dismissed L-1A Case: Dry Cleaning

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
f>/ Washington, DC 20529 
APR 0 7 %0@ 
File: SRC 02 213 50642 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
a 
Robert P. Wiemann, ~irectod 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 02 2 13 50642 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
petitioner subsequently filed four motions to reopen or reconsider, all of which were dismissed by the 
director. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will 
dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its corporate president as 
an L-1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
Florida that is engaged in the dry cleaning business. The petitioner claims that it is the subsidiary of Navkar 
Agency, located in Ahmedabad, India. The beneficiary was initially granted a one-year period of stay to open 
a new office in the United States and the petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that (1) the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; (2) the petitioner did not 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with a foreign entity; and (3) the petitioner did not establish that 
it has been doing business for the previous year. 
The petitioner subsequently filed a timely motion to reopen or reconsider on June 26, 2003. The director 
dismissed the motion on September 23, 2003 on the grounds that the beneficiary, rather than the petitioner, 
filed the motion, and because no supporting evidence was submitted. The petitioner, through counsel, filed a 
second motion to reopen or reconsider on October 2, 2003. Counsel asserted that the beneficiary, in his 
capacity as the petitioner's president, is eligible to submit the motion, and also claimed that counsel had 
submitted a timely brief with supporting evidence in support of the first motion. The director dismissed the 
motion on October 17, 2003, noting that CIS was unable to determine whether the beneficiary was still 
employed with the petitioner, such that he could be considered a representative of the company. The director 
also noted that the Service Center never received the supporting evidence in support of the first motion, and 
that no supporting evidence was included with the second motion. Finally, the director noted that the 
petitioner had a new attorney, but noted that the previous attorney had not notified CIS of his withdrawal 
from the case. 
The petitioner filed a third motion to reopen and reconsider with supporting evidence on November 7, 2003. 
The director granted the motion, and on review of the additional evidence, affirmed her previous decision to 
deny the petition on all grounds stated above. On January 12, 2004, the petitioner filed a fourth motion to 
reopen and reconsider along with additional evidence. The director granted the motion and again affirmed her 
previous decision to deny the petition, noting that the evidence submitted on motion did not overcome the 
reasons for denying the original petition. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner disputes the director's 
decision and asserts that the director has not properly analyzed the evidence or applied the law to the facts in 
the instant petition. The petitioner states that the evidence on record establishes the beneficiary's eligibility 
for the benefit sought. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submits additional evidence. 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 3 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations 
as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a management or executive 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 4 
capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the initial petition, submitted on July 2, 2002, the petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties as 
follows: 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 5 
In general, [the beneficiary] establishes [the petitioner's] internal polices and revenue 
objectives; he alone plans business expansion strategies; and develops all internal corporate 
and personnel policies and operation guidelines. He establishes responsibilities and 
procedures among various employees. Importantly, he is in charge of all the financial and 
fiscal programs of the company. His responsibilities include ensuring that there are always 
sufficient funds on hand to maintain corporate operations, and that revenue goals are attained. 
In addition, he has also been tasked by the parent company in India to continue to seek out 
targeted businesses in this industry for acquisition, which he has already accomplished two 
(2) times in the first year of his L-1A validity. 
[The beneficiary] . . . is continuing to work, literally on a daily basis, with business and real 
estate brokers here in Broward County Florida, for the purpose of identifying and targeting 
additional locations. 
Additional duties include hiring and training all personne1;establishing weekly work 
schedules; assigning current employees to one or the other locations as work requires . . .; 
making decisions as to inventories of dry cleaning chemicals, solutions, etc. to be kept on 
hand; as well as "keeping an eye on the books" of the corporation, making certain that cash 
flow requirements are met and there are always funds on hand to continue daily corporate 
activities and to fund further acquisitions. He also spends a great deal of his time reading 
materials relative to the dry cleaning industry, including the business aspects thereof, as well 
as speaking with machinery and equipment wholesalers as to dry cleaning equipment and 
machinery that may be available for purchase, in order to upgrade current improvement at 
one or the other of the two operating locations. 
The petitioner noted that the beneficiary has been and will be serving in an executive, rather than a 
managerial capacity, and further described his duties as follows: 
As corporate president [the beneficiary] directs the entire organization of [the petitioner]; He 
alone establishes its goals and policies; he exercises 100% latitude in discretionary decision- 
making; and receives no supervision from higher level persons in the United States. [The 
beneficiary] is primarily involved in directing the petitioner corporation in its business and 
corporate functions, namely the ownership and operation presently of two dry cleaning stores 
(including a dry cleaning plant) and, to a very great extent as well, dealing with business and 
real estate brokers, selecting and targeting additional such businesses for acquisition by the 
petitioner corporation. The provision of the actual dry cleaning services to retail customers is 
performed by existing employees. A member of the retail public waling [sic] in for dry 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 6 
cleaning services would not have any dealings with [the beneficiary], and indeed would not 
even see him. 
[The beneficiary] spends a considerable amount of time working on identifying other dry 
cleaning establishments here in South Florida which may be available for sale and (together 
with business and real estate brokers) negotiating for potential purchases. . . .[The 
beneficiary] probably spends, expressed as a percentage, 75% of his time on a daily basis 
involved in these kinds of activities; the remainder of his time is spent on matters involving 
the daily operation of [the petitioner] as a business, including personnel items; revenue and 
banking items; discussions with our suppliers; with the accountant; with our bankers; etc. He 
also hires and trains our employees (there is a great deal of turnover in this industry) and 
assigns work schedules on a weekly basis, including assigning our employees to one or the 
other of our two locations, both in Margate, Florida, as needs reasonably appear. 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that it employed five individuals at the time the petition was filed. The 
petitioner submitted copies of its federal and state quarterly tax reports for the first quarter of 2002, indicating 
five employees, including the beneficiary. 
On September 11, 2002, the director requested additional evidence. Specifically, the director requested (I) a 
description of the staffing of the U.S. company since July 2001, including the name, title, duties, 
qualifications, date hired and hours worked per week for all staff, including the beneficiary; (2) Form W-3 for 
2001; (3) state and federal quarterly tax returns for 2001 and for the second and third quarters of 2002; and 
evidence of business conducted by the U.S. company from July 2001 to the present, including sales invoices. 
In response, the petitioner submitted the requested tax documents which establish that the petitioner employed 
up to six employees, including the beneficiary, during the previous four quarters. As of July 2002, the 
petitioner had four employees. The petitioner also submitted its 2001 Form W-3, transmittal of Wage and Tax 
statements, evidencing wages of $12,015 paid. The petitioner stated that its staff includes a full-time 
"presser/counter," a full-time "presserlspotterlcounter," a part-time "taggerlcounter," a full-time 
"presserlspotter," and a part-time "presser/counter." 
In a letter dated November 19, 2002, counsel for the petitioner also emphasized that the beneficiary is 
employed in an executive capacity and therefore is not required to manage supervisory, professional or 
managerial personnel in order to qualify for the benefit sought. Counsel also asserted: 
[Tlhe existence of five other people is conclusive as to the fact that [the beneficiary] does not 
have to spend his day standing at the counter at one or another of the other locations 
providing the goods and services of [the petitioner]; it proves just the contrary; he is relieved 
of doing so by the existence and presence of these five other people, such that he may spend 
100% of his time involved in executive capacity matters, such as supervising the entire 
business of [the petitioner]; making certain that it meets its revenue goals through pricing and 
SRC 02 2 13 50642 
Page 7 
credit policies that he establishes; exercising extremely wide latitude . . .and receives only 
very generalized, global supervision from [the foreign entity]. 
The fact of the matter is that [the beneficiary] the L-1A transferee, spends most of his days 
dealing with business brokers, looking for additional locations for drycleaning "drop 
locations" here in Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida. When not "on the road" with a 
business broker, he tries to divide his time between the two locations; not for the purpose of 
standing at the counter and providing services to members of the public waking in with 
garments to be dry cleaned, but for the purpose of supervising the entire business of [the 
petitioner] at that location. 
On May 27, 2003, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or an executive capacity. The director noted that 
the petitioner did not have sufficient employees available to relieve him from engaging in non-qualifying 
tasks. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary does not perform the day-to-day duties of the 
business and functions at an executive level with full discretionary authority to direct and develop the 
company. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. When examining the executive or managerial capacity 
of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 
2142(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial 
capacity. Id. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary will perform only executive duties, 
but has provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what 
the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary spends the 
majority of his time "dealing with business brokers" and "negotiating for potential purchases" for additional 
locations, but these broad descriptions of the beneficiary's overall goals convey little understanding of what 
specific executive duties are involved in searching for additional locations. The petitioner did not submit a 
reasonable explanation as to how these duties require 75% of the beneficiary's time, particularly if he is 
utilizing the services of real estate and business brokers, presumably to locate establishments that meet the 
petitioner's requirements. Moreover, as of March 2004, almost two years after the instant petition was filed, 
the petitioner still operates only two dry cleaning establishments, the same number it operated at the time the 
petition was filed. This raises further questions as to whether the beneficiary has been primarily engaged in 
executive-level business negotiations, as asserted by the petitioner. If CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in 
the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $, 1154(b); see also 
Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 
10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The petitioner also states 
that the beneficiary is in charge of all the financial and fiscal programs of the company, but has not identified 
who performs routine bookkeeping and related tasks. Going on record without supporting documentary 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 8 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 1972). Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. 
Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Counsel is required to substantiate his claim 
that "the beneficiary has full discretionary authority to direct and develop the company" with a detailed 
description of how the beneficiary's responsibility of running and managing the company would satisfy the 
requirements of either managerial or executive capacity. 
Further, rather than providing a specific description of the beneficiary's duties, the petitioner generally 
paraphrased the statutory definition of executive capacity. See section lOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
8 1101(a)(44)(A). For example, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "directs the entire organization," 
"establishes its goals and policies," "exercises 100% latitude in discretionary decision-making," and "receives 
no supervision from higher level persons in the United States." However, conclusory assertions regarding the 
beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. Merely 
repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr 
Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at "5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
The petitioner also fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be executive 
functions and what proportion would be non-executive. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's duties as 
executive but it fails to provide a meaningful breakdown of the time the beneficiary spends on them, other 
than making the unsupported statement that the beneficiary devotes 75% of his time to searching for 
additional establishments to purchase for the petitioner. This failure of documentation is important because 
several of the beneficiary's daily tasks, such as training and scheduling the low-level personnel of the dry 
cleaning stores, ordering inventory and supplies, and routine bookkeeping and banking activities, do not fall 
directly under traditional managerial or executive duties as defined in the statute. For this reason, the AAO 
cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of an executive or manager. See 
IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the director erred in determining that the petitioner does not employ 
sufficient staff to relieve the beneficiary from performing non-executive duties. Pursuant to section 
101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(C), if staffing levels are used as a factor in determining 
whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, CIS must take into account the 
reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the 
organization. In the present matter, however, the regulations provide strict evidentiary requirements for the 
extension of a "new office" petition and require CIS to examine the organizational structure and staffing 
levels of the petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(D). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) 
allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive 
or managerial position. There is no provision in CIS regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year 
period. If the business does not have sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from 
primarily performing operational and administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an 
extension. 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 9 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was a one-year-old company engaged in operating two drying cleaning 
establishments. The petitioner claimed to employ the beneficiary as president, and five other employees at 
the time the petition was filed, including three full-time employees and two part-time employees purported to 
work 25 hours per week. A review of the petitioner's state quarterly wage reports reveals that the petitioner 
had only one full-time employee, other than the beneficiary, during the second and third quarters of 2002. 
The individual identified as a "full-time presser/spotter/counter" received a total of $310.00 in wages 
(approximately five hours per week at minimum wage) during the second quarter of 2002 and was no longer 
on the petitioner's payroll as of July 2002, when the instant petition was filed. The individual identified as a 
full-time presser/spotter received $1,300 in wages (approximately 20 hours per week at minimum wage) 
during the second quarter of 2002 and was no longer on the payroll as of July 2002. The part-time 
"presser/counter" employee, who the petitioner described as working 25 hours per week, received wages of 
$300 and $825 respectively during the second and third quarters of 2002. Clearly, the petitioner greatly 
exaggerated the number of hours actually worked by its employees. Doubt cast on any aspect of the 
petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
Based on the petitioner's representations and the evidence submitted regarding the petitioner's staffing, it does 
not appear that the reasonable needs of the petitioning company, which claims to operate two dry cleaning 
establishments, might plausibly be met by the services of the beneficiary as president, one full-time employee, 
and a few part-time employees. Notwithstanding the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary spends the 
majority of his time searching for expansion opportunities, it can only be assumed, and it has not been proven 
otherwise, that the beneficiary is actually working in the dry cleaning establishments on a regular basis in 
order to ensure that the operations are staffed during their operating hours. Further, the petitioner has not 
identified any of its employees as store managers or supervisors. Based on the record of proceeding, the 
beneficiary's job duties, by necessity, must be principally composed of supervising the low-level employees 
who provide dry cleaning services in the petitioner's two stores, if not actually providing the services himself. 
A managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level 
normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
Regardless, the reasonable needs of the petitioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in the 
context of reviewing the claimed managerial or executive duties. The petitioner must still establish that the 
beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, pursuant to 
sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. As discussed above, the petitioner has not established this 
essential element of eligibility. 
When a new business is established and commences operations, the regulations recognize that a designated 
manager or executive responsible for setting up operations will be engaged in a variety of activities not 
normally performed by employees at the executive or managerial level and that often the full range of 
managerial responsibility cannot be performed. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the 
intended United States operation one year within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive 
or managerial position. In order to qualify for an extension of L-1 nonimrnigrant classification under a 
petition involving a new office, the petitioner must demonstrate through evidence, such as a description of 
SRC 02 213 50642 
Page 10 
both the beneficiary's duties and the staff of the organization, that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The record is not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner indicates that it plans to hire additional managers and 
employees in the future. However, the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the 
nonirnrnigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or 
beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. 
Cornrn. 1978). Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the intended United States operation one 
year within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no 
provision in CIS regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business is not 
sufficiently operational after one year, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant 
matter, the petitioner has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly 
managerial or executive position. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established a qualifying relationship with a 
foreign entity as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i). 
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G), "qualifying organization" means a United States or foreign firm, 
corporation, or other legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specific in the definition of a parent, 
branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not required) as an 
employer in the United States and in at least one other country directly or through a 
parent, branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United 
States as an intracompany transferee[.] 
Further, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(I) defines "parent" as a firm, corporation or other legal 
entity which has subsidiaries. A "subsidiary" means, in pertinent part, a firm, corporation, or other legal 
entity of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and in fact controls the 
entity. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that the United States entity is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
beneficiary's previous employer, Navkar Agency, a sole proprietorship located in India. The petitioner 
submitted documentation to establish the qualifying relationship with the initial petition and in response to the 
director's request for evidence. The petitioner's articles of incorporation reflect that the United States 
company is authorized to issue 5,000 shares of corporate stock, and the petitioner's stock certificate reflects 
the issuance of 5,000 shares of stock to Navkar Agency. The petitioner's 2001 and 2002 U.S. Corporate 
Income Tax Returns indicate on Schedule K and on Form 5472, that Navkar Agency is the sole owner of the 
petitioning company. The foreign company's audited financial statements reflect Navkar's investment in the 
petitioning company. 
SRC 02 21 3 50642 
Page 11 
On May 27, 2003, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established a 
qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. The director noted that the stock certificate was issued to the 
foreign sole proprietor's "fictitious name" and stated that it was therefore "of questionable validity." The 
director also noted that the foreign entity did not report the investment in the United States company until 
2002, and further noted that the foreign sole proprietor "had no involvement in the lease of the dry cleaning 
establishment. . . and no involvement in the purchase of its assets." Therefore the director concluded that, 
while the foreign sole proprietor owns the United States entity, the petitioner failed to establish that she in fact 
exercises any control over the United States company. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in her decision, specifically noting that there is no 
requirement that a U.S. company's stock be issued in the name of the sole proprietor rather than in the name 
of the proprietorship, nor any requirement that the foreign company be involved in the U.S. company's lease 
or purchase agreement. 
Upon review of the evidence, the petitioner has established a qualifying affiliate relationship between the 
foreign entity and the United States company, as both entities are owned and controlled by the same 
individual. The director's decision with respect to this issue will be withdrawn. The petitioner has provided 
reasonable explanations with respect to the concerns raised by the director regarding its relationship with the 
foreign entity. Furthermore, it is noted for the record that the shareholder of the U.S. company is deemed to 
have de jure control over the entity by virtue of owning all of the petitioner's stock; the petitioner had no 
further burden to establish that the foreign sole proprietor actually controls the United States entity. See 
Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Cornrn. 1982). 
The third issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that it has been doing business for 
one year preceding the filing of the instant petition to extend the beneficiary's status. 
As noted above, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the intended United States operation one 
year within the date of approval of the petition to establish the new office. Furthermore, at the time the 
petitioner seeks an extension of the new office petition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B) 
requires the petitioner to demonstrate that it has been doing business for the previous year. The term "doing 
business" is defined in the regulations as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andor 
services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office of the 
qualifying organization in the United States and abroad." 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii). Again, there is no 
provision in CIS regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business is not 
sufficiently operational after one year, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant 
matter, beneficiary was granted a one-year period of stay from July 11, 2001 to July 1 I, 2002 in order to open 
a new office. 
With the initial petition and in response to a subsequent request for evidence, the petitioner submitted 
evidence to establish that it was operating two dry cleaning establishments, acquired on August 29, 2001 and 
October 22, 2001, respectively. The petitioner submitted evidence to establish that it had purchased or leased 
property, equipment and assets and taken over existing lease agreements and other obligations, such as 
insurance, utilities and tax payments for both establishments. The petitioner's wage statements establish that 
SRC 02 2 13 50642 
Page 12 
the company began paying salaries in September 2001. The petitioner also submitted its 2001 and 2002 U.S. 
corporation income tax returns, bank statements and financial statements as evidence that it was doing 
business. 
In her decision to deny the petition, the director concluded that the petitioner did not establish that it was 
doing business. The director noted that, according to the Florida Division of Corporations web site the 
original owners of the two dry cleaning establishments were still operating the businesses at the same 
locations. The director also noted some confusion regarding the parties to the lease and purchase agreements 
surrounding the two dry cleaning businesses, and found that, since the petitioner only had a lease to operate 
the businesses, it had not established ownership and control of the businesses. The director also found that the 
petitioner did not pay any wages in 2001, although the petitioner submitted Form W-3, Forms 941 and state 
quarterly reports for the last two quarters of 2001, and the petitioner's accountant had explained that wages 
were included under "cost of labor" on the company's 2001 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner provides an explanation addressing the director's stated reasons for 
denial and asserts that the company has been conducting "a regular, systematic and continuous course of 
business since July 2001." 
Upon review of the record, the AAO concurs that the petitioner has not established that it was doing business 
since July 2001. The petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence to establish that it has, in fact, been doing 
business as an operator of two dry cleaning establishments. Contrary to the statements made by the director, 
whether the petitioner owns or leases the property and equipment is not material to this matter. The AAO is 
also satisfied that the petitioner has been doing business since September 2001. However, there is no evidence 
that the petitioner was doing business between July and September 2001. Furthermore, the petitioner did not 
secure a commercial lease until August 31, 2001, more than one month after the approval of the original new 
office petition. The record includes a copy of the Form 1-129 Petition filed with the new office petition in 
2000. On this form, the petitioner indicated the beneficiary's work site as 5424 West Atlantic Boulevard, 
Margate, Florida. This is the address for the property leased to the petitioner in October 2001. The regulation 
at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(A) requires a petitioner that seeks to open a new office to submit evidence that it 
has acquired sufficient physical premises to commence doing business. In the present matter, either the 
petitioner did not comply with this requirement, misrepresented that they had complied, or the director 
committed gross error in approving the petition without evidence of the petitioner's physical premises. 
Regardless, the approval of the initial petition may be subject to revocation based on the evidence submitted 
with this petition. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(9)(iii). For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.