dismissed H-1B Case: Software Engineering
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish the existence of a definitive, non-speculative job for the beneficiary. The submitted contracts and work orders did not sufficiently prove that the end-client had an actual position available for the entire requested period. Furthermore, the description of the job duties was too vague and generic to demonstrate that the position qualified as a specialty occupation requiring a specific bachelor's degree.
Criteria Discussed
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services In Re: 8775728 Appeal of California Service Center Decision Form I-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office Date: MAY. 1, 2020 The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a "software engineer, IOS" under the H-lB nonirnrnigrant classification for specialty occupations . See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) . The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of record does not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofSkirball Cultural Ctr., 25 I&N Dec. 799, 806 (AAO 2012). Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires: (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: ( I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree; (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or ( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We construe the term "degree" to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). II. ANALYSIS Upon review of the record in its totality and for the reasons set out below, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. Specifically, the Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of the work that the Beneficiary will perform, which precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). 1 The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would work at the end-client's location inl.__ ____ ___. California, pursuant to contracts executed between the Petitioner and the vendor, and between the vendor and the end-client. The path of contractual succession therefore appears to be as follows: Petitioner ➔ Vendor ➔ End-Client. We conclude first that the Petitioner has not established the existence of definitive, non-speculative employment for the Beneficiary. This is particularly important in a case such as this, where the very existence of the proffered position is dependent entirely upon the willingness of an end-client to provide it. And if we cannot determine whether the proffered position as described in this petition would actually exist then we cannot ascertain its substantive nature, let alone determine whether it is a specialty occupation. 1 The Petitioner submitted documentation to suppmt the H-1 B petition, including evidence regarding the proffered position and its business operations. Although we may not discuss every document submitted, we have reviewed and considered each one. 2 The Petitioner filed this petition in April 2019 and claimed that the Beneficiary would work as a software engineer, IOS at the end-client's California location from October 2019 to August 2022. To support that claim, the Petitioner submitted two Sub-Vendor Agreements (SA) executed between itself and the vendor and a Fieldglass work order.2 Upon review of the SAs, we observe that they do not reference the Beneficiary; the job title of the proffered position; the job duties and tasks to be performed by a software engineer, IOS, the proffered position; or the end-client. While the Fieldglass work order references the Beneficiary, it states that the Beneficiary will be providing services as a "Developer" inl I California during "Period 11/04/2018." It does not indicate that the Beneficiary will serve as a software engineer, IOS (as stated in the H-lB petition) but rather as a "Developer." The work order does not describe the duties of the "Developer" in order to determine whether they are sufficiently similar to those of the proffered position. Moreover, the Fieldglass work order does not state that the Beneficiary's services will be needed for the duration the Petitioner requested on the H-1 B petition. In response to the Director's request for evidence, the Petitioner provided a Staff Augmentation and Services Agreement executed between the vendor and the end-client. The agreement states "[ v ]endor shall not perform any services for [end-client] unless and until the parties have executed a [ statement of work (SOW)] or other written agreement covering the services." However, the record does not contain such an SOW. Absent an executed SOW (or similar agreement such as a work order), the agreement alone creates no obligation on the part of the vendor- let alone the end-client - to provide the position described in the petition. The agreement alone is a general agreement for the vendor to provide personnel to the end-client. The agreement does not specify services for the Petitioner to provide; a job title to perform the services; the duties of a position with such a job title; academic requirements to perform such duties; or identify the Beneficiary or any other individual assigned to perform the duties. Thus, the referenced documents do not establish that the Beneficiary will serve as a software engineer, IOS inl I California for the duration of the requested H-lB period.3 Again, if we cannot determine whether the proffered position will actually exist, then we cannot ascertain its substantive nature so as to determine whether it is a specialty occupation. 4 Even if we were to set the speculative nature of the Petitioner's offer of employment aside, we would still be unable to ascertain the substantive nature of the proffered position. The Petitioner submitted letters from the vendor and the end-client. Upon review, we observe that the vendor's and the end client's job duty descriptions contain verbatim language. The verbatim language found in the duty descriptions in the letters from the end-client and the vendor raise questions regarding whether the end-client's signatory actually wrote the descriptions. Regardless of whether the end-client's signatory actually wrote the duty description, the duty description is too vague to determine whether the position actually requires a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. For example, the end-client does not provide sufficient information with regard to the order of importance and/or frequency of occurrence ( e.g., regularly, 2 The SA submitted with the H-1 B petition did not include the signature page executed by the authorized officials for the Petitioner and the vendor. 3 Though acknowledged, the letters from the Petitioner, the vendor, and the end-client do not serve to fill this gap, as they are not evidence of an obligation on the part of the end-client to provide the position the Petitioner describes. 4 Speculative employment is not permitted in the H-lB program. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419-20 (proposed June 4, 1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 3 periodically, or at irregular intervals) with which the Beneficiary will perform the functions and tasks. Thus, the end-client does not specify which tasks are major functions of the proffered position. Moreover, the description does not provide sufficient information about the duties to determine their complexity. Below are some of the duties: • Work closely with the technical team, architect, systems analysts and product managers in coding out stories for features and enhancements. Also responsible for addressing bugs reported. • Using Swift and Objective C as a programming language for the development of [the end client's] application. • Consume web services using Apple's APl's and other third-party frameworks such as Alamo fire, AFN etworking, Adobe Analytics, RASM, Medallia, and Crittercism. • Complete all stories in a timely manner and document all updates in the appropriate system JIRA. • Work with Release Engineering Team in application and feature deployment activities. • Production support. • Support regular production release. • Debug and fix production defects. • Monitor production application running status. • Coordinate with other teams to troubleshoot production failure root cause and raise change ticket or JIRA tickets to other teams. In addition, the Beneficiary's proposed job duties include collaborations with "technical team," architect," "systems analysts," "product managers," "QA team," and "Release Engineering Team," but the end-client has not identified the individuals the Beneficiary would work with in the proffered position. Furthermore, as recognized in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 388, it is appropriate to require a petitioner to demonstrate that an end-client, or the entity where a beneficiary will actually perform the work, requires at least a bachelor's degree in the specialty, or an equivalent. However, the end-client does not state the educational requirements for this position in its letter. In sum, the record contains insufficient evidence from the end-client to establish that specialty occupation work exists for the Beneficiary. Without documents from the end-client that sufficiently provide pertinent information such as the Beneficiary's assigned project and detailed duties to demonstrate what he will actually do on a day-to-day basis, we cannot determine the substantive nature of the proffered position. As the Petitioner has not established the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the Beneficiary, this precludes a conclusion that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree 4 or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. III. CONCLUSION The Petitioner has not established that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 5
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