dismissed L-1A Case: Hair And Nail Salon

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
lqmc copy 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
- FILE: 
SRC 03 148 50703 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: a 2 7 Zm5 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 03 148 50703 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its general manager as an 
L- 1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a Florida limited liability company 
and claims to be an affiliate of u~imited located in Kingston, Jamaica. It 
operates a hair and nail salon. The beneficiary was initially granted a one-year period of stay in L-1A status in 
order to open a new office in the United States and the petitioner now seeks to extend her stay for a two-year 
period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that: (1) the beneficiary 
would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity; or (2) the petitioner was doing business for the 
year preceding the filing of the petition. 
On the Form I-290B Notice of Appeal submitted on September 13,2004, the petitioner states: 
The documentary evidence provided has strongly addressed the operations of both [the 
foreign entity] and [the petitioner] as well as the executive nature of the duties being 
undertaken by [the beneficiary] on behalf of both companies. 
The petitioner indicates that a brief andlor evidence would be submitted within 30 days. As of this date, the 
record does not contain a supplemental appellate brief or-additional supporting evidence, and the record will 
be considered complete. 
To establish eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet certain criteria. 
Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a 
firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof, must have employed the 
beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the sake employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon review, the MO concurs with the director's decision and affirms the denial of the petition. Although 
the director's decision will be affirmed, the MO finds sufficient evidence on record to establish that the 
petitioner was doing business for the year preceding the filing of the petition as required by 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). The director's decision with respect to this ispue alone will be withdrawn. 
The petitioner's vague assertion that it previously submitted sufficient documentary evidence to establish the 
beneficiary's employment in an executive capacity is insufficient to overcome the director's determination. 
The beneficiary is described as performing a number of duties which do not fall under traditional definitions 
of managerial or executive capacity, including researching market preferences, researching and purchasing 
products used and sold in the petitioner's salon, duties related to advertising, monitoring a bank account, 
paying bills, making deposits and performing other routine financial and administrative tasks which suggest 
SRC 03 148 50703 
Page 3 
that the beneficiary is primarily engaged in the non-managerial, non-executive daily operations of the 
business. These duties do not appear to be incidental to the beneficiary's daily duties. An employee who 
primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or provide services is not considered to be 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
583,604 (Comm. 1988). 
Furthermore, as noted by the director, the petitioner employs the beneficiary as its sole payroll employee. The 
petitioner claims a fluctuating number of stylists and technicians who pay a weekly fee of $250 in order to 
operate out of the petitioner's salon, but has not provided documentation to confirm its contractual 
relationship with these individuals. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comrn. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Furthermore, although the petitioner has attempted to depict a three-tiered hierarchy among the 
independently contracted stylists and technicians, the job descriptions it provided for its "senior stylist/salon 
manager," "assistant manager/stylist," and "senior nail technician" show that these individuals are primarily 
engaged in providing the services of the business, rather than in supervising lower-level employees. 
Accordingly, the beneficiary appears to be the first-line supervisor of the non-professional salon personnel. A 
managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally 
vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(a)(l)(v) state, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of 
fact for the appeal. 
Inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of 
fact in this proceeding, the appeal must be summarily dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, the petitioner has not met this burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is summarily dismissed.