dismissed L-1A Case: Law

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MATTER OF B-&M-
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: FEB. 5, 2018 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner is a -based law firm which lends its name to over 70 law firms and other 
entities worldwide. It filed a blanket petition to designate all of these associated firms as qualifying 
entities for future L-1 intracompany transferee petition filings. See Immigration and Nationality Act 
(the Act) section 10l(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The approval of a blanket L petition 
recognizes a qualifying relationship between a United States employer and its parent , branches, 
subsidiaries, and affiliates. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that the law firms sharing the Petitioner's name qualify as affiliates. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director erred by 
not considering all applicable law. Much of the appellate brief directly repeats language from the 
Petitioner's earlier response from a notice of intent to deny the petition. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A United States employer may file a nonimmigrant petition for an intracompany transferee to work 
in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge.'' Section 
10l(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. The beneficiary of such a petition must have worked tor one continuous 
year during the three preceding years for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
qualifying capacity. ld. 
Under certain conditions, a petitioner seeking the classification of beneficiaries as intracompany 
transferees may file a blanket petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
seeking continuing approval of itself and some or all of its parent, branches. subsidiaries, and 
affiliates as qualifying organizations. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(4 )(i). Under the blanket petition process, 
users is responsible for determining whether the petitioner and its parent, branches. affiliates. or 
subsidiaries specified are qualifying organizations. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(i). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)( l )(ii)(L) provides three definitions for the tenn "atliliate": 
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(1) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or propmtion 
of each entity, or 
(3) In the case of a partnership that is organized in the United States to provide 
accounting services along with managerial and/or consulting services and that 
markets its accounting services under an internationally recognized name under an 
agreement with a worldwide coordinating organization that is owned and controlled 
by the member accounting firms, a partnership (or similar organization) that is 
organized outside the United States to provide accounting services shall be 
considered to be an atliliate of the United States partnership if it markets its 
accounting services under the same internationally recognized name under the 
agreement with the worldwide coordinating organization of which the United States 
partnership is also a member. 
II. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
In this case, the Petitioner does not claim a qualifying relationship with any foreign entity based on 
ownership. Instead, the Petitioner asserts that its associated law firms qualify as affiliates under the 
third definition cited above. The Petitioner is the founding firm of 
organized as a Swiss Verein, which the Petitioner defined as "an association of independent legal 
entities, organized under Swiss law for specifically detined purposes, that markets its services 
under 
the same internationally recognized name." The Petitioner asserted that "there are specific 
"umbrella'' organizations that provide services and oversight to the Swiss Verein as a whole 
. etc .. · ) , . 
The Director denied the petition because the cited regulation requires the partnership to have been 
"organized ... to provide accounting services,'" which the Petitioner does not provide. On appeal, 
the Petitioner states that 
the Director did not give full consideration to a 1999 statutory amendment 
that expanded the detinition of a qualifying partnership. 
Specifically, section 6 of the Nursing Relief tor Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-95 
(November 12, 1999), amended section 206(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), 
8 U .S.C. § 11 01 note, to refer to "a partnership that is organized in the United States to provide 
accounting or management consulting services" (emphasis added). The Petitioner asserts that it 
provides management consulting services, and therefore 
qualities under the broadened definition. 
We disagree, for the reasons explained below. 
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Malter of B-&M-
The Petitioner's argument rests on the wording of section 6 of Pub. L. I 06-95. The Petitioner states: 
Senator Hatch, the drafter of the legislation, explained the rationale for the clarifying 
language: 
My amendment will make sure that any international management consulting 
firm that separates from an international accounting firm, yet continues to 
maintain the qualifying worldwide structure, may continue to use the L 
visa even if it is no longer connected to an accounting firm. Thus, no new 
category of beneficiaries may use the L visa. 
145 Cong Rec S 13064, Vol. 145, No. 145 (October 22, 1999).1 
(Petitioner's emphasis.) Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself Pa. 
Dep"l (~(Pub. r-Yelfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). Where the language of a statute is clear 
on its face. there is no need to inquire into Congressional intent. !N5) v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 
(1984). The Petitioner has not shown that the statutory language lacks clarity. 
Even if the statutory language were ambiguous enough to require reference to the legislative history 
in order to determine legislative intent, the quoted language does not support the Petitioner's 
argument. In this case, reliance on legislative intent beyond the language of the statute results in a 
narrower, rather than broader, applicability of the 1999 statutory amendment. 
Senator Hatch did not intend to broaden eligibility to Swiss Vereins outside of the accounting 
industry; rather, he asserted that the 1999 technical amendment would benefit "no new category of 
beneficiaries.'· Senator Hatch was plainly referring not to management consulting firms in generaL 
but specifically to those which had "separate[ d] from an international accounting firm." In 
additional comments that the Petitioner omitted from its quotation, Senator Hatch repeatedly and 
unmistakably referred to ''management consulting businesses" that are "related'' or "associated'' with 
"international accounting firms." This is entirely in keeping with the subtitle of section 6 of Pub. L. 
I 06-95, "Further Clarification of Treatment of Certain International Accounting Firms.'' 
The Petitioner states, on appeal, that "Management Consulting is the Core Aspect of 
This assertion, to be discussed below, deviates from the Petitioner's 
strategy at the time of filing. Initiaiiy, the Petitioner did not cite or rely on the amended language of 
section 206(a) of IMMACT 90. Instead, the Petitioner acknowledged that the regulatory definition 
is limited to accounting firms, but the Petitioner maintained that the intent behind the legislation 
''was to ease the international exchange of professional personnel employed by well-established 
international firms that would not otherwise qualify for the L visa category based on their ownership 
structures." The Petitioner stated: 
1 
Sic. The quoted passage actually appears on page 13065. 
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provides professional services through its member 
firms. While the Firm does not provide accounting-specific services as noted in 
8 CFR 214.2(1)( 1 )(ii)(L)(3), it does provide professional legal services that also 
include the managerial and consulting services described in the regulations. Because 
the intent of this regulation is to allow the movement of professional personnel 
among the member firms of an internationally recognized and marketed organization, 
by confirming that legal services are substantially similar to other professional 
services such as accounting , managerial, and consulting services, the policy goals of 
the L-1 regulations would be advanced. 
Notwithstanding the Petitioner ' s claim that " legal services are substantially similar to other 
professional services such a
s accounting , managerial, and consulting services
," attorneys and 
management consultants perform different roles, with different skill sets and different career 
preparations and credentials . Legal advice may influence a client's business and the decisions of the 
client's management, but it does not follow that. by providing that advice, an attorney or law firm is 
thereby acting as a "management consultant." 
The Petitioner submitted promotional materials and a midyear update from 2015, intended to 
establish the scope and reputation of the global law firm (to meet other blanket petition 
requirements) . These material s did not indicate that the global firm or any of its constituent law 
firms provide management consulting services , or that the firm presents itself to the public and to 
potential customers as a management consulting firm . 
The wording of the regulation at 8 C .F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L)(J) does not take into account the 1999 
statutory amendment regarding management consulting services. USCIS must take all relevant 
statutes into consideration, and in this sense the existing regulation is not the final word. 
Nevertheless, Congress did not provide similar language for law firms when it first enacted 
IMMACT 90 or when it amended that statute in 1999. The Petitioner initially contended that we 
should construe the clause broadly to encompass any kind of business partnership with a Swiss 
Verein-type organizational structure. USCIS, however. lacks the authority to make so sweepin g an 
interpretation beyond the plain statutory language. Congress did not cite accounting firms and 
management consulting services as examples of the type of business arrangement entitled to special 
consideration. Rather , it limited consideration to those specific businesses. 
Following the issuance of a notice of intent to deny the petition , and again on appeal, the Petitioner 
has claimed to be "a qualifying organization that provides management consulting services." 
The Petitioner observes that there is no definition of "management consulting services'' in the 
regulations or case law, and stated: provides management consulting service s as 
defined by Black's Law Dictionary and the O*NET Classification. " Black 's Law Dictionary does 
not define "management consulting services. " The Petitioner cited, instead , the separate definitions 
of "management " and "consultation. ,. 
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The absence of a regulatory definition of "management consulting services" does not mean that we 
must construe the term to refer to any kind of consultation that involves management. Rather. 
management consulting is a distinct line of business, with credentials. preparation. and career 
trajectory that differ from those found in the practice of law. Some attorneys provide legal advice to 
business managers, but this does not make them management consultants. 
Statutory language must be given conclusive weight unless the legislature expresses an intention to 
the contrary. lnt'l Bhd. (?lElec . Workers. Local Union No . .:/7.:/. AFL-C/0 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The plain meaning of the statutory language should control except in rare cases in 
which a literal application of the statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of 
its drafters , in which case, it is the intention of the legislators rather than the strict language that 
controls. Samuels. Kramer & Co. v. CIR, 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cerl . denied, 112 S. Ct. 416 
(1991). 
O*NET is an online database of occupational information sponsored by the Department of Labor; its 
web address is https ://www.onetonline.org/. O*NET's listing for "Management Analysts'' includes 
management consultants. The Petitioner quoted O*NET's summary description of a management 
analyst's job duties: "Conduct organizational studies and evaluations, design systems and 
procedures , conduct work simplification and measurement studies, and prepare operations and 
procedures manuals to assist management in operating more efficiently and etlectively .·· 
The Petitioner states that its services conform to O*NET's description of management analysts and 
consultants, because "[i)It is part of our regular, daily practice to advise the management of small, 
medium , and large corporations to evaluate, design systems, and prepare manuals. presentations. and 
written and oral advice to assist our clients in operating more efliciently and effectively and. 
ultimately, to achieve their goals." 
In the above quotation, the Petitioner did not state that it performs the tasks of a management 
consulting service. Rather, it "advise[s) the management of ... corporations'" regarding the 
performance of some of the listed functions. Furthermore, a closer look at O*NET's listing for 
management analysts 
does not support the assertion that a law firm acts as a management consulting 
service for its corporate clients. Beyond the capsule description quoted by the Petitioner. O*NET 
lists 10 tasks performed by management analysts: 
Document findings of study and prepare recommendations for implementation of new 
systems, procedures , or organizational changes. 
Interview personnel and conduct on-site observation to ascertain unit functions, work 
performed, and methods, equipment, and personnel used. 
Analyze data gathered and develop solutions or alternative methods of proceeding. 
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Plan study of work problems and procedures, such as organizational change, 
communications, information flow, integrated production methods, inventory controL 
or cost analysis. 
Confer with personnel concerned to ensure successful functioning of newly 
implemented systems or procedures. 
Gather and organize information on problems or procedures. 
Prepare manuals and train workers in use of new forms , reports, procedures or 
equipment, according to organizational policy. 
Review forms and reports and confer with management and users about format, 
distribution, and purpose, identifying problems and improvements. 
Develop and implement records management program for filing, protection, 
and 
retrieval of records, and assure compliance with program. 
Design, evaluate, recommend, and approve changes of forms and reports. 
The Petitioner has not produced any evidence to show that its employees perform any of the 10 
listed duties for its client companies. The 10 listed duties do not overlap with the 22 duties listed on 
O*NET's "Lawyers" page. 
When reading or interpreting a statute, we are expected to give the words used their ordinary 
meaning. Chevron . U.S.A .. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We are to 
construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust of related provisions and with the 
statute as a whole. See. e.g, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that 
construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); 
COlT Independence Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989); Matter of' 
W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). 
Because management consulting exists as its own occupation , independent of the practice of law, we 
must assume that the language of the statute refers to management consultants, rather than people in 
other fields who. in the course of their work, consult with managers. 
On appeal, the Petitioner also asserts that its employees perform "a number of duties for 
management consultants include in the [Occupational Outlook] Handbook,'' such as "[gjather and 
organize information" and "[d]evelop solutions or alternative practices." Like O*NET , the 
Handbook distinguishes between lawyers and management analysts/consultants. Each occupation 
involves providing advice and assistance to clients in the business world , but these broad similarities 
do not make them essentially the same occupation. We note that the Handbook lists "'Similar 
Occupations" for management analysts /consultants; attorneys are not on that list. Likewise, the 
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Matter of B-&M-
Handbook's listing for "Lawyers " does not list management analysts /consultants among " Similar 
Occupations .'' 
Here, again, the Petitioner seeks to conflate the act of providing consultation to management with 
the specific occupation of management consulting. This attempt rests not on any concrete evidence 
in the record, but on the lack of a regulatory definition of "management consulting." 
The Petitioner states that, in addition to many local Jaw firms , ''there are specific ' umbrella' 
organizations that provide services and oversight to the Swiss Verein as a whole.'' One of those 
ent1t1es is But the record does not establish what type of 
consulting that entity provides , or to whom it provides it. Even if 
provides management consulting to outside clients, that would not make the entire 
organization "a pattnership that is organized ... to provide ... management consulting 
services. " 
By making specific provision for management consulting services but not for law firms , Congress 
drew a distinction between the two types of business. We Jack the authority to overrule Congress 
and erase that distinction . The regulations do not define "management consulting service ," but 
nevertheless management consulting exists as a specific occupation. The lack of a regulatory 
definition does not require us to ignore this fact in favor of the Petitioner's contention that a law tirm 
that works with corporate clients is therefore a "management consulting service:· 
The statutory provisions, taken together, do not apply to all Swiss Vereins or to law firms . They 
apply only to accounting services and to management consulting services that are currently or 
formerly affiliated with accounting services. The Petitioner has not established that its associated 
tirms fall under these categories . 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not established a qualifying relationship between the entities grouped together 
under the blanket L petition . 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of B-&M- ID# 898611 (AAO Feb. 5, 2018) 
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