dismissed H-1B Case: Software Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 04336685 
Appeal of Vermont Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-18) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG . 19, 2020 
The Petitioner, a software consulting firm, seeks to employ the Beneficiary temporarily under the H-18 
nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-18 program allows a U.S. 
employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the 
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment 
of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite 
for entry into the position. 
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant 
Worker, concluding that the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the proffered position qualified as a 
specialty occupation. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director erred in denying the petition. 
In reviewing the appeal, we observed that the various signatures attributed tol I the 
company's human resources manager, differed visibly within the record of proceeding. Specifically, 
the signatures on the Form 1-2908, Notice of Appeal or Motion, and accompanying Form G-28, Notice 
of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative, were markedly different from those 
within the rest of the record. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires a valid signature on certain documents filed 
with the agency (request).1 Without knowing who signed the forms, and that individual's capacity to 
sign on the petitioning organization's behalf, we cannot recognize the appeal to have been properly 
filed by an affected party with legal standing in these proceedings. 2· Therefore, on February 28, 2020, 
we issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and Request for Evidence (NOID/RFE) to the Petitioner. 
Within this correspondence, we requested an explanation for these variances, alonfc with sworn 
statements and copies of government-issued identification documents froml and any other 
individual who signed the forms and documents in the record. We also informed the Petitioner that, 
consistent with Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988), it "must resolve this discrepancy 
in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies." 
1 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). 
2 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). 
As part of its response to the NOID/RFE, the Petitioner provided a notarized affidavit froml~--~ 
claiming that the signatures differed due to being signed "at different places and time[s]" and "work 
fatigue." Notably,! ts signature on both his affidavit and the submitted copy of his driver's 
license are consistent with the signed documentation submitted prior to the appeal, which were also 
signed "at different time[s]" based on the dates of the signatures, but are not consistent with the 
signatures on the Form I-290B and accompanying Form G-28. The Petitioner also provided an 
affidavit from the resident of the company and a copy of her driver's I icense. The affidavit, however, 
simply confirms s role at the company and states that she 1) "believe[s] that the statements 
made by~----~in his affidavit are true and accurate" and 2) has "taken steps to ensure that 
such mistakes do not happen in the future."3 
Neither affidavit adequately resolves the discrepancy or sufficiently explains the marked differences 
among the signatures, especially given the consistency of all signatures other than the two provided in 
connection with the appeal. While a trier of fact should consider the issues presented and provide a 
sufficiently reasoned analysis, they are not required to interpret evidence in the manner a petitioner 
advocates.4 Similarly, we are not required to accept a petitioner's assertions, even if plausible, where 
there are other permissible views of the evidence based on the record. 5 Even though the Petitioner's 
justification for the markedly different signatures-purportedly made by the same person-may be 
one possible explanation, we are not required to view it as the most likely scenario. 
Without more, the Petitioner's response is insufficient to demonstrate thatl I personally signed 
both the Form 1-129 and the Form I-290B. In this matter, we conclude that it is more likely than not 
that someone other thanl I signed the forms in question. Therefore, as the Petitioner has not 
established that the appeal was personally signed by an authorized individual 6, we cannot recognize it 
as having been properly filed by an affected party with legal standing in these proceedings. 7 Therefore, 
we will dismiss the appeal.8 
In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration 
benefit sought.9 Here, the Petitioner has not met that burden. The appeal will be dismissed for the 
above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and alternative basis for the decision. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
3 It is unclear why the ~ompany's president would consider the inconsistent signatures to be a "mistake," if all the forms 
were, in fact, signed by I 
4 See Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2014); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007). 
5 Matter of D-R-, 25 l&N Dec. 445, 455 (BIA 2011) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 
(1985), which found that where two permissible views of evidence exist, a factfinder's choice between them cannot be 
considered erroneous). 
6 See USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0134.1, Signatures on Paper Applications, Petitions, Requests, and Other 
Documents Filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 3 (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.uscis.gov/legal­
resources/pol icy-memoranda. 
7 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). 
8 See USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0134.1, supra, at 3. 
9 Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
2