dismissed L-1A Case: Import/Export

wing data deleted to 
pre wmt clearly unwm-d b&a ot yrrsoual priwy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 07 01 8 5 1403 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 0 1 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
petitioner filed a motion to reepen and reconsider. The director granted the motion and affirmed his prior 
decision to deny the petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. 
The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as an 
L- 1 A nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability company organized 
under the laws of the State of Georgia and is allegedly an importlexport business. The beneficiary was 
granted a one-year period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to 
extend the beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or manager. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering hs 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U. S .C. 5 1 1 0 1 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 4 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and 
rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that 
the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be primarily employed in either a managerial or an 
executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes its business in a letter dated October 14, 2006. The petitioner asserts that it sells and 
distributes a variety of products ranging from fishing equipment and cosmetics to bluetooth devises. The 
petitioner also claims to be acquiring a Quizno's sandwich restaurant in Lawrenceville, Georgia as part of its 
"diversification effort." The petitioner also described the beneficiary's proposed duties in operating the 
business in the October 14,2006 letter. As this letter is in the record, the job description will not be repeated 
verbatim here. Generally, the beneficiary is described as devoting 20% of her time to establishing goals and 
polices; 35% of her time to directing the management of the operation's "departments" (import and sales, 
development and diversification, and finance); 25% if her time to supervising and controlling the supervisory 
and managerial employees of the three departments; 5% of her time to personnel matters; and 15% of her time 
to "exercising wide latitude in discretionary decision making." 
The petitioner described the duties of the three claimed subordinate supervisory employees in the October 14, 
2006 and submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The "manager" of the sales and 
marketing department (also referred to as the import and sales department) is generally described as managing 
sales and marketing activities and supervising the sales representatives. The "manager" of the development 
and diversification department is generally described as exploring business and investment opportunities in 
the United States and performs tasks related to establishing the Quizno's sandwich restaurant. It is implied 
that the development and diversification department manager will supervise the Quimo's operation once the 
restaurant is established. The "manager" of the administrative and accounting department (also referred to as 
the finance department) is generally described as managing the accounting and administration activities of the 
business and as "supervising" a contracted accountant who provides professional services to the petitioner. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted its quarterly wage reports for 2006. In the most recent report, the petitioner 
lists the five employees identified in the organizational chart. However, despite this list, the petitioner also 
claims to have employed zero employees in the third quarter of 2006 on both the federal Form 941 and on the 
Georgia Quarterly Tax and Wage Report. 
On November 1 3, 2006, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested complete position 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 5 
descriptions for the subordinate employees, a breakdown of the number of hours devoted to each of the 
subordinates' job duties on a weekly basis, and copies of the subordinate employees' educational credentials. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated December 1 1,2006 in which counsel asserts that the beneficiary 
will supervise subordinate employees who are both supervisory and professional employees. Counsel claims 
that both the manager of the development and diversification department and the sales representative have 
earned ,university degrees. Finally, counsel provides the following job descriptions for the three claimed 
subordinate supervisors: 
Manager of the Sales & Marketing Department. Wang Wei Chen (2 years of college): 
Manages sales and marketing activities of the U.S. company; directs and supervises sales 
representatives (8 hrslwk); directs the company's Bluetooth devices and other products 
imports, sales and distribution activities (20 hrslwk); provides training, and performance 
evaluations to develop and control sales programs (2 hrslwk); establish sales territories, 
quotas, and goals and advises dealers, distributors, and clients concerning sales and 
advertising techniques (3 hrslwk); analyzes sales statistics to formulate policy and to assist 
dealers in promoting sales (3 hrslwk); reviews market analyses to determine customer needs, 
volume potential, price schedules, and discount rates, and develops sales campaigns to 
accommodate goals of the company (2 hrslwk); and prepares periodic sales report showing 
sales volume and potential sales (2 hrslwk). 
Manager of the Development and Diversification Department (formerly known as the 
Hospitality Department). Tory Eddy Seng (BBA degree): Assists the President in 
formulating and implementing the development and diversification programs in accordance 
with the parent company's directives (2 hrslwk); explores business and investment 
opportunities in the U.S. for the parent company (2 hrslwk); works on the start-up and 
management of the Quizno Sub restaurant (15 hrslwk); coordinates food service activities of 
the U.S. company (8 hrslwk); reviews food and beverage costs estimates and requisitions or 
purchases supplies (4 hrslwk); and confers with the restaurant's staff concerning menus 
planning, food preparation and inspection, and related activities (9 hrslwk). 
Manager of Administrative & Accounting Department, Jason B. Smith, (College): 
Manages accounting and administrative activities of the U.S. company; analyzes financial 
information and preparation of financial reports (variable, 2-10 hrslwk); directs compilations 
and entries of financial data and documents business transactions (variable, 2-4 hrslwk); 
handles financial information detailing assets, liabilities, and capital, and prepares balance 
sheet, profit and loss statement, and other reports to summarize current and projected 
company financial position (variable, 4-8 hrslwk); audits contracts, orders, and vouchers; 
coordinates the work of contracted outside accountants and bookkeepers (variable, 2-4 
hrslwk); assists the President in preparing activities reports for use by management and 
organizational budget and monthly financial reports (variable, 1-2 hrslwk). 
On April 5, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 6 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or a manager. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 
 214,2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. 
 There is no provision in Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business 
does not have sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary fi-om primarily performing 
operational and administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. Future hiring 
and business expansion plans, such as the petitioner's plan to operate a Quizno's sandwich restaurant, may not 
be considered. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the 
petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 
I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Cornm. 1978); Matter of klatigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Cornm. 1971). In the instant 
matter, the United States operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a 
predominantly managerial or executive position. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. As explained above, a petitioner 
may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial 
sections of the two statutory definitions. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will devote at least 20% of her time to 
establishing goals, policies, strategies, rules, procedures, and major economic objectives. However, the 
petitioner fails to specifically describe these goals, policies, strategies, rules, and procedures, and the only 
major economic objective identified in the petitioner is the planned opening of a Quizno's sandwich 
restaurant. The petitioner also states that the beneficiary will devote 60% of her time to directing the 
management of the three "departments" of the operation and supervising the three departmental "managers." 
However, the description in the October 14, 2006 letter, which accounts for a majority of the beneficiary's 
time, is simply a list of the duties already ascribed to the three subordinate "managers" of the departments but 
qualified with managerial-sounding words such as "directs," "monitors," and "oversees." Crucially, the 
petitioner fails to explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis to direct, monitor, and 
oversee the work of the three subordinate "managers" in the performance of their ascribed duties. The fact 
that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job 
description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform 
managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties 
are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter 
of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 7 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). As the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will devote a 
majority of her time to performing clearly defined managerial or executive duties, it has not been established 
that she will be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. An employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Cornrn. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise a sales and marketing department manager, a 
development and diversification department manager, and an administrative and accounting department 
manager. The sales and marketing department manager is described as supervising a single sales 
representative and the administrative and accounting department manager is described as supervising a 
contracted accountant in his provision of professional services to the petitioner. However, the petitioner's 
description of these employees' job duties and its organizational structure fails to credibly establish that any of 
the purported subordinate "managers" will truly be a supervisory or managerial employee. To the contrary, 
the job descriptions indicate that these three "managers" will more likely than not primarily perform the tasks 
necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product, e.g., sales, administrative, and 
operational tasks. The "managers" are not described as primarily supervising a subordinate tier of workers. 
An employee will not be considered to be a supervisory employee simply because of a job title, because he or 
she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a position superior to another employee, or even because 
he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must be shown to possess 
some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of subordinates. See generally Browne 
v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 904, 907 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (cited in Hayes v. Laroy 
Thomas, Inc., 2007 WL 128287 at *16 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11,2007)). 
Furthermore, only the sales and marketing department manager is described as presently supervising a 
subordinate employee, and it is not credible that the petitioner would employ two tiers of managers to 
ultimately supervise a single sales representative. Given the size and nature of the vaguely described 
business, it is more likely than not that the beneficiary and her subordinate employees will all primarily 
perform the tasks necessary to the operation of the business. See generally Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13 (9'h Cir. 2006). It does not appear that the petitioner's business has 
developed an organizational complexity which requires the employment of a subordinate tier of managers or 
supervisors ultimately managed by an employee who performs primarily managerial or executive duties. 
Therefore, it appears that the beneficiary will be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
employees. A managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the 
level normally vested in a first-line supervisor. See 101(a)(44) of the Act; see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills 
required to perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will manage professional employees.' Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.2 
I 
 In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 8 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 1 9 I&N Dec. 8 1 7 (Cornm. 1 988); Matter of Ling, 1 3 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1 968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education 
required by the position, rather than the degree held by subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's, 
or even a master's, degree by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an 
employee is employed in a professional capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant case, the 
petitioner has not, in fact, established that a university degree is actually necessary, for example, to perform 
the work of any of the subordinate "managers." 
2 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record establishes that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
employees andlor will perform non-qualifying tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent 
by the beneficiary performing her duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of her duties will be 
managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. 
See IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 9 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor and will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations 
are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 
F.3d at 13 16 (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin 
Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 
2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning 
company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of 
employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell 
company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. 
INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company may be especially relevant when CIS notes 
discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
In this matter, the petition contains serious inconsistencies regarding its staffing. For example, the petitioner 
submitted a copy of its federal and state quarterly wage reports for the third quarter of 2006. While the 
petitioner lists five employees in the wage reports, the petitioner also indicates on both reports that it had zero 
employees. The petitioner offers no explanation for this inconsistency in the record. It is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on 
any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of 
the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. at 591. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
for at least one continuous year in a position that was managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. $5 
214.2(1)(3)(iii), (iv), and (v)(B). 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad in the letter dated October 14,2006 as follows: 
Planning, developing, and implementing company policies and objectives in accordance with 
the strategies laid down by the parent company; participating in the formulation and 
implementation of the company's global expansion programs; assisting the President and the 
company's top management in the decision-making processes; reporting directly to the Board 
of Directors and the President regarding the state of the company and major changes; 
overseeing managers and supervisory personnel of various subordinate divisions and 
departments and coordinating their activities; performing responsibilities for the company's 
international sales section; conferring with subordinate executives and managers with respect 
to new product development and new market exploration and expansion; reviewing activity 
EAC 07 01 8 51403 
Page 10 
reports and financial statements; directing overseas promotion and advertising campaigns to 
capture a share of the international market; directing data collection and analysis and 
conducting surveys to predict global market trends; exploring and evaluating opportunities 
for business partnerships; monitoring and advising negotiations and business talks with 
customers, contractors, and suppliers; overseeing the hiring, firing and performance 
evaluation of executive and managerial personnel. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner failed to specifically describe the beneficiary's job duties 
abroad or to explain what she did on a day-to-day basis. Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. 
Supp. 1103, afd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to describe the duties of the beneficiary's 
purported subordinates abroad, if any. Absent detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary and 
her purported subordinates, it is impossible for CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" 
engaged in performing managerial or executive duties abroad. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; 
see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, and the 
petition may not be approved for this reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." 
 See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A). 
 Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a 
"qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the 
qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." "Subsidiary" is defined in part as a limited 
liability company "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the 
entity." "Doing business" is defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor 
services." 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts in the Form 1-129 that the foreign entity owns 100% of the petitioner's stock. 
However, the record contains inconsistencies which undermines thls claim. First, Form 5472, which is attached 
to the petitioner's 2005 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, indicates that the 100% owner of the 
petitioner is San-Ho Huang and not the foreign employer, a Taiwanese corporation. Second, a document titled 
"Agreement and Conditional Consent to Transfer" indicates that the beneficiary, a Quizno's fi-anchisee, agreed to 
transfer her interest in a Quizno's Franchise Agreement to the petitioner and that the beneficiary, and not the 
foreign employer, is the 100% owner of the petitioner. The petitioner offers no explanation for these two 
inconsistent representations of its ownership and control in the record which both undermine its claim to be 
owned and controlled by the foreign employer. Once again, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
EAC 07 018 51403 
Page 11 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591 -92. 
Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence of the foreign employer currently doing business. The record 
does not contain any evidence fi-om 2006 addressing the regular, continuous, and systematic provision of 
goods and/or services by the foreign employer. The foreign employer's 2005 tax return and uncorroborated 
balance sheet is not probative of current business activity. Once again, going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations. For 
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
The previous approval of an L-IA petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.