dismissed L-1A Case: Laser Equipment Manufacturing

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 8705856 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: WLY 13, 2020 
The Petitioner, a manufacturer of laser equipment, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a 
custom product manager in the United States under the L-lA nonirmnigrant classification for 
intracompany transferees. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding the record did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial or specialized knowledge 
capacity abroad. In addition, the Director determined the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the 
Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity in the United States. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary managed an essential function abroad and 
contends his former foreign position involved specialized knowledge uncommon in the industry. 
Further, the Petitioner states it submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the Beneficiary would 
be employed as a function manager in the United States. 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden 
to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification , a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering their services to the same employer 
or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. Id. The petitioner must also 
establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment qualify him or her to perform 
the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL CAP A CITY 
The first issue we will address is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary would be 
employed in a managerial capacity in the United States. The Petitioner does not claim that the 
Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 
whether the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial capacity. 
"Managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; 
supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or 
manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the 
organization; has authority over personnel actions or functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and exercises discretion over the 
day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. Section 
10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
When examining the managerial capacity of a given beneficiary, we will review the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a managerial 
capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 2 l 4.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the required description of the job duties, we examine 
the company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the 
presence of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of 
the business, and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual duties 
and role in a business. Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties 
along with evidence of the nature of the Petitioner's business, its staffing levels, and its organizational 
structure. 
A. Duties 
Based on the definition of managerial capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the Beneficiary will 
perform certain high-level responsibilities. See section 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act. Second, the 
Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial duties, as opposed 
to ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. 
USCIS, 469 F .3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006). 
The Petitioner stated it is "a leading manufacturer of laser equipment" and specializes in the "ability 
to customize systems" for customers. The Petitioner explained that as a custom product manager the 
Beneficiary's "skills et and knowledge" would "enhance [its] ability to modify solutions [ and] innovate 
to satisfy customers' special needs." The Petitioner provided the following U.S. duty description for 
the Beneficiary: 
1. Work with sales team to clarify laser processing needs and challenges, identify the 
customization module, including special laser sources model selection, the motion 
control design and etc.; 15% 
2. Communicate technical specification with R&D team at the parent company, 
oversees the designing process; 15% 
3. Receive technical specification design proposal and processing work piece, arrange 
personnel, time, and location to do demonstration; 
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4. Work with R&D team to make changes when needed by the customers; 
5. Form a local team to provide system initiation, commissioning and training. 
In the request for evidence (RFE), the Director stated that the provided U.S. duty description "lacked 
sufficient detail." The Director noted the Petitioner "provided no supporting documentation to 
demonstrate the beneficiary's managerial authority" or to establish that he would be primarily relieved 
from performing daily non-qualifying duties. The Director further indicated that the duty description 
should describe the Beneficiary's typical managerial duties and include the percentages of time he 
spent on each task. However, as noted by the Director in the denial decision, the Petitioner only 
resubmitted the same duty description included above in response to the RFE; and on appeal, again 
resubmits this same description. 
The U.S. duty description provided for the Beneficiary does include specific daily tasks nor does it 
assign percentages of time he devoted to each claimed duty. In fact, the duty description questionably 
accounts for only 30% of the Beneficiary's time. This lack of detail is noteworthy since the 
Beneficiary's duty description indicates he would be engaged in the performance of several non­
qualifying operational tasks such as identifying the customization module, special laser source model 
selection, and motion control design, communicating technical specifications with the research and 
development team, and making changes to customer solutions as required. 
Whether the Beneficiary is a managerial employee turns on whether the Petitioner has sustained its 
burden of proving that their duties are "primarily" managerial. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
Here, the Petitioner does not document what proportion of the Beneficiary's duties would be 
managerial functions and what proportion would be non-qualifying. The Petitioner lists the 
Beneficiary's duties as including both managerial tasks and administrative or operational tasks but 
does not quantify the time he spends on these different duties. For this reason, we cannot determine 
whether the Beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. 
Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
In contrast, despite a direct request from the Director, the Petitioner provided few details and no 
supporting documentation to substantiate the Beneficiary's primary performance of qualifying 
managerial duties. For instance, the Petitioner did not provide specifics or supporting documentation 
to corroborate the Beneficiary overseeing design processes, arranging personnel, forming teams, or 
providing training as claimed. Further, despite contending that the Beneficiary is relieved from non­
qualifying operational tasks, there is no supporting evidence to substantiate this assertion. This lack 
of detail and documentation is noteworthy as the Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary has been 
acting in his claimed managerial role in the United States for more than three years since September 
2015. 1 Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily 
managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajf'd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Even though the Beneficiary holds a senior position within the organization, the fact that he will 
manage or direct a portion of the business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification 
1 The petition was filed on April 3, 2019. 
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as an intracompany transferee in a managerial capacity within the meaning of section 10l(a)(44)(A) 
of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position be 
"primarily" managerial in nature. Id. The Beneficiary may exercise discretion over the Petitioner's 
day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of authority with respect to discretionary 
decision-making; however, the position descriptions alone are insufficient to establish that his actual 
duties would be primarily managerial in nature. 
B. Staffing 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
capacity, we take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose 
and stage of development of the organization. See section 101 (a)( 44 )( C) of the Act. 
The Petitioner solely asserts that the Beneficiary would be employed as a function manager. The 
statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See section 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act. Personnel managers are required to primarily 
supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Whereas 
the term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the 
work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" 
within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. Since the Petitioner only asserts 
that the Beneficiary would qualify as a function manager, we will not analyze whether he would 
qualify as a personnel manager. 
If a petitioner claims that a beneficiary will manage an essential function, it must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed in managing the essential function. In addition, the petitioner must demonstrate 
that "(1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the function is 'essential,' i.e., core to the 
organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed to perform, the function; (4) the 
beneficiary will act at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and (5) the beneficiary will exercise discretion over the function's day-to-day 
operations." Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). 
The Petitioner indicated in support letters that the Beneficiary's "position doesn't [involve] supervise 
[sic] and control," but noted that "he will have a virtual team with help of management from R&D in 
China, local customer support team and manufacturing team in China." It also stated there were "5 
engineers designated to support customization projects managed by product managers all around the 
world." The Petitioner asserts on appeal that the Beneficiary "oversees modification and innovation 
to satisfy customers' special needs" and contends he is not tasked with the daily duties of the function 
but oversees "others' work and exercise[s] discretion to achieve the goal." 
First, the Petitioner has not sufficiently defined the Beneficiary's claimed essential function. The 
Petitioner only generically indicates that the Beneficiary performs customization projects for 
customers; however, it does not explain these projects in detail nor how this is a specifically defined 
function over which he has discretionary authority. In fact, the Petitioner indicates that the 
Beneficiary's position does not involve "control," leaving question as to whether he exercises 
discretion over an essential function. 
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Further, the Petitioner did not submit sufficient detail and supporting documentation to substantiate 
that the Beneficiary is primarily tasked with managing his function rather than performing it. As 
discussed, the Beneficiary's duty description indicates his substantial involvement in non-qualifying 
operational aspects of the projects he works on, including identifying the customization module, 
special laser source model selection, and motion control design, communicating technical 
specifications with the research and development team, and making changes to customer solutions as 
required. However, there is little evidence of the Beneficiary overseeing others performing these tasks 
or of him delegating these non-qualifying operational duties. In addition, as discussed, the record 
includes little supporting evidence to substantiate the Beneficiary performing managerial level tasks, 
such as overseeing design processes, arranging personnel, forming teams, or providing training as 
claimed. 
The Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary is relieved from performing non-qualifying tasks by 
members of his teams, including research and development staff: the local customer support and 
manufacturing team, and "5 engineers ... designated to support customization projects." However, the 
Petitioner does not identify these employees, explain specifically how they primarily relieve the 
Beneficiary from non-qualifying tasks, substantiate their existence, explain their duties, list their 
salaries, or demonstrate their educational levels, despite these direct evidentiary requests made by the 
Director. Therefore, in sum, the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Beneficiary would be 
employed as a function manager in the United States. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in 
a managerial capacity in the United States. 
III. FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
CAPACITY 
As we have discussed, the Director also denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial or specialized knowledge capacity abroad. 
Because of the dispositive effect of the above finding of ineligibility, we will only briefly address 
whether the Beneficiary acted in a managerial or specialized knowledge capacity abroad. The 
Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary was employed in an executive capacity 
abroad. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to whether the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial 
or specialized knowledge capacity. 
In denying the petition on these grounds, the Director determined the submitted evidence did not 
substantiate that the Beneficiary, an asserted function manager abroad, was primarily relieved from 
performing the non-qualifying operational tasks of his function. In addition, the Director concluded 
that the Petitioner did not compare the Beneficiary's knowledge against that of his colleagues as 
necessary to set his knowledge apart as specialized. 
On appeal, the Petitioner points to prior nonimmigrant visa approvals it received on behalf of the 
Beneficiary, notes that no material changes were made on the record with respect to his foreign 
employment, and contends that based on this, his eligibility should have not been reevaluated by the 
Director. The Petitioner also states that the Director erred in concluding that the Beneficiary's function 
abroad was not essential and asserts he was relieved from non-qualifying duties by the members of 
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the cross-functional teams he oversaw. Lastly, the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary's 
knowledge was special in comparison to others the industry; and therefore, that it was improper for 
the Director to point to the lack of comparisons of the Beneficiary against his colleagues within the 
company. 
First, we do not concur it was improper for the Director evaluate whether the Beneficiary's former 
foreign employment was in a managerial or specialized knowledge capacity. The Director's decision 
does not indicate whether she reviewed the prior approvals of the other nonimmigrant petitions. If the 
previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same evidence contained in the current 
record, these approvals would constitute an error on the part of the Director. We are not required to 
approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior 
approvals that may have been erroneous. Matter of Church Scientology Int'!, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 
(Comm'r 1988). It would be unreasonable for the Director, or us, to treat acknowledged errors as 
binding precedent. Sussex Eng'g, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Furthermore, our authority over the service centers is comparable to 
the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center Director had 
approved the nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of the Beneficiary, we would not be bound to follow 
the contradictory decision of a service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 44 F. Supp. 
2d 800, 803 (E.D. La. 1999). 
For similar reasons as those expressed in the previous section, the Petitioner did not demonstrate that 
the Beneficiary acted as a function manager abroad. As noted by the Director, the Petitioner did not 
sufficiently demonstrate that the Beneficiary primarily managed his claimed function, rather than 
performing it. Again, the Beneficiary's generic duty description indicated his involvement in non­
qualifying operational tasks abroad such as developing detailed descriptions of solutions, arranging 
manufacturing and commissioning of products, "close collaboration" with customers, and acting as a 
"pivot point" on the project. However, the Petitioner did not detail what portion of the Beneficiary's 
duties abroad involved non-qualifying operational tasks as compared to claimed managerial duties. 
Further, despite asserting that the Beneficiary oversaw and directed teams abroad, there is no 
supporting documentation to substantiate this nor evidence of him delegating non-qualifying tasks to 
others. Therefore, much like the Beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment, the Petitioner did not 
properly corroborate that he was primarily engaged in managerial tasks abroad and managing his 
asserted function as opposed to performing it. 
In the alternative, the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the Beneficiary's foreign position involved 
specialized knowledge. In concluding that the Beneficiary's foreign position did not involve 
specialized knowledge, the Director emphasized that the Petitioner did not compare him to his 
colleagues as necessary to establish that his knowledge was greatly developed than that of his 
colleagues. On appeal, the Petitioner contends this analysis was in error, since it was asserting that 
his knowledge abroad was special, or "distinct or uncommon in comparison to that generally found in 
the particular industry." 2 
2 Determining whether a beneficiary has "special knowledge" requires review of a given beneficiary's knowledge of how 
the petitioning organization manufactures, produces, or develops its products, services, research, equipment techniques, 
management, or other interests. Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's 
products or services and its application in international markets, a petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that 
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However, the Petitioner's assertion on appeal ignores that the Petitioner did not compare the 
Beneficiary's knowledge against those similarly placed in the industry to establish it as "distinct or 
uncommon" by comparison. Without further explanation or evidence on the part of the Petitioner, it 
is reasonable to conclude that there are other companies in the international marketplace that 
manufacture and customize lasers, and in turn, other professionals performing duties similar to the 
Beneficiary. However, the Petitioner provides no specifics or documentation to substantiate that the 
Beneficiary's knowledge in the industry is distinct or uncommon. 
In fact, at a minimum, the Petitioner has not even provided a detailed explanation of the nature of the 
Beneficiary's knowledge, but only vaguely indicated that it was based in proprietary information. We 
cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the 
petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of its products and services or 
processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field involved, and the nature of the 
beneficiary's knowledge. The petitioner should also describe how an employee is able to gain 
specialized knowledge within the organization and explain how and when the individual beneficiary 
gained such knowledge. As the Petitioner has not provided this level of detail or other sufficient 
supporting evidence specific to the Beneficiary's asserted specialized knowledge, we agree with the 
Director's conclusion that the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary's former position abroad 
involved specialized knowledge. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary was employed in a 
managerial or specialized knowledge capacity abroad. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the knowledge of other similarly employed 
workers in the particular industry. Knowledge that is commonly held throughout a petitioner's industly or that can be 
easily imparted from one person to another is not considered special knowledge. 
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