dismissed H-1B Case: Social Services

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: OCT. 18, 2024 In Re: 34132481 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
The Petitioner seeks to employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for 
specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-IB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a 
qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding the Petitioner did not 
demonstrate its proffered job qualified as a specialty occupation under section 10l(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of 
the Act. The matter is now before us on appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe , 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter of Christo 's, Inc. , 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
"Specialty Occupation" is defined as an occupation that requires: (A) the theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher 
degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the 
United States. See section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 184(i)(l). 
The regulation at 8 C .F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) adds a non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor to the 
statutory definition. And the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires that the proffered 
position must also meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
1. A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for 
entry into the particular position; 
2. The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel pos1t10ns among similar 
organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so 
complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree; 
3. The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
4. The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to 
perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 
USCIS analyzes the employer's prior practice, as well as the industry norm for parallel positions, to 
assure that a petitioner's requirements do not merely state a degree requirement or its equivalent in a 
specific specialty when such a degree is not actually required to perform the proffered job duties. 
See Matter of Caron International, Inc., 191 I&N Dec. 791, 793-794 (BIA 1988) The burden of 
proof to establish eligibility under the statute and regulation is squarely a petitioner's alone. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The burden of proving that a particular 
position comes within this taxonomy (and thus qualifies as a specialty occupation) is on the 
applicant."). 
Moreover, job title or broad occupational category alone does not determine whether a particular job 
is a specialty occupation under the regulations and statute. The nature of a petitioner's business 
operations along with the specific duties of the proffered job are also considered. We must evaluate 
the employment of the individual and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation. See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). So, a petitioner's self-imposed 
requirements are not as critical as whether the nature of the offered position requires the application 
of a theoretical and practical body of knowledge gained from earning the required baccalaureate or 
higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) required to accomplish the duties of the job. 
The statute and regulations must be read together to ensure the proffered position meets the definition 
of a specialty occupation. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that 
construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); 
see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. And Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989); 
Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). Considering the statute and the regulations separately 
could lead to scenarios where a petitioner satisfies a regulatory factor, but not the definition of 
specialty occupation contained in the statute. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387. The regulatory criteria 
read together with the statute gives effect to the statutory intent. See Temporary Alien Workers 
Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61112 (Dec. 
2, 1991). 
So, we construe the term "degree" in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate 
or higher degree or its equivalent, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered 
position supporting the statutory definition of specialty occupation or its equivalent. See Royal Siam 
Corp., 484 F.3d at 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as 
"one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). USCIS' 
application of this standard has resulted in the orderly approval of H-lB petitions for engineers, 
certified public accountants, information technology professionals, and other occupations 
commensurate with what Congress intended when it created the H-lB category. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Background 
The Petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker, on the Beneficiary's behalf 
seeking a determination that its habilitation specialist position is a specialty occupation under section 
214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 184(i)(l), so that the Beneficiary could be admitted to the United 
States and undertake the proffered position in H-1 B classification at multiple locations within a 
commutable distance in the State of New York. The Petitioner is an agency providing special 
education, residential and community services, as well as behavioral health services. The Petitioner 
described the habilitation specialist's job duties as a member of "an interactive team that includes ... 
nursing, education professionals, therapists and psychology professionals" providing "input and 
influence" on individual "treatment plans and teach[ing] individuals valuable life skills." 
After review of the initial petition, the Director issued a request for evidence (RFE) directing the 
Petitioner to demonstrate the specialty occupation nature of its proffered habilitation specialist 
position. Specifically, the Director evaluated the initial evidence in the record and determined that it 
reflected a disparate range of baccalaureate degree fields unconnected with one another and the duties 
of the proffered job such that the range could constitute a specialty required to perform the proffered 
job duties. 
In response, the Petitioner submitted expanded job duties, an expert opm10n pos1t10n analysis 
evaluation, a copy of Fed. R. Evid. 703, a copy of the "Rehabilitation Counselor" entry in the DO L's 
Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook), job postings advertising purportedly similar roles with 
other U.S. employers, education documents for other habilitation specialists currently employed by 
the Petitioner, a listing of fields of study that can be categorized as human services, the Beneficiary's 
educational documentation and credentials, and a representative sample of education from other 
habilitation specialists at the Petitioner's organization. 
As stated above, the Director denied the petition based on their determination the record did not 
establish the Petitioner's proffered job qualified as a specialty occupation under section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act. We agree. 
B. Specialty Occupation - Wide and Disparate Acceptable Degree Field Range 
We conclude that the Petitioner's acceptance of a bachelor's degree from the wide variety of fields it 
specifies precludes the Petitioner from satisfying both the statutory and regulatory definition of 
specialty occupation. The record of proceedings reflects that the Petitioner would accept a bachelor's 
degree in psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related human services field" 
for entry into the proffered job. 
The Director correctly found this acceptable range of degrees too wide and denied the petition. The 
Petitioner's grouping of psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a closely related human 
services field" is not adequately supported in the record with evidence highlighting its composition as 
collectively forming a singular specialty from a body of highly specialized knowledge. The Petitioner 
provided a list of "closely related human services field[ s ]" populated with diverse fields like 
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anthropology, criminal justice, nutrition, and divinity/religion/theology, all of which also ostensibly 
provide the "the interconnectedness of human experiences and the need for a comprehensive 
understanding of individuals and society." The Petitioner specifically highlights focusing on human 
behavior and development, emphasizing of understanding individuals and society, concern for social 
justice and well-being, research and analytical skills, interdisciplinary approaches, professional roles 
in helping other, shared theoretical foundations, and commitment to evidence-based practice as 
commonalities held by its grouping of degree fields. But the Petitioner's clarification of skills in 
combination with its mass grouping of degree fields constitutes a range so broad that it cannot compose 
a "specialty" required to perform the duties of a "specialty occupation." When the desired skills could 
be gained from any number of seemingly unrelated degrees, spanning from sciences such as 
anthropology to humanities-adjacent fields such as divinity, religion, and theology, the only 
conclusion can be that these skills are fundamental and not specialized. In fact, numerous unrelated 
specialties would fall within the Petitioner's minimum educational requirements with the Petitioner's 
desired range of skills. Such a position would not be considered specialized. See Caremax v. Holder, 
40 F.Supp.3d 1182, 1187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ("A position that requires applicants to have any 
bachelor's degree, or a bachelor's degree in a large subset of field, can hardly be considered 
specialized."). The record as it is presently composed does not establish how the Petitioner's range of 
skills sourced from the diverse grouping of psychology, sociology, social work, education, or "a 
closely related human services field" could form a body of highly specialized knowledge or a specific 
specialty. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that "degrees from multiple fields can qualify for H-1 B status 
without undermining the 'specific' specialty component." The Petitioner cites to Raj & Co. vs. USC IS, 
85 F.Supp.3d 1241 (W.D. Wash 2015) and Residential Finance Corporation v. US. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., 839 F.Supp.2d 985 (S.D. Ohio 2012) to conclude that its wide range of degrees 
can constitute a specialty required to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. We agree in so far 
that we interpret the statutory "the" and the regulatory "a" to mean a singular specialty, but we do not 
so narrowly interpret the statute and regulation such that multiple closely related fields of study would 
not constitute a specialty to perform the duties of a related specialty occupation. But contrary to the 
Petitioner's assertion, the issue here is not that the Petitioner would accept degrees in various fields. 
The issue today is that the Petitioner's stated spectrum of acceptable degrees is too broad to support a 
finding that the proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent. 
In general, a minimum of a bachelor's or higher degree in more than one specialty is recognized as 
satisfying the "degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent)" requirement of section 214(i)(l )(B) 
of the Act provided the specialties are closely related such that they constitute a common specialty 
required to perform the duties of the position. If they constitute a common specialty, then the required 
"body of highly specialized knowledge" would essentially be the same. If the required degree fields 
do not constitute a common specialty, a minimum entry requirement of a degree in disparate fields 
would not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be "in the specific specialty ( or its 
equivalent)." A minimum entry requirement that did include disparate fields of study, such as 
philosophy and engineering for example, would require a petitioner to establish how each field is 
directly related to all the duties and responsibilities of the particular position. Section 214(i)(l)(B) of 
the Act ( emphasis added). 
The cases cited by the Petitioner support the requirement of a singular specialty. The court in 
Residential Finance following this rationale found for the Plaintiff only after determining that the 
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Plaintiff had established its minimum requirements capture the necessity of a baccalaureate degree in 
a specialized course of study in a field related to the proffered job's duties as a minimum. Residential 
Finance Corporation, 839 F.Supp.2d at 996. In other words, the court in Residential Finance did not 
state that a petitioner can cobble together any mass grouping of degree fields and call it a specialty, as 
the Petitioner seems to imply. To the contrary, the plaintiff in Residential Finance prevailed because 
the court determined that the plaintiff's grouping of degree fields was a specialty. In other words, the 
court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the "specific specialty" requirement. 
The foundational principle leading to the holding in Residential Finance is also present in Raj & Co. 
In Raj & Co., the court stated that a specialty occupation requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree 
or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. The court confirmed that this issue is well-settled 
in case law and with the agency's reasonable interpretation of the regulatory framework. In the 
decision, the court noted that "permitting an occupation to qualify simply by requiring a generalized 
bachelor degree would run contrary to congressional intent to provide a visa program for specialized, 
as opposed to merely educated, workers." And in Relx v. Baran, 397 F.Supp.3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019), 
the court determined that a specialty occupation existed only after determining that the occupation 
required a specialized course of study the plaintiff had earned. Relx, 397 F.Supp.3d at 55. 
The Petitioner also cites to Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, 382 F.Supp.3d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
201 7) as relevant here and uses it to support a conclusion concerning the meaning of what is 
"normally" the minimum requirement for the position. We question the applicability of Next 
Generation Tech., Inc. in the instant matter, as the court in Next Generation Tech., Inc. analyzed our 
reading of the U.S Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook) concerning 
the entry requirements for positions located within the different and separate occupational category of 
"Computer Programmers," rather than the "Rehabilitation Counselors" category designated by the 
Petitioner in the LCA relating to this case. And the court in Next Generation Tech., Inc. relied in part 
on a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration (USCIS) policy memorandum specific to "Computer 
Programmers" indicating generally preferential treatment toward computer programmers, and 
"especially" toward companies in that particular petitioner's industry. Moreover, Next Generation 
Tech., Inc. is inapplicable because the Petitioner's mass grouping of psychology, sociology, social 
work, education, or any "related human services field" contained on its list of related human services 
fields is not sufficiently narrow to conclude that the Petitioner's requirement comprises a "specialty" 
required to perform the duties of the specialty occupation. Or in other words, when a petitioner would 
accept a bachelor's degree from a wide variety of seemingly unconnected fields, like the range of 
fields the Petitioner presents here, it cannot establish that the fields constitute a "specialty" if it does 
not establish how each accepted and specific field of study is directly related to each another and to 
the duties and responsibilities of the particular position. 
C. The Petitioner's Assertions on Appeal 
The record contains the Department of Labor's O*NET Online and Handbook entry for Rehabilitation 
Counselors, an expert opinion position analysis authored by Dr. I II I with supporting evidence, the Beneficiary's educational documentation, job postings for 
purportedly parallel positions with reportedly similar employers, a copy of Fed. R. of Evid. 703, 
education documents for other habilitation specialists currently employed by the Petitioner, and a 
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listing of fields of study that can be categorized as human services 1 to support the Petitioner's assertion 
that its proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in a specific field of study comprising a body 
of specialized knowledge or a specialty required to perform the duties of the position. But, as we 
discuss below, the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4) cannot be 
satisfied without the express requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree providing the theoretical 
and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge. 
The Handbook reports that "rehabilitation counselors typically need a master's degree in rehabilitation 
counseling or a related field" whilst "some employers hire workers with a bachelor's degree in 
rehabilitation and disability studies ... " See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, Rehabilitation Counselors, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/community­
and-social-service/rehabilitation-counselors.htm (Aug. 29, 2024). The Petitioner states that it requires 
a bachelor's degree, but in a grouping of fields (psychology, sociology, social work, education, or a 
list of "related human services" fields). It is not adequately described in the record how the Petitioner's 
grouping constitutes a specialty akin to the rehabilitation, rehabilitation counseling, or disability 
studies fields listed in Handbook. Nevertheless, we understand that the Handbook is only one source 
that can be used to assist in demonstrating whether a particular occupation may be a specialty 
occupation. The Petitioner may present other sources to establish that a specific degree is normally 
the minimum requirement for entry into the position or may establish that its particular position 
requires a bachelor's level, or other, degree in a specific discipline or fields of disciplines constituting 
a specialty or theoretical or practical body of specialized knowledge required to perform the duties of 
the position. The Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence regarding its particular position to 
satisfy the requirements necessary to establish the position is a specialty occupation. 
The Petitioner also submits several job postings submitted initially with the petition, in response to the 
Director's RFE, and with this appeal advertising purportedly parallel positions from reportedly similar 
employers. It further asserts that this evidence supports its contention that requirements similar to 
those it has established for its proffered position are widely held across its industry. The Petitioner 
asserts on appeal that the fact the organizations posting the jobs "offer behavioral health services 
and/or long-term and short-term rehabilitative care" is sufficient to demonstrate the organizations' 
similarity to the Petitioner. We do not agree. The job postings the Petitioner submitted do not 
adequately demonstrate that the employers who posted these positions are "similar" to the Petitioner. 
The advertisements the Petitioner submitted were posted by employers ranging from governmental 
organizations to religious organizations, to private for-profit entities engaged in business operations. 
The record does not adequately describe how these diverse organizations, sharing only a service they 
offer, are similar to one another, let alone to the Petitioner. For example, whilst the Petitioner and the 
North Carolina Department of Public Safety may both seek the services of individuals performing 
similar duties, the Petitioner as a community services organization is dissimilar from a state level 
governmental agency which is of different size, scope, mission, and may have different priorities. The 
evidence in the record does not provide any context that would permit a comparison of the Petitioner 
to the organizations whose job postings it submitted to evaluate their contended similarity. And, even 
if the organizations were similar, we would not conclude that the job postings demonstrate the 
proffered job is a specialty occupation because the minimum educational requirements contained in 
1 While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 
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the advertisements are varied and ranging such that they didn't constitute a specialty required to 
perform the duties of the job. 
And the education documentation for other habilitation specialists currently employed by the 
Petitioner do not persuasively support the specialty occupation nature of the proffered habilitation 
specialist position. At most, the documents indicate the Petitioner's preference for its employees to 
have a baccalaureate level of education in a disparate group of degree fields. It does not demonstrate 
the Petitioner's requirement of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, related to 
the performance of the position's job duties. The record must establish that a petitioner's stated degree 
requirement is not a matter of preference for high-caliber candidates but is necessitated instead by 
performance requirements of the position. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. Were we limited solely 
to reviewing a petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, an organization could bring any 
individual with a bachelor's degree to the United States to perform any occupation so long as the 
petitioning entity created a token degree requirement. Id. Here, the evidence in the record simply 
supports the Petitioner's preference for its employees to have a baccalaureate level of education. 
The Petitioner's RFE response refers to an expert opinion position analysis to contend that the range 
of fields it requires for the position is not disparate, and that the fields constitute a specialty closely 
related together and with the duties of the position. As a matter of discretion, we may use opinion 
statements submitted by the Petitioner as advisory. Matter ofCaron Int'l, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 
(Comm'r 1988). But an opinion statement has less weight where there is cause to question or doubt 
the opinion, or if it is not in accord with other information in the record. The submission of expert 
opinion letters is not presumptive evidence in any event. Id.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 
500, 502 n.2 (BIA, 2008). 
The Petitioner's reliance on this evaluation to supports its argument that the range of fields of study it 
accepts is closely related is misplaced. The evaluation does not provide a strong enough basis to 
understand how the wide range of degrees accepted by the Petitioner are related to one another to form 
a body of specialized knowledge. Nor does it show how that body of specialized knowledge relates to 
the duties of the proffered job. The writer of the evaluation formulated their opinion based on their 
knowledge of the wider field of education gained as a professor in the department of educational 
technology at Idaho. The writer has taught courses in teacher 
education and professional development, educational philosophy and training, and instructional 
technology. They also noted other professional experience and certifications. The writer states that 
they reviewed "the support letter and the detailed job description" provided by the Petitioner. The 
writer lists the proffered job's duties, the job's academic prerequisites, and attempts to establish the 
suitability of each required field of study to a selected portion of the proffered job's overall duties, 
concluding that the proffered position fits within the statute and regulations as a "specialty 
occupation." 
We have questions about the sufficiency of the writer's opinion because their conclusions are not in 
accord with information in the record. For example, the writer references their research and published 
work as authority for their opinion. But they do not specifically identify what research in the record 
supports their opinion to bolster their conclusions. The evaluation is mainly based on unspecified 
research authority not present or described in the record of proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation 
makes numerous presuppositions and conclusory findings which are not tethered to any cognizable 
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authority. For example, the writer "presupposes well-developed communication skills" as a 
requirement to perform the duties of the job and concludes baccalaureate level education in the 
grouping of degree fields identified by the Petitioner would confer the skill to successfully perform 
the duties. But "communication skills" could be attained, learned, or acquired through any number of 
vast and varied degree fields. And the Petitioner's own requirements, permitting baccalaureate level 
education in "a related human services field" demonstrate this because the list of 
"related human services fields" submitted by the Petitioner spans a significantly diverse spectrum as 
described above. It is apparent from the Petitioner's list that the "ability and knowledge" in human 
development and professional communication, individualized social, educational, and psychological 
knowledge, and participation as a part of a multi-disciplinary team is generally available amongst a 
wide swath of degree fields such that it is more fundamental knowledge than specialized knowledge 
required for the performance of the specific job duties. And even if we put aside our doubts about the 
basis for the writer's opinions, the writer's conclusions of each degree field's applicability to the 
proffered job duties are selectively applied to only a small portion of the overall job duties. The record 
does not support how each acceptable field of study is directly related to all the duties and 
responsibilities of the proffered job. Moreover, the writer's expertise appears to be in the field of 
education. The record does not indicate how the writer's specific expertise relates to the Petitioner's 
proffered job of habilitation specialist or its operations as a community services organization. And 
the evidence in the record does not convincingly corroborate the writer's claims that education and 
education technology focused teaching and research activities renders them qualified to provide an 
opinion about the applicability of education and other seemingly unrelated degree fields such as 
psychology, sociology, social work and whether they qualify someone to perform the duties of the 
habilitation specialist or are related to one another such that they comprise a specialty required to 
perform those duties. 
Whilst we held in Chawathe that the standard of proof in immigration proceedings is the 
preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proof is always on the petitioner. A petitioner's burden 
of proof comprises both the initial burden of production, as well as the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. Matter ofY-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998); see also the definition ofburden 
of proof from Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (reflecting the burden of proof includes both 
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). A petitioner must satisfy the burden of 
production. As the term suggests, this burden requires a filing party to produce evidence in the form 
of documents, testimony, etc. that adheres the governing statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions 
sufficient to have the issue decided on the merits. When, as here, a petitioner has not met the burden 
of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence because its evidence is not material, relevant, or 
probative it follows that it has not demonstrated eligibility for the benefit that it seeks. So, the 
evaluation is not probative and we decline to assign it any significant evidentiary weight. 
We therefore cannot conclude that the proffered position's minimum requirement for entry into the 
job is anything more than a general bachelor's degree. The Petitioner has not satisfied the statutory 
definition of a "specialty occupation" at section 214(i)(l )(B) of the Act nor the regulatory definition 
of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
Without the express requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree providing the theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, the supplemental regulatory criteria 
at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(])-(4) cannot be satisfied. The supplemental regulatory criteria are 
8 
read together within the related regulations and the statute as a whole. So, where the regulations refer 
to the term "degree," we interpret that term to mean a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific 
specialty related to the proffered position. See Royal Siam, 484 F.3d at 147. The word "degree" is 
mentioned in each prong of the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)­
(4). And where, as here, a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty is not required as a 
minimum requirement of entry, it follows that each prong under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4) 
remains unsatisfied. So, we will not consider the Petitioner's arguments and the evidence it submits 
in support of its contention that it satisfies the supplemental regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)( 4)(iii)(A)(l)-( 4). 
We conclude that the proffered position here is not a specialty occupation because the Petitioner's 
stated range of acceptable degree fields is too broad to constitute a single specialty required to 
accomplish the duties of proffered job. The record of proceedings does not establish that the proffered 
position requires both: (1) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge; and (2) the attainment of a bachelor's degree in the specific specialty. The Petitioner has 
satisfied neither the statutory definition of a "specialty occupation" at section 2 l 4(i)(l )(B) of the Act 
nor the regulatory definition of a specialty occupation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). As the Petitioner 
had not satisfied that threshold requirement, it cannot satisfy any of the supplemental specialty­
occupation criteria enumerated at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(l)-(4). The Petitioner has not 
established that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the 
Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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