dismissed L-1A Case: Law Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 25018829 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : FEB. 22, 2023 
The Petitioner, a foreign law consulting firm, seeks to employ the Beneficiary temporarily as its 
"Executive Director" under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees who 
are coming to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity . Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad and would be employed in the United States in a 
managerial or executive capacity . The matter is before us on appeal. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo . Matter of Christa's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec . 537,537 n.2 (AAO 2015) . Upon de novo review, 
we will dismiss the appeal because the Petitioner has not established that it would employ the 
Beneficiary in an executive capacity. 1 Because the identified basis for denial is dispositive of the 
Petitioner 's appeal , we decline to reach and hereby reserve the Petitioner's appellate regarding the 
Beneficiary's foreign employment. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and 
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results 
they reach"); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n. 7 (BIA 2015) ( declining to reach 
alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
I. LAW 
To establish eligibility for the L-IA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a position requiring 
specialized knowledge for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1 ). In addition, the beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(ii) . 
1 The Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial capacity. 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that the 
Beneficiary's position with the U.S. entity would be in an executive capacity. 
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; 
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; exercises wide latitude 
in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section 101 (a)( 44 )(B) of the 
Act. 
Based on the statutory definition of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the 
Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. The 
Petitioner must also prove that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as 
opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. 
v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006). 
The description of the job duties must clearly describe the Beneficiary's duties and indicate whether 
such duties are in a managerial or an executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the 
required description of the job duties, we examine the employing company's organizational structure, 
the duties of the Beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the 
Beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that 
will contribute to understanding the Beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
Accordingly, we will discuss evidence of the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of the nature 
of the Petitioner's business and its staffing levels. 
A. Job Duties 
First, we will discuss the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary in the proposed position with the 
U.S. entity. We note that the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In a supporting cover letter, the Petitioner explained that it is a client-driven operation that offers legal, 
real estate, and financial advising services through a staff of independent contractors and specialized 
advising institutions. Although the Petitioner described the proposed position at four separate 
instances throughout the supporting statement, it did not clarify how the various job descriptions 
correspond to one another. For instance, one of the job descriptions states that the Beneficiary's 
position as the "highest-ranking representative" will entail the following responsibilities: 1) managing 
and overseeing "all operations"; 2) evaluating "high impact strategic decisions"; 3) growing the 
Petitioner's "network of alliances" in various consulting areas; 4) overseeing contractors' respective 
performances; and 5) providing "key operations leadership." The same supporting statement lists four 
key responsibilities and assigns the following percentage of time to each: 45% to overseeing company 
operations, 20% to supervising staff and network alliances, 25% to networking, and 10% to developing 
business plans and strategy. Because only two of these responsibilities - managing operations and 
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overseeing the service providers - are common to both lists, it is unclear how networking and 
developing business plans and strategy, which are part of the percentage breakdown, correspond to 
three remaining responsibilities itemized in the first list. 
The Petitioner provided two more job descriptions, one consisting of an hourly breakdown and the 
other consisting of 10 job duties without time allocations. The hourly breakdown consists of five sets 
of job duties comprising a 35-hour work week; multiple job duties are grouped together to comprise 
each set and a time allocation is assigned to indicate the number of hours the Beneficiary would devote 
to each set of duties. Ten hours was assigned to the set of duties that would require the Beneficiary 
provide "ground settings, guidelines, and methodology in preparation of the strategic plan and budget, 
deliver tactics and support in the design, implementation and monitoring of operations," optimize 
resources for achieving set objectives, and "ensure consistency between plans and budgets." The 
Petitioner did not specify the types of plans the Beneficiary would review or identify the guideline she 
would follow or the methodology she would use; nor was there an explanation of how the Beneficiary 
would optimize resources or which resources the Beneficiary would seek to optimize. 
Another nine hours would be allocated to a set of duties that involves leading the expansion of the 
Petitioner's operation and capturing new markets, designing operational and financial strategies, 
supervising "activities of the organization," training "incorporated individuals," and following up on 
maintenance, technical and security procedures." The Petitioner did not, however, elaborate on the 
underlying tasks the Beneficiary would perform in meeting the organization's expansion goals, nor 
did it describe specific operational or financial strategies or list specific organizational activities the 
Beneficiary would supervise. The Petitioner also did not elaborate on who the "incorporated 
individuals" are or establish that training such individuals is an executive-level job duty. And the 
Petitioner was similarly ambiguous in allocating five hours of the Beneficiary's time to the group of 
duties that include aligning strategies, implementing best practices, and evaluating "high impact 
strategic decisions." The Petitioner did not describe any strategies or "high impact strategic 
decisions," nor did it outline the best practices to be implemented. In sum, this 24-hour portion of the 
hourly breakdown, which accounts for the majority of the proposed 35-hour work week, is largely 
comprised of vague job duties that convey no meaningful information about the tasks the Beneficiary 
would perform in the daily course of business. 
Although the Petitioner provided a fourth list of job duties, it did not explain how this list corresponds 
to the three job descriptions discussed above. Furthermore, this final list similarly lacks insight about 
the actual tasks the Beneficiary would perform within the scope of a consulting operation. For 
instance, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would be responsible for ensuring proper filing of 
documents and compliance with laws and regulations, helping shareholders determine long- and short­
term goals, and staying informed about "developments in non-for-profit management and governance, 
philanthropy and fund development." However, the Petitioner did not clarify how the Beneficiary 
would ensure documentary and legal compliance or how she would determine which goals to 
recommend to shareholders. The Petitioner also did not explain the relevance of "non-for-profit 
management" and "philanthropy" to an organization whose goal is to expand the operation and 
generate profit. Other job duties included in this list were similarly ambiguous, broadly stating that 
the Beneficiary would develop and implement "standards and controls, systems and procedures" to 
ensure "quality and organizational stability," as well as "[p ]romote programs and services" and 
"maintain[] an excellent level of quality." In addition, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary would 
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be responsible for recrmtmg personnel and negotiating professional contracts, duties that are 
operational, rather than executive, in nature. Because the Petitioner did not state what portion of the 
Beneficiary's time would be allocated to individual job duties, we are precluded from determining 
how much time the Beneficiary would allocate to non-executive job duties. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered 
to be "primarily" employed in an executive capacity. See, e.g., section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated executive duties); Matter of Church 
Scientology Int'!, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm'r 1988). Further, although two of the Beneficiary's 
assigned duties are said to involve oversight of the Petitioner's "fiscal activities" and "general 
activities," it is unclear what actions the Beneficiary would take in the regular course of business to 
carry out these oversight responsibilities. And despite indicating that the Beneficiary will have 
authority to make decisions regarding matters concerning the business, most of the stated job duties 
are vague and do not explain precisely how the Beneficiary will direct the management of the 
organization, which is a critical component of the statutory definition of executive capacity. See 
section 101 (a)( 44 )(B )( i) of the Act. 
In a request for evidence (RFE), the Director asked the Petitioner to provide a more thorough job 
description with details about the Beneficiary's executive job duties and an explanation of how those 
job duties meet the four-prong statutory criteria of executive capacity. The Director asked the 
Petitioner to list the Beneficiary's typical executive job duties and state the percentage of time to be 
allocated to each listed job duty. 
Although the Petitioner responded to the Director's request, it did not submit additional information. 
Instead, it reiterated, nearly verbatim, the information provided in the original job descriptions, stating 
that the original submissions adequately described the Beneficiary's proposed employment. The 
Director denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not provide a sufficiently detailed job 
description demonstrating that the Beneficiary would primarily perform executive-level job duties. 
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the Director "failed to consider all relevant responsibilities 
according to [the Beneficiary's] position and the individual characteristics of the foreign and U.S. 
companies." However, the Petitioner does not state which "relevant responsibilities" it claims the 
Director neglected to consider, nor does it identify the "individual characteristics" of the organization 
that would clarify the Beneficiary's proposed job duties. 
The Petitioner also argues that it submitted "extensive supporting documents" showing that the 
Beneficiary is the highest-paid employee and that she supervises a "staff" of professionals. Although 
these factors are relevant to the Petitioner's claim, a determination of whether the Beneficiary's 
proposed position is in an executive capacity requires a comprehensive analysis that includes 
consideration of the job duties to be performed. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i)(5) (requiring each petitioner 
to submit a job offer statement that "clearly describe[ s] the duties to be performed"). 
The fact that the Beneficiary will manage or direct a business does not necessarily establish eligibility 
for classification as an intracompany transferee in an executive capacity within the meaning of section 
101 (a)( 44) of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position 
be "primarily" executive in nature. Section 10l(A)(44)(B) of the Act. While the Beneficiary may 
exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of 
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authority with respect to discretionary decision-making, these elements are not sufficient to establish 
that her position will be comprised primarily of executive job duties. To make this determination, we 
rely on specific information about the actual daily tasks to be performed; otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter ofreiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 
F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). As discussed above, the 
Petitioner has not adequately described the Beneficiary's proposed job duties. Instead, the Petitioner 
has provided multiple incongruent job descriptions that offer little insight as to the specific activities 
the Beneficiary would undertake within the scope of the Petitioner's operation, whose primary focus 
appears to be outsourcing consulting services in various business sectors, including law, real estate, 
finance, and taxation. Because of the noted ambiguities regarding the Beneficiary's job duties, the 
Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would dedicate her time primarily to performing 
executive-level tasks. 
B. Staffing 
Next, we will address the Petitioner's staffing at the time of filing. When staffing levels are used as a 
factor in determining whether an individual is acting in an executive capacity, the reasonable needs of 
the organization must be considered in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act. 
The Petitioner claimed one employee at the time of filing and described its staffing arrangement as 
one that involves "U.S. partners and providers of specialized services" that are not available to its 
clients abroad. The Petitioner stated that its organization is authorized to practice foreign law in 
Florida and is licensed to advise its clients in international law, real estate, financial and tax 
consultancy, and business consultancy. However, the Petitioner did not indicate that it was providing 
the services it offered its clients; rather, it described its operation as one that relies on consultants 
operating in various business sectors and with whom the Petitioner has "secured strategic alliances" 
to meet its clients' business needs. The Petitioner provided an organizational chart illustrating this 
arrangement; the chart shows the Beneficiary as overseeing three departments - legal, real estate, and 
finance - and depicts the Beneficiary at the top of a hierarchy where she is subordinate only to the two 
directors who own the U.S. entity. In other words, despite claiming to be licensed to advise clients in 
various business sectors, the record does not indicate, nor does the Petitioner claim, that it directly 
provides consulting services to its clients other than through the U.S. business partners with whom it 
claims to have forged "strategic alliances." 
In denying the petition, the Director determined that the contractors who will provide services to the 
Petitioner's clients do not constitute "the management of the organization" whom the Beneficiary will 
direct, oversee, and control. The Director concluded that no evidence was provided to show that the 
Petitioner has an organizational structure for the Beneficiary to manage in an executive capacity. See 
section 10l(A)(44)(B) of the Act. 
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the Director incorrectly excluded the independent contractors 
from the Petitioner's "count of the overall number of employees," contending that the contractors must 
be considered "for purposes of analyzing managerial capacity." We note, however, that the Petitioner 
has not claimed that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial capacity, but rather has 
repeatedly stated that the proposed employment would be in an executive capacity. A petitioner 
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claiming that a beneficiary's position will consist of a mixture of managerial and executive duties will 
not meet its burden of proof unless it has demonstrated that the beneficiary will primarily engage in 
either managerial or executive capacity duties. See section 10l(a)(44)(A)-(B) of the Act. While in 
some instances there may be duties that could qualify as both managerial and executive in nature, it is 
the petitioner's burden to establish that the beneficiary's duties meet each set of criteria set forth in 
the statutory definition for either managerial or executive capacity. A petition may not be approved if 
the evidence of record does not establish that the beneficiary will be primarily employed in either a 
managerial or executive capacity. 
We further note that the Petitioner provided portions of its company's advertising material, which lists 
the six types of services it offers - international consulting, professional alliances, financial audit, 
foreign legal consulting, real estate consulting, and tax consulting - and it listed two law firms, an 
accounting firm, two real estate agents, and a paralegal whose professional services it claims to employ 
in providing the listed services. The Petitioner also provided advertising materials for the two law 
firms and the accounting firm it identified as three of its business partners along with client invoices 
itemizing the paralegal services it used to address the business needs of several clients. However, the 
Petitioner provided no formal contractual agreements documenting the claimed business relationships 
with these service providers, nor did it offer evidence to show the terms of these claimed "strategic 
alliances." 
Furthermore, we note that to meet the first prong of the statutory criteria for executive capacity, the 
Petitioner must establish that the Beneficiary will "[d]irect[] the management of the organization." 
See section 10l(a)(44)(B)(i) of the Act. Here, however, the record contains no evidence showing that 
the businesses and individuals listed as the Petitioner's service providers constitute "the management" 
whom the Beneficiary would oversee in carrying out her executive role. Likewise, the Petitioner 
provided no evidence to corroborate the claim that it will rely on "administrative personnel working 
as independent contractors" and "the international team," located abroad at affiliate entities, to relieve 
the Beneficiary from certain operational tasks; nor did the Petitioner explain who, if not the 
Beneficiary, will solicit clients and market its services in the United States, where it plans to proceed 
with its expansion plans. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and 
credible evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369,376 (AAO 2010). 
In sum, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence establishing that it has the organizational 
structure and staffing to support the Beneficiary in a position where the primary portion of her time 
would be allocated to duties of an executive nature. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Given the evidentiary deficiencies described above concerning the Beneficiary's job duties and the 
Petitioner's staffing, we conclude that the Petitioner has not met its evidentiary burden in establishing 
that the Beneficiary's proposed employment would be in an executive capacity. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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