dismissed L-1A Case: Information Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: SEPT. 24, 2024 In Re: 33687006 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner is an information technology consulting company that seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as the executive partner/controller of its new office 1 under the L-lA nonimmigrant 
classification for intracompany transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
10l(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(L). The L-lA classification allows a corporation or other legal 
entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United 
States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not establish that the Beneficiary is qualified to perform the intended services in the United States or 
that he has been employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year in the 
three years preceding the filing of the petition. 2 We then considered this matter on appeal, which we 
dismissed. In doing so, we listed the relevant eligibility requirements, highlighting, as the Director 
did, that the regulations applicable to L-IA new office petitions allow for the transfer of foreign 
employees who have been employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). 
We noted that the Petitioner neither claimed nor established that the Beneficiary was employed abroad 
in a managerial capacity as defined at section 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act. And while we acknowledged 
the Petitioner's claim on appeal that the Beneficiary, and all the foreign entity's software engineers, hold 
"executive positions" because they are critical to its ongoing activities, we determined that the job duties 
associated with the Beneficiary's position as a software engineer are consistent with his job title and do 
not include the higher-level responsibilities reflected in the statutory definition of "executive capacity." 
See section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. We pointed to the Petitioner's repeated references to the 
Beneficiary's employment abroad as that of a "specialized knowledge professional" and informed the 
Petitioner that the Beneficiary is not eligible for transfer to a new office in the L-lA classification if 
1 The term "new office" refers to an organization which has been doing business in the United States for less than one year. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(F). 
2 We relied on the Beneficiary's employment abroad as the dispositive issue on appeal. We therefore reserved the 
Petitioner 's appellate arguments regarding the Beneficiary's qualifications to perform the intended services in the United 
States. See INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues 
the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"); see also Matter ofL-A-C- , 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n. 7 (BIA 
2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
his employment abroad was in a specialized knowledge capacity. The matter is now before us on 
combined motions to reopen and reconsider. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter 
ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, the Petitioner has not established 
that it has met this burden. 
First, we will address the motion to reopen, which must state new facts and be supported by 
documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our 
latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.S(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and 
demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 
1992) (requiring that new evidence have the potential to change the outcome). 
In the present matter, the Petitioner asserts that it did not previously inform that each of the foreign 
entity's software engineers is "assigned to a specific client." However, this information is not relevant 
to our decision, which was based on the determination that the Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary met the regulations applicable to L-lA new office petitions, which require a showing that 
the beneficiary of such a petition was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity for at 
least one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). Because the Petitioner has not offered new facts or evidence addressing our basis 
for dismissing the appeal, it has not established that a reopening of our prior decision is warranted. 
Next, we will address the Petitioner's motion to reconsider. A motion to reconsider must establish 
that our prior decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy and that the decision was 
incorrect based on the evidence in the record of proceedings at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.S(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and demonstrate eligibility 
for the requested benefit. 
On motion, the Petitioner asserts that we "neglected to classify the beneficiary's position as managerial 
or supervisory" thus indicating that we should have contemplated the Beneficiary's position abroad 
under the statutory definition of "managerial capacity." See section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
However, the purpose of this motion is to consider legal arguments as to whether our decision was 
correct based on evidence in the record at the time of the decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). As 
noted above, the Petitioner did not previously claim or offer evidence to show that the Beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a managerial capacity and we therefore need not consider this claim, which has been 
raised for the first time on motion. 
The Petitioner also claims that it provided "probative, verifiable evidence" establishing its eligibility. 
We disagree. As previously stated, we dismissed the appeal because the Petitioner claimed that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity rather than in a managerial or 
executive capacity as required of L-lA new office petitions. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). The 
Petitioner has not specified which of its prior submissions establishes that our determination was based 
on an incorrect application of the relevant regulatory provisions. 
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Lastly, the Petitioner cites precedent case law which appears to involve issues concerning the 
admissibility of evidence in deportation proceedings. However, the instant matter is not a deportation 
proceeding, nor does it concern the admissibility of evidence. As noted earlier, the issue here is 
whether we correctly dismissed the appeal based on the determination that the Petitioner did not 
provide sufficient evidence showing that it met the requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B), which 
pertains to L-lA new office petitions. As the Petitioner has not explained how the cited cases are 
relevant to the issues in this matter, the Petitioner's citation of those cases does not establish that we 
failed to correctly apply the law or policy based on the evidence before us at the time of the decision. 
In sum, the Petitioner has not established that our previous decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or policy at the time we issued our decision. Therefore, the motion to reconsider 
will be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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