dismissed L-1A Case: Dental Laboratory

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 7, 2023 In Re: 29180880 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner, a dental laboratory, seeks to continue temporarily employing the Beneficiary as its 
chief executive and general manager. The company requests extension of his L-lA nonimmigrant 
petition as an intracompany transferee who would work in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the extension petition and dismissed the 
Petitioner's following combined motions to reopen and reconsider. The Director concluded that the 
company did not demonstrate its proposed employment of the Beneficiary in the claimed executive 
capacity. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Director disregarded evidence in its motion to 
reopen and should have deferred to the approval of the company's prior L-lA petition for the 
Beneficiary. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). 
Exercising de novo appellate review, see Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 
2015), we conclude that the Director considered the company's evidence, appropriately declined to 
defer to the prior L-lA approval, and properly dismissed the motions. We will therefore dismiss the 
appeal. 
I. LAW 
An L-1 A petitioner must demonstrate that - for at least one continuous year in the three years before 
a beneficiary's initial U.S. admission in nonimmigrant status - the petitioner or its parent, branch, 
subsidiary, or affiliate employed the noncitizen abroad in a capacity that was managerial, executive, 
or involved specialized knowledge. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(i), (iii), (iv). An L-lA petitioner must also 
establish that a beneficiary's education, training, and employment qualify them for a proposed U.S. 
job in a managerial or executive capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii), (iv). Although an L-1 extension 
petition need not include supporting documentation, a director may request it. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(14)(i). 
II. ANALYSIS 
The record shows that the petitioning limited liability company formed in the United States inl,____ ____, 
2019 and initially petitioned for the Beneficiary in L-lA status in May 2019. The Beneficiary, a 
Liberian native and Lebanese citizen, had worked as general manager of the Petitioner's affiliated 
dental laboratory in Lebanon since 1995. The Beneficiary wholly owns both the U.S. and Lebanese 
businesses, which make dental prostheses, apparatuses, and devices. 
The Petitioner filed the first petition as a "new office," an organization that had been doing business 
in the United States for less than one year. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(F) (defining the term new 
office). Because the business was a new office, the petition could not be approved for more than one 
year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(7)(i)(A)(3). Accordingly, the Director approved the Petitioner's first petition 
from August 6, 2019 to August 5, 2020. 
In July 2020, the Petitioner filed its second L-lA petition for the Beneficiary, seeking to extend his 
status in the offered job of chief executive and general manager. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii). The 
petitioner indicated that the company would employ the Beneficiary in an executive capacity, and the 
Director ultimately approved the filing from August 6, 2020 to August 5, 2022. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(15)(ii) (limiting the validity period of an individual L-1 extension petition to two years). 
In August 2022, the Petitioner filed this petition, seeking to extend the Beneficiary's L-lA status for 
an additional two years. The company states that he would remain working in the same job in an 
executive capacity. 1 The company claims to employ three workers and generate annual revenues of 
about $210,000. 
In February 2023, the Director denied this petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not demonstrate 
the claimed executive nature of the offered job. The Director found that the company's job-duty 
descriptions lacked details sufficient to demonstrate the Beneficiary's proposed performance of 
executive tasks, as opposed to daily operational duties. The Director also found insufficient evidence 
that the company's staffing and organizational structure would elevate the Beneficiary to a position 
beyond a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. 
In May 2023, the Petitioner moved to reopen and reconsider the petition. The company submitted 
new evidence and contended that the Director should have deferred to the approval of the prior L-1 A 
petition for the Beneficiary. The Director ultimately dismissed the motions, finding the new evidence 
insufficient and declining to defer to the prior L-1 approval. 
A. The Motion to Reopen's New Evidence 
The term "executive capacity" means work primarily involving: 
1 In its motions, the Petitioner, for the first time, claimed the Beneficiary would also work in a managerial capacity. See 
section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act. Because this petition initially omitted that assertion, we - like the Director - will not 
consider the managerial nature of the proposed work. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l) (requiring a petitioner to establish 
eligibility ·'at the time of filing the benefit request"); Matter oflzummi, 22 l&N Dec. 169, 175 (Comm'r 1998) (barring a 
petitioner from making material changes to a petition after its filing). 
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• Directing the management of an organization or a major component or function of it; 
• Establishing the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
• Exercising wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
• Receiving only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, a board of 
directors, or an organization's stockholders. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(C). 
Thus, an L-lA executive must hold an elevated position within an organization. A beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of an organization 
or a major component or function of it. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. A petitioner must show 
how the organization, component, or function is managed and demonstrate that the beneficiary would 
"primarily" focus on its management, goals, and policies, rather than on its daily operations. Id. 
When considering the executive nature of a proposed job, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) first examines the job's duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii) (requiring "a detailed 
description of the services to be performed"); see also Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 
1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990) ("The actual duties themselves reveal 
the true nature of the employment.") The Agency then considers the record's totality and weighs all 
relevant factors, including: the nature and scope of a petitioner's business; its organizational structure, 
staffing levels, and a beneficiary's position within the organization; the scope of a beneficiary's 
authority; a petitioner's employment of others who could relieve a beneficiary from performing 
operational and administrative duties; the duties of a beneficiary's proposed subordinates; and other 
factors affecting a beneficiary's business role. Matter ofZ-A-, Inc., Adopted Decision 2016-02, **4-
5 (AAO Apr. 14, 2016). 
The Petitioner's motion to reopen included: a letter from the Beneficiary stating additional 
information about his proposed job duties; an updated company organizational chart and a 
"forecasted" organizational chart for October 2023; samples of company sales and quality reports 
prepared by staff members; and job descriptions and additional information about the company's 
employees. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director did not "completely consider" the new 
evidence. 
The Director, however, discussed the new materials in her decision. She considered the Beneficiary's 
expanded description of his job duties but found that "the description still does not demonstrate how 
and why the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying executive duties as opposed to the everyday 
ground level functions of running your business." 
The Director also found the new reports and information about the Petitioner's staff insufficient 
because they do not demonstrate the qualifications of the Beneficiary's subordinates as personnel or 
function managers. The Director therefore concluded that the materials do not establish that, as a 
proposed executive, he would primarily direct the organization's management. See section 
101 ( a)( 44 )(B)(i) of the Act ( defining the term "executive capacity" to include primarily "direct[ing] 
the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization"). The 
Director further noted that the motion's organizational charts do not indicate that the Beneficiary's 
subordinates would manage or supervise others. 
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Thus, contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, the record shows the Director's consideration of the 
company's new evidence on motion. The company does not detail any materials that it believes the 
Director overlooked, nor does it specifically challenge her findings regarding the new evidence. The 
Petitioner therefore has not shown the Director's improper disregard of the motion's evidence. 
B. Deferral to the Prior L-lA Approval 
When adjudicating a nonimmigrant petition involving the same parties and underlying facts, USCIS 
generally defers to its approval of a prior filing. See generally 2 USCIS Policy Manual A.(4)(B)(l), 
www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. "[D]eviation from a previous approval carries important 
consequences and implicates predictability and consistency concerns." Id. 
But, while an extension petition follows an approval, a petitioner still bears the burden of proof. Matter 
ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 375-76. If a petitioner has not demonstrated eligibility, USCIS need not 
extend a petition based solely on the prior grant. Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l, 19 I&N Dec. 
593, 597 (Comm'r 1988). USCIS should not defer to prior approvals if: 
• They involved material errors; 
• Circumstances or eligibility requirements materially changed; or 
• New material information adversely impacts a petitioner's or beneficiary's eligibility. 
See generally 2 USCIS Policy Manual A.(4)(B)(l), www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. 
In this petition's initial denial decision, the Director explained why she was not deferring to the 
approval of the Petitioner's prior L-lA petition for the Beneficiary. The Director stated that USCIS 
erroneously approved the prior petition because job-duty descriptions and evidence of the company's 
organizational structure did not demonstrate the Beneficiary's proposed work in an executive capacity. 
For similar reasons, the Director also found that this petition does not demonstrate the claimed 
executive nature of the offered job. In her decision on the Petitioner's motions, the Director again 
explained her lack of deference to the prior L-lA approval before responding to the company's 
additional evidence and arguments on motion. 
On appeal, the Petitioner disputes the Director's finding that USCIS materially erred in approving the 
company's prior L-lA extension petition for the Beneficiary. The company contends that, in 
adjudicating the prior petition, USCIS "acted reasonably and derived reasonable interpretations of the 
evidence." The Petitioner states: "It is counterproductive and destroys the predictability of the law if 
a [USCIS] officer with more restrictive interpretations can simply overturn reasonable prior decision 
making on a whim." 
The record, however, does not support deference to the prior L-lA approval. The Director clearly 
reviewed the prior approval and outlined the basis of its error. In response to a request for additional 
evidence (RFE) on the prior approved petition, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would spend 
the following percentages of his time on the following duties: 
• 50% of his time will be spent on marketing the lab and the services it provides. He will 
visit new dentists to explain the lab services, show the lab capabilities, and understand 
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the dentists' specific needs. He will also be attending trade shows and conferences to 
learn about new products and services to bring the knowledge back and implement in 
the lab. 
• 20% of his time will be spent managing the lab finances, payroll, accounts payable and 
receivable, and investments in new equipment. He will also be processing all the tax 
payments due to the federal and state agencies. 
• 15% of his time will be spent interviewing and hiring new employees, training the new 
hires, and ensuring the existing employees are correctly following procedures. This 
will ensure that exceptional quality products are produced. In training, [the 
Beneficiary] will show them how to fabricate various dental appliances. 
• 15% of his time will be spent visiting dentists to obtain feedback from them on the 
quality of his products. He will also present existing customers with any new services 
he develops. If the dentists express concerns about quality, [he] will discuss these 
concerns with his employees, develop corrective measures, and train the employees to 
address the concerns. He will establish procedures to ensure these concerns are 
permanently addressed. 
• [The Beneficiary] will have the authority to sign all contracts related to the business 
with dentists, suppliers, and employees. As well he has the authority to deal and sign 
the necessary contracts for real property transactions, as well as contracts with banks, 
other financial institutions and any other necessary contracts that shall be signed with 
third-parties. 
As the Director found, most of the described duties do not reflect executive-level tasks involving 
directing the company's management or establishing its goals and policies. See section 
10l(a)(44)(B)(i), (ii) of the Act (defining the term "executive capacity"). Rather, most of the duties 
involve operational tasks. See Matter ofChurch Scientology Int 'l, 19 I&N Dec. at 604 ("An employee 
who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity.") Also, based on the percentages of 
time the Beneficiary would spend on these tasks, he would not "primarily" perform executive duties 
as the Act requires. 
As the Director further found, the Petitioner's prior extension petition also did not demonstrate that 
the Beneficiary's two subordinates at that time worked as managers or executives. Thus, contrary to 
the definition of executive capacity, the record did not establish that he would "direct the management" 
of the organization. See 2 USCIS Policy Manual L.(6)(D) ("An executive directs the management of 
the organization, major component, or essential function of a given organization by controlling the 
work of managerial or lower-level executive employees.") Because the Petitioner did not demonstrate 
that the Beneficiary would work in the claimed executive capacity, USCIS materially erred in 
approving the petition. 
The Petitioner contends that a "different interpretation of the same facts, one in which reasonable 
minds could come to different conclusions, is not a material error." We agree that reasonable people 
can sometimes disagree. But not in this case. Without additional evidence or explanation, a reasonable 
person could not have found that the Petitioner's prior petition established the Beneficiary's proposed 
U.S. work in an executive capacity. Contrary to the statutory definition of "executive capacity," the 
petition lacked sufficient evidence that the Beneficiary would direct the company's management or 
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establish its goals and policies. Based on his proposed duties, his position within the organization, the 
nature and scope of the Petitioner's business, its organizational structure, staffing levels, and the duties 
of his proposed subordinates, the record simply did not support the claimed executive nature of his 
proposed work. 2 The Director's RFE informed the Petitioner of the deficiencies in the prior petition 
and afforded the company an opportunity to respond. See generally 2 USCIS Policy Manual 
A.( 4)(B)(l ). The Director therefore correctly found that USCIS materially erred in approving the prior 
L- lA extension petition for the Beneficiary and properly declined to defer to the approval. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Director disregarded evidence in the company's motion 
to reopen or erred in declining to defer to the company's prior L-lA extension approval for the 
Beneficiary. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
2 USCTS may not base an executive capacity finding solely on the number of employees a beneficiary would supervise. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(C) of the Act. In reviewing the Petitioner's prior L-lA extension petition for the Beneficiary. the 
Director referred to the company's number of employees. But she also considered other factors, including: the proposed 
job's duties; the company's organizational structure; and the duties of the Beneficiary's proposed subordinates. The 
Director therefore complied with section 101(a)( 44 )( C) of the Act. 
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