dismissed H-1B Case: Software Development

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 8138673 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : MAR . 25, 2020 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary under the H-IB nonimmigrant 
classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner had 
not established that (1) it would have the requisite employer-employee relationship with the 
Beneficiary; and (2) the Beneficiary would be employed in a specialty occupation position. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 1 
I. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
We will fust address the issue of whether the Beneficiary will be performing services in a specialty 
occupation . 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires : 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, 
and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States . 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214 .2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a 
non-exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered 
position must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
1 We follow the preponderance of the evidence standard . Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 20 I 0). 
( 1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge 
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 
baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or 
higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal 
Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a 
specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular 
position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
B. Proffered Position 
In the Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary will 
serve as a 'java developer." Although the Petitioner's address is inl I North Carolina, the 
Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would work for its end-client at.__ _______ ___, inl I 
Colorado through an agreement between the Petitioner, its client, and a managed services provider (MSP). 
The record indicates that the contractual path of the Beneficiary's assignment is as follows: 
Petitioner ~ ~--~1~ 
(Vendor) (MSP) (End-Client) 
On the labor condition application (LCA)2 submitted in support of the H-lB petition, the Petitioner 
designated the proffered position under the occupational category "Software Developers, Applications" 
corresponding to the Standard Occupational Classification code 15-1132. 
C. Analysis 
Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we determine that the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
2 A petitioner submits the LCA to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to demonstrate that it will pay an H-lB worker the 
higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of employment or the actual wage paid 
by the employer to other employees with similar duties, experience, and qualifications. Section 212(n)(l) of the Act; 20 
C.F.R. § 655.73 l(a). 
2 
Specifically, the record does not establish that the job duties require an educational background, or its 
equivalent, commensurate with a specialty occupation. 3 
As recognized by the court in Defensor, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the 
petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 
387-388. The court held that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably 
interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered 
position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using 
the beneficiary's services. Id. at 384. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type 
and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform 
that particular work. 
The Petitioner submitted a copy of its subcontractor agreement with the vendor, dated June 14, 201 7. 
The agreement indicates that the Petitioner will provide subcontractor personnel to perform 
information technology services at work sites of the vendor's clients pursuant to a master agreement 4 
between the parties. Specifically, the agreement indicates that the Petitioner will provide 
"programming, systems analysis, engineering, technical writing and other specialized information 
technology related services and staffing for or on behalf of [the vendor's] client as an independent 
contractor under the terms of this agreement and accompanying Statement of Work as attached hereto 
as consecutively numbered Statement(s) of Work (i.e. 'Statement of Work No. __ ')." 
The original agreement between the Petitioner and the vendor submitted in support of the petition was 
accompanied by a Statement of Work (SOW) dated May 23, 2016, which, in addition to pre-dating 
both the subcontractor agreement and the filing of the instant petition, identified an individual (not the 
Beneficiary) who would work as a java developer for the end-client. On appeal, the Petitioner 
resubmitted the subcontractor agreement accompanied by a new SOW, which identified the 
Beneficiary as the java developer to work at the end-client's site. This SOW, dated April 29, 2019, 
was executed nearly one month after the instant petition was filed. Moreover, aside from the 
Beneficiary's hourly rate, no other details, such as the name of the project, its duration, the duties to 
be performed, or the worksite of the Beneficiary, were included. 
With regard to the vendor's relationship with the end-client, the Petitioner submitted a Supplier Master 
Service Agreement (SMSA) between the vendor and the MSP, effective December 4, 2014. 
According to this agreement, the vendor will perform recruitment services for the MSP, who in tum 
will provide "foll time employee recruitment management services" to the end-client pursuant to an 
"MSP agreement," a copy of which was not submitted. The record contains no documentation 
pertaining to the contractual relationship of the MSP to the end-client. 5 
3 The Petitioner submitted documentation to support the H-1 B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position 
and its business operations. While we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each 
one. 
4 The Petitioner did not submit a copy of this master agreement. 
5 The record also contains a document entitled ·I !Addendum, which refers to a "Standard Statement of Services 
for Staff Augmentation Workforce Management Services" f etween the vendor and the MSP, and states that this agreement 
has been assigned froml I I to its affiliate,_ I The document referred to was not submitted into 
the record, and the assignment raises further questions regarding the actual identity of the MSP and its relationship with 
the end-client. 
3 
While the record contains an agreement between the Petitioner and the vendor, and a copy of one 
agreement between the vendor and the MSP, there is no documentation establishing the contractual 
path between the MSP and the end-client. Although the Petitioner submits emails as evidence that 
contractual documentation to this effect could not be obtained, this void in the contractual path 
precludes us from determining the true nature of the Beneficiary's assignment with the end-client. 
The lack of contemporaneous documentation establishing an agreement for the Beneficiary's services 
between the MSP and the end-client, raise further questions regarding the exact nature of the 
Beneficiary's proposed assignment. 
The Petitioner also submitted letters from the vendor and the end-client in support of the claimed 
assignment of the Beneficiary and relies on their contents to establish the duties of the proffered 
position. The end-client letter submitted in support of the petition stated that the Beneficiary would 
work onsite at its offices on the 'I t' project pursuant to its agreement with the MSP, 
and pursuant to the MSP's agreement with the vendor. The end-client stated that the Beneficiary 
would work in the role of j ava developer "until December 31, 2019 or as long as the contract is 
renewed." The Petitioner also submitted a letter from the vendor, which provided a list of duties that 
the Beneficiary would perform. The vendor also stated that the duties of the proffered position usually 
required a minimum of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in computer science, information systems, 
and/or a related field of study. 
In response to the Director's request for evidence, the Petitioner submitted updated letters from the 
end-client and the vendor. The end-client letter again stated that the Beneficiary would work on the 
I !project, but in this letter identified his position as java developer "III." The vendor 
identified the Beneficiary's position simply as java developer. Both the end-client and the vendor 
submitted an identical overview of the duties and requirements of the proffered position, which read 
more as a job vacancy announcement than a confirmation of the duties to be performed on a specific 
project. Specific details regarding those descriptions will be discussed further herein. 
On appeal, the Petitioner again submits new letters from the end-client and the vendor. The end-client 
letter states the essential functions of the assignment in bullet-point format, and states that the 
assignment will continue until March 31, 2020. The vendor letter contains the same list of duties it 
stated in its initial letter and, upon review, we note that the list of duties is identical to the duties set 
forth by the end-client on appeal. The only difference is that the end-client inserts one additional bullet 
point stating that a "[m]inimum of a bachelor's degree is required." 
The record contains insufficient evidence establishing the manner in which the Beneficiary will render 
his services at the offices of the end-client. As noted above, there is no documentation outlining the 
manner in which the Beneficiary will be assigned to the end-client via the MSP, and there is no 
contractual documentation between the end-client and the MSP. Moreover, the documentation 
between the vendor and the MSP lacks documentation specifically identifying existing projects to be 
staffed, and no documentation between those parties identifies the Beneficiary as a resource to be 
provided. 
Although the Petitioner submitted a SOW on appeal, this document merely identifies the Beneficiary 
as a java developer and states: "The following personnel of [the Petitioner] who will work on this 
project have been informed and understand their obligations under this SOW and the Subcontractor 
4 
Agreement." We note that the SOW provides no details regarding the nature of the proposed 
assignment or its associated duties, and although it refers to "this project," the name or requirements 
of such project are not identified. Finally, we note that this SOW was executed on April 29, 2019, 
nearly one month after the instant petition in this matter was filed. The Petitioner must establish 
eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition and must continue to be eligible for the 
benefit through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). A visa petition may not be approved at a future 
date after the Petitioner or Beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of 
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248,249 (Reg'l Comm'r 1978). 
Moreover, the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary are unclear. In its support letter, the Petitioner 
provided a chart that grouped the duties of the Beneficiary into five areas: Meetings (10%), Designing 
(20% ), Development ( 40% ), Validations (10% ), and Review (20% ). The duties as described are 
generalized and do not relate to the specific project to which it claims the Beneficiary will be assigned. 
The letters of the vendor and the end-client provided additional information. The initial letter from 
the end-client provided only a brief statement regarding the duties of the position, as follows: 
The project involves Full life-cycle development for JAVA/J2EE WEB application 
using RAD or R TC in an IBM W ebsphere environment. Working in a team 
environment to enhance and support corporate card banking systems. The candidates 
must have a strong Web application development background. Utilizing Java/J2EE 
and JDBC development experience, OOAD using UML, knowledge of Junit, and foll 
life-cycle system development. 
The generic overview is not particular to the Beneficiary or the claimed project and provides no details 
regarding what the Beneficiary will do in the context of the project and its timelines and deliverables. 
The end-client's statement that "[t]he candidates must have a strong Web application development 
background" undermines the credibility of the letter because it does not appear that the duties 
described pertain specifically to the Beneficiary. 
In response to the RFE, both the vendor and the end-client submitted an identical overview of "the 
project." However, the overview appears to be excerpted from a job advertisement. For example, the 
first sentence states: "[s]eeking a professionally experienced Programmer/Analyst," which is 
confusing as the Beneficiary's stated role is that of a java developer. Further, the overview contains 
statements such as "the candidate must have .... " and "the ideal candidate will have .... ". Finally, it 
outlines requirements such as a minimum of four years of experience in various areas. Neither of the 
letters describe the specific project upon which the Beneficiary will work. Rather, the identical 
statements in both letters appear to be directly taken from a job advertisement for a 
programmer/analyst. 6 The relevance of the contents of these letters, therefore, is afforded little weight. 
6 We further note the submission ofjob vacancy announcements posted by the end-client. The Petitioner asserts that these 
job advertisements demonstrate the need for the Beneficiary's services at the end-client location. Upon review, those 
advertisements are for an agile software developer and an application developer, whereas the proffered position is that of 
a java developer. Moreover, the solicitations seek to hire the candidates on a full-time basis. We do not find the Petitioner's 
reliance on the vacancy announcements sufficient to establish the existence of specialty occupation work for the 
Beneficiary at the end-client's location. 
5 
Finally, on appeal the Petitioner submits updated letters from the vendor and the end-client which 
contain the same description of duties provided by the vendor in its first letter submitted in support of 
the petition. The bulleted duties provide a general list of tasks but provide no context in which the 
Beneficiary will perform them. For example, although the duties include "design and develop flow 
diagrams" and "develop JA V A/J2EE applications," the role of the Beneficiary is still largely 
undefined, as it is unclear how such duties relate to the named project. Most importantly, this is the 
third version of duties provided by the end-client, and none of the three versions are consistent in the 
record. 
Finally, the educational requirements of the position are unclear. The vendor states in its letter that 
the duties of the proffered position usually required a minimum of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent 
in computer science, information systems, and/or a related field of study. The end-client, however, 
merely states "minimum of a bachelor's degree is required." However, we note that the end-client is 
silent on whether a degree in a specific specialty is required. Again as recognized by the court in 
Defensor, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client 
companies' job requirements is critical. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-388. 
This omission, coupled with the lack of specific information pertaining to the project upon which the 
Beneficiary will allegedly work for the requested validity period (i.e., October 1, 2019, to September 
10, 2022) raises further questions regarding the existence of the claimed assignment. We again note 
the SOW submitted on appeal, which was executed after the filing of the petition and thus is not 
sufficient to establish specialty occupation work at the time of filing. Moreover, while the end-client 
makes reference to the duration of the project, it states that the assignment of the Beneficiary will 
continue first through December 31, 2019, and later through March 31, 2020. Even if we accepted 
the letters from the end-client as sufficient evidence of the existence of a project for the Beneficiary, 
they nevertheless would only substantiate work for the Beneficiary for six months of the requested 
three-year validity period. 7 
We further note the submission of photographs, emails, and two affidavits from claimed co-workers 
of the Beneficiary suggesting he is performing services at the end-client location. However, as 
discussed above, absent documentation establishing the nature and duration of the Beneficiary's 
assignment and his associated duties for the period from October 1, 2019 to September 10, 2022, these 
documents are not persuasive. The affidavits from the Beneficiary's co-workers are identical in their 
content, and they identify duties that once again differ from the other statements of duties contained 
in the record. While the photographs and emails suggest that the Beneficiary maintains a presence at 
the end-client worksite, we nevertheless cannot determine what he is actually doing at the worksite 
even if we could otherwise confirm his contractual obligations. 
Therefore, the record of proceedings does not contain sufficient documentary evidence that establishes 
the entire contractual path under which the Beneficiary's assignment will commence. This lack of 
documentation prohibits a determination that specialty occupation had been secured for the Beneficiary 
at the time of filing. Without documentary evidence that delineates the contractual terms between the 
7 We note the submission of "project documents" on appeal, which the Petitioner claims substantiate the availability of 
work for the Beneficiary through 2022. A rview of the:e documen. ts reveals no specific project information or 
assignments specific to the Beneficiary and the I project, and we do not find them probative evidence of 
the existence of specialty occupation work for the Beneficiary under the conditions claimed by the Petitioner. 
6 
end-client, the MSP, and the vendor, including the true duties and the requirements for the position, 
we are unable determine the substantive nature of the proffered position. As discussed above, the 
assertions in the vendor and end-client letters regarding the Beneficiary's assignment are vague, do 
not outline the nature and duration of the claimed assignment, and are further not supported by 
contemporaneous contractual documentation between all parties. 
Absent such documentation, we are not able to ascertain what the Beneficiary would do, where the 
Beneficiary would work, or how this would impact circumstances of his relationship with the 
Petitioner. A petition must be filed for non-speculative work for the Beneficiary, for the entire period 
requested, that existed as of the time of the petition's filing. 8 The Petitioner has not demonstrated the 
substantive nature of the duties the Beneficiary would perform. 
The Petitioner's failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the Beneficiary 
precludes a finding that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under any criterion at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal 
minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; 
(2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a 
common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or 
uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the 
factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue 
under criterion 3; and ( 5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the 
focus of criterion 4. 
The Petitioner has not satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (4) (iii) (A) and, therefore, it 
cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. 
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE 
As the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the proffered position is a specialty occupation, we need not 
fully address other issues evident in the record. Nevertheless, we concur with the Director's 
8 The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1 B program. For example, a 
1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows: 
Historically, the Service has not granted H-lB classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, 
prospective employment. The H-1 B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an individual to engage 
in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet 
possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new 
customers or contracts. To determine whether an individual is properly classifiable as an H-lB 
nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied 
to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See 
section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine 
whether the individual has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative 
employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is 
unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1 B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the 
individual will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country. 
Petitioning Requirements for the H Nonimmigrant Classification, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419, 30,419-20 (proposed June 4, 1998) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
7 
determination that the record as constituted does not establish that the Petitioner meets the regulatory 
definition of a United States employer under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (4) (ii) and will briefly address the 
issue below. 
The United States Supreme Court determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term 
"employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master­
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) ( quoting C,nty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; 
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's 
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." 
Id.; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. 
Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,258 (1968)). 
In the instant case, the record contains insufficient evidence regarding where the Beneficiary will 
work, and who will supervise his work. The Petitioner provided copies of its employee evaluation 
form for the Beneficiary from the period from October 2018 to December 2018, which identifies the 
Beneficiary as a "Programmer Analyst" in the IT department and I I as the 
Beneficiary's supervisor. 9 It is unclear in what manner this individual would supervise the Beneficiary 
(i.e., remotely or onsite). While we acknowledge that remote supervision is certainly feasible, the 
record as constituted is unclear first, with regard to the existence of an assignment for the Beneficiary 
at the claimed end-client location and second, with regard tol l's role and 
level of familiarity in the project. As the actual existence of the claimed project has not been 
established, the claims of the Petitioner regarding the Beneficiary's supervision and the manner in 
which she will complete her duties cannot be verified. 
In addition, we note that the subcontractor agreement between the Petitioner and the vendor states, In 
Part 2, Section D, that "[the vendor] or [the vendor's client] may request the removal or the 
cancellation of the assignment of any [Petitioner] Personnel at any time and for any or no reason that 
9 While the record contains documentation demonstrating that this individual has in fact conducted performance 
evaluations for the Beneficiary, the absence of evidence pertaining to the specific project upon which the Beneficiary will 
work and the particulars of that project, such as who will directly supervise and assign the Beneficiary's work. prohibits 
us from determining the manner in which the Petitioner will supervise and control the Beneficiary. 
8 
it lawful." It would appear, therefore, that the authority to hire and fire the Beneficiary does not lie 
with the Petitioner, but rather the vendor and the vendor's clients. 
Therefore, absent documentary evidence establishing the entire contractual path and outlining the 
nature and duration of the project, the expectations and responsibilities of the Beneficiary, and the 
manner in which work is assigned and supervised, we cannot satisfactorily determine who would 
supervise the Beneficiary's work and how that supervision would be exercised, given that the 
Petitioner's offices are in North Carolina and the Beneficiary will work in Colorado. Therefore, the 
record as currently constituted does not establish that the requisite employer-employee relationship 
exists. 
While social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance 
contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors in 
determining who will control a beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee 
and direct the work of the Beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will 
the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the Beneficiary is 
assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the 
Beneficiary's employer. 10 
The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the Petitioner qualifies as a United States 
employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the Petitioner 
would exercise complete control over the Beneficiary does not establish eligibility in this matter. 
Therefore, the petition must be denied for this additional reason. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner 
has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
1° Finally, we note a further discrepancy. The record contains documentation evidencing the current employment of the 
Beneficiary by the Petitioner. copies of the Beneficiary's timesheets and STEM/OPT employment documents indicate he 
worked no less than 40 hours per week, yet his pay stubs indicate 0.00 for hours worked despite him being paid what 
appears to be a full salary. A few errors or minor discrepancies are not reason to question the credibility of a beneficiary 
or a petitioner seeking immigration benefits. See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 694 (9th 
Cir. 2003). However, anytime a petition includes numerous errors and discrepancies, and a petitioner does not resolve 
those errors and discrepancies after USCIS provides an opp01tunity to do so, those inconsistencies will raise serious 
concerns about the veracity of a petitioner's assertions. 
9