dismissed H-1B Case: Software Development

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 8722325 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : APR. 22, 2020 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-IB nonimmigrant 
classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) . The H-lB program allows a U.S . employer to 
temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's 
or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into 
the position. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not sufficiently establish that: (1) the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation, and (2) it 
qualifies as a United States employer with an employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary . 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec . 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the 
questions in this matter de nova. See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec . 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015) . 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SPECIAL TY OCCUPATION 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires : 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States . 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position 
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
( I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We have consistently interpreted the term "degree" to mean not just 
any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the 
proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing 
"a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and 
responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
As recognized in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient 
information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to properly 
ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. In other words, 
as the beneficiaries in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the 
petitioning staffing company, the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform 
those duties were insufficient for a specialty occupation determination. See id. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we determine that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
Specifically, the record does not sufficiently establish that the proffered position reqmres an 
educational background, or its equivalent, commensurate with a specialty occupation. 1 
1 The Petitioner submitted documentation to suppmt the H-1 B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each 
one. 
2 
The Petitioner, located in Georgia, seeks to assign the Beneficiary as an "embedded software 
developer" through two intermediary vendors to an end-client, in North Carolina for the duration of 
the validity period requested. 2 The claimed contractual chain is as follows: 
Petitioner ➔ T- (mid-vendor) ➔ R- (prime-vendor) ➔ A- (end-client). 
The Petitioner submitted a labor condition application (LCA) 3 for the end-client location for the 
"Software Developers, Applications" occupational category corresponding to the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) code 15-1132, with a level II wage. 
As a preliminary matter, we observe that the Petitioner has provided inconsistent information 
regarding the minimum requirements for the proffered position. 
Record Degree Requirement Experience Requirement 
Petitioner's Bachelor's degree in electrical, electronics, Mar. 2019 NIA 
Letter mechanical, or computer engineering. 
Prime- Bachelor's degree or equivalent work Equivalent work experience vendor's 
Letters expenence. without farther specification. 
Professor G-' s Bachelor's degree in electrical, electronics, NIA Letter mechanical, or computer engineering. 
Professor B-' s Bachelor's degree in electrical, electronics, NIA Letter mechanical, or computer engineering. 
Mid-vendor's Bachelor's degree in electrical, electronics, NIA Letters mechanical, or computer engineering. 
Petitioner's Bachelor's degree in electrical, electronics, Aug. 2019 5 years of relevant experience. 
Letter mechanical, or computer engineering. 
The Petitioner has not consistently stated the minimum educational requirement for this position. For 
instance, it initially specified bachelor's degrees in certain engineering disciplines as required for the 
position. Later, in response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), it indicated that five years 
ofrelevant work experience was required in addition to the previously stated bachelor's degrees. The 
prime-vendor's letters stated differing requirements, contending that an unspecified bachelor's degree 
or an undefined level of work experience "equivalent to a bachelor's degree" would suffice. 
2 The Petitioner most recently employed the Beneficiary through STEM-related post-completion optional practical training 
and has provided copies of wage statement for his employment with the Petitioner. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274.a.12( c )(3)(i)(C), 
214.2(t)(l 0)(ii)(C). 
3 A petitioner submits the LCA to U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to demonstrate that it will pay an H-1 B worker the 
higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid 
by the employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 20 
C.F.R. § 655.731(a). 
3 
As explained above, we interpret the degree requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to require a 
degree in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. The prime-vendor's 
stated minimum requirements, for example - that possession of a general bachelor's degree or work 
experience - alone indicates that the proffered position is not in fact a specialty occupation. The 
Petitioner does not explain why these position requirements differ from other position requirements that 
it put forth, nor does it explain the reasons for its own variances in position requirements within the record. 
The Petitioner must resolve these inconsistencies and ambiguities in the record with independent, 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 
1988). 
Further, certain evidence submitted in response to the Director's RFE is inconsistent with the 
Petitioner's Level II wage selection in the LCA. The purpose of the LCA wage requirement is "to 
protect U.S. workers' wages and eliminate any economic incentive or advantage in hiring temporary 
foreign workers." 4 It also serves to protect H-lB workers from wage abuses. 5 DOL guidance 
provides a five-step process for determining the proper wage level for the proffered position. 6 Step 
two of this process compares the experience described in the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET) Job Zone to the requirements for the proffered position. "Software Developers, 
Applications" are classified in Job Zone 4 with a Specialized Vocational Preparation (SVP) rating of 
"7.0 < 8.0." This SVP rating means that the occupation requires "over 2 years up to and including 4 
years" of specific vocational training. A bachelor's degree expends two years, permitting the Petitioner 
to require up to and including two years of experience as the position's prerequisite before it must 
increase the wage level. If an employer requires a bachelor's degree and more than two years of work 
experience, a wage level increase is required as follows: 
Amount of Experience Experience and SVP Range Wage Level 
Requirement 
Up to and including two years Less than the experience and SVP No increase 
More than two years and up to Low end of the experience and SVP One level increase three years 
More than three years and up to High end of the experience and SVP Two level increase four years 
More than four years Greater than the experience and SVP Three level increase 
4 See Labor Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants on H-1 B Visas in Specialty 
Occupations and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United 
States, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,110, 80,110-11 (proposed Dec. 20, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 655-56). 
5 See Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. § 655.73l(a). While DOL certifies the LCA, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) determines whether the LCA's content corresponds with the H-lB petition. See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.705(b) ("DHS determines whether the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds with the petition .... "). 
6 A prevailing wage determination starts with an entry level wage and progresses to a higher wage level after considering 
the experience, education, and skill requirements of the Petitioner's job opportunity. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't & 
Training Admin., Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagric. Immigration Programs (rev. Nov. 2009); 
http:/ /flcdatacenter.com/download/NPWHCGuidance _Revised_ I I_ 2009 .pdf 
4 
The Petitioner's August 2019 letter specified requirements of a bachelor's degree in one of various 
engineering disciplines and five years of relevant work experience. As the Petitioner's position 
requirements of a bachelor's degree and five years of work experience are greater than the experience 
and SVP range for the occupation, this would appear to require raising the wage level to a Level IV 
hourly wage rate of $59 .19. The Petitioner indicated it would pay the Beneficiary an hourly rate of 
$43 in the petition, a level of compensation greater than the prevailing Level II hourly wage of $42.63 
certified in the LCA, but less than the Level IV wage rate. 7 Here, the varying position requirements 
presented by the Petitioner, which include both a bachelor's degree and a level of work experience 
that exceed the level of vocational training consistent with a Level II wage rate for the designated 
occupational category, results in a significant pay discrepancy. 8 This raises questions regarding 
whether the LCA corresponds with the petition. 9 
The Petitioner also submitted an opinion letter from Professor G- who analyzes the job duties 
presented by the Petitioner and opines that "[t]hese descriptions suggest that the job is more 
responsible than Wage Level I positions are. However, I also believe the position to be less responsible 
than Wage Level III roles .... Contrary to Wage Levels I & III, the description of Wage Level II 
perfectly corresponds to the duties of the proposed [ e ]mbedded [ s ]oftware [ d]eveloper position with 
the Petitioner." The professor's analysis of the appropriateness of the Petitioner's Level II wage 
designation in the LCA is limited to discussing the general descriptions provided in DOL's Prevailing 
Wage Determination Policy Guidance for these wage levels as they compare to the Petitioner's job 
description for the position, but does not an analyze the varying minimum position requirements 
presented in the petition in accordance with the DOL's five-step process for determining the proper 
wage level for the proffered position. 10 Professor G- also does not address the differences between 
the minimum requirements for the position as contemporaneously stipulated by the Petitioner and the 
prime-vendor in the Petitioner's RFE response relative to his or her own conclusions regarding the 
position requirements. 
In similar fashion, Professors B- also does not address the differences between the mm1mum 
requirements for the position as stipulated by the Petitioner and the prime-vendor relative to his own 
conclusions regarding the position requirements in his opinion letter which were also provided in the 
RFE response. For example, Professor B- asserts that the "range of duties [ of the proffered position] 
could not possibly be deployed successfully by a candidate lacking prior bachelor's-level training in [the 
various engineering disciplines specified by the Petitioner]," but he does not address the prime-vendor's 
requirements which indicate that a general bachelor's degree or work experience alone would suffice for 
entry into the position within his analysis of the proffered position. 
7 For additional information, see the Foreign Labor Certification Data Center, Online Wage Library - FLC Wage Search 
Wizard available at http://www.flcdatacenter.com/OESWizardStart.aspx. (Last visited Apr. 21, 2020.) 
8 Matter of Ho, Dec. at 591-92. 
9 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b). See also Matter of Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542, 545-546 (AAO 2015). 
10 Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, supra. 
5 
For the reasons discussed, we find the professors' opinion letters lend little probative value to the 
matter here. Matter of Caron Int'l, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 1988) (The service is not required 
to accept or may give less weight to an advisory opinion when it is "not in accord with other 
information or is in any way questionable."). For the sake of brevity, we will not address other 
deficiencies within the professors' analyses of the proffered position. 
In summary, we conclude that the inconsistencies in the record erode the Petitioner's ability to 
demonstrate the substantive nature of the proffered position. Unresolved material inconsistencies may 
lead us to reevaluate the reliability and sufficiency of other evidence submitted in support of the 
requested immigration benefit. 11 The record contains numerous and material inconsistencies relative 
to the Petitioner's minimum requirements for entry into the proffered position, which may also impact 
whether the LCA actually corresponds to the petition. We therefore conclude that the documentation 
submitted in this regard to establish eligibility for the classification sought lacks probative value and 
overall credibility. 12 For these reasons, the petition may not be approved. 
As discussed, the Petitioner located in Georgia seeks to deploy the Beneficiary to an end-client's location 
in North Carolina to work as an "embedded software developer" through intermediary vendors pursuant 
to contractual agreements. The Petitioner provided contractual documentation to illustrate this 
relationship. Nonetheless, it has not established definitive, non-speculative, specialty occupation 
employment for the Beneficiary. 
To evidence the contractual relationships between the Petitioner and the intermediary vendors in the 
petition, the Petitioner initially indicated that it is "in the process of acquiring [the mid-vendor]," and 
noted that "some of our client and/or vendor letters may be written to [the mid-vendor]," asserting that 
the Petitioner "will be acquiring these agreements as part of the acquisitions process." It also presented 
an agreement between the mid-vendor and the prime-vendor, which indicates among other things, that 
the "[the prime-vendor] retains [the mid-vendor] to provide the services more particularly described 
[] for the benefit of the [prime-vendor] customer identified on [Exhibit A]." The agreement further 
specified that the prime-vendor has the "right to reject any [mid-vendor] [p ]ersonnel who do not meet 
[the prime-vendor's] or [its] Customer's requirements." In order to be paid for the services performed, 
the mid-vendor must "submit a separate invoice based on either (i) Customer-approved timesheets or 
(ii) Customer-approved electronic times entries during the [b ]illing [p ]eriod." 
In response to the Director's RFE, the Petitioner describes the contractual path that we outlined above 
but omits mention of its planned acquisition of the mid-vendor. Instead, it provides its August 2018 
agreement with the mid-vendor which reflects that the Petitioner's staff will provide services to the 
mid-vendor's clients pursuant to statements of work (SOWs). The August 2018 mid-vendor SOW 
identifies the end-client, the Beneficiary, and an August 2018 assignment start-date, but does not 
mention the prime-vendor, the position's job title or duties, the projects to which the Beneficiary will 
be assigned at the end-client location, or the duration of the assignment. 
11 Matter of Ho, Dec. at 591-92. 
12 Matter of Chawathe. 25 l&N Dec. 369. 376 (AAO 2010) (citing Matter of E-M-, 20 l&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm'r 
1989)). 
6 
Further, the submitted prime-vendor SOWs with the mid-vendor identify the end-client, the 
Beneficiary, and his employment as a "software embedded engineer," who will be engaged in "any 
duties and activities necessary to perform the work" for work assignments seven to nine months in 
duration, but do not identify the Petitioner as a party to the agreement. 
The Petitioner also provides a largely redacted copy of the prime-vendor's April 2014 agreement with 
the end-client for the provision of services "described in statements of work" according to the first 
page of the agreement. However, without more, this material is insufficient to substantiate the 
Beneficiary's assignment with the end-client. The Petitioner submitted all pages of this ten-page 
agreement between the end-client and the prime-vendor. While page ten of the agreement contains 
the signatures of officials for the end-client and the prime-vendor, pages two through nine are blank. 
The prime-vendor indicates that the agreement "is confidential and proprietary to both [the prime­
vendor] and the [end-client]." 13 While this partial agreement confirms that the parties may have a 
contractual relationship, the Petitioner has not established what the parties actually agreed to. We 
determine the Petitioner's submission of these partial documents diminishes their evidentiary value, 
as it deprives us of the remaining portions that may reveal information either advantageous or 
detrimental to the petitioning organization's claims, and therefore, are of little probative value. 14 
Notably, page one the agreement references the provision of prime-vendor services for the end-client 
based upon SOWs, but the Petitioner has not provided contractual material from the end-client that 
details the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's proposed assignment. 
On appeal, the Petitioner presents a different August 2018 mid-vendor SOW which newly includes 
the Petitioner's job duties and a brief project description and notes an assignment end-date of 
September 02, 2022. Notably this SOW contains the same August 17, 2018 signatory page as the mid­
vendor SOW submitted in response to the Director's RFE. It seems incongruous that the mid-vendor 
would issue this newly presented SOW and the previously submitted SOW which contain material 
differences in assignment information on the same day. The Petitioner must also resolve these 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, Dec. at 591-92. 
The Petitioner also provides another prime-vendor SOW on appeal, which indicates that the 
Beneficiary's assignment period will be through November 2019 (with possible extensions), which 
otherwise contains the same information as in the previous SOWs. It submits an end-client and prime­
vendor change request document which notes that the prime-vendor's software development teams 
13 The claim a document is confidential does not provide a blanket excuse for a petitioner not providing such a document 
if that document is material to the requested benefit. Although a petitioner may always refuse to submit confidential 
commercial information if it is deemed too sensitive, the Petitioner must also satisfy the burden of proof and runs the risk 
of a denial. CJ Matter of Marques, 16 l&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977) (holding the "respondent had eve1y right to assert his 
claim under the Fifth Amendment[; however], in so doing he runs the risk that he may fail to cany his burden of persuasion 
with respect to his application."). 
Both the Freedom of Information Act and the Trade Secrets Act provide for the protection of a petitioner's confidential 
business information when it is submitted to USCIS. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1905. Additionally, the 
petitioner may request pre-disclosure notification pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,600, "Predisclosure Notification 
Procedures for Confidential Commercial Information." Exec. Order No. 12,600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (June 23, 1987). 
14 Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
7 
"are expected to be depleted on or around April 3, 2019," and that eight individuals employed in 
positions such as senior software engineer, software engineer, and project manager comprise the 
prime-vendor's "feature team" and "core team," and will be needed for the end-client's projects 
through December 2019. Notably, the record is otherwise devoid of evidence from the end-client or 
the prime-vendor which describes the software development team structure for the software 
development projects underway at the end-client location. Here, the Beneficiary's specific role, if 
any, within these project teams has not been sufficiently delineated in the contractual material in the 
record. 
The lack of complete contractual documentation specific to the Beneficiary's employment is important 
because, in this case, the existence of the proffered position appears dependent entirely upon the 
willingness of the end-client to provide it. Absent fully executed contracts and accompanying 
statements of work (or similar documentation) between the Petitioner and the mid-vendor; mid-vendor 
and prime-vendor; and, the prime-vendor and the end-client, the record lacks evidence of any legal 
obligation on the part of the end-client to provide the position described by the Petitioner in this 
petition. 15 The Petitioner did not sufficiently document the contractual terms and conditions of the 
Beneficiary's employment as imposed by the end-client. See Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 
(5th Cir. 2000), (where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of 
the client companies' job requirements is critical). 16 
While relevant, the letters from the end-client and the prime-vendor are not sufficient to fill this gap, 
as they do not sufficiently describe the contractual relationship between the parties such that we can 
ascertain the nature and terms of that relationship and determine whether there is, in fact, a legal 
obligation on the part of the end-client to provide the position the Petitioner describes. For instance, 
the end-client's letter announces the "spin-off'' of its Electronics business," but does not discuss the 
information technology development projects underway in its organization even generally, or the 
terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's contractually-based assignment specifically. The prime­
vendor's letters indicate the "[prime-vendor] entered into an [agreement] for the [Beneficiary's] 
services as an Embedded Software Engineer at [the prime-vendor's end-client]," and notes that "[the 
Beneficiary] is a full-time employee of [the mid-vendor]," not the Petitioner. Again, the record lacks 
evidence of any legal obligation on the part of the end-client to provide the position to the Beneficiary 
as described by the Petitioner in this petition, let alone determine its substantive nature to ascertain 
whether it is a specialty occupation. 
In summary, if we cannot determine whether the proffered position as described will actually exist, 
then we cannot ascertain its substantive nature so as to determine whether it is a specialty occupation. 17 
Nonetheless, even if we were to set these foundational deficiencies aside, we would still be unable to 
ascertain the substantive nature of the proffered position. 
15 Cf Galaxy Software Solutions, Inc. v. USCIS, No. 18-12617, 2019 WL 2296824, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2019) 
(describing the petitioner's "fail[ure] to provide all of the contracts governing the relationships between the corporate 
entities in the chain" as a "material gap"). 
16 We acknowledge that the Petitioner requests that USCTS approve the petition for one year based on the evidence 
presented in the petition. However, for the reasons discussed the Petitioner has not sufficiently established the 
Beneficiary's third-party work assignment, or otherwise demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). 
17 The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-lB program. See, e.g., 63 Fed. 
Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). 
8 
A crucial aspect of this matter is whether the duties of the proffered position are described in such a 
way that we may discern the actual, substantive nature of the position. As noted, the record lacks 
sufficient evidence to substantiate the Beneficiary's assignment as represented by the Petitioner. 
Again, when a beneficiary will perform the work for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the 
client companies' job requirements is critical. Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. When determining 
whether a position is a specialty occupation, we look at the nature of the business offering the 
employment and the description of the specific duties of the position as it relates to the performance 
of those duties within the context of that particular employer's business operations. 
The Petitioner and the mid-vendor consistently reference the end-client's project as the l.__ _____ _. 
.__ ______ _.t [project], but the Petitioner has not presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate what 
this project actually entails. The Petitioner submits prime-vendor and end-client emails which identify 
a list of "consultants" including the Beneficiary and five other individuals who collectively perform 
duties, such as "[d]evelop and maintain Software Architectural and Design documents, [s]upport 
development and maintain application level software, [ s ]upport requirements development, [ d]esign 
and develop unit test case artifacts," and "[r]esponsible for the quality and compliance of the 
software." However, the Petitioner has not provided evidence that describes the end-client's project 
in a manner that illustrates the project's staffing hierarchy and the relative roles, responsibilities, and 
duties of the information technology staff that will be devoted to the project, including for the 
Beneficiary's work assignment. 18 The Petitioner provides copies of the Beneficiary's emails at the 
end-client location which confirm that he has been assigned to work there. The Petitioner has also 
provided its own listings of job duties that Beneficiary will perform in furtherance of the project, 
which in some instances include the relative percentage of time that the Beneficiary will devote to 
these tasks. 19 However, though requested by the Director the Petitioner did not provide sufficient 
evidence of how the Beneficiary's specific job duties relate to the end-client's products and services. 20 
Considering the evidence in its entirety, we conclude that the record lacks sufficient documentation from 
the end-client regarding the project to which the Beneficiary will be assigned, and the actual work that 
the Beneficiary will perform therein to establish the substantive nature of the Beneficiary's end-client 
18 We must review the actual duties the Beneficiary will be expected to perform to ascertain whether those duties require 
at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as required for classification as a specialty 
occupation. To accomplish that task in this matter, we review the duties in conjunction with the specific project(s) to 
which the Beneficiary will be assigned. To allow otherwise, results in generic descriptions of duties that, while they may 
appear (in some instances) to comprise the duties of a specialty occupation, are not related to any actual services the 
Beneficiary is expected to provide. 
19 We acknowledge that the Petitioner submitted information for the job duties, which, for the sake of brevity, have not 
been included herein. However, this material has been closely reviewed and considered, as with all evidence in the record. 
For instance, the Petitioner discussed the Beneficiary's academic coursework for the purpose of correlating the need for 
the Beneficiary's education with the associated job duties of the position. However, we are required to follow long­
standing legal standards and determine first, whether the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty 
occupation, and second, whether the Beneficiary was qualified for the position at the time the nonimmigrant visa petition 
was filed. Cf Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs., 19 l&N Dec. 558, 560 (Comm'r 1988) ("The facts of a beneficiaiy's 
background only come at issue after it is found that the position in which the petitioner intends to employ him falls within 
[a specialty occupation]."). 
20 "Failure to submit requested evidence which precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
[petition]." 8 C.F.R. ~ 103.2(b)(14). 
9 
work assignment, and the associated applications of specialized knowledge that their actual performance 
will require.21 Here, the generally-stated duties provided by the Petitioner without the context of a 
specific end-client project work and the Beneficiary's actual role in the project adds little to our 
understanding of the Beneficiary's duties. While the Petitioner's job descriptions identify information 
technology job functions, without more, they do not support the Petitioner's assertions regarding the 
relative complexity and specialization of the Beneficiary's day-to-day duties. For instance, the 
Petitioner's job descriptions identify tasks such as "[p ]erform requirements tracing using requirement 
management tool IBM rational DOORS," "[ d]eveloping Low level aurix drivers is the task performed 
every firmware release," "[l]oad software release to sensor using DanLoader and view faults generated 
by new release using Dan View," and "[ r ]e-execute tests on new builds with fixed bugs, or new 
functionality," but they do not provide sufficient detail regarding how these tasks merit recognition of 
the proffered position as a specialty occupation. The duties as described by the Petitioner do not 
sufficiently communicate (1) the actual work that the Beneficiary would perform, (2) the complexity, 
uniqueness, or specialization of the tasks, and (3) the correlation between that work and a need for a 
particular level education of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty. 
Upon review of the totality of the record, we determine it is insufficient to establish the substantive 
nature of the work to be performed by the Beneficiary, which therefore precludes a conclusion that the 
proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive 
nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into 
the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the 
proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first 
alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which 
is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner 
normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and ( 5) the degree 
of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 22 The 
Petitioner has not presented evidence or argument sufficient to establish that, more likely than not, the 
proffered position is a specialty occupation as defined by the regulations and the statute. 23 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
Since the identified basis for denial is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach 
and hereby reserve the Petitioner's appellate arguments regarding its assertion that it will have and 
maintain the requisite employer-employee relationship with the Beneficiary at the end-client 
location. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and agencies are not required 
to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"); see 
also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516,526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach alternative issues 
on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
21 Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88. 
22 As the lack of probative and consistent evidence in the record precludes a conclusion that the proffered position is a 
specialty occupation and is dispositive of the appeal, we will not further discuss the Petitioner's assertions on appeal. 
23 Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
10 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner 
has not met that burden here, and the petition will remain denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
11