dismissed L-1A Case: Import/Export

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 06 193 522 14 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 2 8 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its general manager 
as an L-1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Florida and is allegedly an importlexport business. The beneficiary was granted a one-year 
period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the MO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or manager. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 4 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and 
rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the beneficiary 
as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set 
forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in a letter dated June 8,2006 as follows: 
1 - 
 Full responsibility for decisions, direction and budgets; 
2- 
 Plan, formulate and implement administrative and financial policies and procedures; 
3- 
 Direct the activities of the employees; 
4- 
 Evaluate performance of company and staff and to determine areas of cost reduction 
and program improvement; 
5- 
 Engage in long-range planning and identify business opportunities in the US; 
6- Cash-management; 
7- 
 Acquisition of new clients and business relations; 
8- 
 Choose, hire and train a new manager, salesperson and professionals to work in the 
business and establish responsibilities. 
On September 27, 2006, the director requested additional evidence. 
 The director requested, inter alia, 
complete position descriptions for both the beneficiary and the subordinate employees, the petitioner's 2005 
Forms W-2, the petitioner's August 2006 payroll, the petitioner's quarterly tax returns for the first and second 
quarters of 2006, and an organizational chart. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary supervising a secretary, 
a sales representative, and two vacant positions. 
The petitioner also submitted breakdowns of the duties of the beneficiary and the two subordinate employees. 
The petitioner generally describes the beneficiary as making telephone calls, meeting with employees and 
customers, reviewing reports and accounts, developing strategies, negotiating purchases, implementing goals 
and objectives, and monitoring the business. The petitioner generally describes the secretary, who has been 
EAC 06 193 522 14 
Page 5 
given the title "administrative assistant" in the job description, as performing clerical duties. The sales 
representative is described generally as performing sales related tasks, e.g., contacting potential customers, 
completing sales, writing orders, and recording delivery information. 
The petitioner also submitted Florida wage reports for the first and second quarters of 2006 indicating that the 
petitioner employed three people at the time the instant petition was filed. 
On March 26, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or a manager 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business 
does not have sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing 
operational and administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. Future hiring 
plans may not be considered. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility 
or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire 
Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Comm. 1971). In the 
instant matter, the United States operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a 
predominantly managerial or executive position. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. As explained above, a petitioner 
may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial 
sections of the two statutory definitions. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will be responsible for "decisions, 
direction and budgets" and will plan and implement administrative and financial policies and procedures, 
direct employees' activities, engage in long-range planning, and identify business opportunities. However, the 
petitioner does not specifically define any of these decisions, directions, policies, procedures, activities, long- 
range plans, or business opportunities. Furthermore, general managerial sounding-duties such as "monitor the 
business" are not probative of the beneficiary performing qualifying duties. The fact that the petitioner has 
given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes 
inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 6 
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or 
managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 4 1 (2d. Cir. 
1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972). 
Likewise, many of the duties ascribed to the beneficiary appear to be non-qualifying administrative or 
operational tasks which will not rise to the level of being managerial or executive in nature. For example, the 
petitioner asserts in the breakdown of duties that the beneficiary will spend a majority of his time either 
performing vague duties which have not been sufficiently described, e.g., international affairs, or making 
phone calls, meeting with employees and clients, researching and analyzing data, reviewing contracts and 
accounts, marketing, purchasing, and budgeting. However, it has not been established that these duties are 
managerial or executive in nature. To the contrary, these duties appear to be non-qualifying administrative or 
operational tasks, and the petitioner has not explained how the secretary and sales representative will relieve 
the beneficiary of the need to perform these tasks. Finally, as the petitioner has failed to establish that the two 
subordinate employees are supervisory, managerial, or professional employees (see infra), the supervisory 
functions ascribed to the beneficiary are non-qualifying, first-line supervisory tasks. As the petitioner has 
indicated that the beneficiary will devote most of his time to these non-qualifying tasks, it has not been 
established that he will be "primarily" employed as a manager or an executive. An employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise a sales representative and a secretary. 
However, these employees are not described as having supervisory or managerial responsibilities. To the 
contrary, these employees are described as performing sales and clerical tasks. In view of the above, the 
beneficiary would appear to be primarily a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers, the provider of 
actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day 
operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are 
professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills and education required to perform the 
duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage 
professional employees.' Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity.' 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe termprofession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 7 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor and will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 81 7 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, l l I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
2 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record establishes that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
employees and/or will perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and 
credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine 
what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily 
perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 8 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations 
are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 
F.3d 13 13, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. 
Cir. 199 1); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. 
INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the 
petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the 
absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, 
or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics 
Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company may be especially relevant when 
CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
In this matter, the petition contains serious inconsistencies regarding its staffing and business operations. For 
example, the petitioner submitted a copy of its 2005 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. This 
tax return indicates that the petitioner had $21,188.00 in gross receipts or sales in 2005. The return also 
indicates that the petitioner paid no salaries in 2005. However, in response to the director's Request for 
Evidence, the petitioner submitted 2005 Forms W-3 and W-2 indicating that the petitioner paid $59,400.00 in 
salaries in 2005. The petitioner offered no explanation for this fundamental inconsistency pertaining to the 
petitioner's staffing during its first year in operation. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the 
petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. at 591. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
for at least one continuous year in a position that was managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. $8 
2 14,2(1)(3)(iii), (iv), and (v)(B). 
The foreign employer described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated June 8,2006 as follows: 
The Beneficiary was the General Manager [of the foreign entity] since its inception. In this 
executive position the Beneficiary was crucial being in charge of the company's general 
administration, establishing targets, distribution programs, etc. Specifically, the Beneficiary 
had discretionary authority in managing operations and also solving staffs' problems. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner failed to specifically describe the beneficiary's job duties 
abroad. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties will be primarily 
executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating 
the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, aff'd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the 
EAC 06 193 522 14 
Page 9 
petitioner failed to describe the duties of the beneficiary's purported subordinates abroad, if any. Absent 
detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary and his purported subordinates, it is impossible for 
CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" engaged in performing managerial or executive duties 
abroad. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, and the 
petition may not be approved for this reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." 
 See also 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A). 
 Title 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a 
"qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the 
qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." "Subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as 
a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity." 
8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). "Doing business" is defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous 
provision of goods and/or services." 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts in the Form 1-129 that the foreign entity owns 100% of the petitioner's stock. 
However, the record contains a serious inconsistency which undermines this claim. Schedule E to the petitioner's 
2005 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, indicates that the petitioner is not a subsidiary, that no 
one person owned 50% of more of its stock, and that there are no foreign persons owning more than 25% of the 
petitioner's stock. All of these averments are inconsistent with the petitioner's assertion that it is 100% owned by 
the foreign entity. The petitioner offers no explanation for this fundamental inconsistency in the record which 
undermines its claim that it is owned and controlled by the foreign entity. Once again, it is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence of the foreign employer or the petitioner currently doing 
business. The record does not contain any evidence from 2006 addressing the regular, continuous, and 
systematic provision of goods and/or services by either entity. The petitioner's 2005 tax return and 
uncorroborated balance sheet is not probative of current business activity. Once again, going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
 Also, the term of the 
commercial lease submitted by the petitioner does not commence until August 21, 2006, almost two months 
after the filing of the instant petition. As the petitioner's 2005 Form 1120 does not indicate that any rent was 
paid in 2005, it does not appear that the petitioner was maintaining a place of business when the instant 
petition was filed. In view of the above, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner was, or 
EAC 06 193 52214 
Page 10 
is, engaged in "doing business." The record is also not persuasive in establishing that the foreign entity is 
"doing business." 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations. For 
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the petitioner has been 
"doing business" for the previous year as required by 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). As indicated above, the 
record is devoid of evidence addressing the petitioner's current business activities. The uncorroborated tax 
return, profit and loss statement, and balance sheet do not establish the conduct of past or present business 
activity. Also, as the record indicates that the petitioner was not paying rent in 2005 for its purported business 
premises, it does not appear that the petitioner has been maintaining a place of business. Finally, as indicated 
above, the petition contains a serious inconsistency pertaining to the petitioner's claimed employment of three 
people in 2005. Although the petitioner submitted 2005 Forms W-3 and W-2 indicating that the petitioner 
paid $59,400.00 in salaries in 2005, these documents directly contradict the petitioner's Form 1120, which 
indicates that no salaries were paid in 2005. The petitioner offers no explanation for this serious 
inconsistency. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the petitioner has been "doing business" for the 
previous year, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
The previous approval of an L-1A petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the MO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.