dismissed H-1B Case: Software Development

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF A-S-, INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: AUG. 23,2017 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a software solutions and services company, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a 
"software developer" under the H-1 B nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), '8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-1B program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified 
foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body 
of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the 
specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of 
record did not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation position, and that 
the Petitioner will have an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and asserts that the Director erred in denying 
the petition. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
The regulation at 8 CF .R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a 
non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered 
position must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
(1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We have consistently interpreted the term "degree" to mean not just 
any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the 
proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing 
"a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and 
responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
B. Proffered Position 
The Petitioner stated that the proffered position is a software developer position. On the labor 
condition application (LCA) 1 submitted in support ofthe H-1B petition, the Petitioner designated the 
proffered position under the occupational category "Software Developers, Applications" 
corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code 15-1132? 
1 
The Petitioner is required to submit a certified LCA to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1 B worker the higher of either 
the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the "area of employment" or the actual wage paid by the 
employer to other employees with similar experience and qualifications who are performing the same services. See 
Matter o.fSimeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542, 545-546 (AAO 20 15). 
Here, the Petitioner maintains that it has and will continue to comply with the terms of employment listed on the certified 
LCA. But we observe that, according to the certified LCA, the Beneficiary's proffered salary is $60,000 per year. This 
is significantly lower than the proffered salary listed on the H-1 B petition of $75,000 per year. 
2 The Petitioner classified the proffered position at a Level I wage (the lowest of four assignable wage levels). The 
"Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance" issued by the Department of Labor provides a description of the 
wage levels. A Level I wage rate is generally appropriate for positions for which the Petitioner expects the Beneficiary 
to have a basic understanding of the occupation. This wage rate indicates: (I) that the Beneficiary will be expected to 
perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment; (2) that he will be closely supervised and his 
work closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy; and (3) that he will receive specific instructions on required tasks 
and expected results. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't & Training Admin., Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, 
2 
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Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
Although the Petitioner's address is in California, the H-lB petition and LCA state that the 
Beneficiary will work at in Illinois.3 In a letter of support, the Petitioner 
identified the following as the requirements of the proffered position: 
The duties of our Software Developer position will include develop, create, and modify 
general computer applications software or specialized utility programs. This position 
will have the following responsibilities: 
• ModifY existing software to correct errors, allow it to adapt to new hardware, or 
to improve its performance. 
• Develop and direct software system testing and validation procedures, 
programming, and documentation. 
• Confer with systems analysts, programmers and others to design system and to 
obtain information on project limitations and capabilities, performance 
requirements and interfaces. 
• Analyze user needs and software requirements to determine feasibility of design 
within time and cost constraints. 
• Design, develop and modifY software systems, using scientific analysis and 
mathematical models to predict and measure outcome and consequences of 
design. 
• Store, retrieve, and manipulate data for analysis of system capabilities and 
requirements. 
• Consult with customers about software system design and maintenance. 
• Daily tasks will include 40% on analysis and design, 40% on development, 1 0% 
on coordination and remainder on documentation. 
In the itinerary, the Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary will be "working for [the Petitioner's] 
client, [(Company D)] at IL a job location 
where the work will actually be performed." The Petitioner then provided the following description of 
the proffered job duties: 
The beneficiary's duties will design and code from specifications, analyze, evaluate, test, 
debug, document, and implements complex software applications. He will have the 
following responsibilities: 
• Developing applications on Java 6.0 and J2EE application components 
including JSP, Custom Tag libraries, JavaScript, Session EJBs, JDBC. 
Nonagric. Immigration Programs (rev. Nov. 2009), available at http://tlcdatacenter.com/download/ 
NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_ll_2009.pdf A prevailing wage determination starts with an entry level wage and 
progresses to a higher wage level after considering the experience, education, and skill requirements of the Petitioner's 
job opportunity. !d. 
3 The H-1 8 petition states that the Beneficiary would not work off-site at another company or organization's location. 
3 
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Matter C?f A-S-, Inc. 
• Working on Java Integrated Development Environment (IDE) such as RAD 
8.0 
• Working on Object Oriented analysis and designing using Singleton, Factory 
and DAO designing patterns. 
• Working on MVC architecture 
• Working with IBM WebSphere Application Server 8.0, WAS 8.0 running in 
SuSe Linux 11 environment 
• Working on relational databases and writing SQL statements. 
• Analyzing Application code assessment for reusability 
• Deploying and testing the applications 
• Performing the system integration testing and fixed the bugs 
• Fixing the bugs raised in QA testing 
• Environment includes following tools/technologies: IBM Rational 
Application Developer, JSP, Custom Tag libraries, JavaScript, Sessions 
EJBs, JDBC, IBM WebSphere Application Server 8.0, IBM DB2 Database. 
• Daily tasks will include 40% on analysis and design, 40% on development, 
10% on coordination and remainder on documentation. 
In response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner clarified that the Beneficiary 
"will provide his services working on a project being developed for our client, [Company D], at their 
end client, at [Company D's] 
facility located at II " 
According to the Petitioner, the position requires "a miJ1imum of a Bachelor's degree or its foreign 
equivalent in Computer Science or Engineering or a related field." 
C. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we determine that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
Specifically, the record (1) does not describe the position's duties with sufficient detail; and (2) does 
not establish that the job duties require an educational background, or its equivalent, commensurate 
with a specialty occupation. 4 
As recognized in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-8, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient 
information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed in order to properly ascertain the 
minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. In other words, as the nurses 
in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning staffing 
company, the Petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were 
irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. See id. 
4 
The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-1 B petition , including evidence regarding the proffered 
position and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted , we have reviewed and 
considered each one . 
4 
.
Matter of A-S- , Inc. 
Here, . the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary will be employed as a software developer for 
Company D, which it identifies as the end-client. However, repeated claims in the record indicate 
that the Beneficiary will be working on a project for pursuant to an agreement between 
and Company D. Therefore, it is unclear who the Beneficiary will provide services to, and 
who is actually delegating the Beneficiary's work. There is no formal agreement between Company 
D and which describes the nature of their contractual relationship. 
Along with the H-1 B petition, the Petitioner submitted a copy of its Professional Services 
Agreement (PSA) with Company D, executed in 2002, which outlines the nature of the subcontractor 
agreement between the parties. Specifically , the agreement indicates that Company D has entered 
into numerous third-party contracts, and will require the services of the Petitioner's personnel , as 
subcontractors, to perform certain duties set forth in executed work orders between Company D and 
its clients. The agreement further indicates that an entity other than the Petitioner will determine the 
Beneficiary's specific duties by stating in Section 3, Project Management, that Company D, and 
others it may designate, "will supervise and direct the performance of the Services, including , 
without limitation, assigning specific duties to Subcontractor .... " 
The Director's RFE requested additional information regarding the nature of the proposed project for 
the Beneficiary, as well as additional evidence regarding the Petitioner's right to control the 
Beneficiary's work given the nature of the PSA contained in the record. In response, the Petitioner 
submitted a letter in which it stated that the Beneficiary "will provide his services working on a 
project being developed for our client, [Company D], at their end client, at [Company D] 
facility located at Il ' This is the first time the Petitioner 
expressly identified as a third-party client; again, however, no contractual documentation 
between Company D and was submitted. 5 
In its RFE response , the Petitioner also submitted its Consulting Services Agreement (CSA) with 
Company D, dated December 2014, which was intended to supersede prior consulting agreements 
between the parties. However, this newly submitted agreement is not signed and executed by 
Company D; as such, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that this document supersedes the above 
PSA.6 
The record contains a Work Order issued by Company D assigning the Beneficiary to the' 
project, otherwise known as the · project, 
commencing in March 2016. This Work Order specifically references the "Subcontractor 
5 Documents on record, such as the Sole Source Jurisdiction forms and 
existence of a contractual relationship between Company D and 
describe in detail the terms of that contractual relationship. 
"Agenda" minutes, indirectly confirm the 
However , none of these documents directly 
6 On appeal, the Petitioner re-submits a copy of the CSA followed by an unnumbered page containing the signatures of 
representatives from Company D and the Petitioner. But this signature page is not a part of the final CSA; it is a part of 
Company D's letter to the Petitioner and other suppliers informing them that existing contracts will expire and be 
superseded by the new CSA, if accepted and agreed to by the supplier. Notably , this letter states when a supplier accepts 
the new CSA , Company D "will then return a fully-executed copy" of the CSA back to that supplier. The Petitioner has 
yet to submit a fully-executed copy of the CSA as evidence that the above PSA has, in fact, been superseded . 
5 
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Matter of A-S-. Inc. 
Agreement between (Company D and the Petitioner] dated 10/30/2014." But the record does not 
contain a copy of any Subcontractor Agreement with that date. Given this discrepancy, the PSA's 
execution approximately 15 years prior to this petition's filing date, and the lack of evidence that the 
CSA was signed and executed, we are unable to understand the terms of the contractual relationship 
between the Petitioner, Company D, and if any, and the delegation of responsibilities among 
these parties with respect to the Beneficiary's work. 
The Petitioner submitted a letter from Company D which simply states that the Petitioner "serves as 
a subcontractor on a [Company D] Consulting project located in lL," and identifies the 
Beneficiary as one of "certain personnel" who will work on said project pursuant to "the service 
contract." The letter does not further detail which service contract it is referring to. This letter lacks 
other relevant details such as which client or client project the Beneficiary will be as'signed to, and 
the nature of the contractual relationship between the parties and that client. Overall, this letter is 
insufficient to overcome the lack of contractual documentation (if any) between the Petitioner, 
Company D, and 
Moreover, insufficient documentation exists to establish the Beneficiary's specific job duties and 
responsibilities. There is no statement of duties or other documentation directly from 
Additionally, the Beneficiary's job duties listed in the itinerary and the Petitioner's letter of support 
differ from each other. The Petitioner has not reconciled these different job descriptions. We 
observe that the job duties listed in the Petitioner's letter of support are virtually identical to those 
listed in the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) Details Report for the occupational 
category "Software Developers, Applications," corresponding to SOC code 15-1132. O*NET 
Online Details Report for "Software Developers, Applications," 
http://www.onetonline.org/link/details/15-1132.00 (last visited Aug. 23, 2017). While this type of 
general description may be appropriate when defining the range of duties that may be performed 
within an occupational category, it does not adequately convey the substantive work that the 
Beneficiary will perform. 
The Work Order issued by Company D provides the following brief description of services: 
"Converts a design into a complete information system. Includes acquiring and installing systems 
environment; creating and testing databases; preparing test case procedures; preparing test files; 
coding, compiling, and refining programs[.]" This brief description does not adequately detail the 
Beneficiary's specific duties, demands, level of responsibilities, the complexity of such tasks, and 
the substantive application of knowledge involved. The Work Order is silent with respect to the 
proffered position's educational requirements, if any. Similarly, the letter from Company D does not 
describe the Beneficiary's duties and responsibilities in detail; rather, it states that he will "lend [his] 
professional expertise in the area of technology consulting" without further elaboration upon the 
proposed "technology consulting." Company D's letter is also silent with respect to the proffered 
position's educational requirements, if any. 
Again, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the Petitioner, evidence of the client 
companies' job requirements is critical. See id Here, both the Petitioner and Company D make clear 
that the Beneficiary will be assigned to work on a project for but it still remains unclear 
.
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
whether Company D or is the ultimate end-client receiving the Beneficiary's services. Nor is 
there sufficient documentation which describes the nature and timeline of the intended project, the 
project schedule, and the services to be provided for this project. Under these circumstances, 
sufficiently detailed evidence of the work the end-client will assign to the Beneficiary and evidence of 
the educational requirement it imposes for the performance of that work are indispensable. The record 
is missing this critical evidence. This lack of evidence precludes us from determining the substantive 
nature of the duties the Beneficiary would perform. 
Moreover, the Petitioner has not established that it has definite, non-speculative work for the 
Beneficiary for the entire validity period requested. None of the documents of record sufficiently 
describe the project's timeline or schedule. For instance, the "Agenda" mentions the target date 
of July 2016 for "Phase Two" of the project, and indicates that it is "currently negotiating with 
[Company D] regarding details of the project's schedule extension." Other documentation submitted 
on appeal reflects that the Beneficiary's Work Order has been extended until March 2017. Without 
additional documentary evidence from either Company D or that covers the entire duration 
of the period of employment requested (i.e., through September 20 19), we are not able to ascertain 
what the Beneficiary would do, where the Beneficiary would work, as well as how this would impact 
circumstances of his relationship with the Petitioner. A petition must be filed for non-speculative 
work for the Beneficiary, for the entire period requested, that existed as of the time of the petition's 
filing.7 For this additional reason, the Petitioner has not demonstrated the substantive nature of the 
proffered position and its constituent duties. 
As the Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the 
Beneficiary, we are therefore precludes from finding that the proffered position satisfies any 
criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that 
determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular position, 
which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and 
7 
The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1 B program. For example, a 
1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows: 
Historically, the Service has not granted H-1 B classification on the basis of speculative, or 
undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1 B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an 
individual to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary 
foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the 
expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an individual is properly 
classifiable as an H-1 B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the 
position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a 
specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The 
Service must 'then determine whether the individual has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In 
the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong 
analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1 B classification. Moreover, 
there is no assurance that the individual will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this 
country. 
Petitioning Requirements for the H Nonimmigrant Classification, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419, 30,419-20 (proposed June 4, 
1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
7 
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of 
criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the 
second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a 
degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and 
complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 
Accordingly, the record does not demonstrate that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation, and that specialty occupation work existed and was available for the Beneficiary at the time 
of filing. 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
Furthermore, the Petitioner has not established that it meets the regulatory definition of a United 
States employer. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Specifically, the Petitioner has not established that it 
will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated 
by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such 
employee." /d. 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) ofthe Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant, in pertinent part, as an 
individual: 
[S]ubject to section 2120)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to 
perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)( 1) ... , who 
meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) ... , and with 
respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of 
Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of 
Labor] an application under section 212(n)(l) .... 
The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows: 
United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other 
association, or organization in the United States which: 
(1) ·Engages a person to work within the United States; 
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees 
under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and 
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number. 
·s 
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
(Emphasis added); see Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act 56 Fed. Reg. 61,111,61,121 (Dec. 2, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted 
that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the 
H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an individual coming to 
the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who 
will file a Labor condition application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(l) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1 ). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time 
"employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(l)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 
8 U.S. C. § 1182(n)(l )(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States 
employers" must file a Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, in order to classify individuals 
as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of"United 
States employer" indicates in its second prong that the Petitioner must have an "employer-employee 
relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1 B beneficiary, and that this relationship 
be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of 
any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer"). 
Neither the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" are defined by regulation for 
purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as 
being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States 
employer." !d. Therefore, for purposes of the H-IB visa classification, these terms are undefined. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law falls to clearly define the term 
"employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to· describe the conventional master­
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common 
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means 
by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this 
inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether 
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the 
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method 
of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work 
is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired 
party." 
!d.; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
9 
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. 
of Am., 390 U.S. 254,258 (1968)). 
In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(l)(A)(i) of the Act, or 
"employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See 
generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 
1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the tetm 
"United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.8 
Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1 B employers to have a 
tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, 
the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes 
additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United 
States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the tetms "employee" or 
"employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition 
of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to 
extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that 
construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. C.Y. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-19.9 
Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the 
"conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the 
Darden construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used 
in section 1 Ol(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) ofthe Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).10 
8 While the Darden court considered only the definition of"employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S. C. § I 002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer,'' courts have generally 
refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' 
in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the 
traditional common law definition." See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 
I 0 I (a)( 15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)( I )(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 
212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1 B visa 
classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the 
common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to 
be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See Chevron. U.S.A .. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council. 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
9 To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship," 
the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation."' Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461 (1997) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332, 359 ( 1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 ( 1945)). 
10 That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term 
10 
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Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee 
relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, we must 
focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450; see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee 
relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, 
supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee .... " (emphasis added)). · 
The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated 
in both the Darden and Clackamas decisions. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24; Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 
445; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, 
where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the 
employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work 
performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445; 
see also EEOC Compl. Man. at § 2-III(A)(l) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that 
said test was based on the Darden decision); Defensor, 201 F.3d at 388 (determining that hospitals, as 
the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the petitioner, because the hospitals 
ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries). 
It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in Darden and Clackamas are not exhaustive and 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties 
relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 
Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must 
weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The 
determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, 
regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. 
See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-49; EEOC Compl. Man. at § 2-III(A)(l ). 
Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, we must assess and weigh 
each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or 
change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 
323-24. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to 
assign them, it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not 
who has the right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See id at 323. 
Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, ... the answer to 
whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no 
one factor being decisive."' !d. at 451 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 324). 
"employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. See, e.g., section 214(c)(2)(F) of 
the Act, 8 U .S.C. § I 184(c )(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1 B intracompany 
transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of 
unauthorized individuals). 
II 
.
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
B. Analysis 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the Petitioner has not established that it 
will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the 
Beneficiary as an H~lB temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
As previously noted, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary will work ofisite at Company D's 
facility at in Illinois. But the Petitioner's offices are located in 
California. Given the significant distance between the Beneficiary's worksite and the Petitioner's 
offices, it is not evident, absent additional evidence, how the Petitioner intends to supervise and 
control the Beneficiary's work. 
The Petitioner did not submit any document which outlined in detail the nature and scope of the 
Beneficiary's proposed employment at the worksite. Although letters and a Work Order 
from Company D were submitted, these documents merely confirm the Beneficiary as an assigned 
resource to Company D or its 
client. They do not identify the Beneficiary's supervisor, the manner 
in which his work will be monitored and supervised, or other salient aspects of the working 
relationship between the Beneficiary, Petitioner, and the other parties involved in his work. 
Therefore, the key element in this matter, which is who exercises control over the Beneficiary's 
work, has not been substantiated. 
We again refer to the PSA, where the "Project Management" section states as follows: 
[Company D], or others whom Company D may designate, will supervise and direct 
the performance of the Services, including, without limitation, assigning specific 
duties to Subcontractor, fixing time schedules which the duties are to be performed, 
or approving standard hours (reporting time and working hours), overtime, vacations 
of more than two weeks (requires both a written minimum 90 day notice and 
approval) and holidays. All Services by Subcontractor will be performed at locations 
approved in advance in writing by [Company D]. Subcontractor and each of its 
personnel will be required to follow reasonable work rules established by [Company 
D]. 
Clearly, this agreement, executed by both parties, contradicts the Petitioner's claims that it will 
exercise control over the Beneficiary's work. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that it will assign 
specific duties to the Beneficiary, establish and monitor his work hours, and approve requests for 
vacation and leave, which directly contradicts the language contained in the PSA. Although the 
Petitioner submitted the new CSA which was supposed to supersede the PSA, the CSA was not 
properly executed by both parties and cannot be deemed effective. 
While we acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that it will "remotely" monitor and supervise his work, 
it appears that daily, onsite supervision is not exercised at the client location by the Petitioner or its 
employees. In fact, the Petitioner stated that it has "the ability and right to signi{icantlv control the 
12 
.
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
manner and means in which the work product of the beneficiary is accomplished," but that "[t]his is 
not on a daily, minute to minute computation." The Petitioner did not further clarify who manages 
the Beneficiary's daily off-site work, and the nature of the relationship between that off-site 
individual and the Petitioner's employee who purportedly 
monitors and supervises the Beneficiary. 
According to the Petitioner's offer letter, the Beneficiary will report to elsewhere 
identified as the company's managing partner. But according to the Petitioner's organizational 
chart, the Beneficiary will report directly to the COO, and not directly to 
Further, the Beneficiary's timesheets are signed by in the capacity of "manager." 
does not appear on the Petitioner's organizational chart. Given these factors, it is not 
apparent who is the Beneficiary's actual supervisor, or what structure the Petitioner has for 
monitoring and reviewing the Beneficiary's substantive daily off-site work. The Petitioner's 
submission of a blank sample performance review is noted, but it is not specific to the Beneficiary 
and does not demonstrate the Petitioner's actual exercise of supervision and evaluation of his work. 
Moreover, the Petitioner now states on appeal that it "has complete control over the work or project 
assigned to beneficiary ... [and] exercises complete control over the details of the work to be 
accomplished by the beneficiary through assignment, supervision, and evaluation." The Petitioner's 
statements about its "complete control" represents an unexplained shift from its previous statements 
about its "right to significantly control" the Beneficiary's work. The Petitioner must resolve this 
incongruity with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter (~f Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Thus, while social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment 
insurance contributions, federal and state~.income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still 
relevant factors in determining who will control the Beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, 
e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the Beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities 
and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to 
which the Beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a 
determination as to who will be the Beneficiary's employer. Without full disclosure of all of the 
relevant factors, we are unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist 
between the Petitioner and the Beneficiary. 
The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the Petitioner qualifies as a United States 
employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the Petitioner 
exercises significant or even complete control over the Beneficiary's work, without 
evidence 
supporting that claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. 
Based on the tests outlined above, the Petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States 
employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the Beneficiary as an H-1 B temporary 
"employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
13 
Matter of A-S-, Inc. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Here, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered pos1t10n qualifies as a specialty 
occupation, and that it will have the requisite employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of A-S-, Inc., ID# 488215 (AAO Aug. 23, 2017) 
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