dismissed H-1B Case: Not Specified

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 13592957 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : MAR . 1, 2021 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant 
classification for specialty occupations . 1 The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily 
employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both : (a) the theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher 
degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position . 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation . We dismissed the 
Petitioner's appeal, after issuing a notice of intent to dismiss and request for evidence (NOID /RFE) 
and not receiving a response. The dismissal explained the Petitioner had not established standing to 
file the appeal and did not provide requested material evidence. The matter is again before us on a 
motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. 2 In its motions , the Petitioner states it did not receive the 
NOID /RFE, the requested evidence was not material to eligibility, and we misapplied existing policy 
and regulations. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 3 
Upon review, we will dismiss the motions . 
I. LAW 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires a valid signature on certain documents filed 
with the agency. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2); see also 1 USCJS Policy Manual B.2(A), 
https://www.uscis.gov /policy-manual (incorporating former USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-
0134.1, Signatures on Paper Applications, Petitions, Requests, and Other Documents Filed with US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (Feb. 15, 2018)). Unless specifically authorized in the regulations , 
policy manual or form instructions , an individual representing a petitioner must personally sign his or her 
1 See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H )(i)(b), 8 U.S .C. § l 10l( a)(l5 )(H)(i)(b). 
2 By regulation, the scope ofa motion is limited to "the prior decision." 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i ). The filing before us is 
not a motion to reopen and reconsider the denfal of the petition. Instead, it is a motion to reopen and reconsider our most 
recent decision, the summ ary dismissal. 
3 See Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
own request before filing it with USCIS.4 Accordingly, ifUSCIS accepts a request for adjudication and 
later determines that it has a deficient signature, USCIS will deny the request. 5 
In addition, a motion to reopen must state the new facts and be supported by affidavits or other 
documentary evidence. 6 A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration; be supported 
by any pertinent decision to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or 
policy; and establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record at the time of the 
decision. 7 
II. ANALYSIS 
In the NOID/RFE, we explained that the signatures of the attorney/preparer/representative and of the 
petitioner/client on the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, and the Form G-28, Notice of Entry 
of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative, appear to have been signed by the same 
individual. We requested evidence to clarify whether the appeal was filed by an affected party with 
legal standing in these proceedings 8 and raised that the record did not contain evidence demonstrating 
the Petitioner is active and in good standing. We did not receive a response to the NOID/RFE. As a 
result, we were unable to recognize the appeal as properly filed or to establish Petitioner's status as 
active and in good standing and dismissed on these grounds. 9 
The Petitioner asserts it did not receive the NOID/RFE. However, the NOID/RFE was sent to 
Petitioner's address of record and USCIS records do not indicate the NOID/RFE was returned as 
undeliverable. Even if sworn, a denial ofreceipt by itself will not suffice. See Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 
F.3d 732, 735-736 (7th Cir. 2004). Absent independent and objective evidence to support the 
petitioner's claim that it did not receive the notice, we find that the NOID/RFE was properly issued 
by routine service. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(a). 
The Petitioner's submissions in its motions do not raise new facts curing the signature defects raised 
in the dismissal and the Petitioner has not established that our decision was based on incorrect 
application of law or policy. 10 
4 See 1 USC1S Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(A). 
5 Id.; cf Dixon v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 469,477 (2020) (finding that the IRS's acceptance of an improperly signed 
tax return did not "cure" the invalid return). 
6 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
7 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). 
8 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). 
9 In support of the motion to reopen, the Petitioner submits printouts from the Texas Office of the Secretary of State 
establishing its existence and active status. The Petitioner asserts that the appeal should not have been denied as abandoned 
because the requested evidence regarding its business was not material to the issue of eligibility. Of note, the appeal was 
not summarily dismissed but denied on the record pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). The Petitioner has met its burden 
with respect to establishing it is active and in good standing. However, the status of Petitioner's business was not the 
impetus behind the RFE/NOTD and the new facts do not cure the signature deficiency in the record. As the Petitioner has 
not established it had standing to file the appeal, and the issue of its status has been clarified, we need not address its 
arguments on the materiality of the evidence requested in the NOID/RFE. 
10 While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
2 
A. Motion to Reopen 
The Petitioner's motions include declarations by its attorney and chief financial officr (CFO)I 
explaining who signed the forms contained in the record. The Petitioner's attorney states, 
I I another attorney with [his] firm ... sign[ed] Form I-290B ... and Form G-28 ... on his 
behalf" The Petitioner's CFO declares he "authorized.__ _____ __.an attorney with [Petitioner's 
firm], to sign Form I-290B ... and G-28 ... on [his] behalf' and that he "hereby adopt[ s] the signatures 
therein as [his] own and ratif[ies] the same." Attached to the declaration is an email from the 
Petitioner's director of human resources to I O I stating she has "our permission to sign on [ the 
CFO's] behalf" 
The Petitioner did not comply with the plain language of the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). 
The declarations confirm that an authorized representative of the Petitioner did not sign the forms. 
Instead,! I signed both forms with the Petitioner's CFO's initials. While not exhaustive, the 
list of recognized authorized individuals in 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, does not include an 
attorney from a firm representing the legal entity. Furthermore, attorneys, accredited representatives, 
preparers, etc. generally may not sign a benefit request, or associated documents, for a requestor. See 
1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at C.1. Nor has the Petitioner established that a party may "grant 
permission" to sign an official form on their behalf under penalty of perjury, as the Petitioner claims 
to do in this case. 11 
For this reason, we cannot recognize the appeal to have been properly filed by an affected party with 
legal standing in these proceedings. 12 The signature of the affected party serves to certify under 
penalty of perjury that the benefit request, and all the evidence submitted with it is true and correct. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). Unless there is a valid signature from a person authorized to sign the benefit 
request, USCIS cannot consider the request or the supporting evidence to be certified as true and 
correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Instead, USCIS must accord the record little to no probative value. 
Therefore, the facts presented in this appeal do not establish our prior decision was issued in error. 
B. Motion to Reconsider 
The Petitioner asserts our statement, "[t]hough an attorney/preparer/representative as designated in 
Part 6 of the Form I-290B may prepare the forms on behalf and at the direction of a petitioner, this 
does not mean that the attorney/preparer/representative may sign in place of a petitioner" was based 
on an incorrect application of USCIS policy. The Petitioner references USCIS Policy Memorandum 
PM-602-0134.1, Signatures on Paper Applications, Petitions, Requests, and Other Documents Filed with 
US. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.uscis.gov/legal-
11 Addressing similar signature issues, bankruptcy courts have observed that '" [i]t takes no elaborate discussion to point 
out the obvious that no one can grant authority to verify under oath the truthfulness of statements contained in the 
documents and to verify facts that they are true when the veracity of facts are unique and only within the ken of the 
declarant."' In re Veluz, No. 14-20101 (DHS), 2015 WL 161002, *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (quoting In re Harrison, 158 
B.R. 246,248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993)); In re Morton, No. 3:15-bk-30892-SHB, 2015 WL 5731859, *15 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 2015) (quoting In re Harrison, 158 B.R. at 248). "[L]ogically speaking, [an] attorney simply cannot file a document 
with the statement that his client has affirmed the truth of the matters asserted in the pleading without the client actually 
having reviewed the document" and personally signing it. In re Morton, No. 3:15-bk-30892-SHB, 2015 WL 5731859 at 
*15 (citing In re Wenk, 296 B.R. 719, 727 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002)). 
12 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). 
3 
resources/policy-memoranda, and asserts that "[u]nder general legal principles, an individual or entity 
may authorize another to act on his or her behalf: and that person becomes an 'Agent."' However, the 
USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0134.1, supra, at 2, clearly explains that while the "the interim 
PM [] allow[ed] the signing of documents pursuant to a Power of Attorney (POA) under general 
agency principles[,] [t]his final PM removes those provisions." The memorandum farther explains 
that the practice of accepting POA signatures under the interim policy had resulted in inconsistent 
treatment of petitions, created additional evidentiary requirements, and made it more difficult to 
prosecute immigration fraud. Id. 
The Petitioner also asserts that "Section 103.2(a)(2) does not say that the applicant or petitioner must 
personally sign the benefit request" ( emphasis in the original) and we "incorrectly applied a 
memorandum in lieu of the governing regulations." Pursuant to 8 CFR § 103.2(a)(2), "[a]n applicant 
or petitioner must sign his or her benefit request." While the Petitioner asserts that its CFO has since 
adopted and ratified! Is signatures, it does not cite to pertinent precedent decisions applying 
these contractual concepts to a legal entity and its authorized representative, or within the context of a 
users filing. 
The Petitioner does not explain how the memorandum conflicts with this regulation or other governing 
regulations. Instead, the Petitioner asserts that "it is inequitable to hold petitioners and practitioners 
to USCIS's ever-changing policies on this topic." The Petitioner explains that prior USCIS guidance 
"permitted the signing of documents ... under general agency principles" and that "USCIS issued 
Policy Alert 2020-07, stating it would be issuing new policy guidance in the Policy Manual regarding 
the signature issue." That policy guidance may be found at 1 USCIS Policy Manual B.2(A), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual, which incorporates the 2018 USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-
602-0134.1. There has been no change in this guidance since USCIS' s removed the agency provisions 
in 2018. Finally, we recognize that the Petitioner was apparently aware of its signature requirements 
when filing the underlying Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker. 13 
For the reasons listed above as well as the reasons identified in our previous decisions, the Petitioner 
has not shown proper cause to reconsider the previous decision. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not established proper cause to reopen this matter and has not shown proper cause 
to reconsider the previous decision. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
13 Petitioner's CFO explains in his declaration that he has the "authority to sign on behalf of Petitioner and legally bind 
and commit Petitioner in all matters" and he "personally signed Form 1-129." 
4