertinent information for my 
review. I was also requested to list research sources I consult if any, and any other 
specific documents and information I review to form this opinion. Where applicable, 
21 We must review the actual duties the Beneficiary will be expected to perform to ascertain whether those duties require 
at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as required for classification as a specialty 
occupation. To accomplish that task in this matter, we review the duties in conjunction with the specific project(s) to 
which the Beneficiary will be assigned. To allow otherwise, results in generic descriptions of duties that, while they may 
appear (in some instances) to comprise the duties of a specialty occupation, are not related to any actual services the 
Beneficiary is expected to provide. 
22 The Director specifically requested such evidence in her RFE, but the Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence of 
how the Beneficiary's specific job duties relate to the end-client's products and services. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
7 
I have listed all such information sources and documents in this opinion, and I have 
made suitable inquiries with the [B]eneficiary and [the Petitioner.] 
[The Petitioner] is a consulting company, where they provide services based on 
individual contracts. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to analyze the job at the end 
client site. According to information I have been provided, including project 
documentation, the [B]eneficiary has been placed as a [NCO] with [the end-client]." 
[The Beneficiary's] project at [the end-client] relates to the development of a workflow 
for the leads, custom plug-ins, managing the MS Dynamics CRM Administration, MS 
Dynamics CRM Enhancements including customization, workflows, and developing 
software utilities scripts). The specific project that [the Beneficiary] is working on is 
The project has 18 members and over 240+ users. With a total 
budget in excess of $8 million, technologies such as [various information technology 
languages and tools] are used. 
The professor did not list the end-client project documentation that he reviewed as part of his analysis 
regarding the minimum requirements of the position, nor did he memorialize the pertinent information 
that he obtained through "suitable inquiries" with the Beneficiary and the Petitioner. While the 
Petitioner quotes the professor's brief description of the end-client project in its RFE response and 
again on appeal, it did not provide documentary evidence of the project information that the professor 
relied upon to render his opinion. We agree with the professor that it is "necessary to analyze the job 
at the end-client site" in order to establish the requirements of the position, but the record as it is 
presently constituted does not include sufficient evidence corroborating the professor's conclusions 
regarding the minimum entry requirements for the instant position. We recognize that the professor may 
have relied on documents not included in the record, but given the vague, inadequate material that we 
have reviewed, we conclude that the basis for his analysis in this regard has not been substantiated. 
For the reasons discussed, we find that the opinion letter provided lends little probative value to the 
matter here. As a matter of discretion, we may use opinion statements submitted by the Petitioner as 
advisory. Matter of Caron lnt'I, Inc., 19 l&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 1988). However, we will reject 
an opinion or give it less weight if it is not in accord with other information in the record or if it is in 
anyway questionable. Id. We are ultimately responsible for making the final determination regarding 
an individual's eligibility for the benefit sought; the submission of expert opinion letters is not 
presumptive evidence of eligibility. Id.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 l&N Dec. 500, 502 n.2 (BIA 
2008) ("[E]xpert opinion testimony, while undoubtedly a form of evidence, does not purport to be 
evidence as to 'fact' but rather is admissible only if 'it will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'). For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the professor's 
letter renders little illumination regarding the substantive nature of the Beneficiary's position at the 
end-client location. For the sake of brevity, we will not address other deficiencies within the 
professor's analyses of the proffered position. 
8 
Notwithstanding the above evidentiary shortcomings, the duties presented are overly generalized, 
which undermines the Petitioner's claims that the position's duties are specialized and complex. For 
example, it is unclear what theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge is required to "[a]ssist as part of a team to resolve technical problems developing software 
solutions," "[d]esign, develop and implement Dynamics CRM and .Net software application packages 
customized to meet specific client needs," and "[c]reate plugins on appropriate entity events, 
workflows and dialogs to achieve business functionality." From the indeterminate nature of the duties, 
it is not self-evident that they are qualifying under the H-lB program. Without more, it would be difficult 
to conclude that such duties are so specialized and complex, or that the duties comprise a position that is 
so complex or unique, that one must attain a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty in order to perform 
them.23 Here, the general and jargon-laden statements in the record in conjunction with the lack of 
description and material about the nature of the projects and initiatives to which the Beneficiary will 
be assigned do not provide sufficient insight into the Beneficiary's duties. 24 
When considered collectively, we conclude that the inconsistencies, discrepancies, unanswered 
questions, and lack of documentation in the record raise questions as to the actual, substantive nature 
of the proffered position. 25 The Petitioner has not submitted consistent, probative evidence to 
adequately communicate (1) the actual work that the Beneficiary would perform, (2) the complexity, 
uniqueness, or specialization of t~e tasks, and (3) the correlation between that work and a need for a 
particular level education of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty. Accordingly, the 
Petitioner has not established that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. 26 
111. CONCLUSION 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
23 The Petitioner also discusses the Beneficiary's coursework for the purpose of correlating the need for the Beneficiary's 
education with the associated job duties of the position. However, we are required to follow long-standing legal standards 
and determine first, whether the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation, and second, 
whether the Beneficiary was qualified for the position at the time the non immigrant visa petition was filed. Cf. Matter of 
Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 l&N Dec. 558, 560 (Comm'r 1988) {"The facts of a beneficiary's background only come at 
issue after it is found that the position in which the petitioner intends to employ him falls within [a specialty occupation]."). 
24 Cf. Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 l&N Dec. 558, 560 (Comm'r 1988) (indicating USCIS must evaluate the actual 
tasks, demands, and duties to determine whether a petitioner has established the position realistically requires the 
specialized knowledge-both theoretical and applied-which is almost exclusively obtained at the baccalaureate level). 
A broad and generalized presentation of a position's responsibilities prevents USCIS from making such a determination. 
See Sagarwala, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 68. 
25 Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
26 As the lack of probative and consistent evidence in the record precludes a conclusion that the proffered position is a 
specialty occupation and is dispositive of the appeal, we will not further discuss the Petitioner's assertions on appeal. 
9