dismissed L-1A Case: Import/Export

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave.. N.W., Rrn. A3042 
Washington. DC 20520 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: b6N 03 070 53499 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: FED 2 3 2005 
IN RE: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been 
returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that 
office. 
-7 
Robert P. Wiernann, Director 
A~drninistrative Appeals Office 
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Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service - Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will 
be dismissed. 
The petitioner. claims to be a wholly-owned subsidiary o- 
International Trading Company, located in Iran. The petitioner plans to operate an Import and 
export business. The U.S. entity was incorporated in the State of Illinois in November 2001 and 
claims to have five employees. The petitioner seeks to hire the beneficiary as a new employee to 
open its U.S. office. Accordingly, on December 30, 2002, the U.S. entity petitioned Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (CIS) to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany 
transferee (L-1A) pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L), as an executive or manager for one year. The petitioner 
endeavors to employ the beneficiary's services as the U.S. entity's president of the U.S. 
operations. 
On February 14, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a primarily managerial cw 
executive capacity. ' 
On appeal, the petitioner's counsel submits a lengthy brief and claims that: 1) the foreign entity 
has employed a subordinate professional staff that has relieved the beneficiary from performing 
menial tasks; 2) the beneficiary is the directing manager of the foreign entity; and, 3) the 
beneficiary's U.S. duties will be managerial or executive in nature. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet 
certain criteria. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in 
a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in it 
managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3), an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) 
of this section; 
I The AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary may perform some non-managerial or non- 
executive tasks during the first year of operation. The director's managerial and executive 
analysis may, however, be relevant after the petitioner has been in operation for one year. 
Nevertheless, as explained in this decision, the director properly concluded that the new office is 
not established. 
LIN 03 070 53499 
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(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services 
to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was 
managerial, executive, or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's 
prior education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the 
intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States 
need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a 
position that was managerial, executive, or involved specialized knowledge and 
that the a1ikn.s prior education, training, and employment qualifies hidher to 
perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the 
United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(~), if the petition indicates the beneficiary is coming to the 
United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a new office in the United 
States, the petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; 
(B) The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the three 
year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or managerial 
capacity and that the proposed employment involved executive or managerial 
authority over the new operation; 
(C) The intended United States operation, within one year of the approval of 
the petition, will support an executive or managerial position as defined in 
paragraphs (I)(l)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, supported by information 
regarding: 
(I) The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the 
entity, its organizational structure, and its financial goals; 
(2) The size of the United States investment and the financial ability 
of the foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and to commence 
doing business in the United States; and 
(3) The organizational structure of the foreign entity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
LIN 03 070 53499 
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I. manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
. . 
11. supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, 
or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
. . . 
111. if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly 
supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with 
respect to the function managed; and 
iv. exercises discretion over the day-today operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 IOl(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" 'means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
I. directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
. . 
11. establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
. . . in. exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
iv. receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a 
qualifying managerial or executive capacity. As previously stated, the petitioner must submit 
evidence that within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the 
United States, the foreign organization employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(b). 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. Q 214.2(1)(3)(ii). On review, the AAO 
finds that the beneficiary has not been employed in a managerial or executive capacity abroad as 
required by 8 C.F.R. Q 214.2(1)(3)(v)(b). 
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In the response letter to the request for additional evidence and on appeal, the petitioner stated 
that the beneficiary's duties were "65% executive and 35% managerial in nature and included the 
overall responsibility for the financial health and growth of the company." The response letter 
also described the beneficiary's duties as: 
[Rlesponsible for carrying out vital company affairs including oversight of 
import and export of goods, obtaining necessary licenses from various centers 
and administrations and entering into contracts with domestic and foreign 
companies. . . . In this position, he has been directly overseeing other supervisors 
and managers, public relations as well as the accounting and administrative 
departments of the company. [The beneficiary] has enjoyed a wide level of 
discretionary authority in making decisions within the company structure and as 
managing director he holds the position of senior most supervisor answering only 
to the board of directors. 
The AAO notes that although the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary dedicated 65% of his 
time to executive duties and 35% to managerial duties, a beneficiary may not claim to be 
employed as a hybrid "executive/rnanager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory 
definitions. A petitioner must establish that a beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth 
in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager if it is 
representing the beneficiary is both an executive and a manager. 
The petitioner also submitted a copy of the foreign entity's organizational chart. Although 
counsel on appeal claims that the beneficiary is the directing manager of the subordinate 
professional staff of the accounting branch, the chart, however, is so complex that it obscures the 
organization's lines of authority. Moreover, the chart provides the employees' titles and a brief 
description of the actual tasks of the employees, however, there is insufficient detail to determine 
exactly what duties the subordinate employees' are assigned. It is also unclear how the foreign 
organization supports the petitioner's business plan or its relationship to the U.S. entity. 
Further, the petitioner provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties 
that fails to establish what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For instance, the petitioner 
is described as "responsible for canying out vital company affairs," "oversight of import and 
export of goods," and "overall responsibility for the financial health and growth of the company." 
The petitioner did not, however, define or clarify these duties. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornm. 1972). 
In addition, the petitioner generally paraphrased the statutory definition of executive capacity. See 
section IOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act. For instance, the beneficiary's position is depicted as involving 
"wide level of discretionary authority in making decisions." However, conclusory assertions 
regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the 
language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 
1990); Avyr Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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Further, in the response letter to the request for additional evidence, the beneficiary's duties were 
described as "obtaining necessary licenses from various centers and administrations and entering 
into contracts with domestic and foreign companies." Since the beneficiary actually engaged in 
these activities rather than directing or managing them, he is performing tasks necessary to 
provide a service or product. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce 
a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
After careful consideration of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the beneficiary has not been 
employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity abroad. For this reason, the petition 
may not be approved. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment will 
involve primarily executive or managerial authority over the new operation. 
In the initial filing, the petitioner described the beneficiary's duties as: 
[The beneficiary] will direct the goals, policies, and management of the 
organization in accordance to the corporate mission statement, which he has 
helped to design and he will have wide discretion to accomplish these goals. 
In addition, in the response to the request for additional evidence, the beneficiary's proposed U.S. 
duties were described as: 
Initially directing the start-up of the petitioner. 
Eventually expanding U.S., operations. 
He will oversee the General Manager and direct him to develop and 
maintain systems and procedures for marketing the company to whole 
salers, retailers and various markets. 
When in the U.S., he, along with the General Manager, will run 
production meetings with the staff. 
[The beneficiary] will establish the goals and policies of the company. . . 
Direct corporate policy. 
Set goals and milestones to be achieved. 
Guide the direction of the company in order to grow the company from a 
start up to a major player in the importJexport field. 
Challenge and motivate employees. 
[The beneficiary] will exercise wide latitude in discretionary decision- 
making. . . 
On appeal, counsel claims that the beneficiary's U.S. duties will be "managerial or executive." As 
previously stated, a beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" 
and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. A petitioner must establish that a 
beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and 
the statutory definition for manager if it is representing the beneficiary is both an executive and a 
manager. 
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Further, the AAO notes that in the initial petition and in the response to the request for additional 
evidence, the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary's function in the U.S. operations "will be in 
an executive capacity." However, on appeal, counsel claims that the beneficiary's U.S. duties will 
be "managerial or executive." A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future 
eligibility or after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin 
Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Cornm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 
(Comm. 1971). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a 
deficient petition conform to CIS requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 
(Assoc. Cornrn. 1998). 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). On review, the 
beneficiary's job description lacks specificity and is vague. The petitioner described the 
beneficiary's duties as "expanding U.S. operations," "direct the goals, policies, and management 
of the organization," and "establish the goals and policies of the company." However, the 
beneficiary's described duties do not elaborate how the beneficiary will expand the business or 
what goals or policies the beneficiary will direct or establish. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Treasure Crafr of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Further, the petitioner generally paraphrased the statutory definition of executive capacity. See 
section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A). For instance, the petitioner depicted 
the beneficiary as "exercising wide latitude in decision making." However, conclusory assertions 
regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the 
language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 4 1 (2d. Cir. 
1990); Avyr Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y .). 
In sum, the AAO concludes that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity within the first year of operation. For 
this further reason, the petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the business plan also lacks specificity. In examining the 
business plan, the precedent decision, Matter of Ho, 22 I&N Dec. 206, 213 (Imm.1998), lists 
possible criteria for establishing an acceptable business plan. "The plan should set forth the 
business's organizational structure and its personnel's experience. It should explain the business's 
staffing requirements and contain a timetabIe for hiring, as well as job descriptions for all 
positions." The decision concluded, "Most importantly, the business plan must be credible." Id. at 
213. Although Matter of Ho, Id., addresses the specific requirements for the immigrant investor 
visa classification, the discussion of the business plan requirements is instructive for the L-1A 
new office requirements. In sum, the petitioner has failed to clearly establish the proposed nature 
of the office describing the scope of the entity and its organizational structure. Thus, given the 
business plan's generalities and lack of applicable information, it cannot demonstrate whether the 
new office will support a manager or executive within one year of filing this petition. For this 
additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
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Another related issue, beyond the decision of the director, is whether the petitioner has secured 
sufficient physical premises to house the new office pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(A). 
The petitioner submitted a copy of its business lease and photographs. In this matter, although the 
petitioner described its anticipated space requirements for its import and export business, the 
existence of the office is questionable. The photographs show an unidentified building and do not 
show the ~etitioner's office suite or number. The lease signed bv the ~etitioner entered into on 
on its lease, the photographs appear to represent that the petitioner's office is located in Suite 747. 
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objecthe evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inponsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's 
proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
In sum, based on the insufficiency of the information furnished, it cannot be concluded that the 
petitioner has secured sufficient space to house the new office. For this additional reason, the 
petition may not be approved. 
Also, beyond the decision of the director, Executive Order 13,059 and the regulations relating to 
Iranian economic sanctions must be applied when a United States petitioner requests 
nonimmigrant classification under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act for an Iranian citizen or 
national. The executive order specifically prohibits "the importation into the United States . . .of 
any goods or services of Iranian origin." E.O. 13,059 § 1,62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997). Executive 
Order 13,059 also prohibits "any transaction or dealing by a United States person . . . related to . . 
. services of Iranian origin." Id. 5 2(d). The executive order defines a "United States person" as 
"any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the 
United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States." Id. 5 4(c). 
As implemented by the United States Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC), the regulation at 31 C.F.R. 9 560.505(c) states the following: 
Persons otherwise qualified for a visa under . . . L (intracompany transferees) 
and all immigrant visa categories are authorized to carry out in the United States 
those activities for which such a visa has been granted by the U.S. State 
Department, provided that the persons are not coming to the United States to 
work as an agent, employee or contractor of the Government of Iran or a business 
entity or other organization in Iran. 
In this matter, the petitioner claimed that it was an import and export business of Iranian goods of 
Iranian origin; therefore, the executive order prohibits the petitioner from doing business in the 
LW 03 070 53499 
Page 9 
United States. If the petitioner is prohibited from doing business in the United States then the 
beneficiary will not qualify for L-1 status. For this final reason, the petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in 
the initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 
(E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 
(2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains 
entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not 
been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.