dismissed H-1B Case: Network Engineering

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 8474833 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : APR. 3, 2020 
The Petitioner, a wireless services and software solutions firm, seeks to employ the Beneficiary 
temporarily as a "network voice engineer" under the H-lB nonimrnigrant classification for specialty 
occupations. 1 The H-IB program allows a U.S . employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign 
worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly 
specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty 
(or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The California Service Center Director denied the petition, concluding that the record did not establish 
that the proffered position qualified as a specialty occupation . The matter is now before us on appeal. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 
We review the questions in this matter de nova. 3 Upon de nova review , we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C . § l 184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires : 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214 .2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition , but adds a 
non -exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214 .2(h)(4)(iv) provides that "[a]n H-IB petition involving a specialty 
occupation shall be accompanied by [ d]ocumentation ... or any other required evidence sufficient to 
1 See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) , 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b). 
2 Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). 
3 See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015) . 
establish ... that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation." Moreover, 
the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b )(8) and 214.2(h)(9)(i) provide U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) with broad discretionary authority to require evidence such as contracts and 
itineraries to establish that the services to be performed by a beneficiary will be in a specialty 
occupation during the entire period requested in the petition. 
Finally, USCIS has the authority to administer the law that Congress enacted, and to determine 
whether an organization has sufficiently demonstrated that it would have (1) non-speculative work 
available for a beneficiary. 4 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner is located in Michigan and stated it has a contractual relationship with .... I __ __. 
(vendor). Based on this relationship, the vendor would place the petitioning 
._o_r_g_a_m-.z-a-ti_o_n-'s_p_e_r_s_o_nn_e_l~to perform work at an offsite location in Texas for I II 
( end-client). The Petitioner requested the Beneficiary's dates of intended employment from October 
2019 through September 2022. 
Based on a lack of sufficient evidence, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established the 
availability of specialty occupation work, or the actual work the Beneficiary would perform as 
requested on the petition. Individually, each of these shortcomings preclude a determination that the 
proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation under any of the regulatory criteria enumerated 
at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(])-(4). 
We begin noting that because the Petitioner has not established actual, non-speculative employment 
for the Beneficiary, the record does not establish that the position described in this petition would 
actually exist as requested. 5 The evidence of the prospective work consists of assertions within the 
Petitioner's correspondence, a letter from the vendor as well as the end-client, a Supplier 
Subcontracting Agreement executed between the Petitioner and the vendor, a portion of a Software 
and Professional Services Agreement executed between the vendor and the end-client, and the 
Beneficiary's Off er of Employment. 
A. Contractual Documentation 
Considering the contractual material in the record, the Director concluded that because the Petitioner 
only offered the core contracts between the parties, and not the subordinate accompanying contractual 
material, that it had not offered evidence demonstrating the work would exist in accordance with its 
request on the petition. The Director requested subordinate contractual documents in the request for 
evidence, but the Petitioner did not comply with that request and it did not explain why it was not 
submitting that type of evidence. Addressing this issue on appeal, the Petitioner states that: ( 1) other 
material within the record sufficiently shows that it would have qualifying work available for the 
4 See Kollasoft Inc. v. Cuccinelli, No. CV-19-05642-PHX-JZB, 2020 WL 263618, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2020) (generally 
finding that section 214(a)(l) of the Act; 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (a)(l); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(i) provide such authority). 
5 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-lB petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. Although we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered 
each one. 
2 
Beneficiary for the requested period; (2) subordinate contractual material would not add value to the 
record as they are general and not specific, and (3) such documentation would only be duplicative and 
cumulative of the other evidence. 
First, we discuss the contractual material in the record and whether any missing agreements would aid 
in demonstrating eligibility. We begin with the most important business agreement in the chain, the 
one involving the end-client who is actually providing the work for the Beneficiary. The Software and 
Professional Services Agreement (PSA) was executed between the vendor and the end-client in 
December 2009, reflected the services the end-client would receive would be described in Appendix 
A, and specified the cost of said services would be within Appendix B. The main other elements listed 
within this agreement are definitions within the document and a prohibition to assignment and 
delegation of the rights and obligations of that agreement. The total agreement should consist of at 
least 57 pages and at least two exhibits. However, the contract does not convey many of its key 
elements as the Petitioner only provided the cover page and 3 of the 57 pages. Of particular 
importance, the Petitioner did not submit an Exhibit A. 
This contract does not aid the Petitioner in establishing it had non-speculative work available for the 
Beneficiary for the three-year period it requested on the petition. Specifically, core agreements 
governing the terms and conditions of the business arrangement, are generally accompanied by a 
subordinate agreement such as a statement of work, or a work order that provides more granular details 
about the work to be completed, the pricing structure, and the project's expected duration. In other 
words, without the subordinate contractual material ( e.g., Exhibit A), the PSA is but one part of the 
overall agreement between these two parties and is not a complete representation of the business 
arrangement. The PSA does not stand alone. Contrary to the Petitioner's claims, it is this core 
agreement that is general and not specific rather than the subordinate documentation. 
The PSA even provided that the subordinate documentation would offer greater specificity as it related 
to the terms and conditions of their agreement. Consequently, we further disagree with the Petitioner 
that the subordinate contractual material would be duplicative and cumulative of the other evidence in 
the record. The absence of the spectrum of the contractual material deprives us from reviewing the 
remaining portions that may reveal information either advantageous or detrimental to the petitioning 
organization's claims. This omission leaves a significant evidentiary gap regarding the vendor's 
obligation and the type of work it agreed to perform for the end-client. The current contractual material 
between these entities is not sufficient to support the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary would 
perform services in a specialty occupation throughout the duration of the requested H-1 B validity 
period. 
Within its brief, the Petitioner cites to a Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) decision and states 
that a petitioner may refuse to submit confidential commercial information if it is deemed too 
sensitive. 6 The Petitioner presented the findings of this decision in a manner favorable to itself, while 
omitting more important elements that weigh against its own claims. In the Marques decision, the 
Board did state that the "respondent had every right to assert his claim under the Fifth 
Amendment .... " However, the next sentence provided that "in so doing he runs the risk that he may 
fail to carry his burden of persuasion with respect to his application .... " 
6 Matter of Marques, 16 l&N Dec. 314, 316 (BIA 1977). 
3 
We acknowledge the Petitioner's implication that this evidence is confidential. While a petitioner 
should always disclose when a submission contains confidential commercial information, the claim 
does not excuse the Petitioner from providing a requested document if that document is material to the 
requested benefit. Although a petitioner may always refuse to submit confidential commercial 
information if it is deemed too sensitive, the petitioning entity must also satisfy its burden of proof 
and runs the risk of a denial. 7 Moreover, it goes without saying that the burden is on a party claiming 
the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged 
relationship. 8 Such a "burden is not, of course, discharged by mere conclusory or ipse dixit assertions, 
for any such rule would foreclose meaningful inquiry into the existence of the relationship, and any 
spurious claims could never be exposed. 9 
Regarding the open-ended nature of the PSA that the Petitioner requests us to recognize as sufficient, 
such an indefinite agreement does not demonstrate that the project will be ongoing without probative, 
corroborating material to establish the project's actual, or likely duration. The Petitioner did not cite 
to any relevant statute, regulation, or policy to support the position that open-ended arrangements are 
sufficient to satisfy its burden of proof Nor has the Petitioner presented a basis supported by sufficient 
analysis and probative evidence that demonstrates the prediction is reasonable, by a preponderance of 
the evidence. In general, such predictions should be sufficient for USCIS to reasonably deduce 
whether the prospective work will continue, as requested. Basic or conclusory assertions do not 
provide us with a legitimate basis to determine whether a project will continue to require a 
beneficiary's services, or whether such statements are simply speculation. 10 
Hypothetically, if we were to accept the Petitioner's position that perpetual arrangements are sufficient 
evidence, several years or decades could pass and the petitioning organization could continue to rely 
on the old contractual documents without having to demonstrate that such material remains active. 
That is exactly the situation we have here, as the parties executed the PSA more than a decade ago. 
The context of the current scenario is not simply a business arrangement to provide services. Instead, 
the Petitioner has entered into such a relationship while simultaneously intending to assign H-lB 
personnel to perform the work. These deficiencies are sufficient to warrant the petition's denial, and 
as a result we agree with the Director's ultimate adverse determination. 
Still, we will consider the agreement executed between the Petitioner and the vendor in February 2016. 
This Supplier Subcontracting Agreement suffers many of the same shortcomings as the PSA noted 
above. The Supplier Subcontracting Agreement indicated that it would remain in effect until 
terminated and that work requirements and assignment details would be contained within subordinate 
documentation that the Petitioner did not offer for the record. However, it also contains additional 
deficiencies. Namely that either party can terminate the agreement at any time with two weeks' notice, 
7 Cf United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (The exercise of Fifth Amendment privilege has never been 
thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would assist in meeting a burden of production.) 
8 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1984) ( citing to United States v. Stern, 511 
F.2d 1364, 1367 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918,923 (2d Cir. 1961)). 
9 In re Bonanno, 344 F.2d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1965). 
1° Cf Matter of Ho, 22 l&NDec. 206, 212-213 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998) (finding that a projected plan must contain 
sufficient detail to permit USCIS to draw reasonable inferences.) "Mere conclus01y assertions do not enable the Service 
to determine whether the job-creation projections are any more reliable than hopeful speculation." Id. 
4 
and that the vendor or the client can hire the Petitioner's personnel despite the pet1t10ning 
organization's objections. These additional deficiencies diminish the Petitioner's claims that it would 
remain the Beneficiary's employer and that it could preponderantly show that it would be the entity to 
provide qualifying work for him at the client worksite as requested on the petition. 
The final remaining evidence the Petitioner identifies as demonstrating the work would exist is the 
Beneficiary's Offer of Employment. This document represents the position's title, wages, and ordinary 
expectations the petitioning entity's employees can anticipate while working for the organization. It does 
not establish any client for which the Beneficiary will perform work, nor does it demonstrate the duties 
he will perform, or the duration in which he will perform them. As it stands, this employment offer 
establishes an agreement between the Petitioner and the Beneficiary that it will employ him, which is 
required under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(B). In the same manner that the "existence of 
a document styled 'employment agreement"' shall not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the worker 
is an employee, 11 nor will such a document, standing on its own, establish that the work would exist as 
represented on the petition. From this perspective, it is unclear what the Petitioner based its request upon 
for the Beneficiary to work on this project for almost three years. 
B. Correspondence 
Regarding the letter from the end-client, we agree with the Petitioner that it facially contains a set of duties 
and the client's position prerequisites in accordance with the decision in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. 
Although the end-client letter conveyed those elements, absent was a timeframe indicating the project's 
duration except for the generic statement that the Beneficiary would work at their site "for whatever 
temporary period specified in the submitted Form I-129." This statement does not appear to be based 
upon any project milestones, nor does it seem to be a reasoned estimate. As we discuss within this 
decision, the Petitioner did not offer sufficiently probative evidence to corroborate this statement from 
the end-client. 
Similarly, the vendor's latest letter only reflected that the Beneficiary would work at the client site for 
"long term with the possibility of extensions." This vague statement from the vendor was a marked 
change from its initial letter in which it stated the end-client would require the Beneficiary's services 
through the duration of a Purchase Order through July 30, 2022. Even though the Petitioner's appeal 
brief mentions different information within the vendor's letters, it only references the purchase order 
element and neglects to acknowledge that the first letter contained a specific date and the second letter 
did not. As a result, the Petitioner failed to sufficiently explain the varying and relevant information 
within the vendor's letters. The Petitioner must ameliorate this discordant information in the record. 
Such a correction must be demonstrated through the submission of relevant, independent, and 
objective evidence that divulges which elements are the truth. 12 
The Petitioner did not offer sufficient evidence by which we could verify the contents of any of these 
letters. The end-client's and the vendor's statements within its correspondence essentially equate to 
11 Cf Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,450 (2003). 
12 Matter of Ho, 19 T&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
5 
assertions rather than evidence to support such claims. 13 When such statements are made without 
supporting documentation, they are of limited probative value and do not carry the weight to satisfy the 
Petitioner's burden of proof 14 Moreover, none of the involved parties described an adequate basis for a 
three-year estimate as represented on the petition.15 
A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. 16 A visa 
petition may not be approved at a future date after a petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under 
a new set of facts. 17 In other words, if a petitioner's request to employ a foreign national for an 
extended timeframe is based upon the willingness of another party to provide that position, then the 
H-1 B petition should not be based on general, notional possibilities of work. That petitioner should 
present evidence that the position actually exists. Based on this shortcoming, we conclude the end-client 
letter, as well as correspondence from the other parties, is insufficient to corroborate the Petitioner's 
assertions. 
C. Burden of Proof 
Ultimately, the record does not establish a binding obligation on the part of the end-client to provide 
work for the Beneficiary that aligns with the Petitioner's request on the petition. 18 Business needs 
require companies to regularly amend and change previously stipulated plans. A contract provides the 
structure and expectations that allow all contracted entities to plan accordingly. 19 Understanding that 
contracts underlie the reliability of business agreements establishes the importance that a petitioner 
present sufficient claims and evidence to demonstrate the agreed-upon elements within existing contracts. 
A petitioner's burden of proof comprises both the initial burden of production, as well as the ultimate 
burden of persuasion. 2° First, a petitioner must satisfy the burden of production. As the term suggests, 
this burden requires a filing party to produce evidence in the form of documents, testimony, etc. Here, 
the Petitioner has not fully satisfied its burden of production. For instance, it originally claimed that 
13 A statement is defined within the legal context as a verbal assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an asse1iion. 
STATEMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
14 MatterofSoffici. 22 l&NDec. 158. 165 (Comm'r 1998). 
15 The Petitioner cited to an unpublished decision from this office relating to reviewing a vendor's letter to ascertain the 
nature of the position where a purchase order did not provide information relating to the end-client's project. However. 
that decision related to the work that beneficiary would perform (job title and duties) not whether the work would exist for 
the requested timeframe on that petition. In fact, under the Availability of Specialty Occupation Work section of that same 
decision, we concluded that the record did not establish the existence of a non-speculative specialty occupation position 
for that beneficiary. This Petitioner's cite to this decision does not support its claims. Matter ofD-C-Inc, ID# 4429784, 
*4 (AAO Aug. 16, 2019). 
16 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
17 See Matter of Michelin Tire Co1p., 17 l&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg'l Comm'r 1978). 
18 The agency has clearly indicated that it has not historically permitted speculative employment in the H-lB program. See, 
e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419, 30,419--20 (proposed June 4, 1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
19 See Fletcher v. Peck. 10 U.S. 87, 133-34, 137-38 (1810) (describing the standard ofadhering to the "obligations binding on 
the parties" within contracts, which if this principle were overturned, the interactions between the involved parties "would be 
very seriously obstructed"). 
20 Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136. 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998); also see the definition of burden of proof from Black's Law 
Dictionary (I Ith ed. 2019) (reflecting the burden of proof includes both the burden of persuasion and the burden of 
production). 
6 
the Beneficiary would work at the end-client worksite for almost three years. However, it hasn't 
offered sufficient contractual material supporting those claims, and as a result, it has not produced 
sufficient evidence to corroborate its assertions or statements. 
Second, a petitioner must satisfy the burden of persuasion, meaning they must establish the degree to 
which their evidence should persuade or convince users that the requisite eligibility parameters have 
been met (i.e., the obligation to persuade the trier of fact of the truth of a proposition). 21 Whether a 
petitioner is able to show that a particular fact or event is more likely than not to occur is the 
determinant of whether they have met the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. While a 
petitioner may file an amended petition if a beneficiary's proposed work terminated with a client, the 
fact remains that it should rely on prospective work that is more likely than not to exist. 
With this standard in mind, a petitioner's prediction-without sufficient supporting evidence-that 
over nearly a three-year period it would have prospective work available for a particular beneficiary 
appears to be notional and falls short of satisfying the standard of proof. This applies to whether the 
prediction is based on an existing project that a petitioner expects to continue into the future, or on an 
unspecified project. Materially relevant statements made without supporting documentation are of 
limited probative value and do not satisfy a petitioner's burden. 22 This is particularly important in a 
case such as this where the impetus and existence of the proffered position appears dependent entirely 
upon outside clients to provide it. The scenario in the present case is a salient example of why 
petitioning entities must offer more than simple statements relating to the work they will have available 
for foreign workers under the H-lB program. 
If a petitioner is unable to establish that qualifying work actually exists, we cannot determine whether 
the proffered position is a specialty occupation. 23 Within the petition, the Petitioner committed to 
assign the Beneficiary to specific work, at the end-client's location, for a particular timeframe. In the 
same manner that the Petitioner committed to compensate the Beneficiary at a particular wage in 
addition to multiple other factors it attested to, the organization must preponderantly demonstrate that 
all its essential commitments are more likely than not to occur. In other words, the Petitioner 
guaranteed users that it would meet a set of parameters, and it is their duty to ensure their case gets 
to that preponderant apex. 
Moreover, inherent with employing foreign nationals are additional burdens a U.S. employer must 
satisfy when compared to hiring U.S. workers. Part of that burden in the H-lB context is to 
demonstrate the existence of the proposed work. One method to establish the work's existence is to 
provide evidence that preponderantly demonstrates what the duration of the business relationship 
between all the associated parties would likely be, the lack of which can create material gaps within 
21 Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep 't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267,274 (1994). 
22 Sofjici, 22 l&N Dec. at 165. 
23 We must review the actual duties the Beneficiary will be expected to perform to ascertain whether those duties require 
at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as required for classification as a specialty 
occupation. To accomplish that task in this matter, we review the duties in conjunction with the specific project(s) to 
which the Beneficiary will be assigned. To allow otherwise, results in generic descriptions of duties that, while they may 
appear (in some instances) to comprise the duties of a specialty occupation, are not related to any actual services the 
Beneficiary is expected to provide. 
7 
the evidence. The scenario in the present case is one in which the project's duration did not align with 
the Petitioner's assertions. Such a scenario is generally one that can be prohibitive for a petitioner 
attempting to demonstrate that it would have specialty occupation work available for a beneficiary 
while they would work offsite at an end-client location. 24 
Evidence in the record does not support the Petitioner's claim that it would provide qualifying work at 
the end-client worksite for the requested timeframe. The Petitioner has not met its burden of persuasion 
demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the work would exist at the end-client worksite as 
requested. Without greater detail relating to the projects and the Beneficiary's role in the projects, the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated how his role in future assignments requires "attainment of a bachelor's 
or higher degree in the specific specialty." 25 
We note that the Petitioner refers to the preponderance of the evidence standard, states that all 
probative ( e.g., contractual) evidence is not required so long as the evidence of record is sufficient to 
meet the burden of proof: and quotes from the Chawathe decision relating to the juxtaposition between 
a trier of fact having some doubts as to the truth versus the presence of relevant, probative and credible 
evidence in the record. However, as we detailed above, the Petitioner has not offered "relevant, 
probative, and credible evidence that leads the [trier of fact] to believe that the claim is 'more likely 
than not' or 'probably' true," which is what the Chawathe decision actually stated.26 Lacking is such 
a formed belief from our perspective and from the Director's, that the Beneficiary would work on the 
end-client's project for the period the Petitioner claims he would, as represented on the petition. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This evidence is insufficient to establish that at the time of filing, the Petitioner had secured the 
Beneficiary's assignment on any particular project that would likely last for the requested duration, 
which is insufficient to demonstrate eligibility. 27 For the reasons discussed above, the Petitioner has 
not demonstrated that the petition was filed for non-speculative employment. If it is not preponderant 
that a position would exist as requested, then we cannot determine the substantive nature of its associated 
duties.28 
In this matter, the record does not contain sufficient and probative documentation on this issue from 
(or endorsed by) the end-client, the company that will actually be utilizing the Beneficiary's services, 
that identifies the essence and duration of the project, the substantive nature of the duties he will carry 
out, and any particular academic or work experience requirements for the proffered position. 
Therefore, based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established 
the substantive nature of the work the Beneficiary will perform. 
24 KPK Techs., Inc. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-10342, 2019 WL 4416689, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2019) (finding agency's 
determination reasonable that a petitioner has not demonstrated a foreign worker would be employed in a specialty 
occupation for the entirety of the time period it requests on a petition where the contracts-including those executed by an 
end-client-do not cover the dates requested on a petition). 
25 Section 214(i)(l)(B) ofthe Act. 
26 Chawathe, 25 T&N Dec. at 376. 
27 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b )(1 ); Michelin Tire Co1p., 17 l&N Dec. at 249. 
28 Further, without full disclosure of the contractual chain, we are unable to determine whether the requisite 
employer-employee relationship will exist between the Petitioner and Beneficiary. 
8 
This precludes a conclusion that the proffered pos1t10n satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal 
minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 
one; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review 
for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion two; (3) the level of 
complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong 
of criterion two; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its 
equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion three; and (5) the degree of specialization and 
complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion four. 29 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
29 We note that at page 9 of the appeal briet: the Petitioner cites to a case that does not appear to bear any relation to the 
placement of non immigrant workers at client worksites under the H-1 B program, and the Petitioner did not explain how 
any of the elements within that case should impact this petition. Within the appeal briet: the Petitioner also focuses on 
whether it demonstrated an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary and the four criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). However, the Director did not include those aspects within the adverse decision and we will not 
address them here. 
9