dismissed L-1A Case: Leather Goods

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W. 
Washington. DC 20529 
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invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: LIN-04-069-52853 Office: NEBRASKA SERVlCE CENTER Date: AYH Q 3 2~0~ 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
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~obertwlemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
LIN-04-069-52853 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily 
dismissed. 
The petitioner states that it is a leather goods importer and exporter. It seeks to extend its authorization to 
employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as its Chief Executive Officer. The director denied 
the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish the following factors: 1) that the petitioner has a 
qualifying relationship with the claimed foreign entity; 2) that the petitioner has been doing business for one 
year; 3) that the foreign entity is currently doing business; and 4) that the beneficiary has been and will 
continue to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel requested an additional 30 days in which to submit a brief addressing the director's denial. 
Although counsel stated a general objection to the denial on the I-290B appeal form, she failed to adequately 
address the director's conclusions. In the statement, counsel cites an interoffice memo and asserts that the 
petitioner is eligible for the benefit sought. However, the director did a thorough analysis and specifically 
discussed inconsistencies among a number of the submitted documents. Counsel's general objections to the 
denial of the petition, without specifically identifying any errors on the part of the director, are simply 
insufficient to overcome the well-founded and logical conclusions the director reached based on the evidence 
submitted by the petitioner. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter Of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Contrary to counsel's assertions, the facts of the case do not speak for themselves, particularly in light of the 
director's detailed list of reasons for denying the petition. Rather, the record shows a number of 
inconsistencies, including the date the petitioner was established. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to 
resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or 
reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence 
pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). In the instant case, 
counsel fails to acknowledge, much less resolve the inconsistencies discussed in the denial. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 
8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding 
the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year 
by a qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge. 
Regulations at 8 C.F.R. $ 103.3(a)(l)(v) state, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of 
fact for the appeal. 
LIN-04-069-52853 
Page 3 
In this case the petitioner simply asserts that it is qualified to receive the classification and erroneously cites a 
memo allowing for deference where the facts of a petition have not changed. This is the first request for an 
extension of a new office petition, which the memo clearly states is inapplicable.' In addition, a new office 
extension is evaluated under a different set of criteria than an initial petition, and thus the memo does not 
apply. Therefore, the petitioner's assertion that the cited memo precludes adjudication of eligibility by CIS is 
not persuasive, and standing alone does not constitute specifically identifying any erroneous conclusion of 
law or statement of fact for the appeal. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify specifically an 
erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that 
burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed. 
I 
 The AAO would note that this is the second request for an extension, however the initial request was submitted in order 
to provide the petitioner with the full one year period for the initial start-up phase of the business. This petition is the 
first extension request adjudicated under the new office extension criteria outlined at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(14)(ii).