dismissed L-1A Case: Accounting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: MAY 24, 2024 In Re: 32556266 
Certification of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner, an accounting firm specializing in tax preparation, seeks to extend the Beneficiary's 
temporary employment as president of its new office under the L-1 A nonimmigrant classification for 
intracompany transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(L), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). The L-lA classification allows a corporation or other legal entity, 
including its affiliate or subsidiary, to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United States to 
work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center revoked the approval of the petition, concluding that: (1) 
the Beneficiary is no longer eligible for the classification sought; (2) the Petitioner violated applicable 
requirements; (3) the statement of facts in the petition was not true and correct; and ( 4) the approval 
of the petition involved gross error. The matter is now before us on certification under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.4(a). 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter afChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter a/Christa's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537,537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
we will affirm the denial of the petition. 
I. LAW 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year within 
three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
managerial or executive capacity. Id. 
A petitioner seeking to extend an L-lA petition that involved a new office must submit a statement of 
the beneficiary's duties during the previous year and under the extended petition; a statement 
describing the staffing of the new operation and evidence of the numbers and types of positions held; 
evidence of its financial status; evidence that it has been doing business for the previous year; and 
evidence that it maintains a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(14)(ii). 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A), the approval of an individual L-1 petition may be revoked, after 
issuance of a notice of intent to revoke (NOIR), for any of five specified grounds: 
(1) One or more employing entities are no longer qualifying organizations; 
(2) The beneficiary is no longer eligible for the classification; 
(3) A qualifying organization(s) violated applicable statutory or regulatory requirements; 
(4) The statement of facts contained in the petition was not trne and correct; or 
(5) Approval of the petition involved gross error. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Beneficiary has owned and headed the Petitioner's affiliate in the United Kingdom since 2010. 
The Petitioner filed a new office petition in January 2021. The approval of that petition granted the 
Beneficiary L-1 A nonimmigrant status from April 2021 to April 2022. The Petitioner filed an 
extension petition in March 2022. The Director approved that petition in April 2022, extending the 
Beneficiary's L-1 A status until April 2024. But in June 2022, the Director issued a NOIR. After the 
Petitioner responded to the NOIR, the Director revoked the approval in October 2022. 
The Petitioner appealed the revocation. We remanded the matter to the Director in April 2023, because 
"the NOIR did not provide a detailed statement of the grounds for the revocation as required by 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(B)" and "[t]he vague statements in the NOIR do not identify any specific 
deficiency that the Petitioner may have been able to address in its response." We instrncted the 
Director: "Beyond identifying a particular ground for revocation, the Director must explain why the 
Petitioner's claims lack credibility or why the Beneficiary's position, as described, does not qualify as 
managerial or executive." 
The Director issued a new NOIR in August 2023, citing several deficiencies and issues of concern. 
After considering the Petitioner's response to that NOIR, the Director revoked the approval of the 
petition, stating the following grounds: 
• The approval involved gross error, because the Petitioner had not established that its new office 
is doing business and would support a primarily executive position during the extension period, 
and because the Petitioner had not established that the Beneficiary's position meets the 
requirements of an executive capacity; 
• Statements of fact in the petition are not trne or correct; and 
• The Petitioner willfully misrepresented material facts. 
The Director certified the decision to us in Febrnary 2024, and then reissued the decision in March 
2024 to correct a technical error. More than two months have passed since the Director issued the 
certified decision, and the record contains no response from the Petitioner. Therefore, we consider the 
record to be complete as it now stands. 
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A. Executive Capacity in the United States 
The Director determined that the petition had been approved in error, in part because the Petitioner 
had not established that it would employ the Beneficiary in the United States in a managerial or 
executive capacity. The Petitioner had specified that it would employ the Beneficiary in an executive 
capacity, and therefore we need not consider the separate requirements of a managerial capacity. 
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; 
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; exercises wide latitude 
in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. 
To show that a beneficiary is eligible for L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification as an executive, the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary will perform all four of the high-level responsibilities set 
forth in the statutory definition at section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. If a petitioner establishes that the 
offered position meets all four elements set forth in the statutory definition, the petitioner must then 
prove that the beneficiary will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary 
operational activities alongside the petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 
1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006). In determining whether the beneficiary's duties will be primarily 
executive, we consider the description of the job duties, the company's organizational structure, the 
duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the 
beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that 
will contribute to understanding the beneficiary's actual duties and role in the business. 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in an executive 
capacity, we must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall 
purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section 10l(a)(44)(C) of the Act. 
Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of 
the nature of the Petitioner's business and its staffing levels. 
In a letter submitted with the extension petition, the Beneficiary, in his capacity as the Petitioner's 
president, stated that he "will continue performing the following executive duties": 
• Overall management and marketing functions .... 
• Design and plan [the petitioning organization's] worldwide strategy .... 
• Direct and coordinate marketing activities between [the Petitioner] and [its U.K. 
affiliate], serving as a liaison with potential U.S. clients ... . 
• Manage, develop and implement financial control policies ... . 
• Seek and evaluate new business opportunities .... 
• Confer with the Board of Directors in the United Kingdom and senior management 
in developing, planning and establishing business objectives for [the Petitioner] in 
the United States. 
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• Oversee and manage the review and analysis of business activity reports and 
financial statements.... 
• Review and assess investment opportunities .... 
• Oversee, manage and implement policies, objectives, and activities .... 
• Negotiate and/or approve contracts or agreements with suppliers, distributors, 
federal or state agencies and other organizational entities. 
• Revise corporate objectives in accordance with current market conditions .... 
• Develop [the Petitioner's] industry-based contacts, negotiate conditions and terms 
of contracts, as well as oversee the expansion efforts in the United States. 
• Increase coverage of clients in the U.S. market. ... 
• Train and supervise subordinate staff including accountants and tax advisors. 
The Beneficiary estimated that "at least 80-90% of my time has been and will be devoted [to] executive 
functions and 10% [to] non-executive functions/duties." 
In the NOIR, the Director stated: 
[T]he provided duties description is overly generalized and does not contribute to a 
complete understanding of the beneficiary's actual role within the company. For 
instance, the letter only vaguely references the company's policies and goals, providing 
leadership, etc. but does not effectively convey how the beneficiary's focus on these 
items would translate into day-to-day executive-level tasks. The above assertions do 
not provide enough information beyond re-stating the statutory requirement that an 
executive must establish goals and policies. Specifics are an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
aff' d, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
We agree with the Director's assessment. In addition to being broad and general, the stated duties do 
not always appear to be readily compatible with the Petitioner's line of business as an accounting firm. 
For example, the Petitioner does not explain why it needs to negotiate with "distributors." 
Furthermore, some of the duties are below the executive level. For example, the Petitioner indicated 
that the Beneficiary trains and supervises non-managerial subordinates such as tax advisors and 
"assist[ s] with day-to-day marketing operations." 
Also in the NOTR, the Director stated that, when USCTS employees contacted the Beneficiary in 
conjunction with a site visit to discuss his employment with the Petitioner, the Beneficiary stated that 
"his main role is training his staff and bringing in clients," and that he spends his mornings consulting 
with clients. The Director concluded that these tasks "are not readily apparent executive 
responsibilities." 
In response to the NOTR, the Petitioner submitted a longer description of the duties the Beneficiary 
"currently performs." That job description dates from October 2023, more than a year and a half after 
the Petitioner filed the extension petition, and the Petitioner did not provide evidence that this 
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description accurately reflects the Beneficiary's duties at the time the Petitioner filed the extension 
petition as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
The Petitioner has also submitted appraisal forms dated September 2022 and September 2023, that 
indicate that the Beneficiary personally conducted employee appraisals for subordinates at all levels, 
including tax associates performing first-line operational tasks. In the NOIR, the Director had 
previously stated that the Beneficiary's involvement in these appraisals is consistent with the duties 
of "a first-line supervisor" rather than an executive. 1 
In the revocation notice, the Director concluded that, while the Beneficiary has discretionary authority 
over the petitioning company, the Petitioner had "not provided any supporting documentation to 
demonstrate that the indicated duties are executive in nature." We agree with the Director. The record 
does not contain a brief contesting the Director's conclusion. 
Furthermore, an essential element of an executive capacity is that the executive directs the 
management of the organization or a major component or function thereof. See section 
10l(a)(44)(B)(i) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(C)(l). An executive directs the management 
of the organization, major component, or essential function of a given organization by controlling the 
work of managerial or lower-level executive employees. See generally 2 USCJS Policy Manual 
L.6(D), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. As the Director stated in the NOIR, the statutory and 
regulatory definition of a managerial capacity "contemplates that the organization will have a 
subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct." 
The record does not establish that the Petitioner had any "subordinate level of managerial employees" 
when the Petitioner filed the extension petition. As we will discuss further below in greater detail, the 
Petitioner claimed only six U.S. employees on Form I-129, and the Petitioner has documented the 
employment of only a fraction of that number. The Petitioner's organizational chart at the time the 
Petitioner filed the extension petition did not indicate which employees had authority over other 
employees, and the Petitioner did not establish that any of the Beneficiary's claimed subordinates 
qualify as managers. The revised job description submitted in response to the NOIR refers to the 
Petitioner's "CFO," or chief financial officer, but the organizational chart at the time of filing does not 
include a CFO and the record does not otherwise establish that the Petitioner employs anyone with 
that title. 
The record provides minimal information about the positions subordinate to the Beneficiary in the 
United States, and the Petitioner has not established that the company has sufficient organizational 
complexity to warrant both a layer of management and, above that, an executive to direct that 
management. 
In the revocation notice, the Director concluded that "the record does not demonstrate that any 
subordinates qualify as managers," and that "the beneficiary's authority as a first-line supervisor does 
not rise to the level of directing the management of the company through those subordinates." We 
agree with the Director's conclusion. 
1 The appraisal forms dated September 2023 are, apart from the dates in the upper left comer of each document, identical 
to the previously submitted appraisal forms dated September 2022. 
5 
The Petitioner has not met its burden of proof to establish that the Beneficiary's duties have been and 
will be primarily those of an executive, and that the petitioning U.S. employer has a lower level of 
management for the Petitioner to direct as an executive. 2 We therefore agree with the Director's 
determination that the extension petition was approved in error. 
B. Doing Business and Ability to Support an Executive Position 
A petitioner seeking to employ a beneficiary as a manager or executive of a new office must establish 
that the new office will support an executive or managerial position within one year of approval of the 
petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). A petitioner seeking an extension of a previously approved 
new office petition must submit evidence that the United States entity has been doing business for the 
previous year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). Doing business means the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods, services, or both, and does not include the mere presence of an agent 
or office. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(H). 
The approval of the new office petition in April 2021 allowed the Petitioner one year, until April 2022, 
to develop to the point where it was doing business and could support an executive position. When 
the Petitioner filed the extension petition in March 2022, the petition did not include evidence of wages 
paid to the Petitioner's claimed U.S. employees as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(D). 
In the August 2023 NOIR, the Director cited the regulation requiring evidence that the Petitioner has 
been doing business during its year as a new office. The Director requested documentary evidence of 
the Petitioner's business activity after the approval of the new office petition, including tax, payroll, 
and financial records. 
In response, the Petitioner submitted evidence relating to its rental of shared office space; a slightly 
modified organizational chart, showing an additional tax associate; and documentation regarding the 
Petitioner's foreign affiliate. These materials have little evidentiary bearing on the question of the 
petitioning U.S. company's development and business activity from April 2021 to April 2022. Under 
the regulatory definition of the term, the mere presence of an agent or office does not constitute "doing 
business." Therefore, renting office space and hiring staff cannot suffice to show that the Petitioner 
is regularly, systematically, and continuously providing goods or services. 
The Petitioner submitted a copy of Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Business, from the Beneficiary's 
2021 income tax return. On that form, the Beneficiary reported $821,429 in gross receipts in 2021, 
entirely offset by expenses. The Petitioner did not submit invoices or other documentation to identify 
the sources of this income or the services that the Petitioner performed to bring in that income. The 
Beneficiary did not report the payment of any wages, leaving that line blank. 
An accompanying balance sheet for 2021 indicates that the Petitioner took in $821,429 in "Sales" and 
spent $769,317 on "Subcontractor costs," but the Petitioner did not document payment of those costs 
2 When considering the scope and extent of the Beneficiary's claimed executive duties, we note that the Petitioner's March 
2022 submission included documents showing that the Beneficiary had applied to in 
October 2021. When submitting these documents, the Petitioner did not explain how the Beneficiary's s intended law school 
studies are consistent with the stated intention to work as an executive at an accounting firm. 
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or the services provided by the claimed subcontractors. The Petitioner did not submit any 2022 tax 
records or Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statements, both of which the Director had specifically requested. 
Bank statements from May through August 2022 show that the Petitioner's balance rarely exceeded 
$1,500, and many of the transactions involve vendors such as Amazon Marketplace, Amazon Prime 
Video, and HBOMax. Deposits and credits into the bank account totaled $7,760 over three months, a 
rate of income too low to support the salaries that the Petitioner claims to pay. This rate of income is 
also substantially lower than the claimed but minimally documented revenue figure for the previous 
year, 2021. 
According to the organizational charts in the record, the tax associates earn a salary of $30,000 per 
year. Therefore, their monthly pay statements ought to show gross pay of $2,500. But the only pay 
statement the Petitioner submitted for any of its tax associates, dated August 2022, shows gross pay 
of $1,000 for the month, at a specified rate of $5.77 per hour for 173.33 hours. This rate is less than 
half of New York's 2022 minimum wage of $13.20 per hour. 3 
In the revocation notice, the Director determined that the Petitioner's "NOIR response ... did not 
provide any evidence of business activity as of the filing date of the petition"; "most of the debits 
shown on the [ submitted] bank statements appear to be personal spending"; and "the very low monthly 
balance indicates minimal business activity." The Director acknowledged the submission of evidence 
that the Petitioner exists as a legal entity, but concluded that such evidence "does not demonstrate the 
US entity engaged in doing business," and that "the evidence of record does not support the finding 
that the petitioner has reached the point that it could employ the beneficiary in a predominantly 
executive position." 
We agree with the Director's decision. The fragmentary evidence that the Petitioner submitted with 
the extension petition and in response to the NOIR is not sufficient to demonstrate that, at the time of 
filing, the Petitioner was regularly, systematically, and continuously providing goods or services and 
had developed to the point where it could support an executive position. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the Director's determination that the extension petition was 
approved in error. The revocation of the approval of the petition shall remain in effect. 
But we will withdraw the Director's other determinations, as explained below. 
C. True and Correct Statements 
The Director determined that the statement of facts contained in the petition was not true and correct. 
In the NOIR, the Director cited only one disputed fact in support of this determination. Specifically, 
when the Petitioner filed the extension petition in March 2022, the Petitioner specified on Form I-129 
that the Beneficiary would work at a specified address onl INew York. 
In the NOIR, the Director informed the Petitioner that USCIS officers visited the Petitioner's stated 
address, and found "a shared office location" with no signage indicating the presence of the petitioning 
company. The Beneficiary was not at the location. When contacted by USCIS, the Beneficiary stated 
3 See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/history (added to record). 
7 
that he uses the I I address for administrative purposes but that he and other employees 
typically work from home. 
The Director stated that, by changing the Beneficiary's work location, the Petitioner had materially 
changed the terms of employment described in the petition. The Director stated that this change would 
require the filing of an amended petition, which the Petitioner had not filed. 
In response to the NOIR, the Petitioner stated that the company relied much more heavily on remote 
work during the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, and claimed that "employees have gradually 
started to work full-time at the worksite location" onl I 
The Petitioner submitted a copy of a membership agreement with the shared space provider on 
I I In the notice of revocation, the Director observed that this agreement is dated August 
2022, several months after the Petitioner filed the extension petition in March 2022. The Director 
stated that the Petitioner had not established that the Petitioner worked from the I location at 
the time of filing. 
The record shows that the Petitioner had not concealed the nature of the shared office location. Exhibit 
P of the extension petition was an agreement for that same space. The August 2022 document 
submitted with the NOIR response was a renewal of that agreement. That agreement prohibited the 
posting of signs and the use of the space "involving frequent visits by the public." Other materials in 
the record indicate that some of the Petitioner's bills and bank statements were addressed to the 
Beneficiary's home address, consistent with a degree ofremote or virtual work. 
Given these facts, the Beneficiary's absence from the shared work site and his conduct of some 
business activities from home do not appear to amount to material changes in the nature of the 
Beneficiary's intended employment in the United States, and there is sufficient evidence to show that 
the Petitioner has operated from the stated location. We conclude that the Petitioner's statements in 
this regard were not untrue or incorrect to an extent that would warrant revocation of the approval of 
the petition. We will therefore withdraw this determination by the Director. 
We emphasize that this is not a stipulation that the Petitioner's activity at that location was sufficient 
to meet the definition of"doing business." This determination is limited to a finding that the Petitioner 
did not falsely claim thel !address. 
There are other credibility issues in this proceeding. We addressed some of these issues above, and 
will discuss others below. But the Director did not address these issues in the circumscribed context 
of the truth or correctness of the Petitioner's claims with respect to 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A)( 4). 
A decision to revoke approval of a visa petition can only be grounded upon, and the petitioner is only 
obliged to respond to, the factual allegations specified in the notice of intention to revoke. Matter of 
Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568, 570 (BIA 1988). 
D. Misrepresentation 
A determination that statements of fact in the petition are not true can result in revocation, but even 
more serious is a finding that the Petitioner willfully misrepresented material facts. A 
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misrepresentation is an assertion or manifestation that is not in accord with the trne facts. A material 
misrepresentation requires that the individual willfully made a material misstatement to a government 
official for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit to which the individual is not entitled. See 
Matter ofKai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289-90 (BIA 1975). The term "willfully" means knowing 
and intentionally, as distinguished from accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts 
are otherwise. See Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&N Dec. 22, 28 (BIA 1979). To be considered 
material, the misrepresentation must be one which "tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant 
to the alien's eligibility, and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be 
excluded." Matter ofNg, 17 I&N Dec. 536, 537 (BIA 1980). 
In this proceeding, the Beneficiary is the sole owner of the petitioning U.S. employer, and he signed 
the Form I-129 and other documents in that capacity. Therefore, any willful misrepresentation by the 
Petitioner would, in effect, also amount to misrepresentation by the Beneficiary, who may then be 
subject to a finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
In the NOIR, the Director alleged the following instances of misrepresentation: 
• The Petitioner claimed that it would employ the Beneficiary as an executive, but a site visit 
and interview with the Beneficiary indicated that "his main role is training his staff and 
bringing in clients as well as assisting the manager in leading the junior tax associates." The 
Director concluded that this information "contradicts the claim that the beneficiary would work 
primarily as an executive." 
• The Petitioner claimed six employees in the United States, but the Petitioner submitted pay 
receipts for only two employees other than the Beneficiary, and the year-to-date figures on 
those pay receipts "suggest that these individuals were hired in August 2022." Three other 
claimed U.S. employees reside outside the United States, and no information could be found 
about another claimed employee. 
• The aforementioned site visit did not confirm the Petitioner's use of the address 
claimed on Form I-129. 
In the notice ofrevocation, the Director concluded: "[t]he record contains an organizational chart that 
misrepresented the petitioner's number of US employees," and "[t]he record contains multiple 
inconsistencies and apparent misrepresentations regarding the petitioner's number of US employees, 
overall business operations, the beneficiary's qualifying capacity and the job offered." 
We have already discussed the matter of the Petitioner's claimed office address onl in New 
York, and determined that while the Petitioner provided incomplete information about work locations, 
the record does not warrant a finding that the Petitioner falsely claimed that address. 
We have also determined that the Petitioner has not shown that the Beneficiary's duties with the 
company meet the definition of an executive capacity. We agree with the Director that this 
determination supports revocation of the petition's approval, but we conclude that the issue is one of 
vagueness rather than willfully false statements. An individual might perform low-level duties and 
9 
not meet the regulatory definition of executive, but still honestly consider themselves to be an 
"executive" because of their control over a small company. The Director did not identify specific, 
demonstrably false statements regarding the Beneficiary's duties and responsibilities. 
The Petitioner's staffing is material to the extension petition because executive duties rely on the 
presence of subordinate managers or executives, and others who perform lower-level tasks. But here, 
again, the record is not sufficiently conclusive to merit a definitive finding of willful 
misrepresentation. The Petitioner claimed, in response to the NOIR, that some of the staff in the 
United Kingdom report to the Beneficiary, and in this respect they work for the U.S. Petitioner but not 
in the United States. Such an arrangement is permissible under Matter ofZ-A-, Inc., Adopted Decision 
2016-02 (AAO Apr. 14, 2016). Given the various inconsistencies in the petition, the Petitioner would 
need to document the nature of the arrangement to have work performed abroad, and the Petitioner 
has not done so, but given the ambiguity of the record, it is not readily apparent that the Petitioner 
willfully misrepresented the employment of these individuals. 
The year-to-date figures on the August 2022 payroll documents are consistent with the employees 
beginning work that month, but there are other possible explanations. The Petitioner would need to 
document such scenarios in order to meet its burden of proof, and has not done so, but it remains that 
the year-to-date figures on the August 2022 pay receipts are not prim a facie evidence that the Petitioner 
willfully misrepresented its staffing when it filed the extension petition in March 2022. 
As discussed above, there are serious deficiencies in the evidence regarding the Petitioner's staffing. 
The Petitioner has submitted payroll records for only a fraction of its staff, and the minimal evidence 
of business activity does not show that the Petitioner is fully staffed and doing business to an extent 
that would have justified approval of the extension petition. But a failure to meet the burden of proof 
is not the same as willful misrepresentation of material facts, and the lack of evidence to support the 
Petitioner's claims is not, itself, evidence that the Petitioner knowingly provided false information in 
support of the petition. 4 
III. CONCLUSION 
We withdraw the Director's determination that the petition contained false statements, and we 
withdraw the finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact. Nevertheless, we affirm the 
revocation of the petition's approval because the Petitioner has not established that it employs the 
Beneficiary in a primarily executive capacity, and has not established that its new office is doing 
business and can support an executive position. The burden of proof to establish eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains with the petitioner in revocation proceedings. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1361; Matter of Cheung, 12 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1968); and Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450, 
452, n.1 (BIA 1987). The Petitioner has not met that burden. Therefore, the extension petition was 
approved in error, and the Director properly revoked that approval. 
ORDER: The approval of the petition is revoked. 
4 We note that the Director's reference to "travel records and open-source information" regarding some of the Petitioner's 
claimed U.S. employees in the NOIR may well point to an area that bears further inquiry, but is insufficient as currently 
constituted to support a finding of willful misrepresentation. 
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