dismissed
H-1B
dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the substantive nature of the work the beneficiary would perform at the end-client's location. The contractual documents in the record were too general and did not provide specific details about the beneficiary's duties, precluding a determination of whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation.
Criteria Discussed
Specialty Occupation Employer-Employee Relationship Labor Condition Application (Lca) Beneficiary Qualifications
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services In Re : 7563972 Appeal of California Service Center Decision Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office Date : APR. 23, 2020 The Petitioner, an information technology company, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a "software developer/implementation consultant" under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations . See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor 's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the proffered position does not qualify as a specialty occupation. The Director also concluded that the record does not establish the Petitioner would have an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary during the requested period , that the record lacks a certified labor condition application (LCA), 1 and that the Beneficiary is not qualified for the position. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director erred. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 2 I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1184(i)(l) , defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires: (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 1 A petitioner submits the LCA to DOL to demonstrate that it will pay an H-lB worker the higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid by the employer to other employees with similar duties , experience , and qualifications . Section 212(n)(l) of the Act ; 20 C.F.R. § 655.73l(a) . 2 We follow the preponderance of the evidence standard as specified in Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec . 369, 375- 76 (AAO 2010) . The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: ( I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree; (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or ( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). II. PROFFERED POSITION The Petitioner describes the proffered "software developer/implementation consultant" position's duties as follows: • Application development using Agile methodology. Perform detailed analysis of the business requirements and specifications provided by the users and analysts; • Create user interface in the form of electronic forms (WebDocs) used for entering and presenting data; • Code and test the validation logic implemented on the front-end in VB.NET; • Develop logic and set up mail templates for batch printing of the returns in the application; • Write medium to complex ad hoc queries to manipulate/retrieve data in SQL server databases; • Write and execute queries to update the configuration data in the [r]eference database that represents the static data of the application; • Implement business logic to calculate tax rates depending on the stored rate tables and the various conditions provided by users; • Debug and perform code walk through to understand the business layer of the application; • Coding and code review of the developed modules as per the design specifications using VB.NET in Visual Studio 2017 environment; 2 • Perform [ u ]nit testing before moving or migrating to test environment; • Closely interact with the users for clarification of requirements; • Participate in meetings to discuss the issues reported during the stages of development; and • Analyze enhancement requests reported by the user to provide possible solutions. According to the Petitioner, the position requires "a Bachelors degree or foreign equivalent m Computer Science, MIS, Software Engineering or related field." III. ANALYSIS Upon review of the record in its totality, we conclude that the Petitioner has not sufficiently established the substantive nature of the work the Beneficiary would perform during the intended period of employment, which precludes the determination of whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) and (iii)(A).3 The Petitioner, located in Wisconsin, asserted the Beneficiary would work at the end-client location in Pennsylvania. However, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's assignment during the requested employment period. The record contains a subcontractor agreement (SA) between the Petitioner and the mid-vendor. The SA is a general agreement for the Petitioner to "provide personnel as requested by [the mid-vendor] to support projects with Agencies. [The mid-vendor] shall give [the Petitioner] personnel specific assignments upon mobilizing to the project." Although the SA does not identify the client(s) whose projects the workers would support, the individual workers to be assigned to such projects, and the specific duties of such workers, the record contains a document titled "Schedule: Project for [the end-client]" between the Petitioner and the mid-vendor. The schedule indicates that, beginning August 20, 2018, for an "undetermined" duration, the Beneficiary would work as a "software developer/implementation specialist" at the end-client location, performing the following duties: "[d]esign and [d]evelopment of [s]ystem [c]omponents; [t]esting of [s]ystem [c]omponents; [ d]ocumentation; [ and o ]ther [ d]uties as [ a ]ssigned." The schedule does not elaborate on the system and its components; how the Beneficiary would design, develop, and test them; what the Beneficiary would document; and the scope of other duties that may be assigned during the "undetermined" duration of the assignment, raising questions regarding the substantive nature of the work for which the parties contracted the Beneficiary to perform during the requested period. The record also contains a master service agreement (MSA) between the mid-vendor and the end-client. 4 The MSA is a general agreement for the mid-vendor to "provide the [t]ax [p ]rocessing [s]ystems and related services to the [end-client] according to this Contract, [request for proposal (RFP)] and the Proposal ... in accordance with the [mid-vendor's] [i]mplementation [m]ethodology as described in [the mid-vendor's] Proposal and the Statement of Work [(SOW)]." The MSA does 3 The Petitioner submitted documentation to suppmt the H-1 B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position and its business operations. Although we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 4 The MSA is titled simply "Contract Between [the mid-vendor] and [the end-client]." We refer to it as an MSA to distinguish it from the other contractual documents discussed. 3 not further identify the workers to be assigned to the project, describe the duties of such workers in order to "provide the [t]ax [p]rocessing [s]ystems and related services," or specify the duration of the project. The record also contains an SOW that states it "describes the scope and services to be provided by [the mid-vendor] to the [end-client]"; however, the SOW is undated and does not indicate that it corresponds to the MSA. In contrast, statements in the record from the end-client specifically acknowledges the MSA by its 10-digit contract number. The SOW contains a section titled "Vendor Personnel," describing the roles of the project director, project manager, application architect, technical/security manager, training manager, and conversion manager, and identifying the individuals assigned to those roles. However, the SOW does not describe the responsibilities of a "software developer/implementation consultant" or identify the Beneficiary or any other individual-assigned to such a role for the project. Additionally, although the SOW contains 18 pages generally describing nine different "phases" of the project, the "key project milestone" chart indicates that 21 months of the requested employment period would entail "post implementation support," unlike the preceding "rollout 3" period during which project workers would complete "personal income tax pass through entity processing, [and] property tax/rent rebate" milestones. The SOW indicates that, during the majority of the requested employment period, "a desk-side support team is [to be] deployed in user work areas affected by the rollout ... to answer any questions that arise during those initial weeks" following rollout. Then, "[a]s the need for desk-side support diminishes, project team members are no longer deployed on a regular basis to the business areas. At this stage, a system-specific help desk will continue to serve as the first point of contact for users who need assistance." Later, "project staff [will] work with [the end-client's] help desk staff to ensure they have the skills, knowledge, and procedures to take over. This may include training, use of a 'buddy system,' mentoring, and documentation development." The SOW does not elaborate on the nature of the "questions that arise" and the substantive nature of the tasks a given worker would perform in order to answer those questions. The SOW also does not clarify the assistance the "system-specific help desk" workers would provide, or the process of training and mentoring the end-client's help desk workers. Furthermore, the SOW indicates that, throughout the majority of the requested employment period, "[t]he location, duration, and amount of desk-side support are [to be] determined through discussions between [the end-client] and the [mid-vendor's] project team." Therefore, even if the SOW specifically identified the Beneficiary or the "software developer/implementation consultant" position title, which it does not, the SOW raises questions regarding the substantive nature of the work for which the parties contracted and, moreover, whether the mid-vendor and the end-client would "determine[] through discussions" whether to include any particular worker among the post-implementation support team throughout the majority of the requested employment period. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that "the [B]eneficiary is not listed as a [mid-vendor personnel in the MSA because] the [B]eneficiary is not a [mid-vendor] employee." However, the issue is not simply that the SOW does not identify the Beneficiary as a worker assigned to the project; neither the MSA nor the SOW address the mid-vendor providing a "software developer/ implementation consultant" or 4 similar worker to the project, for any particular duration, to perform any particular duty, regardless of whether such a worker would be employed by the mid-vendor, the Petitioner, or some other entity. Furthermore, the SOW indicates that the mid-vendor and the end-client-not the Petitioner-would "determine[] through discussions" at some unspecified future date whether to include any particular worker. Therefore, the SOW raises questions regarding the actual work for which the parties contracted the Beneficiary to perform during the requested period. See 8 C .F.R. § 103 .2(b )( 1) (providing that a petitioner must establish that all eligibility requirements for the immigration benefit have been satisfied from the time of the filing and continuing through adjudication). The record also contains two one-page letters from the end-client. The initial letter states that the Beneficiary "has been at this assignment since December 3, 2018," although, like other documents in the record, it does not indicate the period during which the Beneficiary would remain at that assignment. The second letter, submitted in response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), is essentially a verbatim copy of the first letter but, unlike the first, it states that the Beneficiary's assignment is "expected ... through at least August 2022." However, as noted above, the SOW indicates that the mid-vendor and the end-client-not the Petitioner-would determine whether to include any particular worker during the final 21-month period of the project. Both letters summarize the Beneficiary's duties in a list of six bullet points, consisting of generalized language that limits our ability to determine whether the position requires a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. Descriptions such as "[g]ather information through presentations, design sessions, and live demonstrations," "[ c ]onducting JAD sessions with the clients for gathering requirements on business processes behind government tax, revenue, and registration programs across multiple lines of business," and "[w]riting scenarios of complex business processes to aid [s]cenario [t]esting and [u]nit/[i]ntegration testing of the applications while providing support to UAT team" do not elaborate on the actual tasks the Beneficiary would perform while conducting sessions, gathering requirements, writing scenarios, and providing support. They also do not elaborate on the nature of the presentations, design sessions, live demonstrations, business processes, scenarios, and testing. Additionally, neither letter addresses the tasks the Beneficiary would perform during the 21-month "post-implementation support" period of"answer[ing] any questions that arise." Furthermore, neither letter indicates that the end-client requires a particular academic level or specialty in order to perform the position's duties. As recognized by the court in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88, where the work is to be performed for an entity other than the petitioner, evidence of the client company's job requirements is critical. The court held that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. Id. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work. Here, the record does not adequately establish that the Beneficiary would provide services in a specialty occupation for the end-client for the employment period requested in the petition. We also note that the record contains two letters from the mid-vendor, providing inconsistent estimates of the duration of the Beneficiary's assignment. Although the first letter states that the mid-vendor 5 "anticipate[ s the Beneficiary] will remain on the project until December 2021," the second letter, submitted in response to the RFE, states that the mid-vendor "anticipate[ s the Beneficiary] will remain on the project until August 2022." As noted above, the SOW does not specifically identify the Beneficiary-or even the proffered position title-among the workers contracted for the project and, even if it did, the SOW indicates that the mid-vendor and the end-client would "determine[] through discussions" at some unspecified future date whether to include any particular worker among the post implementation support team throughout the majority of the requested employment period. Moreover, both letters state that the mid-vendor requires "at least a Bachelor's degree" to perform the duties described therein, without stating that the degree must be in a specific specialty. In summation, we conclude that the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and lack of documentation in the record raise questions regarding the actual substantive nature of the proffered position, which therefore precludes a conclusion that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because the substantive nature of the work determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 5 IV. CONCLUSION In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 5 As the lack of probative and consistent evidence in the record precludes a conclusion that the proffered position is a specialty occupation and is dispositive of the appeal, we will not further discuss the Petitioner's assertions on appeal regarding the criteria under 8 C.F.R. ~ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Additionally, because this issue is dispositive, we reserve our decision regarding the Director's separate conclusions that the Petitioner would not have an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary during the requested period, that the record lacks a certified LCA and that the Beneficiary is not qualified for the position. 6
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