dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF S-I-, INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JULY 31,2017 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, an information technology consulting firm, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiflry as a "programmer analyst" under the H-1B nonimmigrant classification for specialty 
occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a 
qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of 
record does not establish that 1) the proffered, position is a specialty occupation, 2) there will be 
specialty occupation work available for the duration of the requested validity period, and 3) the 
Petitioner will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the 
Beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee," 
( 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director erred in the decision. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
Matter of S-1-, Inc. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position 
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
(I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can b(( performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that 
knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the 
attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We have consistently interpreted the term "degree" to mean not just 
any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the 
proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Cherto.ff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing 
"a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and 
responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor. 201 F.3d at 387. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we determine that the 
Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the Beneficiary, 
and therefore, has not established that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
Specifically, the Petitioner has not provided documents from the end-client that sufficiently describe 
the duties and requirements for the proffered position or establish that it has sufficient H-lB caliber 
work for the Beneficiary for the requested validity period. 1 
The Petitioner, which is located in New Jersey, indicated that it will place the Beneficiary at an end­
client, located in Florida, in the position of programmer analyst. As recognized by the court in 
Defensor, and explained by the Director, where the work is to be performed for entities other than 
the petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical. See Defensor, 201 F.3d 
at 387-88. The court held that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably 
interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered 
position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis qf the requirements imposed by the entities 
using the beneficiary's services (emphasis added). !d. In other words, as the beneficiaries in that 
1 
While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
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Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
case would provide services to the end-client hospitals, and not to the petitioning staffing company, 
the job duties and requirements to perform those duties provided by the petitioning company were 
insufficient for a specialty occupation determination. See id. Therefore, in order for us to determine 
whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation, the end-client must provide 
suffic;iently detailed information regarding the proposed job duties and the minimum educational 
requirements necessary to perform those duties. 
The Director's decision notified the Petitioner that it did not submit sufficient documents from the 
end-client to establish the duties and requirements of the proffered position. On appeal, rather than 
address the Director's findings, the Petitioner relies on the same letter from the end-client submitted 
in response to the request for evidence (RFE) that the Director found to be insufficient. 
The end-client's letter indicates that the Beneficiary will work on "application development 
projects," but does not provide additional pertinent information regarding the specific project(s) to 
which he will be assigned. The end-client also provides a general description of the duties as 
follows (note: errors in original have not been changed): 
• Responsibilities include designing technical specification, developing and 
maintaining middle-tier and some web applications, analyzing and 
troubleshooting 
• Responsible for analyzing requirements, determining technical approach & 
technical design, determining effort, and providing deliverable dates for projects 
and enhancement requests 
• Collaborating with Technology team member to design and develop middle-tier 
and some web backend systems. 
• Researching and prototyping new technologies and providing recommendations 
for application improvement. 
• Mentor & provide development guidance to the junior engineers 
• Additional responsibilities include documenting product functionality, supporting 
QA and deployment activities, troubleshooting production defects 
The letter also states that "[ o ]ther similar professional responsibilities may also be assigned." 
We must first note that the record does not contain information which describes the end-client's 
business operations. The Director noted that the public records indicate that the end-client is another 
software consulting business which raised questions regarding for whom the Beneficiary will be 
providing services as a programmer analyst. While we acknowledge the end-client's general 
statement that the Beneficiary will be "on contract from 10/3/2016 - 9/27/2019 at our premises," the 
record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a claim, and on appeal, "the Petitioner 
again relies on the insufficient letter from the end-client. 
Moreover, the description of the Beneficiary's duties lacks the specificity and detail necessary to 
support the Petitioner's contention that the position is a specialty occupation. The provided duties 
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Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
do not sufficiently communicate the Beneficiary's actual role or the work that he will perform in 
relation to the specific project(s) he will work on and in the context of the end-client's business 
operations. The overall responsibilities for the proffered position contain generalized functions 
without providing sufficient information regarding the particular work, and associated educational 
requirements, into which the duties would manifest themselves in their day-to-day performance 
within the end-client's business operations. 
Further, the letter from the end-client does not state any educational requirements for the proffered 
position. In addition, due to the lack of information regarding the project(s) the Beneficiary will 
work on and the end-client, we cannot determine whether the Petitioner secured definitive, non­
speculative employment for the Beneficiary for the entire three-year period requested? 
Without reliable, official documentation directly from the end-client which provides information 
regarding the project(s) itself, including a description of the Beneficiary's specific duties and 
responsibilities in relation to the project on which he will be working, the position's educational 
requirements, and other pertinent aspects of the proposed employment in Florida, we cannot 
determine the substantive nature of the proffered position. 
We are therefore precluded from finding that the proffered position satisfies any of the criterion at 
8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines 
(1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the 
focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus 
appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 
2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the 
second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a 
degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization 
and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 
2 The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1 B program. For example, a 
1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows: 
Historically, the Service has not granted H-1 B classification on the basis of speculative, or 
undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1 B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an 
alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign 
workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the 
expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly 
classifiable as an H-1 B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the 
position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a 
specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The 
Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the 
case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis 
and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1 B classification. Moreover, there is no 
assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country. 
Petitioning Requirements for the H Nonimmigrant Classification, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419, 30,419-20 (proposed June 4, 
1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
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Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-lB nonimmigrant, in pertinent part, as an 
individual: 
[S]ubject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to 
perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(l) ... , who 
meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) ... , and with 
respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of 
Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of 
Labor] an application under section 212(n)(l) .... 
The term "United States employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows: 
United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other 
association, or organization in the United States which: 
(1) Engages a person to work within the United States; 
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees 
under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and 
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number. 
(Emphasis added); see Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act 56 Fed. Reg. 61,111, 61,121 (Dec. 2, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), the terms 
"employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-lB visa 
classification. The UnitedStates Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the 
skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the 
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
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Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring 
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in busi~ess; the provision of employee benefits; and 
the tax treatment of the hired party." 
Id; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc~ .. P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. 
of Am., 390 U.S. 254,258 (1968)).3 
In considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with 
a "United States employer" for purposes of H-lB nonimmigrant petitions, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." Clackamas, 
538 U.S. at 450; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who 
"has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the 
fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee . " 
(emphasis added)). 
Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the 
worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee 
benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular 
3 While the Darden court considered only the definition of"employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § I 002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally 
refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' 
in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the 
traditional common law definition." See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 
I 0 I (a)( 15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)( I )(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 
212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1 B visa 
classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the 
common law agency definition. Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1 B 
employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the H-1 B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" 
combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law 
definition" or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to 
absurd results. Cf Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-19. A federal agency's interpret;1tion of a statute whose administration is 
entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
6 
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Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
business. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445; see also EEOC Compl. Man. at § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a 
materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the Darden decision); Defensor v. 
Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of 
beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" ofH-1B nurses under 8 C.P.R.§ 214.2(h), even though 
a medical contract service agency is the petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries). 
It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in Darden and Clackamas are not exhaustive and 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties 
relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship 
exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder 
must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual 
case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the 
parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor 
relationship. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-49; EEOC Compl. Man. at§ 2-III(A)(l). 
When examining the factors relevant to determining control, we must assess and weigh each actual 
factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that 
factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24. For 
example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to assign them, 
it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not who has the 
right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See id at 323. 
Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, ... the answer to 
whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no 
one factor being decisive."' Id at 451 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S .. at 324). 
B. Analysis 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests tO; this matter, we find that the record does not establish 
that the Petitioner will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" 
with the Beneficiary as an H-lB temporary "employee." Specifically, we find that the record of 
proceedings does not contain sufficient, consistent, and credible documentation demonstrating who 
will exercise control over the Beneficiary. 
As noted, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary will work for the end-client in Florida, 
and asserts that it will maintain an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary. Notably, 
the "employment offer letter" indicates that the Beneficiary will be working out of the Petitioner's 
office in New Jersey, but does not mention any end-client. The letter also does not provide any level 
of specificity as to the Beneficiary's duties, the requirements for the position, number of hours to be 
worked per week, annual leave allotment, etc. While an employment agreement may provide some 
insights into the relationship of a petitioner and a beneficiary, the "mere existence of a document 
Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an 
employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. 
Further, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient documentation to corroborate its actual control 
over the Beneficiary at the end-client's location, especially since evidence in the record contradicts 
and undermines the Petitioner's claims of control. For example, according to the Petitioner's RFE 
response, "[a]t all client project site locations, we always have an onsite senior level employee or 
manager to supervise our employees" and that the Beneficiary's work "is supervised by the Senior 
Programmer Analyst assigned to the project." The response then states that "we will be in frequent 
touch with the Beneficiary through the phone and email." It would, therefore, appear that the onsite 
supervisor/manager may not be the Petitioner's own employee, as it would otherwise not be 
necessary to communicate via phone and email when they are both onsite. Further, the submitted 
itinerary lists only one supervisor, the chief executive officer of the end-client. However, the 
"employment officer letter" names another individual as the Beneficiary's manager. We must also 
note that the letter from the end-client does not reflect any role for the Petitioner in the project(s) 
upon which the Beneficiary would work. Without additional evidence, it is unclear how the 
Petitioner will be able to direct the Beneficiary's day-to-day tasks as they relate to the project(s) to 
which the Beneficiary will be assigned. 
Of additional concern is the "staffing agreement" between the Petitioner and the end-client. 
Although the agreement initially indicates that the Petitioner is the "Staffing Supplier" and the end­
client is the "Customer," based upon a review of the document, it appears that the Petitioner is 
actually providing individuals from other "Staffing Suppliers" to the end-client, and is not acting as 
the employer. For example, section 1.4 states that a "'Contract Worker' means an individual 
employee of Staffing Supplier providing temporary labor services pursuant to the terms [of] this 
agreement," but then indicates that "[i]n no event shall any such Contract Worker be regarded as an 
employee of Customer or [the Petitioner]." Similarly, section 5.6 indicates that the staffing supplier 
is the employer. Section 4.1 indicates that the Petitioner "shall, at Customer's option and sole 
discretion, contact Staffing Supplier to request Contract Workers to perform Contract Services based 
upon open Job Postings [the Petitioner] receives from Customer" and that the end-client "is under no 
obligation to select a candidate presented to it by Staffing Supplier." Section 4.2 describes how the 
Petitioner will post "available Contract Worker" positions and ,grant access to the staffing supplier 
"for the purpose of reviewing open Job Postings available to Staffing Supplier." If the assignment is 
cancelled by the end-client, according to section 4.5, its "sole obligation to Staffing Supplier is 
payment for Contract Services rendered" and the Petitioner's "sole obligation to Staffing Supplier 
shall be to forward such payment in accordance with section 7 of this agreement." Section 5.12 
states that the "Staffing Supplier shall make available to [the Petitioner] a copy of its most recent 
annual financial statements" and section 12 states that the "Staffing Supplier agrees to indemnify and 
hold harmless [the end client] and [the Petitioner]." The agreement strongly suggests that there are 
other parties involved in the Beneficiary's proposed assignment to the end-client. 
Further, section 6 of the agreement describes the Petitioner's responsibilities which, are to "serve as 
a resource to the end-client and Staffing Supplier ... throughout the acquisition process" and to 
Matter ofS-1-, Inc. 
"coordinate on behalf of [the end-client] all interactions between Staffing Supplier and [the end­
client]'s hiring managers concerning Contract Workers, including . . . performance issues, 
terminations and job extensions or completion." Sections of the agreement also describe control 
over the staffing arrangements. For example, Section 4.5 indicates that the end-client may cancel 
any staffing assignments at its discretion, while Section 4. 7 indicates that if the staffing supplier 
reassigns the contract worker "without [the Petitioner's] approval:" then the staffing supplier must 
replace the worker at the Petitioner's request. We must also note that although the agreement states 
that the end-client "has chosen [the Petitioner] to provide staffing services to [the end-client] 
: pursuant to a Master Services Agreement ('Customer Agreement')," no such agreement was 
submitted. 
The agreement is also inconsistent with the Petitioner's claims regarding the administration of the 
Beneficiary's payroll, tax withholdings, and other employment benefits. Section 5 indicates that the 
Petitioner and the end-client "have the right to audit Staffing Supplier's records, as necessary, to 
verify that the government tax payments," were made, that the "Staffing Supplier shall be solely 
liable for" taxes and that "[ n ]either Customer nor [the Petitioner] will have any obligation to 
withhold Federal, State, or Local income tax, or employee's portion of FICA, or other payroll taxes." 
The Petitioner must resolve these inconsistencies in the record with independent, objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1998). 
The Petitioner also provides little evidence to indicate who will provide the tools and 
instrumentalities necessary for the Beneficiary's work. In response to the RFE, the Petitioner 
emphasized the Beneficiary's experience and knowledge, but did not explain who would provide the 
equipment and software likely necessary to complete the Beneficiary's assignments. 
We must weigh all aspects of the relationship, including who will oversee and direct the work of the 
Beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and 
who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the Beneficiary is assigned in order to 
make a determination as to who will be the Beneficiary''s employer. As a result of the 
inconsistencies, deficiencies and contradictions in the record, we find that the Petitioner has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that it qualifies as a "United States employer" having an "employer­
employee relationship" with the Beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
III. ITINERARY REQUIREMENT 
Finally, we also find that the Petitioner did not sufficiently comply with the itinerary requirement at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B). 
The regulation states, in pertinent part: 
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Matter ojS-1-, Inc. 
Service or training in more than one location. A petition that requires services to be 
performed or training to be received in more than one location must include an 
itinerary with the dates and locations of the services or training and must be filed with 
USCIS as provided in the form instructions. The address that the petitioner specifies 
' as its location on the Form I-129 shall be where the petitioner is located for purposes 
of this paragraph. 
. 
The itinerary language at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B), with its use of the mandatory "must" and its 
inclusion in the subsection "Filing of petitions," establishes that the itinerary is a material and 
necessary document for an H-1B petition involving employment at multiple locations, and that such 
a petition may not be approved for any employment period for which there is not submitted at least 
the employment dates and locations. Here, the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary will be 
primarily assigned to the end-client's location in Florida, but also offers its location in 
New Jersey as a "secondary" place of employment. Although the Petitioner provides a 
document titled "itinerary," it does not include the dates the Beneficiary will work at either the end­
client or its location, but merely lists contact information for it and the end-client. Therefore, the 
Petitioner did not sufficiently comply with the itinerary requirement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter o.fS-1-, Inc., ID# 540395 (AAO July 31, 2017) 
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