dismissed L-1A Case: Computer Accessories

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.. Rtn. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
~dedfY@*bmm U. S. Citizenship 
prem##t dearly on- and Immigration 
imm-dgasodp- .L - 
PUBLlC COPY 
File: SERVICE CENTER Date: NOV 2 8 2005 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 l(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
* Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
\ 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the pet~tion for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1A nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the ~mrnikation and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a California corporation that claims to be engaged in the design of 
computer accessories. The petitioner claims that it is the subsidiary of Rain Design, Pte. Ltd. located in 
Singapore. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its technology director for a three-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred in finding that the beneficiary would not perform primarily managerial or executive duties, and claims 
that the beneficiary "performs the high level responsibilities that are specified in the definition of executive 
capacity." Counsel claims that the director based his decision partially on the petitioner's staffing levels 
without taking into account the reasonable needs of the organization. Counsel further notes that the director 
denied the petition without first requesting additional evidence, and requests a thorough review of the record. 
Finally, counsel contends that the director relied on case law "that is entirely unrelated to the instant case." 
Counsel submits a brief and evidence in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 3 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 4 
In an August 27, 2004 letter appended to the 1-129 petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
proposed duties as "Technology Director" as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will use his independent discretion and authority in identifying and 
cultivating our technology and services leads, and orchestrating the availability of resources 
required to progress toward the promotion of [the petitioner's] products. [The beneficiary] 
will be responsible for the branding of our product, ensuring the development of consisting 
[sic] messages and images, which may require him to work collaboratively with outside 
strategic consultants. He will be implementing and overseeing the company's entire IT 
operations and other web and networking services, with focus on enhancing our relationships 
with resellers, customers, and Apple Computer company, including managing departmental 
customers to include, but not limited to customer expectations/requirements and ensuring 
department budgets schedules and deadlines are met. His engagement with our U.S.-based 
facility is particularly critical to our business operations and expansion efforts as [the 
beneficiary] plays a major role in our staffing decisions, business development activities, and 
other management activities. 
[The beneficiary] will routinely confer with other members of [the petitioner] to ensure that 
our corporate philosophy is understood and is accurately conveyed. [The beneficiary] 
continues to exercise authority in regarding to hiring, training, terminating of employment, 
delegating assignments, promoting, disciplining, and remuneration. In the capacity of 
Technology Director, [the beneficiary] is responsible for performance reviews of members of 
his staff and ensures all staff follows corporate procedures. 
[The beneficiary's] primary responsibility is to ensure corporate objectives are met. One of 
his duties as our Technology Director entails the strategizing and planning of new 
technologies, focusing on product development and positioning, allowing the company's 
growth and profitability. . . . He continuously reviews, develops, implements, and plans for 
the implementation of special activities to promote our technology. He has a thorough 
understanding of how crucial the process is to the growth of the company. To that end, [the 
beneficiary uses his acumen and serves as our "clearinghouse" for information on trends, 
research, applications and effective practices as it relates to the use of expansion projects into 
the U.S. market. 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that it employs 13 individuals. The petitioner submitted an 
organizational chart identifying a CEO/CIO who supervises the beneficiary and a business development 
director. The chart shows that the business development director supervises an administration/accounts 
employee, a part-time business analyst, and a sales representative "to be hired." The beneficiary is depicted as 
"technology director" supervising a part-time computer analyst (who also serves as a business analyst), an 
unidentified part-time "warehouse operation" employee, and a computer security technician "to be hired." 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 5 
The director denied the petition on September 10, 2004 concluding that the petitioner had not established that 
the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. The director observed that while 
the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary will "oversee" and "direct" the company's IT operations, the 
petitioner had yet to hire two of his three proposed subordinates. The director found that the one part-time 
employee currently assigned to the IT department would not relieve the beneficiary from performing non- 
qualifying duties. The director also determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary 
would supervise a subordinate staff of professional, managerial or supervisory personnel, or that he would 
manage an essential function of the organization. 
On appeal. counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director denied the petition based on the petitioner's 
staffing levels without considering the reasonable needs of the petitioner. Counsel also contends that the 
director utilized the size of the petitioning company as the determining factor in denying the petition without 
considering the beneficiary's duties. Counsel claims that the beneficiary performs the high-level 
responsibilities that are specified in the definition of executive capacity in that he "will be implementing and 
overseeing [the petitioner's] entire IT operations and other web and networking services, establishing goals 
and policies, exercising discretion over [the petitioner's] operations and working independently." Counsel 
further describes the beneficiary's proposed responsibilities as technology director: 
In the proffered position, the Beneficiary will be managing [the petitioner's] technology 
operations and oversee[ing] the international development activities and coordinating 
development and service delivery regarding IT planning. He will plan and implement key 
strategies as they pertain to technology, and direct the professional development and training 
of staff and supervise three other employees l, Computer Security Technician, 
Operations, and 1 Computer Analyst). He will monitor the 
development, documentation and support of company products and services, and recruit, hire, 
train, promote, and terminate the employment of staff, including the recruitment, interviewing 
and recommending of applicants for open positions in IT. 
Counsel contends that the offered position is "sufficiently complex and senior for an intracompany transferee 
Petition because the Beneficiary performs tasks that are primarily managerial or executive in nature." Counsel 
claims that the beneficiary's subordinates perform "day-to-day activities" and relieve him from performing 
non-qualifying duties. 
Counsel provides the following descriptions for the beneficiary's claimed subordinates: 
Mr. -will set up and ensure software application[s] run properly. He will take directions 
from [the beneficiary] to ensure compliance of [the petitioner's] network and physical 
security, and on-line store security. He will also be responsible for the data identity theft 
precaution and firewalls set-up. 
Mr. will take his direction from [the beneficiary] and be responsible for the 
automation and set up of [the petitioner's] logistic systems, including order processing, 
shipping, inventory control and product returns systems. 
WAC 04 24 1 50383 
Page 6 
Ms. il) is a full-time employee of [the petitioner] and divides her time up, working 
approximately 50% as a Computer Analyst, taken [sic] directions from [the beneficiary] and 
the other 50%, working as a Business Analyst, taken [sic] directions from [the petitioner's 
chief executive officer]. Ms-sets up and ensures the efficient function of hardware and 
software, including workstation, internet connection, office equipment and management 
information system. 
Counsel further contends that much of the case law cited by the director is "entirely unrelated to the instant 
case," "are not supportive of the Service's decision," and "have no authority." Counsel attempts to distinguish 
the facts of the following cases from the instant matter: Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593 (Comm. 1988), Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988), Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 
I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980); Matter of laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter ofIzummi, 22 I&N Dec. 
1969 (Assoc. Comm. 1998), and Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 
1972). 
Finally, counsel notes that the director denied the petition without issuing a request for additional evidence, 
and requests that the MO review the facts of the instant case "to ensure denial is not based on erroneous 
judgment." 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. As a preliminary matter, the MO notes that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(8) 
requires the director to request additional evidence in instances "where there is no evidence of ineligibility, 
and initial evidence or eligibility information is missing." Id. The director is not required to issue a request 
for further information in every potentially deniable case. The director did not deny the petition based on 
insufficient evidence of eligibility. 
Furthermore, even if the director had committed a procedural error by failing to solicit further evidence, the 
petitioner has in fact supplemented the record on appeal, and the new evidence will be considered in this 
proceeding. Finally, as will be discussed below, the AAO has identified a deficiency not discussed by the 
director that renders the beneficiary clearly ineligible for this visa classification. The deficiency cannot be 
cured through the submission of additional evidence; therefore, it would serve no helpful purpose to remand 
the petition to the director. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to 
demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the 
beneficiary's duties include "identifying and cultivating our technology and services leads," "implementing 
and overseeing the company's entire IT operations and other web and networking services," "orchestrating 
the availability of resources," and exercising responsibility for "the branding of our product." The petitioner 
WAC 04 24 1 50383 
Page 7 
did not, however, clarify who performs routine marketing tasks inherent in product branding, or identify what 
specific duties are entailed by "identifying and cultivating" technology leads or "orchestrating" resource 
availability, nor did it indicate who performs the routine tasks associated with the "overall IT operations." 
The petitioner also indicated that the beneficiary "reviews, develops, implements and plans for 
implementation of special activities" and serves as a "clearinghouse" for technology information but failed to 
clarify how these responsibilities meet the definition of managerial or executive capacity. Specifics are clearly 
an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afld, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
On appeal, rather than clarifying these duties, counsel merely paraphrases the statutory definition of executive 
capacity by indicating that the beneficiary will "establish policies and procedures," "exercis[e] discretion over 
[the petitioner's] operations," and "work independently." See section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
5 1101(a)(44). However, conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not 
sufficient to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 
broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does 
the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the 
employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 4 1 (2d. 
Cir. 1990). Without a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily tasks, the AAO is unable to determine 
whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or executive duties. 
The AAO acknowledges counsel's assertion on appeal that the director based his decision partially on the size 
of the enterprise and the number of staff, but failed to take into consideration the reasonable needs of the 
enterprise. As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, if staffing levels are used as a factor in 
determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, CIS must take into account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the 
organization. In this case, the director's review of the number of subordinates supervised by the beneficiary 
was necessary, given the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary will have personnel responsibility over all 
employees in the IT department and will "monitor" and "oversee" all aspects of the department. An analysis 
of the nature of the petitioner's business makes it unclear who would be performing operational duties related 
to the company's IT operations, if not the beneficiary 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was a two-year-old computer product design company. The petitioner 
claimed to employ thirteen employees, but subm~tted an organizational chart identifying only five employees 
by name, including the beneficiary. Based on the petitioner's representations, the petitioner's IT operations 
will require employees to implement and maintain a web site and on-line store, internal networks and 
information systems, and logistics systems for order processing, shipping and inventory. At the time of filing, 
the petitioner's organizational chart identified only one part-time employee, a computer analyst, among the 
beneficiary's proposed subordinates. Based on the petitioner's representations, it does not appear that the 
reasonable needs of the petitioning company's technology department might plausibly be met by the services 
of one technology director performing primarily managerial duties and one part-time computer analyst. 
Accordingly, as concluded by the director, it would be necessary for the beneficiary, as technology director, 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 8 
to perform the non-qualifying duties of the proposed "computer security technician" and "warehouse 
operations" positions until such employees were hired. Rather than "overseeing" and "monitoring" the 
implementation of the company's IT operations, the beneficiary would be performing technical duties related 
to providing the company's IT services. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce 
a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The AAO notes that on appeal, counsel identifies two additional employees who would work under the 
beneficiary's supervision. The petitioner neither claims nor provides evidence that these additional employees 
were working for the petitioner as of the date this petition was filed. The petitioner must establish eligibility 
at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after 
the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Miclzelin Tire Corp., 17 
I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). Absent evidence that the petitioner employed the computer security 
technician and "operations" employee at the time of filing, these employees need not and will not be 
considered for the purpose of this analysis. 
Regardless, since the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will oversee the operations of the IT department 
through the supervision of subordinate employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate 
employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 5 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The petitioner has 
not established that any of the proposed positions would require a bachelor's degree, such that they could be 
classified as professionals. Nor has the petitioner shown that any of the beneficiary's proposed subordinates 
would supervise subordinate staff members or manage a clearly defined department or function of the 
petitioner, such that they could be classified as managers or supervisors. Thus, the petitioner has not shown 
that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial, as required by 
section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner 
must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Clzamnpion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). The test is basic to ensure that a person not only has the requisite 
authority, but that a majority of his or her duties relate to operational or policy management, not to the 
supervision of lower level employees, performance of the duties of another type of position, or other 
involvement in the operational activities of the company. 
Here, the beneficiary evidently will exercise discretion over the petitioner's IT operations, but the petitioner 
has not shown that the majority of his time would be allocated to operational or policy management, the 
supervision of managerial, supervisory or professional employees, or management of an essential function. 
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties does not establish what proportion of the 
beneficiary's duties is managerial in nature, and what proportion is actually non-managerial. See Republic of 
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). CIS reviews the totality of the record, including the 
descriptions of a beneficiary's duties and his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the petitioner's 
business, and any other facts contributing to a compete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role in a 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 9 
business, when examining the managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary. In this matter, upon review 
of the totality of the record, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary performs primarily 
executive or managerial duties. Rather it appears that the majority of the beneficiary's time would necessarily 
be devoted to the performance of designing, implementing and maintaining the petitioner's IT systems. 
Counsel asserts that the director improperly relied upon several decisions cited in the Notice of Denial, 
including: Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (Comm. 1988); Matter of 
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980); Matter 
of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 1969 (Assoc. Comm. 1998), and 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
The Matter of Church Scientology Int '1 decision remains a valid precedent decision that is binding on all CIS 
officers in the enforcement of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. 103.3(c). Specifically, in Matter of Church Scientology, 
the AAO examined the claimed managerial capacity of a member of the Church of Scientology. After citing 
to the regulations and noting that the beneficiary's duties must be "primarily at the managerial or executive 
levels, the AAO stated: "An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity." Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. The AAO continued to examine the specific job duties and 
concluded that the beneficiary appeared to function as a staff officer or specialist and not as a manager or 
executive. 
The director's citation to Matter of Treasure Craft of California, Matter of Obaigbena, Matter of Ramirez- 
Anchez and Matter of Laureano is supportive of the overriding proposition that the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361; 
see also, Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998). The director's citation to Matter of lzumrni 
also relates to the petitioner's burden of proof, specifically, the requirement that the petitioner establish 
eligibility at the time the petition is filed. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(12) (requiring that an application or 
petition be denied where evidence submitted in response to a request for initial evidence does not establish 
eligibility at the time of filing). A review of the record and the adverse decision indicates that the director 
properly applied the statute and regulations, as well as relevant case law, to the petitioner's case. As 
previously discussed, the petitioner has not met its burden of proof and the denial was the proper result under 
the regulations. 
Based on the above discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary completed at least 
one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition as required by 8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(1)(3)(iii). In its August 27, 2003 letter, the 
petitioner stated: "[The beneficiary] has been continuously employed with [the foreign entity] in Singapore 
since April 30, 2003 immediately preceding the filing of this petition." 
WAC 04 241 50383 
Page 10 
Citizenship and Immtgration Services (CIS) records show that the beneficiary was admitted to the United 
States in B-1 nonimmigrant status on May 2, 2003 and subsequently filed an 1-539 Application to 
ExtendIChange Nonimmigrant Status on October 1, 2003, as a result of which he was granted an extension of 
stay until May 1, 2004 (WAC 04 002 52784). On April 28, 2004, the petitioner submitted an 1-129 Petition 
for a Nonimmigrant Worker requesting H-1B temporary worker classification on behalf of the beneficiary 
(WAC 04 146 52734). The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that the beneficiary's last date of admission at 
the time of filing was May 2, 2003. Accordingly, the beneficiary was in the United States from May 2, 2003, 
two days after he purportedly commenced employment with the foreign entity, until at least April 28, 2004. 
Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the 
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(l)(ii)(A) states: 
Periods spent in the United States in lawful status for a branch of the same employer or a 
parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof and brief trips to the United States for business or 
pleasure shall not be interruptive of the one year of continuous employment abroad but such 
periods shall not be counted toward fulfillment of that requirement. 
As the instant petition was filed on September 1, 2004, the beneficiary could not have accumulated more than 
approximately four months of continuous employment abroad with the foreign entity. As such, he does not 
qualify for this visa classification. Furthermore, willful misrepresentation in these proceedings may render 
the beneficiary inadmissible to the United States. Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act. For this additional reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.