dismissed L-1A Case: Dairy Products

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Etm. A3042 
Washington, DC 2052'9 
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$7. ~~-~YUD&B?, and Immigration 
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FILE: SRC 03 06 1 5 1696 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been 
returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that 
office. 
Adm~nistrative Appeals Office 
SRC 03 061 51696 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service 
Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will 
be dismissed. 
The petitioner, Victoria Dairy Products, Inc. endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a 
nonimmigrant manager or executive pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(I 5)(L). The petitioner claims to be a subsidiary of 
Industria de Quesos La Victoria S.A., located in Venezuela. The petitioner claims to be engaged 
in the dairy products business and operates a cruise planning services franchise. The initial 
petition was approved to allow the petitioner to open a new office. It seeks to extend the petition's 
validity and the beneficiary's stay for one year as the U.S. entity's general manager. The 
petitioner was incorporated in the State of Florida on November 14, 2001 and claims to have 
three employees. 
On December 26, 2002, the director denied the petition and determined that the petitioner failed 
to establish (1) that the petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, and (2) that 
the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion 
and forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner's counsel claims that 
the petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the foreign company and the beneficiary 
"manages the entire U.S. subsidiary." Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in support 
of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet 
certain criteria. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in 
a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
In relevant part, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. # 214.2(1)(3) state that an individual petition filed on 
Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this 
section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be 
performed. 
Further, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) require that a visa petition under section 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Act which involved the opening of a new office may be extended by filing a 
new Form 1-1 29, accompanied by the following: 
SRC 03 06 1 5 1696 
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(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(11)(G) of this section; 
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and 
the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner 
and the foreign entity. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(l)(ii) provides: 
(G) Qualzfiing organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or 
other legal entity whlch: 
(I) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not 
required) as an employer in the United States and in at least one other 
country directly or through a parent, branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for the 
duration of the alien's stay in the United States as an intracompany 
transferee; and 
(3) Otherwise meets the requirements of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Act. 
(H) Doing business means the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of 
goods andlor services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere 
presence of an agent or office of the qualifying organization in the United States and 
abroad. 
(I) Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has 
subsidiaries. 
(J) Branch means an operation division or office of the same organization 
housed in a different location. 
SRC 03 061 51696 
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(K) Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent 
owns, d~rectly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or induectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls 
the entity. 
(L) Af$liate means 
(I) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled 
by the same parent or individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same 
group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling 
approximately the same share or proportion of each entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner and 
foreign organization. See Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I &N Dec. 593 (BIA 
1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986) (in 
nonimmigrant visa proceedings); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982) (in 
nonimmigrant visa proceedings). In the context of this visa proceeding, ownership refers to the 
direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an organization with full power and 
authority to control. Matter of Church Scientology International at 595. Control means the direct 
or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an 
organization. Id. 
Initially, in an attachment to Form 1-129, the petitioner claimed that: 1) the petitioner is a subsidiary 
of the foreign entity; 2) the foreign entity owns 100 percent of the petitioner's stock.; 3) the foreign 
entity is a family owned business with four 25 percent shareholders; and, 4) due to economic 
conditions the petitioner decided to adjust its original business plan and diversified the U.S. business 
to two different areas of operation: Technology Products Services and CP Franchise Services. The 
petitioner submitted a copy of its articles of incorporation and a copy of its fi-anchise purchase 
agreement with CP Franchising, Inc. 
On January 9, 2002, the director requested additional evidence. In particular, the director requested 
evidence showing that the petitioner and foreign entity have a qualifying relationship. The director 
stated that the "organization is a franchise, which is not a qualifying relationship." 
In response, the petitioner submitted a January 8,2003 letter stating that the petitioner and foreibm 
entity have a qualifying relationship. The petitioner claimed that it entered into a franchise 
agreement with CP Franchising to operate the Cruise Planners Franchise. The petitioner further 
stated that the U.S. petitioning entity "purchased the franchise business model" and "it is not a 
legal format of corporate organization, or a separate entity from the U.S. petitioner, in fact the 
U.S. petitioning entity will function under a D/B/A for the Cruise Planners cruise travel agent 
SRC 03 061 5 1696 
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business." In addition, the petitioner claimed that apart from operating the franchise business, it 
operates a "Technology Products" business focused on the export of dairy processing equipment. 
The petitioner submitted another copy of the franchise agreement signed on November 5, 2001, 
and a copy of its stock certificate number one. The stock certificate indicates that 1,000 shares of 
the U.S. company's common stock were issued to the foreign entity on November 2 1, 200 1. 
On January 14, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner 
failed to establish that the U.S. entity had a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. The 
director found that "since the petitioning company is operating as a franchise, the petition cannot 
be approved." The director stated that the franchise and license agreements effectively negate the 
qualifying relationship because "they take away control of the organization." The director also 
stated that the petitioner sometimes operates an import-export business; however, the director 
found that since there were only three employees, it was not possible for the petitioner to be 
operating the two businesses. 
On appeal, the petitioner's counsel claims that the petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the 
foreign company. The petitioner claims that the franchise is not the petitioner. The petitioner 
states that "the franchise is an asset of the U.S. subsidiary" and [tlhe Cruise Planners division will 
operate under a d/b/a with the same tax identification number of the petitioner. In addition, the 
petitioner claims that it operates a Technology Products division dedicated to export technology 
equipment for milk and dairy products that is operated by the beneficiary and the same staff who 
operate the franchise business. 
On review, the AAO concurs with counsel that the director incorrectly focused on the petitioner's 
operation of a franchise rather than on the necessary qualifying relationship between the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the U.S. petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. # 214.2(1)(3)(i) (requiring 
that the petitioner and the organization which employed the beneficiary are qualifying 
organizations). The evidence of stock ownership, rather than the petitioner's purchase of' a 
franchise agreement, the petitioner's claims, is critical to determining whether a qualifying 
relationship exists. The director's comments with regard to the franchise agreement will be 
withdrawn. 
In general, a "franchise" is a cooperative business operation based on a contractual agreement in 
which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a business or to sell a product or service in 
accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the franchiser, and, in return, the 
franchiser undertakes to assist the franchisee through advertising, promotion, and other advisory 
services. A franchise agreement, like a license, typically requires that the franchisee comply w~th 
the franchiser's restrictions, without actual ownership and control of the franchised operation. See 
Matter of Schick, 13 I&N Dec. 647 (Reg. Cornrn. 1970) (finding that no qualifying relationship 
exists where the association between two companies was based on a license and royalty 
agreement that was subject to termination since the relationship was "purely contractual"). An 
association between a foreign and U.S. entity based on a contractual franchise agreement is 
usually insufficient to establish a qualifying relationship. Id. See also, 9 FAM 41.54 N7.1-5; 0.1. 
214.2(1)(4)(iii)(D) (noting that associations between companies based on factors such as 
ownership of a small amount of stock in another company, or licensing or franchising 
agreements, do not create affiliate relationships between the entities for L-1 purposes). 
SRC 03 061 5 1696 
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By itself, the fact that a petition involves a franchise will not automatically disqualify the 
petitioner under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. When reviewing a petition that involve:; a 
franchise, the director must carefully examine the record to determine how the franchise 
agreement affects the claimed qualifying relationship. As discussed, if a foreign company enters 
into a franchise, license, or contractual relationship with a U.S. company, that contractual 
relationship can be terminated and will not establish a qualifying relationship between the two 
entities. See Matter of Schick, 13 I&N Dec. at 649. However, if a foreign company claims to be 
related to a U.S. company through common ownership and control, and that U.S. company is 
doing business as a franchisee, the director must examine whether the U.S. and foreign entities 
possess a qualifying relationship through common ownership and management under section 
lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Act. 
In the present matter, the critical relationship is that between the 
Industrias de Quesos de Victoria, S.A., and the U.S. 
Although the petitioner does busmess in rhe llnited States 
Franchises, Inc., the claimed relationship between the foreign entity and the petitioner is based on 
stock ownership and not the franchise agreement. In order to determine whether a qualifying 
relationship exists, the AAO must examine the number of shares of stock issued by the petitioner, 
the ownership of that stock, and the resulting percentage ownership of the U.S. petitioner. 
On the Form 1-129, the petitioner indicated that the foreign entity owns 100 percent of the U.S. 
entity's stock. The petitioner submitted its stock certificates and articles of incorporation. '['he 
articles of incorporation indicate that the company is authorized to issue 1,000 shares and the 
stock certificate shows that 1,000 shares were issued to the foreign entity; however, stock 
certificates alone are insufficient evidence to determine ownership and control of the foreign 
entity. As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates 
alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and 
control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, 
corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be 
examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the 
shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. 
Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, 
the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor 
affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supt-a. 
Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of 
ownership and control. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to supports the petitioner's claim 
that it is wholly-owned by the foreign entity. 
After careful consideration of the evidence, the AAO finds that the petitioner failed to establish 
that a qualifying relationship exists between the U.S. entity and foreign company. For this reason, 
the petition will not be approved. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. Section IOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
9 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
SRC 03 061 5 1696 
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The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
(i.) Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii.) Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a 
department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii.) If another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such 
as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv.) Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(8) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 IOl(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
(i.) Directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii.) Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii.) Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv.) Receives only general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
On December 26, 2002, the petitioner filed Form 1-129. In two separate letters dated December 
23,2002 and January 8, 2003, the petitioner described the beneficiary's duties as: 
As General manager of the U.S. entity, he is in charge of developing and 
establishing all corporate policies and objectives; planning all company's 
functions, operations, and investments. [The beneficiary] is in charge of directing 
the financial programs and expansion of the U.S. subsidiary to insure at all times 
the availability of sufficient funds to attain the desired objectives, and to review 
and adjust the U.S. entity's goals with the consent of the parent company. 
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As General Manager, he directly supervises the work of the Franchise Service 
Manager who is responsible for contracts and relationships with individual 
companies that required our Cruise Planning services, suppliers, and liaises 
directly with clients for our technology products division in order to assess the 
viability and profitability of these contracts. [The beneficiary], as General 
Manager reviews and approves the U.S. subsidiary marketing efforts, such as 
contracts to promote the Cruise Planning business by print media advertising, 
direct mail, mass e-mailing, and established business contracts with dairy 
manufacturers in Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia for expansion of our client 
base. He has the unfettered decision making authority in this regard, as well as 
how to expend company funds to further establish the business and expand into 
other geographical areas. He also decides on additional staff required as the 
operation expands. His positions is at the management level since the two (2) 
employees . . . report to him and operate under his control. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted the U.S. entity's organizational chart showing that the 
beneficiary supervises two part-time employees, the franchise service manager and the franch~se 
services manager's assistant. The petitioner described the subordinates' job duties and 
educational backgrounds. The petitioner also stated that the U.S. subsidiary is not a fully 
developed conlmercial enterprise. 
On January 14, 2003, the director denied the petition and determined that the petitioner had failed 
to establish that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. The director found that it was not possible for the beneficiary to be 
functioning as a manager or executive of two businesses. The director stated, "Either there is one 
person in charge of both businesses, with the beneficiary overseeing those people, or the 
beneficiary is heading one business, while leaving the other individuals to operate the other 
business. The director further found that at best, the beneficiary was acting as a first line 
supervisor, with some of the employees operating under a non-qualifying franchise and not 
considered for managerial or executive purposes. 
On appeal, the petitioner's counsel claims that the beneficiary "manages the entire U S. 
subsidiary, which includes two divisions, second, he supervises the work of professional and 
managerial personnel . . . , third, [the beneficiary] has unfettered authority to hire and fire 
employees." 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the MO will look first to 
the description of the beneficiary's U.S. job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). On review, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner has provided a nonspecific description of the 
beneficiary's duties that fails to establish what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For 
example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary's duties include "developing and establishing 
all corporate policies and objectives" and "planning all company's functions, operations, and 
SRC 03 061 51696 
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investments." However, these duties are generalities that fail to enumerate any concrete policies 
and objectives that the beneficiary will develop and establish or how the beneficiary will plan the 
company's operations. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In addition, the petitioner generally paraphrased the statutory definition of executive and 
managerial capacity. See section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. For instance, the beneficiary's 
position is depicted as "establishing all corporate policies." However, conclusory assertions 
regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating ihe 
language of the statute or regulations does not satis@ the petitioner's burden of proof. Ferfin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108; Ayyr Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Further, a critical analysis of the nature of the petitioner's business undermines counsel's 
assertion that the beneficiary manages the entire U.S. subsidiary. For instance, the petitioner 
claims that the beneficiary "reviews and approves the U.S. subsidiary marketing efforts." 
However, it is unclear who will actually develop the marketing activities that the beneficiary &ill 
oversee. Rather, it appears from the record that the only individuals performing any marketing- 
related functions are the beneficiary and his part-time franchise service manager. As the franchise 
service manager has been described as performing administrative functions for the beneficiary on 
a part-time basis, it can only be assumed, and has not been proven otherwise, that the beneficiary 
is performing all other marketing functions, including devising marketing plans, contacting 
advertisers, and performing any public relations tasks. In addition, although the petitioner claims 
the beneficiary supervises two part-time employees, the AAO notes that the part-time franchise 
service manager is the beneficiary's spouse, who indicated on her Form 1-539, Application to 
Extendl Change Nonimmigrant Status, that she had not been employed in the United States since 
her last admission in January 2002. The record contains no evidence of wages paid to the other 
claimed employee. The petitioner has not established that it employs staff to relieve the 
beneficiary from performing routine operational duties of the business. Based on the record of 
proceeding, the beneficiary's job duties are principally composed of non-qualifying duties that 
preclude him from functioning in a primarily managerial or executive role. An employee who 
primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientoloily 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that the 
beneficiary's duties involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the 
subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 5 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of 
the Act. On appeal, counsel claims that the beneficiary supervises "the work of professional and 
managerial personnel." In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, 
the AAO must evaluate whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a 
minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 
1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not be limited to architects, 
engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary school:;, 
SRC 03 061 51696 
Page 10 
colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, 
not merely slull, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of speciali~~ed 
instruction and study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into 
the particular field of endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter oj'Ling, 
13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education requlred by the position, rather than the 
degree held by subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate 
employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a 
professional capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant matter, the petitioner has not, in 
fact, established that a bachelors degree is actually necessary, for example, to perform the 
administrative work of the franchise service manager or the franchise service manager assistant, 
who are the beneficiary's claimed subordinates. 
After careful consideration of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the beneficiary has not been 
and will not be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the 
petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, another issue in this proceeding is whether the United States 
entity has been doing business for the previous year. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the intended United States operation one year 
within the date of approval of the petition to establish the new office. Furthermore, at the time 
the petitioner seeks an extension of the new office petition, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
3 214,2(1)(14)(ii)(B) requires the petitioner to demonstrate that it has been doing business for the 
previous year. The term "doing business" is defined in the regulations as "the regular, systematic, 
and continuous provision of goods andlor sewices by a qualifying organization and does not 
include the mere presence of an agent or office of the qualifying organization in the United States 
and abroad." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii). There is no provision in CIS regulations that allows for 
an extension of this one-year period. If the business is not sufficiently operational after one year, 
the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the petitioner has 
not demonstrated that it has been doing business for the previous year. The petitioner filed to 
extend the beneficiary's stay on December 26, 2002. However, on November 5, 2002, only less 
than two months prior to the time of filing, the petitioner entered into a contractual agreement 
with Cruise Planners Franchise to operate a franchise business. In addition, the petitioner, by its 
own admission, claimed that the "U.S. subsidiary is not a fully developed commercial enterprise." 
The petitioner has also failed to submit U.S. Corporate Income Taxes showing that the business 
generated any income for the previous year. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Therefore, the petitioner failed to establish 
that the U.S. entity has been doing business for the previous year. See 8C.F..R. 
3 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). For this additional reason, the petition will not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in 
the initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 
SRC 03 061 5 1696 
Page 11 
(E.D. Cal. 2001), afjd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 
(2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought rema~ns 
entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has riot 
been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.