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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave, N.W. Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 03 102 50296 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 2 8 2005 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
/--. '~ 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 03 102 50296 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its general manager as an 
L- 1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)( 1 5)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
t. The petitioner claims that it is the 
located in Caracas, Venezuela. The 
new office in the United States, which 
was subsequently extended for two years. The petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay for three 
more years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitianer did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner filed an appeal in response to the denial.' On appeal, the petitioner submits a two-page letter in 
which it restates the beneficiary's qualifications. In support of its assertions, the petitioner submits several 
supporting documents intended to provide a more concise overview .of the petitioner's business and the 
beneficiary's duties. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
I The AAO notes that the petitioner was represented byupon the filing of the 
initial petition. At the time of the filing of the atmeal on Form I-290B. a woverlv executed Form G-28 dated - . . 
December 24, 2004 was submitted which designated as the petitioner's new 
counsel. In a letter dated January 29, 2004, the petition o longer represented by 
and submitted a written supplement to the appeal. As a result, the AAO will treat the petitioner 
as self-represented. 
SRC 03 102 50296 
Page 3 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of einployment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely<by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
SRC 03 102 50296 
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(iv) receives only general supervision or direction ,.. from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the initial petition, former counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter dated February 24, 2003, which 
provided the following description of the beneficiary's role in tlie petitioner's organization: 
During the past years that [the beneficiary] joined- [the petitioner], he has been employed in 
the capacity of General Manager and he is responsible for the internal operation of the 
company, such as final decision making regardingMcontracting, hiring and firing authority of 
all personnel, staffing, marketing and programming of the company activities. He is 
responsible for the complete operation and admin!stration of the business. In this position, he 
has full responsibility for the staffing and supervision of the company. This responsibility 
includes the recruitment and training of staff, over which he has hiring and firing authority. 
He is also responsible for coordinating the work so as to run the business in an efficient and 
profitable manner. He exercises complete day-to-day discretionary authority over the work 
of the company. [The beneficiary] has been in charge of supervising all personnel's work, set 
standards for the work and general guidelines for each assignment which must be followed 
and executed by the personnel. Strong managerial skills are needed for the important 
coordination and scheduling functions performed by the General Manager. 
[The beneficiary] also has the discretionary authority to seek the purchase of any existing 
business andlor enter into negotiations for such an-entity. His executive level positions [sic] 
permits [the beneficiary] to produce more assessment for the subsidiary and parent company. 
He is responsible for the management, administration and financial aspects of the business, 
along with the hiring and training of the personnel. His years of management and executive 
level experience in this filed, has given him the latitude to make these decisions without 
having to consult with any other person or entity. His position is at the executive level since 
he formulates policy and has the ultimate discretionary authority to make necessary changes 
in the structure of the business. His functions with the organization are purely executive 
since he performs only those executive functions and leaves the daily tasks to the company 
employees. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted to be insufficient to warrant approval. Consequently, the 
director issued a request for evidence on June 13, 2003. In the request, the director asked counsel to submit 
details regarding the beneficiary's employment abroad, copies of the petitioner's Employer's Quarterly Tax 
Returns, accompanied by payroll records, for the fourth quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of 2003, evidence 
that both the U.S. entity and foreign entity are doing business, along with confirmation as to the year the U.S. 
entity began doing business. In a response dated August 25, 2003, counsel for the petitioner submitted the 
information requested by the director with supporting evidence. 
On December 2, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director found~that the evidence in the record 
failed to establish that the beneficiary would be functioning in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Specifically, the director concluded that the beneficiary would be performing the day-to-day tasks of the 
SRC 03 102 50296 
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organization. The director further concluded that the beneficiary did not supervise a subordinate staff of 
managerial, supervisory, or professional employees, and instead was merely acting as a first-line supervisor. 
The petitioner's newly retained counsel submitted a brief statement on the Form I-290B which alleged that the 
petitioning entity had the organizational complexity to qualify the beneficiary for L-1 status. Additionally, 
counsel requested an additional 30 days within which it would file a brief and additional evidence. Along 
with the petitioner's letter of January 29, 2004, which advised the AAO that it was now self-represented, the 
petitioner submitted a second letter addressing the director's denial and submitted several folders containing 
various documents in support of the petitioner's position. Specifically, the petitioner discussed the importance 
of the beneficiary's role in the U.S. entity, and continually asserted that the beneficiary was in fact a qualified 
executive employee. Each of the folders provided contained documentation pertaining to each division of the 
company and the responsibilities of the employe[es] within each unit. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. Whether the beneficiary is a manager or executive 
employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" 
managerial or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the 'Act. In this case, the petitioner asserts 
that the beneficiary is an executive by virtue of his position title, experience, and associated duties. However, 
the description of duties provided is vague and fails to specify the exact nature of the claimed executive 
duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive 
or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 
1990). 
The description of the beneficiary's duties, provided in the initial letter of support from the petitioner's former 
counsel, is vague and merely repeats the regulatory definitions. Specifically, the identification of duties such 
as "responsib[ility] for the internal operation of the company," "formulating policy," and "responsib[ility] for 
the management, administration, and financial aspects of the business " do little to clarify what the beneficiary 
does on an average workday. However, conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment 
capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden ofproof. Id. at 1108; Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 
(S.D.N.Y.). 
The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. 
Supp. at 1108, afyd, 905 F.2d 41. In reviewing the beneficiary's stated duties, it appears that the majority of 
his time is devoted to the company's marketing and acquisitions. For example, his stated duties include the 
"discretionary authority to seek the purchase of any existing business and/or enter into negotiations for such 
an entity." Furthermore, one of the folders provided by the petitioner on appeal contains evidence that the 
beneficiary traveled to trade shows and apparently operated a booth or display on behalf of the company. At 
the same time, the description of duties provided in the February 24, 2003 letter claims that he leaves all the 
daily tasks to the company employees. On appeal, the petitioner then claims that the beneficiary performs all 
the "financial-legal-sales-marketing-accounting [and] licensing" duties. It appears from the overall 
description of his duties that he is the person primarily responsible for the marketing and promotion of the 
petitioner's enterprise, as evidenced by his involvement in trade shows and Florida tourism, in addition to 
handling all of its sales, legal services, marketing, and accounting services. An employee who primarily 
SRC 03 102 50296 
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performs the tasks necessary to produce a proctuct or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 
(Comm. 1988). 
The director also concluded that the beneficiary was not supervising managerial, professional, or supervisory 
employees. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that his duties 
involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, 
professional, or managerial. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held 
by the subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a professional capacity as that term is 
defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner has not, in fact, establishe 
actually necessary, for example, to perform the reservation services 
reservation agent, or that such a degree is required to perform the duties o 
be an administrative assistant performing clerical and administrative functions. 
Finally, although the petitioner claims to have contractual employees in the areas of maintenance, 
landscaping, and pest control, the petitioner has neither presented evidence to document the existence of these 
employees nor identified the services these individuals provide. The petitioner has also failed to show that the 
reservation agent or the administrative assistant would qualify as managerial or supervisory positions, such 
that the beneficiary would not be considered a first-line supervisor. Additionally, the petitioner has not 
explained how the services of the contracted.employees obviate the need for the beneficiary to primarily 
conduct the petitioner's business. Without documentary evidence to support its statements, the petitioner does 
not meet its burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998). 
For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's duties would be 
primarily managerial or executive in nature. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petition also may not be approved because there is insufficient 
evidence of a qualifying relationship between the petitioner and the foreign entity. The petitioner claims that 
it is a subsidiary of the foreign entity. However, the only evidence submitted by the petitioner in support of 
this claimed relationship is a stock certificate indicating that the foreign entity owns 510 shares in the U.S. 
entity, whereas the beneficiary owns 490 shares. As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying 
SRC 03 102 50296 
Page 7 
relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains 
ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, 
corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to 
determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent 
percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose 
all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distributidn of profit, the management and direction of the 
subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, 
Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986). Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to 
determine the elements of ownership and co_ntrol. 
Furthermore, the AAO notes that the petitioner's Form 1120, Corporation Income Tax Return for 2001 
indicates on Schedule K and Statement Five that the beneficiary owns 60% of the U.S. entity, and that an 
unidentified foreign person owns the other 40% of the entity. This directly contradicts the ownership interests 
set forth on the stock certificates. In addition, while the petitioner's Articles of Incorporation indicate that it 
is authorized to issue 1000 shares at a par value of $1.00, Schedule L of this same 2001 tax return indicates 
that the petitioner has $5,000 worth of stock outstanding, which at a par value of $1.00 each would be 5,000 
shares. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). If CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that 
fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th 
(3.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 
153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997,'1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.