dismissed L-1A Case: International Trade

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 8694067 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : WLY 10, 2020 
The Petitioner, a "new office 1 ," seeks to employ the Beneficiary as its chief executive officer (CEO) 
under the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification for intracompany managers or executives . Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a)(15)(L) . 
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the petition and dismissed the Petitioner's 
following motions to reopen and reconsider. We dismissed the Petitioner's appeal, then twice 
dismissed the company's motions to reopen and reconsider. In our last decision, we concluded that, 
contrary to the Act and Department of Homeland Security regulations, the Petitioner did not 
demonstrate its proposed employment of the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity , or his 
employment abroad for at least one continuous year within the three years before the petition's filing. 
Matter of K-W-LLC, ID# 5761610 (AAO Sept. 16, 2019) . 
The matter is before us again on the Petitioner's motions to reopen and reconsider. The Petitioner 
bears the burden of establishing eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1361. Upon review, we will dismiss the motions . 
I. MOTION CRITERIA 
A motion to reopen must state new facts, supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
In contrast, a motion to reconsider must establish a decision's misapplication of law or U.S . 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy based on the record at the time of the decision. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). We may grant motions that meet these requirements and demonstrate 
eligibility for the requested benefit. 
IL MOTION TO REOPEN 
The Petitioner submits copies of three, online advertisements by other companies for CEO positions . 
The Petitioner's last motion to reopen contained these same ads. We reviewed and considered the ads 
in our last decision. We found that, combined with all other relevant evidence of record, the ads did 
1 The term "new office" refers to an organization that, at the time of a petition 's filing, had been doing business in the 
United States for less than one year. 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii)(F). 
not establish the Petitioner's likely employment of the Beneficiary in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity within a year of the petition's approval. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) (requiring 
a new office, L-lA petitioner to demonstrate that, within one year of a petition's approval, the business 
will support an executive or managerial position). Thus, contrary to 8 C.F .R. § 103.5( a)(2), the motion 
to reopen does not state "new facts." We must therefore dismiss the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4) 
(requiring dismissal of a motion that does not meet applicable requirements). 
III. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
A. The Petitioner's Ability to Support a Managerial or Executive Position 
The Petitioner asserts that we erred by faulting the company for omitting specific daily tasks from the 
job duties of the offered position of CEO that the company submitted in response to the Director's 
written request for additional evidence. The Petitioner contends that "[a] CEO's job duties can only 
be described in general terms" as "[a] CEO has to be flexible in what he or she does everyday [sic] to 
carry out the ultimate purpose of the CEO position." The Petitioner asserts that our reasoning "shows 
that the reviewing officer ... has no fundamental understanding of how businesses in [the] real world 
work[]." 
We acknowledge that CEOs must remain flexible to respond to daily business problems or 
opportunities that may arise. An L-1 petitioner, however, must provide "a detailed description of the 
services to be performed." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). A petitioner cannot describe the duties of an 
offered position in vague terms. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), ajf'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990) (stating: "Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether [a beneficiary's] duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting 
the definitions [ of the terms "executive capacity" or "managerial capacity"] would simply be a matter 
of reiterating the regulations"). 
The job duties of the offered position provided by the Petitioner include some executive duties, such 
as developing business projections and strategies, and implementing company policies. But the record 
does not provide specific examples of projections, strategies, or policies that the Beneficiary would 
develop or implement. The Petitioner also did not sufficiently explain how the Beneficiary would 
develop or implement the projections, strategies, and policies. Thus, the Petitioner's job duties are not 
specific enough to demonstrate that the Beneficiary would work in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On motion, the Petitioner provides a new set of job duties for the offered position. Some of the duties 
mirror prior ones. But the Petitioner has reorganized prior duties and recalculated the percentages of 
time the Beneficiary would spend on them. The company has also amended some prior duties and 
added new ones. For example, the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary would perform the prior 
duty of coordinating the company's public relations. But new information on motion indicates that he 
will perform this duty "through the oversight of a public relations professional." The Petitioner's 
proposed organizational chart does not list a public relations professional, let alone one under the 
Beneficiary's direct oversight. The discrepancies on motion cast doubt on the true job duties of the 
offered position, the amount of time the Beneficiary would spend on them, and the Petitioner's 
proposed staff. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988) (requiring a petitioner to resolve 
inconsistencies ofrecord with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies). 
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Moreover, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). A 
petitioner may not make material changes to a petition after its filing in an effort to conform with 
regulatory requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 175 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998). For 
the foregoing reasons, the job duties of the offered position do not support the Beneficiary's proposed 
employment in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The Petitioner also asserts that we erred in doubting its plan to build a warehouse on its property. The 
company states: "USCIS did not show any evidence in support of its finding." Contrary to the 
Petitioner's assertion, however, we questioned the plan based on the company's own statements. In a 
motion filed with the Director, the Petitioner appeared to retreat from its written business plan, which 
states: "The short-term vision is to build a temporary warehouse facility on the land adjacent to the 
office building." Instead, the Petitioner stated that: its current property has enough storage space; it 
could rent additional space; and the "export business does not necessarily need warehousing." Our 
doubts about the Petitioner's plan to build a warehouse therefore stemmed from evidence ofrecord. 
The Petitioner further asserts that we lacked a basis to question its first-year projected revenues of 
$1,228,000. The company's business plan indicates that the Petitioner would annually generate 
$300,000 from leasing the office building it owns. Thus, we found that the company anticipated its 
proposed warehouse/export operations to generate the remaining $928,000 in first-year revenues. 
Because the company appeared to withdraw its plan to immediately build the warehouse, we 
questioned its projected amount of additional, first-year revenues. 
The Petitioner contends that its business plan details and analyzes its first-year revenue projections. 
The company states: "The USCIS failed to review the business plan in sufficient detail and jumped 
to [the] wrong conclusion." But, besides the Petitioner's leasing of office space, the business plan 
bases the company's projected first-year revenues on its combined exportation of products and leasing 
of warehouse space to others. The Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how, without a warehouse 
to lease to others, it would generate the remaining $928,000. See section 291 of the Act (requiring a 
petitioner to demonstrate its eligibility for a requested benefit). The Petitioner has not established the 
decision's misapplication of law or USCIS policy based on the record at the time of the decision. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that, within one 
year of the petition's approval, it would support the Beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. 
B. The Beneficiary's Employment Abroad 
The Petitioner asserts that we erred in questioning the Beneficiary's employment abroad for at least 
one continuous year in the three years before the petition's filing. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(A) 
( defining the term "intracompany transferee"). The Petitioner acknowledges that, while on the foreign 
entity's payroll, the Beneficiary spent more than two-thirds of the relevant three-year period in the 
United States as a business visitor. But the company contends that we misinterpreted 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(A). 
In relevant part, the regulation states: 
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Periods spent in the United States in lawful status for a branch of the same employer 
or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof and brief trips to the United States for 
business or pleasure shall not be interruptive of the one year of continuous employment 
abroad but such periods shall not be counted toward fulfillment of that requirement. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(A). 
The Petitioner argues that, because the Beneficiary remained in the United States for prolonged parts 
of the three-year period, he did not make "brief trips" to the country as described in the regulation. 
The company therefore contends that the provision does not bar him from establishing one year of 
employment abroad. 
The Act, however, indicates that an L-1 beneficiary must have spent at least one continuous year 
within the prior three-year period outside the United States. The Act requires that an intracompany 
transferee be not only one "who, immediately preceding the time of his application for admission into 
the United States, has been employed continuously for one year," but also one "who seeks to enter the 
United States temporarily." Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. "[T[he two requirements evince 
congressional intent that the requisite one year of continuous employment take place abroad." 
Karmali v. INS, 707 F.2d 408,411 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). 
USCIS policy also requires the one continuous year of L-1 qualifying employment to occur outside 
the United States. 
The one-year foreign employment requirement is only satisfied by the time a 
beneficiary spends physically outside the United States working foll-time for the 
petitioner or a qualifying organization. A petitioner cannot use any time that the 
beneficiary spent in the United States to meet the one-year foreign employment 
requirement, even if the qualifying foreign entity paid the beneficiary and continued to 
employ the beneficiary while he or she was in the United States. 
USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0167, Satisfying the L-1 I-Year Foreign Employment 
Requirement; Revisions to Chapter 32.3 of the Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM) 3 (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/policy-memoranda (last visited July 1, 2020). 
The Petitioner's interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(A) conflicts with congressional intent and 
USCIS policy. Thus, we will reject the company's argument. The Petitioner therefore has not 
demonstrated the Beneficiary's qualifying employment abroad. 
C. The Petitioner's Request to Change the Beneficiary's Status 
Finally, the Petitioner seeks to change the Beneficiary's nonimmigrant status from business visitor to 
L-lA. The Petitioner asks us to excuse the petition's untimely change-of-status request based on 
"extraordinary circumstances" beyond the control of the company and the Beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.1 ( c )( 4) (granting USCIS discretion to excuse a failure to file a petition before the expiration of 
a beneficiary's prior authorized status). As indicated in our appellate decision, however, we lack 
authority to review denial of a requested change of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 248.3(g) (barring appeal 
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from the denial of a change-of-status application). We therefore cannot consider the Petitioner's 
change-of-status request. Also, as previously discussed, the Petitioner has not demonstrated eligibility 
for the requested L-lA status. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner's motion to reopen does not meet regulatory requirements. The company's motion to 
reconsider does not establish our last decision's misapplication of law or USCIS policy, or the 
petition's approvability. We will therefore affirm the petition's denial. 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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