dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 9368588 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: SEPT. 21, 2020 
The Petitioner, an information technology consulting services finn, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB 
program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that 
requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; 
and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) as a 
minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The California Service Center Director denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner had not 
established that (1) the proffered position is a specialty occupation, and (2) an employer-employee 
relationship will exist with the Beneficiary. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director erred in 
denying the petition, and contends that the petition should be approved. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the 
questions in this matter de nova. See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-lB nonirnmigrant as a foreign national ''who is 
coming temporarily to the United States to perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in 
section 2 l 4(i)(l) ... " ( emphasis added). Section 214(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(I), defines the 
tenn "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires "theoretical and practical application of a 
body of highly specialized know ledge, and attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States." The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates section 214(i)(I) of the Act, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) provides that the 
proffered position must meet one of four criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation position. 1 Lastly, 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(l) states that an H-lB classification may be granted to a foreign national 
who "will perform services in a specialty occupation ... " ( emphasis added). 
Accordingly, to determine whether the Beneficiary will be employed in a specialty occupation, we 
look to the record to ascertain the services the Beneficiary will perform and whether such services 
require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained 
through at least a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty or its equivalent. Without 
sufficient evidence regarding the duties the Beneficiary will perform, we are unable to determine whether 
the Beneficiaiy will be employed in an occupation that meets the statutmy and regulatmy definitions of 
a specialty occupation and a position that also satisfies at least one of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)( 4 )(iii)(A). The services the Beneficiary will perform in the position determine: (1) the normal 
minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 
1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review 
for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of 
complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong 
of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, 
when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the 
specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 
By regulation, the Director is charged with determining whether the petition involves a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(l) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2). The Director 
may request additional evidence in the course of making this determination. 8 C .F .R. § 103 .2(b )(8). 
In addition, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition and must continue to 
be eligible through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
B. Analysis 
For the reasons set out below, we determine that the proffered position does not qualify as a specialty 
occupation. Specifically, the record provides inconsistent and insufficient information regarding the 
proffered position, which in tum precludes us from understanding the position's substantive nature 
and determining whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 2 
The Petitioner, located in California, seeks to employ the Beneficiaiy as a "software developer" offsite 
to provide services for a large health insurance provider [the end-client] located in Georgia. It 
designated the proffered position under the occupational category "Software Developers, 
Applications" corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code 15-1132 with a 
1 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must be read with the statutory and regulatory definitions ofa specialty occupation under 
section 214(i)(l) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any 
baccalaureate or higher degree. but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertojf, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as 
"one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). 
2 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-1B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each 
one. 
2 
level I wage on the labor condition application (LCA) submitted in support of the H-IB petition. 3 The 
Petitioner indicates on the LCA that the Beneficiary will be solely employed at the end-client location.4 
There are several entities involved with the Beneficiary's placement at the ultimate end-client. The 
contractual chain the Petitioner and other relevant parties represented in the petition are: 
Petitioner ➔ U-G- (mid-vendor) ➔ A- (end-client). 
The Petitioner submitted the mid-vendor's master service agreement (MSA) with the Petitioner which 
details their general contractual airnngement, reflecting that the Petitioner's employees (which 
presumably includes the Beneficiary) will work for the mid-vendor's clients under staff augmentation 
arrangements, "as detailed in the [mid-vendor's] signed Statement of Work ("SOWs")." 
As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the Petitioner has provided inconsistent statements 
regarding the minimum requirements for the proffered position. At first, it stated that "a Bachelor['s] 
Degree ( or its equivalent) in a related specialty field like Computer Science and some relevant 
experience" was required for the position. Later, in response to the Director's request for evidence 
(RFE) it provided an analysis of the duties of the proffered position asserting that all of the duties 
require a "Master's Degree in Computer Sciences or Information Systems." 5 Considered together, the 
material in the record specifies different types of degrees ( either a bachelor's or a master's degree) in 
computer science, information systems, or a related field. 6 The Petitioner did not provide an 
explanation for the variances in its minimum degree requirements. The Petitioner must resolve this 
inconsistency in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Additionally, on appeal the Petitioner acknowledges that "where the work is to be perfmmed for entities 
other than the petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical." See Defensor 
v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). It asserts that USCIS "misreads Defensor in requiring 
that this evidence be only found in a contract, SOW, or work order between the [mid-vendor] and end­
client," claiming "we have met our burden of proof based on the client letter alone .... " However, the 
3 A petitioner submits the LCA to the U.S. Department of Labor to demonstrate that it will pay an H-IB worker the higher 
of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid by the 
employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.731(a). 
4 The Petitioner employed the Beneficiary through post-completion optional practical training. 8 C.F.R. §§ 
274a.12( c)(3)(i)(B), 214.2(t)(l 0)(ii)(A)(3). 
5 The Petitioner also discussed the Beneficiary's coursework for the purpose of correlating the need for the Beneficiary's 
master's degree education with the associated job duties of the position. However, we are required to follow long-standing 
legal standards and determine first, whether the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation, 
and second, whether the Beneficiary was qualified for the position at the time the nonimmigrant visa petition was filed. Cf 
Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 l&N Dec. 558, 560 (Comm'r 1988) ("The facts of a beneficiary's background only 
come at issue after it is found that the position in which the petitioner intends to employ him falls within [a specialty 
occupation]."). 
6 Notably, if the proffered position requires a master's degree for the proffered position, then the wage level would increase 
by one level, and the labor condition application (LCA) in the record would not correspond to the petition. U.S. Dep't of 
Labor, Emp't & Training Admin., Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagric. Immigration Programs 
(rev. Nov. 2009), available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/NPWHC _Guidance_ Revised_ 11 _ 2009.pdf. A 
prevailing wage determination sta1is with an entry level wage and progresses to a higher wage level after considering the 
experience, education, and skill requirements of the Petitioner's job opportunity. Id. 
3 
end-client's letter is not probative towards establishing the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's 
assignment as imposed by the end-client for multiple reasons, some of which we will discuss later. 7 
Notably absent from the end-client letter are any prerequisites it requires to perform the duties we discuss 
below, even though the Director's RFE notified the Petitioner that this information should be included in 
any end-client letter. 8 
The contractual material between and amongst the Petitioner, mid-vendor, and end-client is similarly 
lacking. 9 For instance, the heavily redacted SOW between the mid-vendor and the end-client submitted 
on appeal provides little insight into the end-client's position requirements. The mid-vendor's MSA 
describes a staff augmentation hiring process whereby the Petitioner will submit the resumes of 
candidates for interview by the mid-vendor. If the candidate is deemed "resume qualified" by the mid­
vendor, the candidate is then interviewed by the end-client. However, the Petitioner did not submit 
evidence from the end-client regarding its requirements for the position. 10 This lack of information 
alone is sufficient to preclude the petition's approval, as the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the 
offered position satisfies the definition of a specialty occupation found at section 214(i)(l) of the Act. 
Moreover, the evidence presented to the Director and on appeal does not substantiate the Petitioner's 
assertions regarding the substantive nature of the work the Beneficiary would perform at the end-client 
worksite. As discussed, the mid-vendor's MSA describes a subcontractor hiring process whereby the 
Petitioner will submit the resumes of candidates for interview by the mid-vendor, and ultimately for 
presentation and interview by the mid-vendor's end-clients. The MSA includes a '·rate card" listing 
the various positions to be filled under the MSA and the "cost-plus pricing" which the mid-vendor 
will pay to the Petitioner in accordance with "[] the rate specified for the particular skill set and 
experience levels in the Rate Card (Exhibit B)." The mid-vendor's rate card specifies at least 36 
positions with various rate categories. The Petitioner also submits a mid-vendor SOW and letter to 
establish the nature of the Beneficiary's contractual assignment. However, the Petitioner's reliance on 
this material is misplaced. 
The mid-vendor's SOW indicates that the Beneficiary will be employed as a "Product Development 
Engineer, under a project identified as l I from September 2018 throurh December 
2020 in "a team environment with [mid-vendor] personnel" at the mid-vendor's office in I 
California, and the Petitioner will receive a fee schedule rate of$40 per hour for his services. The mid­
vendor's rate card in the MSA does not identify "Product Development Engineer'' positions and the $40 
hourly fee rate specified in the SOW is at least $10 less per hour than the fee rate for any position listed 
7 Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. 
g "Failure to submit requested evidence which precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
[petition]." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4). 
9 Although a petitioner is not required by existing regulation to submit contracts or legal agreements between the petitioner 
and third parties to establish an employer-employee relationship, "the petitioner must demonstrate eligibility for the benefit 
sought" and "if a petitioner provides contracts or legal agreements, [an] officer is not precluded from evaluating that 
evidence in the adjudication of other eligibility criteria." USC IS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0114, Rescission of Policy 
Memoranda at 3 (June 17, 2020), http://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/policy-memoranda. 
1° For instance, the mid-vendor's MSA provides "[p]erformance [s]tandards" for the Petitioner's candidate recruitment 
efforts for the information technology positions filled thereunder, based upon whether the positions require 
"Vanilla/Commodity Skills," or "Niche Skills/Specialized Skills." The Petitioner has not documented or identified the 
"skills" category and underlying skill prerequisites that the proffered position falls under per the end-client's requirements. 
4 
in the MSA' s rate card, which raises question regarding whether the Beneficiary's placement under the 
SOW was contracted for under the mid-vendor MSA submitted with the petition. We also observe that 
while the Petitioner's president manually signed the SOW in September 2018, the mid-vendor's signatory 
digitally signed the SOW a year later in September 2019. It seems incongruous that the mid-vendor 
would issue a SOW for the Beneficiary's employment commencing in September 2018, but did not 
actually execute the SOW until a year later. The Petitioner must also resolve these inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 11 
Further, the California employment location identified in the mid-vendor's SOW was not included as an 
employment location for the proffered position in the LCA, which casts further doubt about whether the 
submitted LCA corresponds with the petition. 12 This California work assignment would result in a 
wage pay disparity in the Beneficiary's compensation of at least $9,194 according to the prevailing 
wage specified in the LCA. 13 Specifically, the prevailing wage in the LCA is $68,328 for the Georgia 
work location, while the prevailing wage for the California work location identified in the mid­
vendor's SOW is $77,552. 14 The Petitioner references this mid-vendor SOW as evidence of the 
Beneficiary's proposed H-IB employment both in its response to the Director's RFE and on appeal, 
but it has not explained how the Beneficiary's employment in California under the mid-vendor's SOW 
substantiates the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's employment with the end-client in 
Georgia. 15 
The initially submitted mid-vendor letter also provides insufficient and inconsistent inf01mation about 
the Beneficiary's end-client work assignment. The mid-vendor indicates in its letter that the 
Beneficiary is providing services as a '"software developer" at the end-client location on the 
~------------~ Project," through the SOW #.___ _____ _.which is valid 
through January 2020. The Petitioner has not explained why it initially provided this mid-vendor letter 
with the petition which referenced the end-client's work assignment in Georgia, then later provided a 
mid-vendor SOW for a different project in California. 16 Additionally, the mid-vendor's signatory did 
not detail how he came to have knowledge of the te1ms and conditions of the Beneficiary's contractual 
assignment at the end-client location. Therefore, the Petitioner has not substantiated that the signatory 
of the mid-vendor's letter possessed a degree of familiarity with the Beneficiary's proposed 
employment sufficient to verify the nature of his employment with the end-client. 17 
11 Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
12 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b). See also Matter ofSimeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542, 545-546 (AAO 2015). 
13 The Petitioner must identity and provide prevailing wage rates for each of the work locations where the Beneficiary is 
to be employed in the LCA. For multiple worksites, the actual wage paid cannot be lower than the highest prevailing wage 
listed on the LCA. Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, supra. See the Online Wage Librmy - FLC Wage 
Search Wizard, Foreign Labor Certification Data Center (Sep. 18, 2020), 
https://www.flcdatacenter.com/OesQuickResults.aspx?code=15-l 132&area=~&year=l9&source=1. 
14 Based on the Beneficiary's proposed placement in California, the Petitioner would not be in compliance with H-IB 
statutory intent if it failed to compensate the Beneficiary with the higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational 
classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid by the employer to other employees with similar duties, 
experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) ofthe Act; 20 C.F.R. § 655.73l(a); Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 
F.3d 418, 422 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2005); Patel v. Boghra, 369 F. App'x 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2010). 
15 Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
16 Id. 
17 Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
5 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits a 30-page February 2016 SOW between the end-client and the mid­
vendor, which is almost completely redacted, though portions of the SOW's preamble are not redacted. 
The preamble indicates that the SOW was effective from February 2016 through December 2018, a 
time period that expired ten months prior to the requested employment start date in the petition. The 
signature page is also unredacted , and shows that the mid-vendor's "head oflegal services" signed the 
document in April 2016. The SOW bears no indication that it was executed by the end-client. 
Considering the limited information provided in this SOW, we conclude that the document does not 
establish what the parties actually agreed to, and is of little probative value. Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
at 376. 
The Petitioner has also not established the relevance of the April 2019 SOW change order executed 
between the mid-vendor and end-client to the issue of the Beneficiary's placement with the end-client in 
Georgia. This document is redacted in a manner similar to the previously discussed SOW, with the 
exception that page 2 of the document discusses the addition of various "offshore" personnel, and the 
addition of "configurators" and "resources to support BPD Standardization" at unidentified locations. 
The Petitioner has not explained how this allocation of additional personnel is related to the Beneficiary's 
staff augmentation assignment with the end-client in Georgia. 18 
Turning again to the end-client's letter submitted in response to the Director's RFE, we conclude this 
evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Petitioner's burden of proof . Id. Oddly, the letter is dated March 
28, 2019, but the digital signature on the letter by the end-client's signatory indicates that it was signed 
on June 5, 2019, over two months after the letter's issuance date.19 The signatory of the end-client's 
letter states the purpose of the letter is to "confirm that [ the Beneficiary] is [] currently on assignment 
with the end-client since May 2018" in the role of"project engineer" and identifies the project that the 
Beneficiary is assigned to as '1 I Support services ." Like the signatory of the 
mid-vendor letter, the end-client's signatory does not provide information about his own knowledge 
of the details of the Beneficiary' s work assignment, and his own qualifications to opine regarding the 
Beneficiary 's employment on behalf of the end-client. 
Additionally, the end-client letter lists job duties for the position that appear, in part, to be general work 
tasks that could be attributed to many occupations, not specific software development tasks assigned to 
the Beneficiary in furtherance of the end-client's information technology projects. For instance, the end­
client indicates that the Beneficiary will be "Evaluating Information to Determine Compliance with 
Standards - Using relevant information and individual judgment to determine whether events or 
processes comply with laws, State Mandates, Regulations, and Standards ." A review of the DOL's 
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) shows that the end-client largely quoted this job task 
from the O*NET work activity "Evaluating Information to Determine Compliance with Standards," 
which is described by O*NET as "Using relevant information and individual judgment to determine 
whether events or processes comply with laws, regulations, or standards . "20 (Emphasis added.) O*NET 
attributes this work activity to at least 30 occupations, such as "Auditors," "Lawyers," "Fire Inspectors," 
18 In light of the redacted omissions , we conclude the Petitioner's submission of select sections of the mid-vendor and end­
client SOWs diminish their evidentiary value, as it deprives us of the remaining portions that may reveal information either 
advantageous or detrimental to the petitioning organization's claims, and therefore, is of little probative value. Id. 
19 Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92 . 
20 See O*NET's "Browse by Data" work activity listing at https://www.onetonline .org/find/descriptor /result/4.A.2.a.3 , 
(last visited Sep. 18, 2020). 
6 
and "Chemical Technicians," but the occupation designated by the Petitioner in the LCA, "Software 
Developers, Applications" is not among them. For the reasons discussed, we determine the 
Petitioner's reliance on the end-client's letter is also misplaced. 21 
Moreover, when determining whether a position is a specialty occupation, we look at the nature of the 
business offering the employment and the description of the specific duties of the position as it relates 
to the performance of those duties within the context of that particular employer's business operations. 
We conclude that the record lacks sufficient, credible documentation about the end-client's projects and 
initiatives and the Beneficiary's role therein, in order for us to discern the substantive nature of the 
work the Beneficiary will be performing for the end-client, and the associated application of specialized 
knowledge that their performance will require. As a result, the record does not demonstrate that any 
work that may be available at the end-client location will be H- lB caliber work. 
The contractual documentation and letters in the record variousl identif the end-client ro·ect(s) for 
which the Beneficiaiy will provide services as the Project," 
~------- ..... ' and '~--------~ Support services." The Petitioner also 
submitted end-client and mid-vendor reports that discuss the end-client's overarching information 
technology initiatives, but do not detail the staffing of the end-client's software development team( s) 
generally, or the Beneficiary's role therein specifically. 
The computer screen shots and copies of the Beneficiary's work emails in the record show that an end­
client manager assigns tasks to the Beneficiary, such as "Change control #535-2020 LG MO-Physical 
Therapy SSBR update PPO 3 Tier," and "SPIDMDL 20140 template validation update." However, 
the Petitioner has not demonstrated the substantive nature of the Beneficiary's end-client work 
assignments. For example, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiaiy will interact and liaise with 
various end-client personnel and stakeholders, including "Educating the team on Agile Process," 
"Facilitating Agile meetings," and ''Work closely with IT claims system staff to develop product 
design and changes, ensuring they adequately meet claims processing needs," but the submitted 
evidence does not establish how the Beneficiary will perform these duties as part of the end-client's 
software development team( s ). 22 
Notwithstanding the above evidentiary shortcomings, the Petitioner's evidence attributes inconsistent 
job titles to the position, and presents overly generalized job duties, which undermine the Petitioner's 
claims that the position's duties are specialized and complex. For example, the Beneficiaiy's position 
with the end-client has been alternatively identified by the contractual parties as a "software 
developer," "programmer analyst," "software engineer," "product engineer," l !external labor," 
and "product developer engineer." While each of these job titles could be attributed to an information 
technology position, the record suggests inconsistencies between the parties about the specific role 
that the Beneficiaiy will perform for the end-client. 
21 Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
22 The Director specifically requested such evidence in her RFE, but the Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence of 
how the Beneficiary's specific job duties relate to the end-client's products and services. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b )(14). 
7 
Additionally, it is unclear what theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge is required to "Create scalable and high performance web services for data tracking," 
"Create Claims through [the end-client's] Claims Processing Applications," and "Use ADO.NET 
objects for data retrieval and database updates" as presented in the Petitioner's letter. The end-client's 
letter lists similarly vague information technology tasks, such as "Contributes on deliverables & 
takeaways for Quaiterly Business Review Meetings," and "Provides Analytical and Technical suppmt 
for development process and QA process of Client Level Dashboards and other recunent repmting." 
From the indeterminate nature of the duties, it is not self-evident that they are qualifying under the H-1 B 
program. 
When considered collectively, we conclude that the inconsistencies, discrepancies, unanswered 
questions, and lack of probative documentation in the record raise questions as to the actual, 
substantive nature of the proffered position. 23 The Petitioner has not submitted consistent, 
conoborative evidence to adequately communicate (I) the actual work that the Beneficiaiy would 
perfmm, (2) the complexity, uniqueness, or specialization of the tasks, and (3) the cmrelation between 
that work and a need for a particular level education of highly specialized knowledge in a specific 
specialty. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not established that the proffered position is a specialty 
occupation. 24 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
Since the identified basis for denial is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach and 
hereby reserve the Petitioner's appellate arguments regarding whether an employer-employee 
relationship will exist with the Beneficiary. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts 
and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the 
results they reach"); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n. 7 (BIA 2015) ( declining to 
reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
III. CONCLUSION 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
23 Chawathe. 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
24 As the lack of probative and consistent evidence in the record precludes a conclusion that the proffered position is a 
specialty occupation and is dispositive of the appeal, we will not further discuss the Petitioner's assertions on appeal. 
8