remanded
H-1B
remanded H-1B Case: It Consulting
Decision Summary
The appeal was remanded because the Director's decision to revoke the H-1B petition was not adequately explained. The Director concluded that a change in the beneficiary's end-client resulted in a material change in job duties but failed to specify how or why these changes were material. The AAO found that without a clear explanation, the revocation was unsupported and remanded the case for a new decision with proper analysis.
Criteria Discussed
Revocation For Beneficiary No Longer Employed In Specified Capacity (8 C.F.R. § 214.2(H)(11)(Iii)(A)(1)) Material Change In Terms And Conditions Of Employment Specialty Occupation Definition (8 C.F.R. § 214.2(H)(4)(Iii)(A))
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office Date: OCT. 15, 2024 In Re: 28785801 Appeal of California Service Center Decision Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (H-lB) The Petitioner seeks to employ the Beneficiary under the H-lB nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-IB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both: (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The Director of the California Service Center revoked the approval of the petition pursuant to 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)(l l )(iii)(A)(l) , concluding the Beneficiary was no longer employed by the Petitioner in the capacity specified in the petition. The Director also denied the Petitioner's subsequently filed combined motion to reopen and reconsider for not meeting the regulatory requirements . The matter is now before us on appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe , 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will withdraw the Director's decision and remand the matter for entry of a new decision consistent with the following analysis. I. REVOCATION U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may revoke the approval of an H-IB petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l l)(iii), which states the following: (A) Grounds for revocation. The director shall send to the petitioner a notice of intent to revoke the petition in relevant part if he or she finds that: (1) The beneficiary is no longer employed by the petitioner in the capacity specified in the petition; or (2) The statement of facts contained in the petition ... was not true and correct, inaccurate, fraudulent, or misrepresented a material fact; or (3) The petition violated terms and conditions of the approved petition; or (4) The petitioner violated requirements of section 101 (a)( l 5)(H) of the Act or paragraph (h) of this section; or (5) The approval of the petition violated paragraph (h) of this section or involved gross error. The regulations require that USCIS provide notice consisting of a detailed statement of the grounds for revocation and provide an opportunity for the petitioner to respond to the notice of intent. The Director's statements in the notice of intent to revoke (ITR) notified the Petitioner of the regulatory reasons for revocation of petition approval and afforded them an opportunity to respond. After the Petitioner's response, the Director revoked the petition's approval. The Director also denied the Petitioner's subsequently filed combined motion to reopen and reconsider for not meeting the regulatory requirements. The Petitioner has filed the instant appeal. II. ANALYSIS Upon de novo review on appeal, we conclude that a remand is warranted in this matter. The Director revoked the approval of the petition because information uncovered during a post adjudication administrative site visit indicated the Beneficiary was no longer employed in the capacity specified in the petition. Specifically, in the course of the administrative site visit, USCIS contacted the end client where the Beneficiary was providing their services as an employee of the Petitioner to verify the terms and condition of the Beneficiary's employment. The end client reported the Petitioner's staff augmentation services in the form of the Beneficiary providing services at the end client commenced as anticipated in the petition but were terminated some time before the site visit. Consequently, the Petitioner issued an ITR to revoke the approval of the petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l l)(iii)(A)(l), 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l l)(iii)(A)(2), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l l)(iii)(A)(3). The Petitioner's response to the ITR confirmed that the Petitioner's staff augmentation services and the Beneficiary's employment at the end client had ended. But the Beneficiary continued to provide their services as described in the petition in the same metropolitan statistical area albeit with a different end client. The Petitioner asserted the Beneficiary continued to be employed in the capacity specified in the petition, the statement of facts presented in the petition was true, correct, accurate, and truthful, and that there had been no violation of the terms and conditions of the petition. The Director revoked the petition's approval pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(l l)(iii)(A)(l) because the Petitioner's job description remained uniform despite the change of end client. The Director also highlighted that the duties described by the new end-client were materially different to the duties the Petitioner had described in the initial petition. The Director concluded the description of the duties were not "sufficient and consistent" evidence of the nature of the work the Beneficiary would perform, 2 precluding an evaluation to determine if the proffered position qualified as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria contained at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). It is not clear why the Petitioner's consistency in the expression of its proffered job's duties obscured the proffered job's substantive nature. Specifically, the Director called the existence of the Petitioner's proffered job into question because the proffered job's duties described in response to the ITR were identical to the job duties initially described in the petition. The Director concluded that "these identical duties call into question the actual substantive nature of the position" creating doubt that there was a "reasonable and credible offer of employment that is consistent with the needs of the petitioning organization." But it is unclear why the uniform expression of the proffered job's duties supports a conclusion the Beneficiary is no longer employed in the capacity specified in the petition. And, whilst the Petitioner identifies that the duties contained in the letter from the new end client are "materially changed" the Director does not describe how the duties have materially changed other than stating there were "different duties and responsibilities than [ the Petitioner's] description of the duties that the [B]eneficiary would perform" and expressing "the [B]eneficiary will work at a different end client." Whilst we agree with the Director the duties are different and will be performed at a different end-client than the one initially contemplated, it is not sufficiently clear how those differences are material. Or in other words, it is not evident why the Director thought the duties borne from the change in the end-client were material enough that they changed the terms and conditions of employment and rendered the Beneficiary employed in a capacity different than the one specified in the initial petition. An officer must fully explain the reasons for denying a visa petition in order to allow the Petitioner a fair opportunity to contest the decision and to allow us an opportunity for meaningful appellate review. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(i); see also Matter of M-P-, 20 I&N Dec. 786 (BIA 1994) (finding that a decision must fully explain the reasons for denying a motion to allow the respondent a meaningful opportunity to challenge the determination on appeal). Here, the Director did not explain the reasons behind their conclusions that the petition's approval must be revoked because the Beneficiary was no longer employed in the capacity described in the initial petition. On remand, the Director may consider the job duties described in the petition and supporting evidence submitted initially with the petition and with the response to the ITR to identify specific deficiencies or inconsistencies demonstrating a material change in the terms and condition of employment supporting a conclusion that the Beneficiary was no longer employed in the capacity specified in the petition but instead in a capacity that is not a bona fide specialty occupation job opportunity. III. CONCLUSION The Director's revocation of the petition's approval is withdrawn, and the matter is remanded for further action. The Director may choose to consider our observations as they evaluate the record. And if appropriate the Director may issue a notice intending to revoke the petition's approval that specifically identifies the applicable H-1 B petition approval revocation criteria contained in the regulation and supports the reasons underpinning their conclusions. We express no opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of this case on remand. ORDER: The Director's decision is withdrawn. The matter is remanded for the entry of a new decision consistent with the foregoing analysis. 3
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