dismissed L-1A Case: Fruit Import And Export

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: JULY 12, 2024 In Re: 32157984 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner, a fruit importer and exporter, seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a purchasing manager. 
The company requests her classification under the L-lA nonimmigrant visa category as an 
intracompany transferee who would temporarily work in a "managerial" or "executive capacity." See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition. The Director concluded that the 
Petitioner did not demonstrate the Beneficiary's foreign or proposed U.S. work in either capacity. On 
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Director overlooked evidence and reached contradictory 
conclusions. 1 
The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). 
Exercising de novo appellate review, see Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 
2015), we conclude that the company has not established the qualifying nature of the proposed U.S. 
work. We will therefore dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
An intracompany transferee is a noncitizen who - for one continuous year in the three years before 
their U.S. admission-worked abroad and seeks to enter the country to temporarily work for a branch, 
parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of their foreign employer in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or 
involves "specialized knowledge." Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(A). 
An L-lA petitioner must demonstrate that: 
1 The Petitioner also contends that the Director erred in separately finding the Beneficiary ineligible to change her U.S. 
nonimmigrant visa status. See section 248(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1258(a). To the extent that the company did not 
request a change of her status, we agree that the Director erred. But the decision on that collateral matter does not affect 
this appeal's merits regarding the requested L-lA classification. Nor would we have jurisdiction to rule on a noncitizen's 
change of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 248.1 (b) (barring appeal from the denial of a change-of-status application). 
• It and the beneficiary's foreign employer are "qualifying organizations" under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G); 
• The beneficiary would be employed in an executive or managerial capacity; 
• The beneficiary has at least one continuous year of full-time work abroad with a qualifying 
organization within the three years before the petition's filing; 
• The beneficiary worked the prior year abroad in a job that was managerial, executive, or 
involved "specialized knowledge;" and 
• The beneficiary's education, training, and employment qualifies them to perform the proposed 
U.S. services. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(i)-(iv). 
II. ANALYSIS 
The record shows that the Beneficiary, an El Salvadoran native and citizen, has a bachelor's degree in 
commerce and administration, three years of university studies in public accounting, and more than 
25 years' experience in the fruit business. She has worked for the Petitioner's affiliate in El Salvador 
as a procurement manager since August 2021. 
Both the Petitioner and its affiliate import and export fruit. The Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary 
will lead the company's expansion efforts in the United States. 
A. The Proposed U.S. Work 
The Petitioner must demonstrate that it would employ the Beneficiary in the United States in a 
managerial or 
executive capacity. The term "managerial capacity" means work where a beneficiary 
"primarily:" 
• Manages the organization or a department, subdivision, function, or component of it; 
• Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, 
or manages an essential function within the organization or its department or subdivision; 
• Has the authority to hire and fire or to recommend those and other personnel actions, or, if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or regarding the function managed; and 
• Exercises discretion over daily operations of the activity or function for which the employee 
has authority. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A)(i)-(iv) of the Act. 
As the term's definition indicates, "managerial capacity" recognizes both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." Personnel managers must primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05, 
*3 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). In contrast, function managers primarily manage an essential function within 
the organization. Id. If incidental to managing the function, function managers may also oversee 
personnel. Id. 
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The term "executive capacity" means work where a beneficiary "primarily:" 
• Directs the management of an organization or a major component or function of it; 
• Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
• Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
• Receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, a board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(C). 
The definition of "executive capacity" describes an elevated position. An executive must be able to 
"direct[] the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of an organization or a major 
component or function of it. Section 101(a)(44)(B)(i), (ii) of the Act. The phrase "directs the 
management" requires an executive to exercise control over a subordinate level of managerial 
employees. VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf, 17 F.4th 109, 114 (11th Cir. 2021). To demonstrate these 
abilities, a petitioner must explain the management of the organization, component, or function and 
establish a beneficiary's primary focus on its goals and policies, rather than its daily operations. See 
Boyang, Ltd. v. INS, 67 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Matter ofChurch Scientology Int'!, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988)) ("An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce 
a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity.") 
When considering the nature of an offered pos1t10n, USCIS examines a petitioner's job duty 
descriptions. The descriptions must clearly describe a beneficiary's proposed duties and indicate that 
the noncitizen would perform all the elements comprising the definition of"managerial" or "executive 
capacity." See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii) (requiring "a detailed description of the services to be 
performed"). USCIS also considers: a petitioner's organizational structure; the presence of other 
employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing non-qualifying duties; the duties of a beneficiary's 
subordinate employees; the business's nature; and other factors potentially affecting a beneficiary's 
duties and role. 
The Petitioner's descriptions of the offered U.S. job reflect inconsistencies casting doubt on the 
descriptions' accuracy. In the initial filing, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary, in part, would 
"set the goals for [the] product management, marketing, and sales departments." The Petitioner's 
organizational chart lists a sales manager who appears to supervise a contracting company. But the 
chart does not indicate that the Petitioner has product management or marketing departments. 
Also, in a revised job description in response to the Director's request for additional evidence, the 
company's controller stated that the Beneficiary, in part, would "analyze research conducted by 
subordinate managers." The record, however, does not demonstrate her proposed supervision of any 
subordinate managers. The Petitioner's organizational chart shows that the Beneficiary would directly 
supervise a purchasing agent. But the chart does not show that the purchasing agent would supervise 
anyone. Nor does the record otherwise establish the agent as a manager. The inconsistent job 
descriptions cast doubt on the accuracy of the offered job's purported duties. See Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988) (requiring a petitioner to resolve inconsistencies of record with 
independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies). 
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Other evidence also casts doubt on the Petitioner's proposed employment of the Beneficiary in a 
managerial or executive capacity. As previously indicated, the phrase "directs the management" in 
the definition of "executive capacity" at section 10l(a)(44)(B)(i) of the Act requires an executive to 
exercise control over a subordinate level of managerial employees. VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf, 
17 F.4th at 114. As discussed above, the Petitioner has not established the Beneficiary's proposed 
sole subordinate as a manager. Also, the Petitioner's organizational chart does not indicate the 
Beneficiary's control over the company's sales manager. The company therefore has not 
demonstrated that the Beneficiary would meet the "executive capacity" definition by directing the 
company's management. 
The Petitioner also has not demonstrated that it would employ the Beneficiary in a managerial 
capacity. A personnel manager must primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. Section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act; Matter ofG-Inc., supra, 
at *3. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Beneficiary's sole subordinate would constitute a 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employee. The company's organizational chart does not 
indicate the subordinate's proposed supervision of anyone, and the record lacks evidence that she 
would otherwise serve as a manager. And, as the Director notes, the Petitioner has not documented 
the subordinate's duties, educational level, or employment by the company. Thus, the record also 
does not establish the subordinate as a professional employee. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) (defining 
the term "profession" to mean "any occupation for which a United States baccalaureate degree or its 
foreign equivalent is the minimum requirement for entry into the occupation"). 
Further, the Petitioner has neither asserted its proposed employment of the Beneficiary as a "function 
manager" nor demonstrated that she would manage a clearly defined or "essential" function. See 
section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii); see also Matter of G- Inc., supra, at *4. Thus, the Petitioner has not 
demonstrated its proposed employment of the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Director reached a "confusing conclusion" regarding the 
purported managerial nature of the offered job and that her reasoning was "inherently contradictory." 
The Petitioner asserts that the Director "acknowledged that the proposed duties set forth in the 
[company's initial] support letter are managerial in nature but also found that the record did not 
establish that these duties are clearly managerial in nature." 
Contrary to the Petitioner's contention, we do not find the Director's decision to be contradictory. The 
Director stated: 
The support letter indicated that the beneficiary[' s] position is in a managerial capacity; 
however, the record lacked supporting evidence that the beneficiary will primarily 
perform in a[] managerial capacity in the U.S. position. The record did not sufficiently 
demonstrate that the beneficiary will primarily engage in managerial-level tasks on a 
daily basis. 
The Petitioner appears to mistakenly assume its support letter's sufficiency to demonstrate the offered 
job's managerial nature. As previously discussed, proposed job duties in the letter conflict with other 
evidence of record. The letter states that the Beneficiary would "set the goals for [the] product 
management, marketing, and sales departments." But the Petitioner's organizational chart does not 
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indicate that the company has product management or marketing departments. Thus, the letter does 
not constitute reliable evidence of the job's purported managerial nature. The Director therefore did 
not err in finding insufficient evidence to support the letter's statements. 
The Petitioner also asserts that it demonstrated the Beneficiary's proposed U.S. work in an executive 
capacity because she would purportedly primarily perform executive duties. As previously indicated, 
however, the term "executive capacity" requires meeting all of the elements at section 
10l(a)(44)(B)(i)-(iv) of the Act. Section 10l(a)(44)(B)(i) of the Act requires an executive to primarily 
"direct[] the management of the organization," meaning to exercise control over a subordinate level 
of managerial employees. VHV Jewelers, LLC v. Wolf, 17 F.4th at 114. Because the Petitioner did 
not establish the Beneficiary's proposed sole subordinate as a manager or her control over the 
company's sales manager, the Petitioner did not meet the "executive capacity" definition by showing 
that the Beneficiary would direct the company's management. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not demonstrated its proposed U.S. employment of the 
Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. We will therefore affirm the petition's denial. 
B. The Beneficiary's Work Abroad 
Our conclusion regarding the nature of the proposed U.S. work resolves this appeal. Thus, we need 
not reach, and hereby reserve, the Petitioner's appellate arguments regarding the nature of the 
Beneficiary's work abroad. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (stating that agencies 
need not make "purely advisory findings" on issues unnecessary to their ultimate decisions); see also 
Matter ofL-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516,526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach alternate issues on appeal 
where the applicant did not otherwise meet their burden of proof). 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated the qualifying nature of the proposed U.S. work. We will 
therefore affirm the petition's denial. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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