dismissed L-1A Case: Education

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF G- INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAR. 15,2018 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a provider of education products and services, seeks to continue the Beneficiary's 
employment as its "CEO" under the L-1 A nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees 1 See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section IOI(a)(I5)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ IIOI(a)(IS)(L). TheL-IA classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its 
affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United States to work 
temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the new office petition concluding that the 
Petitioner did not establish, as required, that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity under the extended petition. 
On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the Director's decision, asserting that the decision contains 
factual and legal errors and misinterprets the submitted evidence. 
Upon de nol'o review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
l. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 A nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year within 
three years preceding the beneficiary's application tor admission into the United States. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(l)(3)(v)(B). In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
managerial or executive capacity. !d. 
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The Petitioner previously filed a ·'new office'' petition on the Beneficiary's behalf which was approved for the period of 
July 7. 2016. to July 6, 2017. A "new office" is an organization that has been doing business in the United States 
through a parent. branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for less than one year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(F). The regulation at 
8 C.F.R. ~ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows a ·'new office" operation one year within the date of approval of the petition to 
support an executive or managerial position. 
Mauer of G- l11c. 
A petitioner seeking to extend an L-1 A petition that involved a new office must submit a statement 
of the beneficiary's duties during the previous year and under the extended petition; a statement 
describing the starting of the new operation and evidence of the numbers and types of positions held; 
evidence of its financial status, evidence that it has been doing business for the previous year; and 
evidence that it maintains a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l4)(ii). 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
or executive capacity, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take into account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. See section 10l(a)(44)(C) of the Act. 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
In this matter, the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary will be employed in an executive capacity. 
As the Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary will be employed in a managerial capacity, we 
restrict our analysis to whether the Beneficiary will be employed in an executive capacity. 
The tenn '"executive capacity" is defined as an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily directs the management of the organization or a major component or fi.mction of 
the organization; establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or 
direction trom higher-level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
When examining the managerial or executive capacity of a given beneficiary, we will look to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. The petitioner's job description must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). Beyond the required description of the job duties, 
USCIS examines the company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate 
employees, the presence of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational 
duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a 
beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
Accordingly, we will discuss the submitted evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along 
with evidence of the nature of the Petitioner's business and its stafting levels. 
A. Duties 
Based on the statutory definition of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the Beneficiary 
will perfonn certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 
1991) (unpublished table decision). The Petitioner must also prove that the Beneficiary will be primarily" 
engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other 
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employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 
1533. 
The Petitioner in this instance owns and operates a preschool and sells educational materials and 
services. In its supporting statement, the Petitioner stated that it forged a partnership with a U.S. soccer 
club to organize "an international winter event" to encourage Chinese families to visit the United States 
lor "weekend activities tor parents and children." Evidence of its business activities include documents 
showing the Petitioner's purchase of an existing preschooL photos of the preschool facility, and pay stubs 
indicating that the Petitioner retained a number of employees who were already working at the preschooL 
In addition, the Petitioner provided a consulting agreement and a general service agreement, each of 
· which identify the Petitioner as a party to the agreement. 
With regard to the proposed position, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would fommlate and 
implement the company's policies and objectives, provide direction and leadership towards realizing the 
company's "philosophy, mission, strategy, and objectives," make recommendations to the board of 
directors and carry out their plans approved, review reports and financial statements, and recommend and 
oversee budgets and investments. The Petitioner also provided fonnal job descriptions,. which included 
job duty breakdowns for the Beneficiary's first year of employment and his proposed employment under 
an extended petition. With the exception of the listed actions and initiatives the Beneficiary carried out 
during the Petitioner's first year of operation, the job descriptions were otherwise identical, generally 
focusing on the Beneficiary's discretionary decision-making authority with respect to the Petitioner's 
business activities, finances, and subordinate staff Both job descriptions consisted of ten groups of 
duties with each group being allocated 10% of the Beneficiary's time. Each group of duties was placed 
in one four categories: "About goals and policies"; "About directing the management [and] discretionary 
decisions"; "About goals and policies [and] discretionary decisions"; and "About discretionary 
decisions." 
In a notice of intent to deny (NOlO), the Director notified the Petitioner that the previously 
submitted job description did not adequately describe the Beneficiary's proposed position because it 
lacked detailed information about his specific daily activity. Despite being notified of this 
evidentiary deficiency, the Petitioner resubmitted the original job duty breakdown, claiming that the 
job description included "detailed duties and expected executive decisions" as well as "the 
percentage of time (as small as possible) required for each duty." The Petitioner also provided a 
"Revised Employee List," which contained a job summary for each claimed employee; the 
Beneficiary's job summary briefly reiterated his leadership role with respect to all business matters 
and staff and indicated that he would answer only to the board of directors. 
The Petitioner also discussed its purchase of a preschool and provided evidence of initiatives 
undertaken by the Beneficiary following the purchase, including copies of parent and employee 
handbooks and invoices for upgrades done to the school's security system. The Petitioner also 
resubmitted the previously described consulting and service agreements and provided product and 
education service sales invoices and promotional advertising material. 
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We found seve ral tlaws with the consulting agreement in the course of our review . First, although 
the agre ement identities as "Party A" and the Petitioner as " Party B," it does not 
clearly designate either party as "the Consu ltant" or the clie nt. Despite the Petitioner 's claim that it 
served as the provider of education consultin g services, this agreement does not express ly designate 
the Peti tioner as the servic e provider. In fact, even if the Petitioner estab lished that it wa s the serv ice 
providing party in this agreement , it is uncl ear who, if not the Beneticiary, would car ry out t he 
consultin g function, which was not assigned to any of the Ben eficiary's dir ect or indirect 
subordinate s, accor ding to the employee job summaries. Given this lack of clarity as to who would 
provi de education consulting services to the Petitione r' s clie nts, we are precluded from mak ing a 
determin ation as to the amo unt of time the Beneficiary would devote to providi ng cons ulting 
services to the Petitioner 's client s. An emp loyee who " primari ly" perform s t he tas ks necessa ry to 
produc e a produc t or to provide services is not considered to be "primaril y" emp loyed in a 
manageri al or exec utive capacity. See . e.g., sections I 0 I (a)( 44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requi ring that 
one "prim arily" perform the enumerated manage rial or exec uti ve duties); lvlatter (?[ Chu rch 
Scientolo f:.'Y !nt '/, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm ' r 1988). We also note that sect ions I and 4.1 are at 
odds w ith one anothe r in terms of when the consu lting agreement will termina te. Section I reiterates 
the agreement 's date of executio n and states that the agreem ent "shall terminate after 12 months, 
unle ss otherw ise agreed in writing .... " However, section 4.1 , titled " Bas ic Term," is uncle ar on 
the perio d the agree ment will be in eftect and, in fac t, seems to indicate that the agre ement may be 
terminated on the date that it comme nces. 
Next , with regard to the trave l planning service agreement, altho ugh the Petition er is clearly 
designated as the purchas ing party, no additi ona l infor mation was provided about the circumstances 
under which this agreement would be in effect within the scope of the Petiti oner's business 
operation. The Petitioner also did not state who would oversee the prov ision of the travel service o r 
specifically di sclose the degr ee of the Benefici ary's involvement in such oversight whe n discuss ing 
his job duties. Despite designating workers in China who woul d " [o]versee aspects of international 
operation s a nd activities" and deve lop business in China, it is unclear who woul d actually impleme nt 
the U.S.-based summer and winter camp proj ects, given that the ' ' which 
is respon si ble for the overseas acti vities, is purportedl y compri sed of workers in China , thousands of 
miles away from where the summer and winter camps would actuall y take place. 
Lastly , while the Petitioi1er subm itted six invoic es for a 12-da y ,, 
it did not provide corroborating evidence to show that payment s we re made on tho se invoices or 
disclose the dates and location(s) of the camp( s), describe the nature of the camp activities, or 
speci fy who within the Petitio ner 's organization wou ld organi ze and oversee those act ivities dur ing 
the camp scss ion(s). This overa ll lack of sufficient evide nce about the full scope of the Petitioner's 
business preclud es a meaningf ul understandin g of the Beneficiary's leve l of participation and 
amount of time he would devot e to the daily operationa l tasks assoc iated w ith this reve nue­
generating activity . 
In the den ial decision, the Directo r determined that the NOID response contai ned a deficient job 
descripti on that lacked specific information about the Beneficiar y's dai ly j ob duties. The Directo r 
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therefore concluded that the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary would primarily perform 
tasks of an executive nature. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that pur.chasing a preschool was within its business scope as an 
investment company and argues, as it did in the NOlO response, that a detailed job description and 
specific time allocations for each duty had already been provided. We disagree and find that the 
Petitioner did not adequately support its claims with a detailed description of the Beneficiary's 
typical daily tasks. 
As noted earlier, the Petitioner provided identical job duty breakdowns to describe what the 
Beneficiary did during the Petitioner's first year of operation as. a new office and what he would do 
in his proposed position under an extended petition. As evident from the provisions of the "new 
ot1ice" regulations, it is assumed that the beneficiary of a new ot1ice petition is not likely to focus 
primarily on executive job duties during a new office petitioner's initial phase of operation. As such, 
we question the reliability of a job description that was used to describe the Beneficiary's job duties 
during two entirely different phases of the Petitioner's operation. The fact that the Petitioner did not 
provide a job duty breakdown that reflects the Petitioner's stage of development under an extended 
petition indicates that the job description is overly broad and does not identify actual tasks that 
correspond to a specific operational phase. For instance, the first set of duties was placed in the 
category "About goals and policies" and stated, in part, that the Beneficiary would be responsible tor 
"creating, planning, implementing and integrating the [Petitioner's] strategic direction"; 
"[d]evelop[ing] the culture of the business"; communicating and implementing "the company's 
vision, mission, and overall direction"; leading in strategy development and implementation; 
reviewing and approving various management and marketing policies and objectives; and reviewing, 
evaluating, and approving investment projects and proposals made by the general manager and 
marketing director and collaborating with them to "generate substantial annual revenue and foster ... 
financial health." The Petitioner did not assign time constraints to individual job duties or provide 
specific information about the underlying tasks that would enable the Beneficiary to formulate 
policies, strategies, and objectives. The Petitioner also did not specify any policies, strategies, or 
objectives that are consistent with its stage of development at the time the petition was filed. 
The second set ofjob duties- also categorized as "About goals and policies" -was equally vague,· 
focusing on the Beneficiary's responsibility with respect to company finances and business strategies 
that are consistent with the company's short- and long-term goals. The Petitioner stated that the 
Beneficiary would also: generate new business and approve new- projects; guide board actions; 
establish and adjust financial procedures, accounting policies, and management systems; review 
financial business plans and forecasts; and approve annual budgets, audit reports, and business 
decisions. The Petitioner did not state how the Beneficiary would generate new business or establish 
that this is a qualifying executive job duty, nor did the Petitioner state how much time the 
Beneficiary would devote to this potentially non-executive task. As with the first set of duties, these 
job duties are similarly comprised of vague statements that convey the same general idea about the 
Beneficiary's discretionary authority in all business matters; they do not, however, provide true 
insight as to the Benefici'ary's proposed daily actions within the scope of the Petitioner's education­
based organization. 
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The next six sets of duties were categorized as "About directing the management [and] discretionary 
decisions"; the Petitioner indicated that the duties in these six sets would consume 60% of the 
Beneficiary's time. The Petitioner did not explain why the job duties were separated into six sets, 
given that all six sets were identified under the same category. The duties listed were once again 
broad in nature and did not identify the Beneficiary's specific daily tasks, maintaining focus on the 
Beneficiary's discretionary authority with respect to the company's staff, finances, and business 
objectives. Although the Petitioner expressly stated that the Beneficiary would engage in contract 
negotiations, it did not establish that contract negotiation is an executive task or state how much time 
the Beneficiary would devote to this activity. The Petitioner also stated that the Beneficiary would 
help with "all tasks necessary to achieve the company's mission," thereby indicating that the 
Beneficiary may have to perform other non-executive job duties to meet the company's business 
needs. Again, the Petitioner did not identify specific tasks or assign time allocations in such a way 
that would establish that the Beneficiary would devote more time to executive tasks than to non­
executive ones. Instead, the Petitioner broadly relied on the Beneficiary's key role in overseeing, 
monitoring, and coordinating the company's business activities, subordinate staft~ and financial 
interests to establish that he would be employed in an executive capacity. As noted earlier, these 
generalities lack meaningful content and do not take into account that the Beneficiary's job duties 
during the Petitioner's earlier operational phase were likely to have been different from tasks he 
would be required to perform during the phase of development the Petitioner entered at the time this 
petition was filed. 
In light of the deficiencies noted above, we find that the job descriptions provided in this matter were 
deficient and lacked the degree of detail that is necessary to determine what actual tasks the 
Beneficiary would perform on a daily basis and the executive or non-executive nature of those tasks. 
Grouping the Beneficiary's job duty breakdown into categories does not impart sufficient critical 
knowledge about his specific tasks; these subdivisions confuse, rather than help, our ability to 
understand the Beneficiary's specific tasks, as the Petitioner did not explain why the same category 
was assigned to multiple sets of job duties. Further, while we acknowledge that the Petitioner 
assigned I 0% of the Beneficiary's time to ten sets of job duties, contrary to its claim, no time 
allocations were assigned to individual job duties. 
Moreover, as noted throughout this decision, the job description was primarily comprised of vague 
references to the company's "vision and mission" and broad claims about the Beneficiary's overall 
job responsibilities. While this information ·is adequate to give us a general sense of the 
Beneficiary's discretionary authority over all business matters, it does not convey a meaningful 
understanding of the specific activities that would comprise the Beneficiary's proposed position. 
The fact that the Beneficiary will manage or direct the Petitioner's organization does not necessarily 
establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity within the meaning of 
section I 0 I (a)( 44 )(B) of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties 
of a position be "primarily" executive in nature. !d. Thus, aside from establishing that the 
Beneficiary will exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possess the 
requisite level of authority with respect to discretionary decision-making, the Petitioner must 
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Mauer ofG- Inc. 
establi sh that the duties to be performed would be primarily at an execu tive level. We note that a 
detailed job description is cri tical in establishing that the Beneti ciary's proposed posit ion meets the 
statu tory cri teria, as the act ual duties the mse lves revea l the true nature of the emplo yment. Fedin 
Bros. Co .. Ltd. v. Sctva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, I I 08 (E.O.N. Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 4 I (2d. C ir. I 990). 
While the Beneticiary may have discretionary aut hority over the Petitioner's financial and business 
concerns , the Petitioner has prov ided a job description that consists mainly of general info rmation 
and doe s not establish that the Beneficiary would primarily perform execu tive-leve l tasks as part of 
his daily or week ly routine. 
B. Staffing 
At the time o f tiling, the Petiti oner ·claimed that it had 14 em ployees and no net annual income. In 
support of the petition, the Petitioner provided an orga nizati onal chart that depicted the Beneficiary 
·at the top of the organiz ationa l hierarchy, second only to the company 's board of directors. The 
chart shows t hat the Benefi ciary has one direct subo rdinate - t he genera l manag er - who oversees a 
marketing directo r, the di rector of the preschoo l that the Petitioner purchased, and an interna tiona l 
department locate d in China. 
, 
The Petiti one r' s NOID response included pay stub s for the Petiti oner's employees in July 2017 
during which the instant peti tion was filed . The reco rd does not conta in a pay stub for the 
Petition er's marketing director or evidence to show that the Petitioner compensat ed t he employees it 
claim s to have in China. As note d earlier, the NOID respon se also included an emp loyee job 
description shee t, wh ich ind icates that critical marketing duti es are ass igned to the marketing 
director. Howeve r, based on the lack of evidence showing that the Petitioner actua lly emp loyed a 
marketing director at the tim e of tiling, it is uncl ear who was performi ng the duties of this position 
_and how the lack of a mar keting director would affec t the Benefici ary and his abilit y to devote his 
time primarily to exec utive job dut ies. 
In den ying the petition, the Director incorrectly app lied the s tatut ory definition of exec utive capac ity 
to the Benefic iary's subordinat es. We note that only the Benefici ary is bound by the cri teria set by 
the statut ory detinition of man age rial or executive capacity. As such, the Peti tioner must provide 
evidenc e to s how that its organizational hierarchy and staffing structure will support the Beneficiary 
in an executive positiOn. Here, notwithstanding the flawed analys is, the Director prope rly 
questioned how the Bene ficiary would oversee employees that are located in China, given the 
dista nce betw een the Bene ficiary and the location where three of his clai med subordi nates woul d 
exec ute the tasks of the · The Director also noted that the sub mitted 
employee pay stubs do not corroborate the claim that the Petiti oner had 14 em ployees at the time the 
petition was liled. 
On appeal , the Petitioner contends that we must take into accoun·t "the wider qualifying international 
organization ," which includes emplo yees who wprk overseas. However, the Pet itioner mus t support 
its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible ev idence. See Matter ofChawathe , 25 I&N Dec. 
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Mauer ofG- Inc. 
369, 3 76 (AAO 201 0). In the present matter, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient information 
explaining how the Beneficiary would oversee employees who work in China, nor has it provided 
evidence of compensation to show that it actually employs these individuals, as claimed. We 
therefore cannot conclude, based on the evidence provided, that the Petitioner has foreign-based 
employees who would help relieve the Beneficiary from having to allocate his time primarily to non­
executive tasks. 
Furthermore, the statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated 
position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish 
the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a 
subordinate level of managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct and they must primarily focus 
on the broad goals and poli.cies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the 
enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they 
have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial 
employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and 
receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." !d. 
The Petitioner asserts that it operates within "a typical traditional organizational reporting structure" 
where the Beneficiary assumes the role of its "top executive" with multiple subordinate levels of 
employees below him. The Petitioner's organizational chart indicates that the general manager is the 
Beneficiary's. only direct subordinate and that it is the general manager who would oversee a 
preschool director, a marketing director, and the "international department" where the three China­
based employees would work. However, as previously stated, the Petitioner has not provided 
evidence to show that at the time of filing it employed a marketing director, who would oversee a 
marketing department. or that it had overseas employees, who. would carry out the duties of an 
"international department." See Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. at 376. Although the Petitioner appears to 
have two marketing employees, a preschool director, and part- and full-time preschool teachers, we 
cannot conclude that this organizational structure provides a sufficient managerial tier through which 
the Beneticiary can be said to "direct the management" of the organization. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, we find that the Petitioner has not established that the 'Beneficiary 
will be employed in the United States in an executive capacity under an extended petition. The 
appeal will be dismissed for this reason. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Maller ofG- Inc., ID# 1015557 (AAO Mar. 15,20 18) 
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