dismissed H-1B Case: Interior Design

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 6505982 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form I-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-IB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : JAN. 9, 2020 
The Petitioner, an interior design firm, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a 'junior 
designer" under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations.1 The H-lB program 
allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both 
(a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the 
attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum 
prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that 
the Director erred in denying the petition . 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 2 
ANALYSIS 
Upon review of the entire record, for the reasons set out below, we have determined that the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
The Director concluded that the Petitioner did not establish that the offered position qualifies as a 
specialty occupation. In her decision, the Director thoroughly discussed the Petitioner's failure to 
meet any of the four regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(J)-( 4). Upon consideration 
of the entire record, including the evidence submitted and arguments made on appeal, we adopt and 
affirm the Director's decision with the comments below. 3 
1 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) , 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b). 
2 The Petitioner must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 
375-76 (AAO 2010). While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
3 See Matter of P. Singh, Attorney, 26 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2015) (citing Matter of Burbano , 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 
1994)); see also Chen v. INS , 87 F.3d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[I]fa reviewing tribunal decides that the facts and evaluative 
judgments prescinding from them have been adequately confronted and correctly resolved by a trial judge or hearing 
officer, then the tribunal is free simply to adopt those findings" provided the tribunal's order reflects individualized 
attention to the case). 
First we observe that within the appeal, the Petitioner presents several high-level and unspecific errors 
it attributes to the Director, but it does not offer sufficient discussion supporting is assertions. The 
Petitioner recounted the proffered position's duties and briefly discussed its eligibility claims and 
evidence. However, simply claiming that: (1) it has satisfied various criteria; (2) the Director has 
ignored "ample" evidence; or (3) the Director misrepresented its job description as generic, is 
insufficient to meet the Petitioner's burden of proof. The Petitioner did not offer sufficient details of 
how its evidence is not only relevant to each criterion, but also the manner in which the evidence meets 
the applicable requirements. Such a presentation essentially amounts to conclusory assertions of the 
Petitioner's eligibility. It is insufficient to allege eligibility through conclusory assertions that are not 
supported by sufficient evidence, which proves the allegation. 4 The conclusion the Petitioner requests 
us to draw is not self-evident from the documents and description it submitted. 
The reason for filing an appeal is to provide an affected party with the means to remedy what it 
perceives to be an erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact within a decision in a previous 
proceeding. 5 By presenting only a generalized statement without explaining the specific aspects of 
the denial they consider to be incorrect, the affected party fails to identify a sufficient basis for the 
appeal. 6 In order to review this appeal, it would therefore be necessary to search through the record 
and speculate on the manner in which the Petitioner's claims and evidence sufficiently address the 
regulatory criteria. 7 The Petitioner therefore has not satisfied its burden of proof. A petitioner's 
burden of proof comprises both the burden of production, as well as the burden of persuasion. 8 
Ultimately, the Petitioner's appeal does not demonstrate how the Director erred in denying the petition. 
This deficiency alone is sufficient to dismiss the appeal. 
Notwithstanding that shortcoming, we briefly note some appellate arguments here. We begin 
addressing the Petitioner's interpretation of the relevant statute and regulatory provisions. The 
Director indicated within her decision that satisfying at least one of the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should be considered as necessary to qualify for H-1B approval, but not 
necessarily sufficient. The Director cited to the need to factor in the statutory definition of a specialty 
occupation within her H-1B eligibility analysis, as a petitioner must also meet that distinct mandatory 
requirement in addition to satisfying at least one criterion. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that this 
4 Mattero(Ho. 22 T&NDec. 206,213 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998); Fano v. O"Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Innova Sols .. Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1023; I 756. Inc. v. Att'y Gen, 745 F. Supp. 9, 17 (D.D.C. 1990). 
5 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(v). 
6 Matter of Valencia, 19 l&N Dec. 354, 354-55 (BIA 1986). 
7 Appellants have an obligation to spell out their arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold their 
peace. Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts 
Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985,990 (1st Cir.1988)). The mention ofan error in an appeal brief, absent any 
specific argument as to how the previous entity was in error, is insufficient to present the matter for adjudication on appeal. 
Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 324 
(5th Cir.1977)). See also Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) tstating that "an argument consisting 
of more than a generalized assertion of error" is required to hold that an issue has not been waived in the briefing). 
8 Matter of Y-B-, 21 T&N Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998). 
2 
reading contravenes the plain language of the regulation and imposes evidentiary requirements beyond 
those required by Congress. 
First, statutory requirements are more authoritative than regulatory requirements. Within the order of 
authorities, statutes are oriented as the second most authoritative with administrative and executive 
materials ( e.g., regulations) listed in the sixth position. 9 As a result, we do not agree with the 
Petitioner's statement that we should apply the regulation without regard to the statute. 
Second, the basic hombook rule for H-lB eligibility is that for entry into an occupation, a candidate 
must possess a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through a bachelor's or higher degree 
in the specific specialty. The process of demonstrating that a proffered position is sufficient to meet 
the requirements under the H-lB program includes more than satisfying one of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Contrary to the Petitioner's statement, even the regulation requires the filing 
party to demonstrate that a petition "involves a specialty occupation as defined in section 214(i)(l) of 
the Act." 10 That statutory definition states: "the term 'specialty occupation' means an occupation that 
requires ... [a] theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and ... attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a 
minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States." 
From this, we reason that the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should be read logically as being 
necessary-but not necessarily sufficient-to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of a 
specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) 
as stating the necessary, but not necessarily sufficient conditions as being adequate to qualify would 
result in some positions meeting a condition under the criteria, but not under the statutory definition. 11 
To avoid this erroneous result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing 
supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory 
definition of a specialty occupation. This results in a multi-part analysis to determine whether a 
particular position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
Next, we disagree with the Petitioner's appellate statement that because U.S. Department of Labor's 
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) provides that most interior designer positions require a 
bachelor's degree, that this is sufficient to demonstrate eligibility under the H-lB program. It does 
not, however, demonstrate that a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty is required. Therefore, the 
O*NET entry for Interior Designers does not demonstrate that a position so designated is in a specialty 
occupation as defined in section 214(i)(l) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
Finally, the Petitioner contends the Director was incorrect when she discussed how it failed to 
demonstrate its position was more complex than similar positions. However, it appears the Petitioner 
misunderstood the Director's analysis. The context of this statement from the Director was that the 
Petitioner did not demonstrate that entry-level interior designer positions required a qualifying 
bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, meaning it only demonstrated this occupation requires a 
9 See Rule l .4(a)-(t) of The Bluebook. 
10 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l)(ii)(B)(I). 
11 See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000); Pa}Joy, Inc. v. Cuccinelli, No. l 9-CV-03977-HSG, 2019 
WL 3207839, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2019); Innova Sols., Inc. v. Baran, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018); 
Sagarwala v. Cissna, 387 F. Supp. 3d 56. 64 (D.D.C. 2019). 
3 
general "bachelor's degree in any field." And as those types of positions do not require a qualifying 
degree, based on the regulatory text under the second criterion, the Petitioner should be able to set its 
position apart from those lesser positions by demonstrating it is so complex or unique that only an 
individual who has attained a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty (or its equivalent) can perform 
in it. Consequently, we see no error on the Director's part within this analysis. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner 
has not met that burden here, and the petition will remain denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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