dismissed L-1A Case: Jewelry

PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland 9rcurity 
20 blassachu~e~ts 4bc. ;\, W Rnl r\?OJ2 
Wash~ngton DC 20520 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: EAC 00 275 5 1560 Office: VERMONT SERVICE ( 
k'h 11 l'lON: Petit~on for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant 
and Nat~onality Act. 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(15)(1 
to Section 1 
2) 
0 1 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Immigratloll 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision ofthe Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
X 
EAC 00 275 51560 
Page 2 
DISCIISSION. The D~rector, Vermont Serv~ce Center, denled the petltlon for a nonimnugrant visa Thc 
Adrnlnlstrat~ve Appeals Office (AAO) d~smissed the subsequently filed appeal. The matter is now beforc the 
AAO on motion to reopen. The motion will be granted and the prevlous declsion of the AAO will be 
affirmed. 
The petitioner states that it is engaged .in the import and retail sale ,of jewelry. It seeks to extend its 
authorization to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as its executive director pursuant to 
sectlon 101(a)(15)(L) of the lmm~gratlon and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) The 
petlt~oner, a Vlrgmm aorporatlon, clalrns to be a subsldlary of located in Delh~, hd~a. The 
beneficlary was m~t~ally granted a one-year penod of stay In L-1A status In order to open a new office In the 
IJn~ted States and the petitloner now seeks to extend his stay. 
The d~rector denled the petltlon on February 16, 2001, concluding that the petitloner faded to estabhsh that 
the beneficiary would be employed m a managerial or executive capaclty. 
On appeal, the AAO affirmed the declslon of the d~rector In a dec~slon dated October 15, 2002. The MO also 
observed that the evidence on record did not demonstrate that (1) the beneficiary's servlces would be for a 
temporary penod or that the beneficlary would be transferred abroad upon completion of the assihmment as 
requlred by 8 C.F.R 9 214.2(1)(3)(vii); or that (2) the pet~t~oner'has a qualifying relat~onsh~p wlth the 
beneficiary's forelgn employer pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1)(11)(G). 
On motlon, counsel submlts a brief statement and add~t~onal evidence to address the grounds of the director's 
denla! and the find~ngs of the AAO. 
To establish L-1 ellglbllity under sectlon lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Imm~gratlon and Natlonallty Act (the Act), 
8 U S.C. 9 I lOi(a)(lS)(L), the petltloner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, w~thin three years preced~ng 
the benefic~ary's appllcat~on for adm~sslon Into the Unlted States, has been employed abroad In a qual~fylng 
managerial or executive capaclty, or in a capaclty lnvolvlng spectalized knowledge, for one continuous year 
by a qualifying organrzat~on and seeks to enter the United States temporarily In order to contlnue to render his 
or her servlces to the same employer or a subsidiary or affil~ate thereof In a capaclty that 1s managerial, 
executive, or lnvolves spcclal~zed knowledge. 
'rhe regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3) states that an indlvldual petltion filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by. 
(I) Evldence that the petitioner and the organlzat~on wh~ch empfoyed or wllI employ the 
ahen are qual~fylng organ~zatlons as defined In paragraph (1)(1)(11)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the allen will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
EAC' 00 275 5 1560 
Page 3 
(111) Evldcnce that the alien has at least one continuous year of full tlmc enlployment 
abroad w~th a qual~fylng organization w~thln the three years preced~ng-the fil~ng of 
the petlt~on. 
(iv) Ev~dence that the allen's pnor year of employment abroad was In a positlon that was 
manager~al, executive or Involved spec~ahzed knowledge and that the allen's prlor 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnher to perform the Intended 
servlees in the Un~ted States: however, the work In the Unlted States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. (j 214.2(1)(14)(11) also provides that a visa petit~on, wh~ch lnvolved the openlng of a 
new office, may be extended by fil~ng a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the follow~ng: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are st111 qualify~ng organizations 
as defined m paragraph (1)(1)(11)(G) of this section; 
(B) , Evidence that the United States entlty has been dolng business as defined In 
paragraph (I)(l)(li)(H) of thls section for the previous year: 
(C) A statement of the dut~es performed by the beneficiary for the prevlous year and the 
duties the benefic~ary wlll perform under the extended petit~on; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages. paid to 
employees when the beneficiary wlll be employed tn a management or executive 
capacity: and 
(E) Evldence of the financ~al status of the United States operat~on. 
The first Issue In the present matter IS whether the beneficiary w~ll be employed by the Un~ted States entrty In 
a pnmarily manager~al or executive capacity. 
Section IOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
asslbqment within an organizatlon In whlch the employee pnmanly: 
(1) manages the organlzation, or a department, subdivision, funct~on. or component of 
the organizatlon; 
(11) supervises and controls the work of other supervtsory, professional, or manager~al 
employees, or manages an essential functron wlthln the organ~zatlon, or a department 
or subd~v~sion of the organ~zat~on; 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
Page 4 
(111) ~f another employee or other employees arc directly superv~sed, has the authority to 
htre and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actlons (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or ~f no other employee 1s dlrectly supervised. 
functions at a senlor level wlth~n the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(IV) exercises dlscretlon over the day to day operat~ons of the actrv~ty or funct~on for 
whlch the employee has authority. A first line supervisor IS not considered to be 
actlng In a manager~al capaclty merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professtonal 
Sect~on IOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executlve capaclty" as an 
assignment w~thln an organizat~on in wh~ch the employee pnmarlly: 
(I) dlrects the management of the organizat~on or a major component or funct~on of the 
organizatlon; 
(11) establishes the goals and pol~cies of the organlzat~on, component, or funct~on; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(IV) receives only general supervision or direct~on from h~gher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organlzatlon. 
The Form 1-129 petltlon was submltted on September 8, 2000 wtth msufficlent evldence to establ~sh that the 
beneficiary would be employed In a primarily manager~al or execut~ve capacity. The petltloner prov~ded only 
a br~ef descrlpt~on of the benefic~ary's duties dunng the first year of operat~ons, and indicated that the 
beneficlary's wlfe, an unsalaned shareholder, was solely responsible for selltng jewelry and mainta~n~ng the 
store. The petltloner stated that it d~d not have any payroll employees 
On October 25, 2000, the d~rector requested additional ev~dence in support of the pet~t~oner's claim that the 
beneficiary would bc employed In a managerlal or executive capac~ty, tnclud~ng In part a co~nprehens~ve 
descr~ptlon of the beneficiary's duties, an organ~zat~onal chart deplct~ng all of the petitloner's employees, and 
descrrptlons of the dutles performed by the beneficlary's subordinates The petttioner, through former 
counsel, submitted ev~dence that ~t hired two employees subsequent to the filing of the petlt~on, brief 
descr~pt~ons of the~r duties, and a new descnpt~on of the benefic~ary's dut~es. As the benefic~ary's job 
descnption was quoted m ~ts entirety In the AAO's prevlous declslon, ~t w~ll not be repeated here 
The dlrector dented the pet~tion on February 16, 2001 concluding that the petltloner had not establ~shed that 
the benefic~ary had been and would be employed in a pnmarily executlve or managerial capaclty. The drrector 
observed that the ev~dence subm~tted Indicated the beneficiary had been and would be engaged prlmarlly in 
non-managerial, day-to-day operahons involv~ng producing a product or providtng a servlce. 
Page 5 
On appeal, former counsel for the petitioner asserted that the director faded to cons~der the job descnption 
provided In response to the pet~tioner's request for evidence "detailing his duties vis-a-vis executrve funct~ons 
In contrast to the duttes of its two regular staff employees." The AAO dismissed the appeal, noting that the 
pet~tioner's descriptions of the beneficiary's duties were too broad and general, and that the record contained 
no lndicat~on of the beneficiary's actual duties. The AAO also found no evidence that the beneficiary would 
manage a staff of professional, managerial or superv~sory personnel and concluded that he would be acting, at 
most. as a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. 
On motion, counsel for the petitioner does not specifically address the issues ralsed In the AAO's dec~s~on. 
Rather, counsel merely states: 
The pnor counsel misstated the benefic~ary's dut~es. Actually, he was performmg these duties 
while settlng up the business. The job descr~ption for his pos~tion as a Manager 1s as follows. 
Manager - Dlrects Sales, Export and Import of Jewelry. Formulates prlclng pollcles of 
Jewelry accordmg to profitablhty of store operatrons. Coord~nates sales promotion actlv~ties 
and prepares or directs workers prepanng merchandise displays, supervises employees 
engaged m sales work. Taking ~nventories, Reconciling Cash and Sales Rece~pts. Plans and 
prepares work schedules and assrgns employees to speclfic duties 
The job is a combination ofjob of Export Manager, Sales Manager, Retail Store Manager and 
General Manager all m one. In a small business enterpnse, there has to be a lot of flexibility. 
The Manager has to wear many hats, and sometimes he has to substitute for employee too. 
Counsel cites several unpublished AAO decisions to stand for the proposition that CIS is required "to look at 
the increase in the number of employees, s~gnificant growth in cash flow, presence of significant customers 
and clientele or similar elements m order to determine the need of Managerial or Executtve Employee " 
Counsel states that the petltioner's "cash flow 1s growlng everyday as 1s indicated by its sales. The sales are 
much higher In 2001 than m 2000 and 1999. Its clientele or base of customers is increasing and thus it needs 
the servlces of the benefictary " The pet~tioner prov~des copies of its Internal Revenue Servlce (IRS) Forms 
1120, U S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the years 1999. 2000 and 2001 and "payroll deductions" for 
the 2001 and 2002 years. Finally, counsel asserts that the Immigration Act of 1990 "liberalized" the 
definitions of managenal and execut~ve capacity, and no longer requlres beneficiar~es to have supervisory 
responsib~llt~es Counsel concludes that the beneficiary 1s performing "all the managerla] duties" whtle other 
employees perform the day-to-day functions. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. When examining the executrve or managerial capacity of the 
benefic~ary, the AAO w~ll look first to the petlt~oner's job description of the job duties. See 8 C F R 
24213)(i). 'The petitloner's descnption of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary and tndtcate whether such dutles are In an executive or managerlal capacity Id 
Counsel has prov~ded no addit~onal ev~dence on motton to persuas~vely demonstrate that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a managenal or executive capacity. Rather, the new job dewnpt~on. which counsel 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
I'age 6 
claims represents the beiieficlary's "actual" duties, supports the d~rcctor's and the AAO's prevlous 
conclus~ons that the beneficiary pr~mar~ly performs loutme operat~onal tasks. such as taking inventory and 
reconc~ling cash register rece~pts, and directly performing sales tasks, as well as first-l~ne supervisory duties 
over low-level staff. An employee who pr~marlly performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provlde services 1s not considered to be employed m a managerlal or execut~ve capacity. Matter of Clzurch 
Scientology Ititern~ilional, 19 I&N Dec. 593. 604 (Comm 1988). A manager~al or executive employee must 
have author~ty over day-to-day operat~ons beyond the level normally vested In a first-line supervisor, unless 
the supervised employees are profess~onals Id 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. second, the petitioner 
must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Charripion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Where an individual is primarily performing the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or to provide a service, that individual cannot also primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties. In the instant matter, the petitioner has failed to show 'that non-qualifying duties will not 
constitute the majority of the beneficiary's time. 
Counsel correctly states that the Immigration Act of 1990 removed the requirement that a managerial or 
executive employee directly supervise personnel. However, counsel does not submit evidence or argument to 
establish that the beneficiary qualifies as a, "function manager." The tenn "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff .but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the oiganization. See section 101(a)(44)(A) 
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9; 1101(a)(44)(A). Based on the petitioner's representations, the beneficiary devotes a 
substantial .proportion of his time to supervisory responsibilitjes. If it is claimed that his duties involve 
supervising employees, ,the petitioner .must establish that the subordinate employees' are supervisory, 
professional, or managerial. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. As discussed in the MO's previous 
decision. the beneficiary has not established that the beneficiary has authority beiond that of a first-line . . 
supervisor of non-professional personnel. 
Counsel correctly states that the AAO wlll take Into account certaln factors, such as an Increase in the number 
of employees, a s~gnlficant growth In cash flow or the presence of significant customers In determining the 
need for a managerlal or executive employee once a business becomes operat~onal. However, the AAO need 
not and will not conslder evidence of bus~ness growth or expansion that occurred subsequent to the fillng of 
the petltlon. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 6 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the Intended United States operation one 
year w~thin the date of approval of the pet~tion to support an executive or manager~al position. There 1s no 
provlslon m CIS regulations that allows for an extenston of this one-year penod. If the buslness 1s not 
suffic~ently operat~onal after one year, and does not have sufficient subordinate staff to relieve the beneficiary 
from perform~ng non-quahfy~ng dut~es, the petitloner 1s ~neligible by regulat~on for an extension Therefore, 
the AAO wlll not consider evldence of the petitloner's staffing levels or sales figures for the 200 1 and 2002 
years. The record ~nd~cates that as of the date of fillng, the beneficiary and hls spouse were st111 solely 
responsible for all aspects of the pet~tloner's business. Accordmgly, the pet~t~oner has not reached the point 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
Page 7 
that it can employ the beneficiary in a predom~nantly managerial or executive posltion. 'l'he petltloner has not 
submitted ev~dence on motion to overcome the AAO's previous decls~on on this Issue. 
The second Issue In thls proceeding is whether the petitloner has establ~shed that the beneficiary's 
employment will be for a temporary period. 
Generally, the petlt~oner for an L-1 nonlmm~grant classificat~on needs to subm~t only a s~mple statement of 
facts and a listing of dates to demonstrate the intent to employ the benefic~ary In the United States 
temporarily. However, where the beneficlary 1s cla~med to be the owner or a major stockholder of the 
petltlonlng company, a greater degree of proof 1s requ~red. Mntrer oflsovic, 18 I&N Dec. 361 (Comm. 1982). 
see also 8 C F R. 6 214.2(1)(3)(~11) As noted in the AAO's prevlous dec~s~on, the record ind~cates that the 
beneficiary 1s a 50 percent owner of the petitioning organ~zatlon. The petitioner d~d not fum~sh evidence that 
the beneficlary's servlces are for a temporary penod or that the benefic~ary will be transferred abroad upon 
completlon of the assignment. 
On motion, counsel s~mply asserts that the statute does not requlre ev~dence that the beneficiary's services 
will be for a temporary period or ev~dence that the beneficlary w1l1 be transferred abroad upon completlon of 
his ass~gnment. The petltloner has not subm~tted any add~t~onal evldence in compliance with the 
requlrements at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~11). Counsel's contention that such a requirement does not ex~st, when 
the requirement is stated In the plain language of the regulat~ons, IS not persuasive. 1 he petitroner has fa~led to 
overcome the AAO's detenninatlon on th~s Issue For th~s addlt~onal reason, the petition may not be 
approved 
The th~rd and final Issue in th~s proceed~ng IS whether the petitloner has establ~shed a qualify~ng relationship 
between the U.S. company and the foreign entlty. 
The pertinent regulat~ons at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(1)(11) define the term "qual~fyrng organ~zat~on" and related 
terms as follows: 
(Ci) Qua1zfi:ing organization means a Un~ted States or forelgn firm. corporat~on, or other 
legal entlty which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qual~fylng relat~onsh~ps spec~fied In the definitions of 
a parent, branch, affil~ate or subsid~ary specified In paragraph (1)(1)(11) of this 
sectlon; 
(2) Is or w~ll be doing business (engaging In lnternatlonal trade IS not requ~red) as 
an employer in the United States and m at least one other country dlrectly or 
through a parent, branch, affihate or subsidiary for the duratron of the allen's 
stay In the Un~ted States as an lntracompany transferee; and, 
(3) Otherwise meets the requlrements of sect~on IOI(a)(15)(L) of the Act. 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
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I Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries.. 
(J) Bravch means an operating division or office of the same organization housed in a 
dl fferent location. 
(K) Szlhsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
d~rectly or mdirectly, more than half of the entlty and controls the entity; or owns, 
drrectly or indirectly, half of the ent~ty and controls the entity; or owns, dlrectly or 
~ndrrectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 jolnt venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity; or owns. directly or indrrectly, less than half of the entity, but m fact controls 
the entity. 
(L) Afjiliate means 
(I) One of two subsrdianes both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or rnd~vldual. or 
(2) One of two legal entlt~es owned and controlled by the same goup of 
~ndividuals, each lndlvidual ownrng and controlling approximately the same 
share or proport~on of each ent~ty. 
The petrtroner indicated on Form 1-129 Supplement EL that the Un~ted States company 1s a subs~diary of the 
foreign entity and explained: 
Both companies family owned: Alien owns overseas branch with hls brother from '84 to '92 
and thereafter alone until March '99 when he left for U.S. (HIS wife's brother manages the 
business to date In whlch he and allen are equal [partners]. U.S. business is 100% owned by 
ahen & wlfe. 
The record ~ncludes the following documents wlth respect to the forelgn entrty's ownershrp: (1) a partnershrp 
deed for the forelgn entlty dated July 20, 1984, l~st~ng the beneficrary and h~s brother as 50-50 partners; (2) a 
d~ssolut~on deed confirming that the beneficiary's brother left the partnership on December 30, 1994; and (3) 
an affidavit executed by the beneficiary on September 9, 1999, which lndrcates that his brother-in-law became 
a partner rn the forergn entity in March 1999, and that h~s brother-ln-law currently manages the foreign entlty. 
The record also contains the pet~troner's stock certificates numbers one and two, confirming that the 
beneficlary and h~s spouse each own ten shares of stock in the company. 
Although the director d~d not address th~s issue rn hls dec~ston, the AAO noted that the petitioner did not 
submit evidence to establ~sh that ~t IS a subs~diary of the foreign entity, as claimed on the Form 1-129 
supplement. The AAO further observed that the petitioner Indicated that the beneficlary alone owns the 
fore~gn entlty. while the U.S. entrty IS owned by the beneficiary and hls spouse, and concluded: "Given thls 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
Page 9 
evidence. it 1s apparent that there IS no quallfy~ng relat~onship between the petltloner and the foreigm entlty 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(1)(11)(G)." 
On appeal. counsel objects to the AAO's findlngs and asserts: 
The law does not say that the U.S. entlty has to be a subsidiary of the forelgn entlty. A 
Majority of stock ownershlp In both companles IS sufficlent (Matter of Tessel). Less than 
majority ownership, but control, may be sufficient. (Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). It IS a matter of fact that the benefic~ary 1s a majorlty owner for both the 
a 
ent~ties. Thus, there 1s a qualifying relat~onsh~p between the two companles. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive Upon review of the previous decls~on, the AAO acknowledges that 
thrs office could have offered a clearer explanation for finding the petitloner's evidence deficient. However, 
the petitloner has not submitted ev~dence on motlon to establ~sh that the U S. entity and the foreign ent~ty 
have the requlslte qualifying relat~onship. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownershlp and control are the factors that must be exam~ned in 
determining whether a quahfying relatlonsh~p exists between Un~ted States and forelgn ent~tles for purposes 
of thls vlsa class~ficat~on. Matter of Church Scientology Internattonal, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see ulso 
Matter ofSrenrens Medical Sy.stenis, Inc., 19 1&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownersh~p refers to the dlrect or Indirect legal nght of 
possession of the asseis of an ent~ty with full power and authorlty to control; control means the direct or 
indlrect legal right and authorlty to drrect the establishment, management, and operations of an ent~ty. Ahtter- 
of C'izurclz Scientology Internutional, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
To establ~sh el~glblllty In this case, ~t must be shown that the forelgn employer and the pct~t~on~ng entlty share 
common ownershlp and control. Control may be "de jure" by reason of ownership of 51 percent of 
outstanding stocks of the other entlty or ~t may be "de facto" by reason of control of voting shares through 
partla1 ownership and possession of proxy votes. Mutter of Hugite~, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). 
Addltlonally, a petltlonlng company must dlsclose all agreements relatlng to the votlng of shares, the 
dlstnbut~on of profit, the management and d~rection of the subs~dlary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entlty. See Matter of Sie~neris Medical Systems, Inc., I&N Dec. 362 Wlthout full d~sclosure of 
all relevant documents, CIS 1s unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The petitloner claims that the benefic~ary owns 50 percent of the foreign entlty, but has faded to prov~de any 
supportlng documentation to establish the current ownersh~p and control of the company. The petitloner drd 
not submrt a copy of the forelgn entity's current partnershlp deed, which would establish the benefic~ary's - 
actual percentage of ownershlp and degree of control in the forelgn partnershlp at the tlme th~s petltion was 
filed. In addltlon, the petitloner's statement that the beneficiary's partner actually manages the foreign entity 
suggests that the benefic~ary does not exerclse "de facto" control over the entlty Golng on record w~thout 
supportlng documentary evldence IS not sufficlent for purposes of meetlng the burden of proof In these 
proceedmgs. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (crtlng Matter of Trcusilre Craft of 
EAC 00 275 5 1560 
Page 10 
CaI!fot-t~iu, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Absent th~s essential documentation, the AAO 1s unable to 
determine whether the United States and foreign entlt~es possess the claimed affiliate relatlonshlp 
Although counsel also cites on appeal that Maner of Trsset, Irzc , 17 I&N Dec 63 1 (Acting Assoc. Comm 
1981) detenn~ned that a majonty stock ownersh~p in both companies 1s sufficient for the purposes of 
establlsh~ng a qual~fylng relatlonsh~p, counsel has misconstrued the dectsion In the Tkssel decls~on, the 
beneficiary owned 93% of the forelbm corporatlon and 60% of the petitlonlng organlzatlon, thereby 
establishing a "high percentage of common ownersh~p and common management . . . ." It was further 
determrned that "[wlhere there IS a hlgh percentage of ownersh~p and common management between two 
companies, e~ther duectly or indirectly or through a thlrd ent~ty, those companies are 'affil~ated' wlth~n the 
meaning of that term as used In section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act." Id at 633. The facts in the present matter 
can be distmgu~shed from Mutter of TesseZ because no one shareholder holds a majonty Interest In either 
corporatlon. The record, therefore, falls to demonstrate that there is a hlgh percentage of common ownersh~p 
and common management between the two companies. 
The pet~tloner has not submitted sufficient evrdence to estabhsh a quallfy~ng relat~onsh~p between the United 
States and foreign entitles. For thls add~ttonal reason, the petitioner may not be approved. 
The pet~tion wlll be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
altemat~ve basis for den~al. In visa pet~tion proceedmgs, the burden of proving el~gib~lity for the benefit 
sought remarns entlrely wlth the petitioner. Sectlon 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. (i 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. Accordingly, the prevlous decls~on of the AAO w~ll be affirmed, and the petltlon will be 
denled. 
ORDER: The decision of the AAO dated October 12,2002 1s affirmed.