dismissed
H-1B
dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the proffered position of 'solution architect' qualifies as a specialty occupation. The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence from the end-client to detail the beneficiary's specific day-to-day duties, making it impossible to determine if the work required a bachelor's degree in a specific field.
Criteria Discussed
Specialty Occupation Definition Degree Requirement Normal For The Position Degree Requirement Common To The Industry Employer Normally Requires A Degree Specialized And Complex Duties Valid Employer-Employee Relationship
Sign up free to download the original PDF
Downloaded the case? Use it in your next draft →View Full Decision Text
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
In Re: 4811491
Appeal of Vermont Service Center Decision
Form I-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB)
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office
Date : JAN. 16, 2020
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a "solution architect" under the H-lB
nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act)
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S.
employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment
of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite
for entry into the position .
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of record
does not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation .
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit.
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofSkirball Cultural Ctr., 25 I&NDec. 799, 806 (AAO
2012). Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal.
I. LAW
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l) , defines the term "specialty occupation" as an
occupation that requires :
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized
knowledge, and
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R . § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation:
(]) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum
requirement for entry into the particular position;
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an
individual with a degree;
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that
knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the
attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or
higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a
specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular
position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000).
II. ANALYSIS
Upon review of the record in its totality, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the
proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation because the record lacks sufficient evidence of
the actual work that the Beneficiary will perform for the end-client. 1
As recognized in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-388, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient
information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to properly
ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. In other words,
as the employees in that case would provide services to the end-client and not to the petitioning staffing
company, the job duties and alleged requirements to perform the duties that the Petitioner provided
were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. See id.
Here, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary will be employed offsite at an end-client's location.
The record of proceedings, however, is devoid of information from the end-client regarding the nature
of the Beneficiary's proposed position and the duties associated therewith. While the record contains
job descriptions from the Petitioner, there is no evidence in the record from the end-client to
corroborate the claimed duties and scope of the Beneficiary's assignment.
1 The Petitioner submitted documentation in support of the H-IB petition, including evidence regarding the proffered
position and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and
considered each one.
2
The Petitioner also provided a Master Services Agreement and statement of works between itself and
the end-client. However, the documents do not contain sufficient evidence outlining the nature of the
Beneficiary's proposed assignment on the end-client's premises for the requested validity period. For
instance, the agreements do not mention the Beneficiary's name, job title, or duties.
Furthermore, the Petitioner has not provided information from the end-client outlining the company's
educational requirements. The record, therefore, also lacks documentation or information about the
end-client's educational requirements for the position and whether such educational requirements
would match the Petitioner's requirements and qualify for a specialty occupation and meet the wage
level specified on the labor condition application. Consistent with Defensor, where the work is to be
performed for entities other than the Petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is
critical. However, the record of proceedings does not contain such evidence.
Without documents from the end-client that sufficiently provide pertinent information such as the
Beneficiary's assigned project and detailed duties to demonstrate what he will actually do on a day
to-day basis, we cannot determine the substantive nature of the proffered position. As the Petitioner
has not established the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the Beneficiary, this
precludes a conclusion that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal
minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1;
(2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for
a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity
or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion
2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that
is an issue under criterion 3; and ( 5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties,
which is the focus of criterion 4.
III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
As the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the proffered position is a specialty occupation, we need not
fully address other issues evident in the record. That said, we wish to identify an additional issue to
inform the Petitioner that this matter should be addressed in any future proceedings. 2
Specifically, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that it will have a valid employer-employee
relationship with the Beneficiary. The United States Supreme Court determined that where federal
law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency
doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:
2 In reviewing a matter de nova, we may identify additional issues not addressed in the Director's decision. See Spe!lcer
EJ1te1prises, IJ1c. v. UJ1ited States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The
AAO may deny an application or petition on a ground not identified by the Service Center.").
3
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."
Id.; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins.
Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,258 (1968)).
As such, while social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment
insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant
factors in determining who will control the Beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who
will oversee and direct the work of the Beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools,
where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the
Beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who
will be the Beneficiary's employer.
As detailed above, the record lacks sufficient documentation evidencing what exactly the Beneficiary
would do for the period of time requested. Given this specific lack of evidence, the Petitioner has not
established who has or will have actual control over the Beneficiary's work or duties, or the condition
and scope of the Beneficiary's services. Moreover, the record shows that the Petitioner has provided
inconsistent information regarding the Beneficiary's supervisor. For instance, in its support letter and
offer letter, the Petitioner stated the Beneficiary would report tol I Director of Engineering.
However, in the same support letter, the Petitioner also stated the Beneficiary would be working under
a project manager at the end-client's location. In addition, the Petitioner stated in its itinerary
submitted in response to the Director's request for evidence that the Beneficiary would "work under
I rs (VP Delivery) general direction and supervision." There is no explanation in
the record for these inconsistencies. Without foll disclosure of all of the relevant factors, we are unable
to properly assess whether the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the
Petitioner and the Beneficiary.
4
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. The
appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner
has not met that burden.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
5 Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial
MeritDraft learns from dismissed cases so your petition avoids the same pitfalls. Get arguments built on winning precedents.
Avoid This in My Petition →No credit card required. Generate your first petition draft in minutes.